Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

Buy-outs in Hungary,Poland and Russia: governance and finance issues1

The governments of Hungary, Poland and Russia have used buy-outs as an important privatization strategy which can be viewed as forming a continuum from straightforward sales where management and employees generally achieve significant ownership, as in Hungary, via intermediate approaches as in Poland where both payment and free distribution of shares are involved, to the Russian case where state-owned enterprises were effectively “given away” through a voucher privatization scheme. This paper, first, presents preliminary evidence on the extent and nature of post-privatization restructuring in buy-outs in these three countries, which highlights the transitory nature of this form of organization. Second, in the light of these findings, the paper analyses the possibilities and difficulties associated with enhancing corporate governance and finance.     

建立经营者股权激励机制应摆正八大关系

经营者股权激励制度近年来在我国各地备受推崇，就国情而言，我国目前实行这一制度应正确处理好八大关系：即按劳分配与按要素分配的关系，经营者持股与职工持股的关系，长期激励与短期激励的关系，期股期权激励与实股激励的关系，物质激励与精神激励的关系，股权激励机制与约束机制，与法人治理结构，与营造外部环境的关系。     

股权结构、董事会治理与公司成长性——来自中小企业板的实证研究

以中国2004—2008年中小企业板上市公司为样本,按第一大股东所持股比例分为绝对控股型、相对控股型和分散持股型三类,构建公司成长性综合评价指标,检验三类公司董事会治理结构与成长性之间的关系。独立董事比例、股权集中度、流通股比例三个治理结构指标对三类公司的成长性具有显著负向影响,其他治理结构指标对三类公司成长性的影响各异。董事会治理并不是促进中小企业成长性的决定性因素,董事会治理的效用不显著。     

论上市公司股权结构的调整与优化

当前,中国上市公司的股权结构普遍不合理,严重阻碍了公司治理和经营绩效的提高,因此,优化上市公司股权结构显得十分迫切和必要。文章在分析了中国上市公司股权结构存在的主要问题的基础上,结合中国的实际.提出了优化上市公司股权结构的对策建议。     

Fire the manager to improve performance?Managerial turnover and incentives after privatization in the Czech Republic

This paper analyses the effect of the introduction of managerial incentives and new human capital on enterprise performance immediately after privatization in the Czech Republic. We find weak evidence for the presence of managerial incentives: only from 1997, 3 to 4 years after privatization, does poor performance significantly increase the probability of managerial change. Nevertheless, replacing the managing director in a newly privatized firm improves subsequent performance. This indicates that the privatized firms operate below potential under the incumbent management. We show that the institutional framework matters as well: managerial turnover improves performance only if the management is closely interconnected with the board of directors and thus holds effective executive authority.     

所有制、制度环境与公司治理效率

资本所有制作为资本所有权的制度安排是企业有效治理的前提条件。企业治理制度的形成具有路径依赖的特性 ,是与各个国家和企业所处的环境因素分不开的。在既定的经济技术和制度环境下 ,只要企业所有权安排得当 ,任何与其经济技术和制度环境相适应的资本所有制形式都是可以有效的。衡量治理效率的标准是治理成本的最小化或治理主体收益的最大化。为了提高治理效率 ,我国应根据不同企业的情况适时进行治理制度的改革和创新 ,并努力创造适于企业生存的制度环境。     

公司治理、股票估值与资产定价

鉴于公司治理的重要性,上市公司越来越重视公司治理信息的披露,监管部门等机构出台了相关的公司治理披露政策,进而使得投资者购买公司股票时,能够考虑公司治理因素。由内在价值理论和相对估值理论组成的传统估值理论没有考虑公司治理因素,公司治理是否影响股票价格和如何影响股票价格问题有待深入研究。在资产定价模型中,单因素模型和多因素模型的解释能力不是很理想,公司治理风险因子的提出将有利于完善定价模型,治理溢价这个市场异例的本质、检测和存在原因将是未来公司治理关注的焦点之一。     

股权制衡、大股东掏空与企业价值

股权结构对大股东掏空行为及公司价值的影响是当前研究的热点问题之一。基于大股东掏空主要受到法律保护、其他大股东制衡和掏空成本3个因素影响的假设,作者借鉴LLSV(2002)的研究,结合国情进行理论建模,证明了随着其他大股东的制衡能力的增强,第一大股东的掏空程度呈现先升后降的倒"U"型形态,被掏空的企业的价值呈现先降后升的"U"型形态;控制权与现金流权差异越大,终极控制人对公司的掏空就越大。本文收集1998～2003年我国A股市场168家上市公司的并购事件进行实证,其结果支持了本文模型的推论。其他大股东对第一大股东的制衡能力,当处于很强或很弱的两端时,比处于中间水平更有利于上市公司的价值。"多足鼎立"和"一股独大"的股权结构,未必比"分散持有"的股权结构低效。     

Empowering Firm Owners by Separating Voting from Buying and Selling Shares

This paper discusses a new system of firm governance. In the system, the responsibility for voting the shares of a firm (“voice”) is given to the people who ultimately provided the money, who, however, have to delegate it to proxy voting institutions. The system helps overcome collective action problems and conflicts of interest within firms, and it reduces the private benefits of control. The disadvantages for firm governance may be relatively modest. However, since the new system of voice is a conceptual innovation, the analysis of its effects is rather tentative. Further research and experimentations are required for firmer conclusions.     

Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

In this paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results show that product market competition has a positive and significant impact on performance. Concerning the effect of ownership concentration, we find a U–shaped relationship with performance. Firms with relatively dispersed and relatively concentrated ownership have higher productivity growth than firms with an intermediate level of ownership concentration. This correlation between concentration of ownership and productivity growth is not explained by the type of the controlling shareholder. Finally, product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other rather than to be substitutes. Competition has no significant effect on performance for the firms with ‘poor’ governance; on the contrary, it has a significant positive effect in the case of firms with ‘good’ corporate governance. JEL classification: D24, G32, L1, P2.     

资本市场开放与企业真实盈余管理——基于“陆港通”的经验证据

资本市场开放不仅是扩大国际融资、更好地利用国际金融市场的需要,而且对我国资本市场发育和上市公司行为具有多重外部治理效应。本文借助我国内地与香港资本市场互联互通机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放对企业真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)总体上,“陆港通”机制的实施显著降低了标的公司真实盈余管理程度。(2)委托代理问题是企业进行盈余管理的重要原因,而“陆港通”机制开通后,能够缓解标的公司代理矛盾,进而约束管理层的真实盈余管理行为。(3)当资本市场信息环境改善、管理层面临较大股票抛售压力以及大股东监督力度较强时,“陆港通”抑制企业真实盈余管理行为的治理效果更强。本文结果表明,资本市场开放有助于提高我国上市公司财务信息披露质量及公司治理水平。     

资本市场开放与企业真实盈余管理——基于“陆港通”的经验证据

资本市场开放不仅是扩大国际融资、更好地利用国际金融市场的需要,而且对我国资本市场发育和上市公司行为具有多重外部治理效应。本文借助我国内地与香港资本市场互联互通机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放对企业真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)总体上,“陆港通”机制的实施显著降低了标的公司真实盈余管理程度。(2)委托代理问题是企业进行盈余管理的重要原因,而“陆港通”机制开通后,能够缓解标的公司代理矛盾,进而约束管理层的真实盈余管理行为。(3)当资本市场信息环境改善、管理层面临较大股票抛售压力以及大股东监督力度较强时,“陆港通”抑制企业真实盈余管理行为的治理效果更强。本文结果表明,资本市场开放有助于提高我国上市公司财务信息披露质量及公司治理水平。     

Entry, exit and business cycles in a general equilibrium model

This paper studies the role of entry and exit in the short run behavior of a general equilibrium model with industry dynamics. For tractability, and to preserve potential asymmetries in the impulse responses, I focus on the transition dynamics of the economy after shocks. Entry and exit are found to be insensitive to productivity shocks of reasonable magnitude. Moreover, the dynamics of GDP are insensitive to fluctuations in entry and exit rates, and any asymmetries are negligible. As an application of the model, the paper also asks whether firing costs may interact with entry and exit to affect transition dynamics after shocks, finding that they do not.     

企业的契约性质、所有权理论及公司治理结构述评

公司治理结构是一个企业所有权安排的契约,而企业所有权的制度设置是由企业的本质决定的,对企业本质的不同认识必然导致不同性质的公司治理结构.本文通过文献综述,旨在勾勒出企业的契约性质--企业所有权理论--公司治理结构三者的演进脉络和之间的对应关系,发现企业家人力资本产权与企业所有权之间的复杂联系是未来公司治理问题研究的焦点.     

Dynamic linkages between exchange rates and stock prices: Evidence from East Asian markets

This study examines dynamic linkages between exchange rates and stock prices for seven East Asian countries, including Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, for the period January 1988 to October 1998. Our empirical results show a significant causal relation from exchange rates to stock prices for Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. We also find a causal relation from the equity market to the foreign exchange market for Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore. Further, while no country shows a significant causality from stock prices to exchange rates during the Asian crisis, a causal relation from exchange rates to stock prices is found for all countries except Malaysia. Our findings are robust with respect to various testing methods used, including Granger causality tests, a variance decomposition analysis, and an impulse response analysis. Our findings also indicate that the linkages vary across economies with respect to exchange rate regimes, the trade size, the degree of capital control, and the size of equity market.     

公司治理、经验学习与企业连续并购——基于我国上市公司并购决策的经验证据

文章以2004-2008年我国上市公司的1 480起并购事件为样本,运用事件历史分析方法研究了公司治理和经验学习对企业连续并购行为的影响。研究发现:(1)并购管理程序熟练程度和以往并购绩效反馈都会增加连续并购决策的发生概率;(2)国有股权、管理层持股比率的增加、CEO和董事长两职合一会促进企业连续并购的发生,而具有较高独立性的董事会则可能会降低企业并购的发生概率;(3)国有股权、管理层持股比率、董事会领导结构和董事会独立性会强化经验学习对并购决策的影响效果。     

金融发展、债务治理与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

文章运用新制度经济学的基本理论,以我国沪深两市A股上市公司2000-2006年的数据为样本,实证分析了金融发展促进经济增长的微观作用机制.研究发现,若债务比例增加1%,金融发展水平高的地区与低的地区相比,公司市场价值平均多提高[作者单位].54%,并且,债务融资与公司价值的正相关关系只在金融发展水平高的地区才存在.这表明,金融发展水平对债务治理作用的发挥有重要影响,公司所处地区的金融发展程度越高,债务治理的作用越强,越有利于提高公司的价值.     

The governance of privatized firms: authority,reposnisbility and disclosure1

In any market economy, a fundamental question is how to make management accountable to shareholders and also to the requirements of law. This paper raises selective, critical issues of corporate governance that are particularly relevant to problems of the accountability of boards of directors to their shareholders in transition economies. These issues include the separation of ownership and control and the duties of directors; the need for disclosure given that separation; and the corporate charter as a vehicle for the direct participation of shareholders in governance. The paper suggests that one of the best models of corporate governance that transition economies can use is that employed by the leveraged-buyout (LBO) and venture capital funds operating in the West. It argues that weaknesses in corporate governance may undermine the entire privatization process. Economics and law are too often seen as separate disciplines. In reality, they come together in transition economies perhaps with greater impact than elsewhere.