企业香港买壳上市并购的价值分析

买壳上市就是通过向一个已经在联交所上市的目标公司注入新的资产或业务,从而获得该上市公司的权益并使自己的业务上市。本文首先概述了并购与买壳上市的含义,分析了企业IPO与买壳上市的对比意义,详细论述了企业香港买壳上市并购的价值,并提出了相关要求与注意点。     

浅谈壳公司价值估价的方法

在买壳上市的两个交易中,"壳"公司价格和优质资产转让价格的确定是最容易引起争议的问题之一,也是非常关键的两个问题。本文要探讨的是买壳过程中"壳"公司的估价方法,从不同的角度出发探讨壳公司的估价方法以及各种方法的优缺点。     

通过成本与绩效研究浅析买壳上市的可行性

当今,越来越多的企业想通过买壳上市的手段来避开公司重组上市的烦琐程序,从而来达到在社会上广泛筹募资金的目地。然而企业买壳上市并非都能成功,有些企业花了不少成本,却未能买壳成功;有的企业即使买壳成功但是收益不大。因此买壳上市前一定认真研究企业的买壳成本、壳价格的合理性及预测买壳上市后企业的经营绩效。     

企业买壳上市的风险控制

企业买壳上市已经成为我国资本市场的一件大事,据不完全统计,1997年我国证券市场典型的买壳上市共发生25家.买壳上市是指非上市公司按照国家法规和股票上市交易规则,通过协议方式或二级市场收购方式收购上市公司,取得控股权后,对该上市公司的人员、资产、业务等进行重组,注入自己的优质资产与业务,实现自身资产与业务的间接上市.一个典型的买壳上市由两个交易组成:一是买壳交易,即非上市公司通过收购上市公司股份绝对或相对地控制该上市股     

基于财务视角的壳资源利用问题研究

壳公司是资本市场上一种独特的资源,借助于壳资源,许多公司成功地实现了上市的梦想。本文系统地分析了企业买壳上市的成本和效益,并从买壳方式和支付方式等方面探讨了对壳资源的利用。     

基于财务视角的壳资源利用问题研究

壳公司是资本市场上一种独特的资源,借助于壳资源,许多公司成功地实现了上市的梦想.本文系统地分析了企业买壳上市的成本和效益,并从买壳方式和支付方式等方面探讨了对壳资源的利用.     

企业买壳上市风险及对策探究

我国的证券市场不断发展完善,使得其对公司的上市有了更高的要求。无论是在上市要求还是审批程序上都令公司的上市难度有所加大。而在证券市场上一些公司中,也开始分化出一些经营出现问题、盈利能力持续下降,可能面临退市风险的企业,这些上市公司因具有上市的资格,因此被称为"壳"公司。买壳上市的优点在于扩大其融资渠道、节约时间、快速达到扩张的效果,但是同时也具有成本较高、风险突出的特点。而这些风险往往可能导致买壳上市的失败。因此需要采取必要的对策来控制这些风险。     

通向资本市场之路——浅谈企业进入资本市场的主要途径之买壳上市

买壳上市作为企业进入资本市场的主要途径之一 ,在资本市场上一直占有很重要的位置 ,也是企业进行资本扩张的一个重要的手段。自 1998年以后 ,买壳上市开始活跃 ,且近年来越来越占主导地位。研究买壳上市的实质、方式、程序以及要注意的问题 ,对企业买壳上市具有指导作用。     

买壳上市——我国中小企业海外上市的最佳途径

本文通过对直接上市和买壳上市的对比分析和实证分析,得出中小企业取得境外上市地位的最佳途径是买壳上市。     

买壳上市“壳”的定价模型分析

证券市场上由于有些公司不符合证券交易所的严格条件,或者有符合条件却不愿意将自己的经营活动暴露在公众和竞争对手面前,于是为买壳上市提供了存在的环境。文章主要从买壳方的角度出发,把买壳上市作为一种多层次的兼并收购和利益追求行为,探索合适并具有操作性的定价模型。     

谈谈国富与民富、先富与共富的一些问题

本文认为,把"国富"与"民富"对立和并提是缺乏科学依据的,"国富"与"民富"之间并非完全互相排斥,而是矛盾统一的关系。就"国富"来说,经过改革开放,我国的经济实力也就是"国富"大大增强,但人均GDP不是很高,不能说国家已经很富;就"民富"来说,国民有富有穷,不能一概而论。我国从未明确宣布或实行过所谓"国富优先"的政策,倒是明确宣布并实行了"让一部分人先富起来"的政策。只是多年的实践证明,"让一部分人先富"的目标在很短的历史时期内迅速完成,而"先富带后富,实现共同富裕"的目标却迟迟没有自动实现。文章指出,当前我国收入分配领域最核心的问题不是"国富"与"民富"的矛盾,而是贫富差距急剧扩大与两极分化趋势日益明显的矛盾。克服和扭转贫富差距扩大和两极分化的趋势,不是将"国富优先"转变为"民富优先",而是要明确宣布"让一部分人先富起来"的政策已经完成任务,将之转变为逐步"实现共同富裕"的政策,完成"先富"向"共富"的过渡;要从所有制结构,从强化公有经济为主体、国有经济为主导着手加以解决,只要保持公有制和按劳分配为主体,贫富差距就不会发展到两极分化的程度,从而最终向共同富裕的目标前进。     

“公共地悲剧”的博弈分析

博弈中往往会出现个人理性和集体理性的矛盾,使得公共资源产权界定不清,社会资源不能得到很好的利用。必须对“公共地悲剧”进行博弈分析,运用博弈理论中的Nash均衡和反应函数讨论公共资源低效率配置的原因和造成的后果,这样才能说明环境资源保护的社会意义。     

我国公共文化设施边际融资的最优选择

在梳理并分析公共文化设施边际融资影响因素的基础上，以我国2011－2013年869家地方融资平台1325个公共文化设施的数据为样本，采用逐步回归的logistic方法处理面板数据，探讨公共文化设施边际融资的最优选择。研究表明：文化品牌价值的增长能力、政府融资风险、资金清算时政府价格谈判能力的增加会使公共文化设施倾向于选择社会资本融资；信贷供给的增加使其倾向于选择债务融资，影响程度的大小顺序为：政府的价格谈判能力、信贷供给、文化品牌价值的增长能力以及政府融资风险。     

开发农村人力资源是解决“三农”问题的根本

“三农”问题是近年来社会各界倍受关注的热点,引起了各级政府高度重视。但只是“头疼医头,脚疼医脚”,没能从根本上认清问题的关键所在。重视农村人力资源开发,理性思考是解决我国“三农”问题的根本途径。     

The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information

In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division’s (seller’s) costs and downstream division’s (buyer’s) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.     

城市供水产业价格规制问题与对策——基于天津市的调查研究

对城市供水产业来说,其产品既有商品特性,又有公共必需品特性,更与水资源的制约和环境保护紧密关联,同时自然垄断特性限制了竞争机制的引入。近些年来,天津市城市供水价格改革取得较大成就,但仍然存在价格形成机制不完善、水价管理体制不合理等问题。为此,必须转变政府干预市场方式,克服市场监管中的"错位"与"越位"现象;建立健全公共财政补贴机制,克服政府在供水领域公共服务职能的"缺位";建立统一的水资源费征收标准体系,逐步实现城市供水"同城同质同网同价";完善水价形成机制,切实推进天津市城市供水产业市场化进程。     

Toward a Resource-Based Theory of Bargaining Power in International Joint Ventures

Political, cultural, industrial, and firm-specific factors comine to make the bargaining relationship between international joint ventures partners a particularly complex one. This study focuses on one aspect of the problem: the relationship between the resources that a partner contributes and the bargaining power that it achieves in the venture. It traces ideas of bargaining power in the literature, to elicit what types of resource are likely to lead to dominance, the identifies several resources generally thought to be important contributions to a joint venture. The resources are ranked according to criteria of tacitness and appropriability, then displayed in matrix form to illustrate the expected outcome of bargaining in two-party international joint ventures.     

Die neuen Elterngeld-Komponenten: Will money trump gender?

Empirical evidence on couples’ decision making has shown that the partners’ sharing of resources (particularly of time and money) is driven by their respective bargaining positions and gender role behaviour. Against the background of an asymmetric specialisation risk carried by the person that takes care responsibilities, we discuss the potential effects that the recently proposed extensions of the German parental leave system, particularly the “ElterngeldPlus” and “Partnerbonus”, may have on the partners’ work division and their individual welfare levels in the long run.     

The public shell: Vehicle for venture financing

A public shell is generally defined as an inactive public corporation. It may or may not have assets or a publicly trading stock. However, for purposes here it must have valid SEC and domicile-State legal standing to permit its reactivation by merger with, or acquisition of, an operating company. After many years of clouded regard because of promoters' stock abuses, acceptance of using a shell to go public has considerably widened. This has been due to clarified and tighter SEC policies, rising costs of an IPO, and innovative financial uses of a shell by businessmen and investment bankers. Supply of shells probably still greatly exceeds demand for shells because of the mortality rate of the waves of new issues of recent years, the lack of cleanness of many of these shells and still lagging sophistication in their use. Nevertheless, advertising analysis indicates that in the past year alone companies “going public the back door” has at least trebled the number a decade ago. The greater part of this increase, also, appears to be accountable by ventures.For venture start-ups public access via merger with a shell can produce economies in legal/accounting costs and opportunity cost in time. It is also a means of becoming public when an initial public offering is not feasible due to market condition or nature of business. If the stock is trading it can encourage initial venture capital investment. The concept impact can vault the stock price even before earnings eventuate. Or exciting prospects can entice an exaggerated price/earnings ratio on tiny earnings. These events can even facilitate additional financing to prolong viability. But once the venture decides to use a shell for public access, the caveats of the route must be considered. In addition to valid registration and cleanness, such aspects as stockholder list, market sponsorship, control and dilution problems must be matched to the venture's financial aims. Cost of the shell can vary between $25,000–$100,000 depending on the outcome of these considerations, terms of payment, and general attractiveness of the venture entering the shell.Finally, speculative merits of shell stocks compared with the OTC Index of Industrial Stocks show that for equal holding periods, a market basket of revived-shell stocks bought soon after revival and sold around their highs, during the past decade would have produced multiple total returns compared to the less speculative index market basket. This optimum buy-sell period usually fell between 18 months and two years. But these returns presume not only sagacious timing, but that sales of stock of the typically small companies constituting shell-revivals could actually be made at the prices shown in the National Securities Dealers Pink Sheets. Beyond the optimum holding period, shell-descended companies become increasingly subject to valuation factors similar to those accorded to long established companies in related industries.     

Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy

In this paper, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. The finding shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm’s higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.