Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.     

Progressive taxation,tax exemption,and corporate liquidation policy

This paper develops a real options model of a firm that operates in continuous time with an infinite horizon. The firm receives stochastic profit flows that are subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. The firm possesses an option to liquidate its operation, which is optimally exercised when the firm's profit flow reaches an endogenously determined threshold level (the liquidation trigger) from above. We show that the firm's liquidation trigger under progressive taxation increases with either a reduction in the tax exemption threshold or an increase in the corporate income tax rate. Corporate income taxes are thus not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

Estimating the speed of adjustment of European banking efficiency under a quadratic loss function

This paper investigates the speed of adjustment of cost efficiency to equilibrium level in the European banking industry. Our analysis provides for the first time insights into the process of convergence across European banking markets as measured by the speed of adjustment of cost efficiency. In particular, we employ a quadratic loss function specification based on forward-looking rational expectations to model the underlying dynamics of efficiency scores in the banking industry of the EU-15 region over the period 1998–2005. Results show that there is considerable variation in the speed of adjustment across banking systems, while over time it appears that continuing efforts to advance financial integration have led to some improvement in the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.     

With a little help from our friends: The effect of USAID assistance on SME growth in a transition economy

Using survey data on Macedonian firms that participated in USAID programs providing technical and financial assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and on firms that did not, we estimate the effectiveness of such assistance in increasing the growth of employment in the assisted firms. We control for selection bias in program participation and use both kernel and caliper propensity score matching to estimate the excess growth of employment in assisted firms. We find that assistance programs raised employment growth by 16-20 percentage points in the first year after assistance and by 26-30 points by the third year.     

Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital

When capital is sunk after it is invested, a host government facing heterogeneous foreign investors has a strong incentive to reduce preferential taxes over time in order to attract less eager investors while fully expropriating past investors. This induces investors to wait rather than invest in the initial period, and leads to loss of tax revenue. This dynamic inconsistency problem is resolved if the host government commits to non-preferential taxation in each period even if it does not commit to future tax rates.     

Modes of foreign bank entry and effects on lending rates: Theory and evidence

Policy makers who decide to liberalize foreign bank entry frequently put limitations on the mode of entry. We study how different entry modes affect the lending rates of foreign and domestic banks. In our model, the mode of entry determines whether a foreign bank inherits a customer base. This, in turn, affects how information is distributed between foreign and domestic banks. We show that this distribution of information about incumbent customers leads to stronger competition if foreign entry occurs through a greenfield investment. As a result, domestic bank lending rates are lower after greenfield entry. We find empirical support for this prediction for a sample of banks from 10 Eastern European countries for the period 1995–2003.     

A Test of Strategic Trade Policy in the Semiconductor Industry: The Impact of Japanese Policy on U.S. Firms

This paper analyzes a multinational corporation that may use tax evasion and profit shifting as a means to minimize tax liabilities. Our main finding is that profit shifting may occur even when tax rates are the same across countries. This will be the case whenever there is a tax differential in effective tax rates resulting from differences in tax enforcement. In this context, profit shifting occurs to enable tax evasion in a country where tax enforcement is less harsh. Moreover, for a given differential in tax rates, differences in tax enforcement may either accentuate or dampen profit shifting. Importantly, the predictions regarding the direction of profit shifting that would result in our set-up may contrast sharply with those of the preceding literature.     

Viewing Tax Policy Through Party‐Colored Glasses: What German Politicians Believe

Abstract. The process of globalization has an important impact on national tax policies. Most of the literature does not focus directly on the political decision‐making process and assumes that the desired tax policy is responding to objective underlying tradeoffs. Based on an original survey of members of the German national parliament (Bundestag) in 2006/07, we document a strong ideological bias among policy‐makers with respect to the perceived mobility of international tax bases (real capital and paper profits). Ideology also influences, directly and indirectly, the perceived national autonomy in tax setting and preferences for a European Union minimum tax for companies. There seems little consensus as to what the efficiency costs of capital taxation in open economies are, even though our survey falls in a period of extensive debate about, and actual adoption of, a company tax reform bill in Germany.     

Does eliminating international profit shifting increase tax revenue in high-tax countries?

We analyze under what conditions initiatives intended to eliminate profit shifting (such as the OECD BEPS action plan and the more recent European implementation of the ATAD) can be successful, given that these actions may induce multinational companies to relocate activities to low-tax countries. We demonstrate that removing tax-motivated profit shifting increases tax revenue in the onshore region if the low-tax jurisdiction is not too efficient in providing attractive infrastructure. This outcome is more easily achieved when the high-tax country is able to counter the shifting of international activity using infrastructure investment to compete with the tax haven rather than being passive. International regulations aimed at combating aggressive tax avoidance should anticipate the adverse effects induced by the resulting emergence of other forms of base erosion.     

Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting

This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base sensitivity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the sensitivity of the high tax jurisdiction. Tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. This will be the case even though in general equilibrium tax rates in both jurisdictions may decrease or increase.     

A CLASS OF PERFORMANCE‐BASED SUBSIDY RULES*

We consider a benchmark static incentive scheme, i.e. a per unit subsidy, that induces a monopoly to produce a target output level. We show that the same output level can be achieved by a continuum of dynamic subsidy rules based on a performance indicator. The rules require only local information. The present value of the subsidies paid is smaller than the amount paid under the static subsidy. Each of the dynamic subsidy rules results at each moment in a lower per unit subsidy than the static subsidy. The subsidy rate depends on a state variable that reflects the monopolist's performance history.