Tensions Arising from Imposing NPM in Australian Public Universities: A Management Perspective

This study seeks to identify the characteristics causing tensions in the move towards a corporate culture in Australian public universities. The findings reveal ongoing structural, competency and behavioral issues contributing to the tensions. Two theoretical propositions have emerged regarding the status of the change process. First, the change to a corporate culture is slow but continuing. Second, universities have accepted that public sector, collegial and corporate cultures have to co‐exist, thus adopting an adapted version of new public management (NPM). These findings provide avenues for further research to confirm both the characteristics and theoretical propositions.     

Tension between the corporate and collegial cultures of Australian public universities: The current status

Australian public universities have been under the influence of a corporate management culture since the 1980s. Driven by pressures for more accounting and accountability, its characteristics have variously been described as being in tension with the traditional collegial and autonomous management culture, threatening its demise. This study applies a multi-theoretical lens to recognize the interests of academics as important stakeholders and critically analyses the existing literature to determine the current status of both cultures within Australian public universities. A series of interviews with a number of vice chancellors and other senior management staff complement and provide a management perspective to the analysis. The results suggest that amidst a shift toward a corporate culture, aspects of collegial and autonomous practices continue to exist in various degrees among universities due to different levels of influencing forces on its operating environment. A quasi-management approach exists with continued tensions between both cultures, compromising their expected outcomes. Universities are attempting to narrow this tension gap. An analysis of the quasi-management approach further reveals that a right balance between both cultures has potential to serve as an effective management model under a multi-theoretical platform. The findings provide avenues for further research to examine this potential.     

Corporate Governance and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Australian Companies

The authors examine a sample of large Australian companies over a 10‐year period with the aim of analyzing the role that firm‐level corporate governance mechanisms such as insider ownership and independent boards play in explaining a company's cost of capital. The Australian corporate system offers a unique environment for assessing the impact of corporate governance mechanisms. Australian companies have board structures and mechanisms that are similar in design to Anglo‐Saxon boards while offering a striking contrast to those of German and Japanese boards. At the same time, however, the Australian market for corporate control is much less active as a corrective mechanism against management entrenchment than its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, making the role of internal governance mechanisms potentially more important in Australia than elsewhere. The authors report that greater insider ownership, the presence of institutional blockholders, and independent boards are all associated with reductions in the perceived risk of a firm, thereby leading investors to demand lower rates of return on capital. In so doing, the study provides evidence of the important role of corporate governance in increasing corporate values.     

Does adopting good corporate governance impact the cost of intermediated and non‐intermediated debt?

This study examines the impact of good corporate governance practices on the reported cost of debt for Australian listed companies. Prior research has established that governance lowers the cost of non‐intermediated debt ( Sengupta, 1998 ; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003 ; Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al., 2006 ). We extend this analysis to the Australian corporate debt market which is dominated by intermediated or privately held debt. Our findings are consistent with the prior work and shows that increased corporate governance lowers cost of debt. However, when we split the sample companies into intermediated and non‐intermediated debt sub‐samples, we find this result only holds for the non‐intermediated debt sub‐sample. Furthermore, we find that small companies that adopt better corporate governance practices do not benefit through lower cost of debt. This raises questions about the merits of universal adoption of costly governance practices.     

Agency costs,ownership structure and corporate governance compliance: A private contracting perspective

This paper examines whether the adoption of specific corporate governance practices, and, in particular, adherence to an overall code of governance practice, is associated with agency cost benefits for companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using a private and voluntary contracting setting, the adoption of individual corporate governance attributes is found to have no influence on firm-level agency costs, whereas greater compliance with an overall governance index variable representative of the ASX Corporate Governance Council requirements now in force results in significantly lower agency costs. The beneficial influence of voluntary governance compliance on agency costs is also found to be independent of firm ownership structure, with these findings having a range of implications for firms both in Australia and globally.     

Corporate Governance and the Prediction of the Impact of AIFRS Adoption

This study examines whether a firm's corporate governance system, particularly with respect to the characteristics of the board of directors and senior management, affects how accurately the impact of accounting changes is reported to shareholders. We concentrate on the relation between corporate governance measures and accounting forecast errors that arise with adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards by listed Australian firms. Evidence reveals that corporate governance mechanisms are associated with the likelihood and magnitude of managerial forecast errors.     

Corporate governance,external market discipline and firm productivity

Using a sample of Australian companies over the 2000–2005 period, we examine the impact of internal corporate governance on firm's total factor productivity, taking into account the interaction between internal governance and external market discipline. Our empirical findings point to a substitution effect between product market competitiveness and firm-level corporate governance. Overall, internal corporate governance mechanisms – more efficient boards and greater CEO stock-based compensation – are effective instruments for improving firm productivity. However, internal governance is less effective when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. We find only weak empirical support for an association between firm's ownership structure and productivity, and no support for an association between industry takeover intensity and firm productivity.     

Do US Corporate Governance Standards Effectively Discourage Risk in the Emerging Markets?

This study provides an examination of the effect of various corporate governance factors on the management of the risks inherent in business and the potential divergent impact of these factors on US firms and firms in emerging countries. In particular, the study scrutinises corporate governance and corporate risk‐taking behaviour across different political and socioeconomic environments. In a cross‐sectional time‐series setting, two‐step generalised least squares regression outcomes reveal that the impact of corporate governance on corporate risk taking demonstrates similar implications for US and emerging markets firms in several ways. Nonetheless, the findings also indicate that although some of the US governance standards are effective in the emerging markets, further strengthening of governance standards may be required. Specific governance aspects of the emerging markets, such as board and committee composition, are still lacking when compared to those of the US. Regardless of these differences, the outcomes reveal that those US governance standards adopted by the firms in the emerging markets strengthen governance structures and discourage corporate risk‐taking behaviour.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Corporate communication of financial risk

This study provides insights on the Financial Risk Management Disclosure (FRMD) patterns of Australian listed resource companies for the 2002–2006 period leading up to and immediately following adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Regression analysis demonstrates that corporate governance and capital raisings of firms are significant and positively associated with FRMD patterns. In contrast, overseas stock exchange listing of firms is significantly negatively associated with FRMD patterns. The findings show that the introduction of IFRS changes corporation’s willingness to communicate risk information.     

An exploratory study of earnings management detectability,analyst coverage and the impact of IFRS adoption: Evidence from China

Analysts serving as external monitors to managers is a topic of considerable interest in the analyst coverage literature. There are two outcomes of analyst coverage studies: curbing and stimulating earnings management. However, recent studies (such as Yu, 2008) only provide evidence supporting the curbing side. Given the fact that the data of these studies focus on developed markets and the finding of Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen (2010) that external governance mechanisms may stimulate earnings management in an opaque information environment, we conjecture whether stimulating side would be dominant in emerging markets. China offers a valuable setting for us to test the question. Using the data of China capital market from 2003 to 2009, we find that analyst coverage stimulates earnings management through above-the-line items (ALIs) where earnings management cannot be easily detected, and curbs earnings management through below-the-line items (BLIs) where earnings management can be easily detected. We also find that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in China does create many new opportunities for managers’ earnings management but does not significantly improve the monitoring effect of analyst coverage. We only find that compared to those without analyst coverage, firms with analyst coverage have a lower level of earnings management through BLIs after IFRS adoption. These findings suggest that information opacity may weaken the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms and high quality accounting standards in the literal sense may not enhance the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms if it is not compatible with the market’s institutional environment. In addition, we find that firms with earnings meeting the benchmark have a lower level of earnings management, which indicates that bright-line accounting based rules used in emerging capital markets may constrain the managers’ behavior.     

公司治理结构与盈余管理模式的互动分析

公司治理结构影响会计信息质量,会计信息质量的高低对公司治理结构的完善起到关键作用.盈余管理通过会计政策的选择与公司治理结构产生关系,公司治理结构对盈余管理模式具有重要影响,这种影响体现在内部治理和外部治理两个方面.同时,不同的盈余管理模式对公司治理结构的完善起着不同的作用.     

Knowledge balance sheets in Austrian universities: The implementation,use, and re-shaping of measurement and management practices

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of how a mandatory external (mostly) non-financial reporting process, labelled Knowledge Balance Sheets (KBS), is interpreted and used by different stakeholders in the Austrian university system. We are also interested in how the content and structure of the report transforms over time, how the possible link to the internal management control agenda is made, and how it reshapes organizational routines. The paper applies a critical approach where mostly non-financial, intellectual capital-related measurement, management, and reporting processes and structures are being questioned and discussed from different perspectives.This study is based on a qualitative case study approach where a number of semi-structured interviews have been conducted in various Austrian universities at different management levels over a period of approximately one year. In addition, interviews have been held with other stakeholders of universities (e.g., representatives from the ministry) and with members of the working group dealing with the KBS at the supra-university level. An inductively oriented methodology was chosen to obtain a deeper understanding of the current (management) interpretation and use of the KBS, both externally and internally. This paper aims to investigate the practice of KBS in order to build new knowledge relating to both externally oriented reporting and internally oriented management control.The findings indicate that as a reporting-tool, the KBS is embedded in a broader framework of governance and accountability regarding public universities, and interlinks the following different reporting-formats: (1) the KBS itself, (2) the performance report, and (3) the financial statement of accounts. Rectors, deans, and management accountants have highlighted different parts of the framework as important and problematic. However, it is obvious that governing via externally oriented reports and rules of accountability also has relevance to internal management decision and control agendas.Furthermore, there is an on-going debate about measuring, benchmarking, and standardizing qualities within and between universities. Scientific professionals generally question the viability of only one standardized reporting format for scientific outcomes, while the administrative staff usually promotes the necessity of such a report – for example, with respect to benchmarking routines. By analysing the practices triggered by KBS reporting, we contribute to the discussion of how performance (measures and targets) can be represented, interpreted, and acted upon within public organizations in general and within public universities in particular.     

Ranking Corporate Governance of Australia's Top Companies: A Decade On

The Horwath/University of Newcastle (UoN) Corporate Governance Reports commenced in 2002 and were among the first to assess Australia's largest companies on their corporate governance structures and policies. Initiated prior to the release of the 2003 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council's Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, and at a time of increased focus on corporate governance failures, the reports attracted much attention from both the media and stakeholder groups. This paper reports the findings of applying the Horwath/UoN methodology to the relevant corporate governance disclosures of the 2012 annual reports of Australia's top 200 companies. Comparison to the original analysis of 2002 annual report disclosures shows a significant improvement across all areas of corporate governance by Australia's top companies. However, there remain some areas of concern, particularly in respect to board diversity, risk management and insider share trading policies.     

Initial public offer pricing,corporate governance and contextual relevance: Australian evidence

This study examines the relationship between initial public offer (IPO) corporate governance, IPO pricing and possible contextual relevance. A comprehensive inventory of IPO governance attributes is modelled. A positive association is reported between the inventory and IPO initial returns. This relationship is attenuated for IPOs where a diminished price relevance of governance structure is posited: smaller scale firms and/or those with alternative monitoring agents in place. Relevance appears modified and even supplanted by particular corporate priorities or the presence of other monitoring mechanisms. These contexts inform the motivation of key players regarding whether and how to act in response to the governance signal.     

Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies

More than regulations, laws on the books, or voluntary codes,enforcement is key to creating an effective business environmentand good corporate governance, at least in developing countriesand transition economies. A framework is presented to help explainenforcement, the impact on corporate governance when rules arenot enforced, and what can be done to improve corporate governancein weak enforcement environments. The limited empirical evidencesuggests that private enforcement tools are often more effectivethan public tools. However, some public enforcement is necessary,and private enforcement mechanisms often require public lawsto function. Private initiatives are often also taken underthe threat of legislation or regulation, although in some countriesbottom-up, private-led initiatives preceded and even shapedpublic laws. Concentrated ownership aligns incentives and encouragesmonitoring, but it weakens other corporate governance mechanismsand can impose significant costs. Various steps can be takento reduce these costs and reinforce other corporate governancemechanisms. But political economy constraints, resulting fromthe intermingling of business and politics, often prevent improvementsin the enforcement environment and the adoption and implementationof public laws.      

Clawback provision adoption,corporate governance,and investment decisions

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the likelihood of clawback provision adoption, and its consequences in terms of corporate investment practices and risk‐taking behavior. We find that firms with strong governance (as proxied by board independence, diligence, and size) are positively associated with the firm's adoption of a clawback provision; whereas firms with weak governance (as proxied by management entrenchment, i.e., CEO duality status and tenure) are negatively associated with clawback provision adoption. Using the propensity‐score matching, difference‐in‐differences research design, and inverse Mills ratio to mitigate omitted variables and self‐selection biases, we find that after adopting a clawback provision, firms’ abnormal investment decreases and the firms’ investments are less risky.     

Corporate philanthropy in the US stock market: Evidence on corporate governance,value relevance and earnings manipulation

This study examines the financial attributes of corporate philanthropy derived from the agency motives for corporate giving. Further, this study assesses the value relevance of corporate giving and investigates the impact of giving on investor perceptions and future profitability and growth. Also, it investigates the association between charitable spending and earnings manipulation. The findings indicate that the adoption of structured philanthropic initiatives and the use of in-kind contributions encourage corporate giving. Monitoring exercised by leverage and corporate governance affects corporate giving downwards. Firms that experience a management change are subject to more public scrutiny and tend to give more. Corporate giving is value relevant and is negatively related to analyst forecast error and positively to analyst coverage. Charitable firms tend to engage less in earnings manipulation. However, firms with significant growth options may direct slack resources to discretionary charitable causes. In-kind contributions are negatively related to managerial opportunism.     

基于组织视角的银行集团并表管理机制研究

并表管理的组织法保障问题属于银行集团公司治理范畴,相关特殊监管规则叠加于企业集团法的一般规则之上,共同形成并表管理的法律框架.在组织机构上,母行董事会宜单设并表管理委员会或将并表管理职权授予既存委员会(对内授权),并通过设立集团管理委员会向管理层授权(对外授权).重置审计委员会的机构归属是消除监事会形骸化的抓手,独立的风险管理部门和首席风险官是并表管理中风险管理的重点.一般企业集团中的间接性管理手段不能迅速有效管控银行集团风险,易导致风险外溢.可以考虑突破附属机构选择权赋予母行直接性管理手段,依据与风险管理的紧密关系及是否涉及公共利益,对直接性并表管理手段进行类型化构建是较为妥当的路径.     

The Role of Risk Management and Governance in Determining Audit Demand

Abstract:  Most prior research into audit fees has been based on a theoretical model which treats audit fees as the by-product of a production function ignoring potential demand forces that may drive the level of the audit fee. Inspired by prior 'anomalous' results, we take a different perspective by focusing on demand factors that may affect the level of the audit fee. Using data collected from a sample of listed companies in Belgium, we consider both disclosures about risk and risk management and actual decisions about corporate governance to examine whether audit fees are higher when these demand forces exist. In general, we expect that external auditing will increase in situations where there are multiple stakeholders with individual risk profiles who can shift some of the cost of monitoring to other stakeholders. Consistent with our theory and expectations, our results indicate that audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, discloses a relatively high level of financial risk management, and has a larger proportion of independent Board Members. Audit fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high level of compliance risk management. The latter result indicates that controls are only complementary as long as they are voluntary, as mandated controls act as substitutes for non-mandated controls.