标准化组织专利政策中的强制披露原则研究

标准化组织专利政策中设定的披露义务应该选择“强制”原则以克服“自愿”原则的弊端,违反强制披露原则规定将承担免费许可的法律责任。     

ICT领域涉及标准的专利许可谈判中标准必要专利认定的困境及其解决对策

科技的发展促使更多的产业向ICT领域转型,越来越多的企业参与ICT领域标准的实施,在标准实施过程中,SEP专利权人与专利实施人就SEP许可谈判出现了诸多问题。日本《专利法》规定日本专利局可以提供专利权范围的官方意见书,并新建了一套咨询意见制度,同时制定了《涉及标准必要专利的许可谈判指南》保障该制度的实施。通过对我国现状及问题进行分析,综合我国具体国情,提出我国目前不必建立由国家专利主管部门负责管理与实施的咨询意见制度,应当建立针对专利许可谈判中SEP认定与评估的规范性流程,并且在制定相关规范时,关注SEP的国际统一性问题。     

如何进行专利转让

1首先要了解专利技术贸易的模式 ①普通实施许可:许可方(即专利权人)允许被许可方实施其专利,许可方仍保留使用该项专利或再与第三方签订许可合同的权利.     

专利标准化的反垄断规制

专利与技术标准的融合已经成为不可阻挡的趋势。标准制定组织制定标准的方式与网络效应和锁定效果导致专利标准化垄断行为的产生。在现阶段，我国存在跨国企业利用专利标准化压制中国企业、国内企业联盟专利标准化垄断的可能性增加、专利标准化垄断规制的法律缺失等问题。对此，应当在反垄断规制政策目标的选择、重视反垄断法的域外适用、出台针对性的立法等方面加以完善。     

如何进行专利转让

1 首先要了解专利技术贸易的模式 ①普通实施许可:许可方(即专利权人)允许被许可方实施其专利,许可方仍保留使用该项专利或再与第三方签订许可合同的权利。 ②独占实施许可:被许可方取得独占实施该专利的权利,任何他人(包括许可方)都不得实施该专利。     

企业标准专利政策探讨

随着科学技术的日新月异,企业的技术标准适用怎样的专利政策,对企业起着至关重要的作用。文章通过分析DVD标准、数字电视地面传输标准(DMB-TH)、数字音视频编解码标准(AVS)在推广过程中采取的不同专利政策及推广效果,探讨了对于国内企业标准需要采用以下几个方面的专利政策:企业通过采取产业联盟的方式组成专利联盟,对标准制定采取合理的专利许可政策。     

高新企业应对标准化中的专利劫持问题研究

专利劫持是标准化过程中难以避免的一个问题。专利劫持不仅会影响标准的适用、打击企业参与标准的积极性,还会使公众的利益遭受损失。一旦受到劫持,企业不应立即支付过高的许可费,而是应当积极寻求法律的保护。充分了解标准化组织的专利政策、积极应诉以及增强自身的研发能力是企业避免被劫持的有效方式。     

强制性标准中的知识产权问题

拟制定的强制性标准如果涉及知识产权,标准制定机构将不得不面对两个问题:一是取得知识产权权利人的授权问题,二是知识产权费用问题。标准制定机构可以通过协商或申请颁发强制许可的方式从知识产权人处取得授权。关于知识产权费用问题,文章提出了三种方案:政府制定统一的知识产权许可收费政策;国家买断知识产权;由国务院专利行政部门裁决。     

什么是专利实施许可

专利实施许可证贸易是专利技术流通的主要形式,专利实施许可不同于一般技术转让,专利实施许可是专利权人许可他人实施自己已经公开了的专利技术,这仅是一种实施权的转移,换言之虽然专利技术是公开的,得不到专利权人的许可任何人不得实施其专利,而技术转让的通常含意包括一般不对外公开的工艺。图纸技术决窍技术服务、培训等以契约形式转移,由于得不到法律保护,在技术转让合同要规定保密条款,而专利一旦公开是任何人都可以看的,不需要保密。专利实施许可又称为专利许可证贸易,可分为普通许可、独家     

技术标准的发展趋势及我国面临的挑战

标准与专利本来是互相排斥的。标准追求公开性、普遍适用性，标准技术的使用更强调行业的推广应用；专利技术实施的前提是获得许可，不允许未经授权的推广使用。因此，早期的标准化组织尽可能的     

Repeated interaction in standard setting

Standardization may allow the owners of standard‐essential patents to charge higher royalties than would have been negotiated ex ante. In practice, however, standard‐setting efforts are often characterized by repeated interaction and complementarities among technologies. These features give firms that contribute technology to standards both the ability and the incentive to avoid excessive royalties by threatening to exclude other technology contributors from future rounds of standardization if they charge royalties exceeding ‘fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory’ (FRAND) levels. We show that such an outcome can be sustained as a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of a repeated standard‐setting game and examine how the decision‐making rules of standard‐setting organizations (SSOs) affect the sustainability of FRAND royalties. Our analysis provides a novel justification for super‐majority requirements and other rules frequently adopted by SSOs.     

Supply-Side Innovation and Technology Commercialization

The majority of research and practice tends to conceptualize innovation as a vertically coupled, intra-organizational process. We expand this perspective by conceptualizing innovation as a vertically decoupled, inter-organizational process and by studying the role of research universities as suppliers of discoveries to this market for innovation . We combined logic from agency and real options theories to explain why the outcomes of technology commercialization are a function of licensing strategies, the autonomy of technology licensing offices (TLOs), and the incentives bestowed on scientists, research departments, and TLO officers. We rely on data from licensing surveys, interviews with 128 TLO directors, and – for convergent validity – from web-based searches of the TLOs of American universities and the US Patent and Trademark Office. Results suggest that commercialization outcomes (in this case, revenue and start-up creation) are enhanced when TLOs employ diverse licensing strategies, TLOs enjoy greater autonomy, universities share revenues with scientists' departments, and universities compensate TLOs officers well. Results also show that late entrants – typically underperforming universities – inflate royalty shares to scientists as a means to rectify their commercialization record. We conclude with a discussion of this study's contribution to the literature on innovation and technology commercialization.     

Choosing the partners in the licensing alliance

I consider a situation in which the incumbent strategically adopts the licensing alliance, facing potential entrants. The queue of entrants consists of two firms, the ‘strong’ entrant and the ‘weak’ entrant, who differ in their productivities. The incumbent sets a licensing fee and offers it to the entrants. Each entrant decides whether or not to buy the licensing alliance. After the set of the licensing alliance is determined, they engage in the Cournot competition. I examine the optimal licensing fee, and show that the optimal licensing fee is to charge a discriminatory royalty to each licensee. I also examine the licensing policy on the partner(s): To whom should the licensor license its technology? By comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs for the licensor, I show that licensing to both entrants would be preferred to licensing to a single entrant. But, if the licensor faces the problem on choosing the partner, he prefers the licensing of the weak entrant to the strong entrant. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assigning Patents to Industries: Tests of the Yale Technology Concordance

We describe a method to predict patent counts disaggregated by industry, using available data on patenting by technology field. This method—the Yale Technology Concordance (YTC)—exploits a data set of patents that have been individually assigned by the Canadian Patent Office to both an industry and a technology field. The procedure for predicting patents by industry is developed as a statistical model so that the standard errors of the predictions can be estimated. The YTC is tested on several subsets of Canadian patents by comparing out-of-sample predictions with industry assignments made by the Canadian Patent Office. We find that the predictions of patents by industry are quite accurate for the subset of patents form US inventors. The prediction errors are much greater for the subset of patents granted or published after 1989. This suggests that the relationship between the technology fields and industries has shifted in a way that the procedure does not capture. Nonetheless, predictions from the YTC do appear to give a reasonably accurate picture of the pattern of patenting by industry.     

核电中国专利分析

文章从统计分析的角度,对近20年来核电中国专利进行数据挖掘与分析,了解了该产业在我国的申请、技术领域分布等总体发展情况。分析结果显示,核电专利申请和授权量存在一定程度的时间和地区"集聚"现象。2008年以来,核电中国专利申请与授权进入高峰期,从地域来看,上海、广东、江苏授权核电专利占据国内授权核电专利的半壁江山,在核电发展方面比其它地区具有技术上的优势。     

THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

During the last few decades, the number of patents in information and communication technologies has increased considerably. An increasing number of patents and the associated fragmentation of IP rights have generated a series of potentially problematic consequences. Patent thickets, royalty stacking, the emergence of patent assertion entities, increased patent litigation – particularly around standard essential patents – and the difficulties with defining fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing terms are some of the most debated issues in the literature that we review in this paper. We devote a specific section of our survey to patent quality, currently one of the most debated issues surrounding the patent system. In our analysis, we mix theoretical and empirical arguments with a more policy‐oriented reasoning. This allows us to better position the different issues in the relevant political and economic context.     

An Analysis of Pure-Revenue Technology Licensing

This paper analyzes the incentives of patentholders to license their technologies for pure-revenue reasons. We hypothesize that this decision is mainly driven by characteristics of the innovation, which determine its technological attractiveness, the relevance of transaction costs in its transfer and the importance of the competition effect. By using the NBER Patent Citations Database and an original dataset of patented technologies devoted to license in an Internet marketplace, we find that importance, innovativeness, fit into the firm's core and scope of the innovation affect the patentholder's willingness to license it. Results increase our awareness on the drivers of technology licensing decisions.     

CBHD标准及其专利池前景分析

蓝光光盘（Blu—ray Disk,BD）在高清光盘市场上取得国际标准争夺战的胜利之后,中国毅然推出拥有自主知识产权的CBHD（中国蓝光高清光盘）,希望凭借中国庞大的国内市场以及强大的产业链抗衡BD标准。CBHD专利池已经在着手组建,本文通过对其《专利许可计划》的分析,提出该专利池应该注意的问题及其改进的措施,并认为专利池的组建是CBHD标准能够狙击BD的关键一环。     

Contributing to markets for technology? A comparison of patent filing motives of individual inventors,small companies and universities

We compare patenting motives of individual inventors, small firms, and universities to those of large firms. We use data from a survey (641 responses) among applicants at the European Patent Office. Our results from regression and factor analyses confirm significant differences among applicant types. The generation of licensing opportunities is rated as being more important if the applicant is a university, individual inventor or small firm. Blocking and prevention of imitation is rated as being less important if the applicant is a university. We interpret that this finding results from the universities' willingness to license under adequate conditions and their tendency not to use their patents for preventing the diffusion of their technology and its usage by others. Individual inventors and small firms place a higher importance on using patents as signals to investors, suggesting that patents are perceived as useful to secure access to the capital necessary to start or grow a business. Among all applicant groups, individual inventors attribute the most importance to blocking as a patent filing motive. This gives cause for concern because individuals who do not manufacture products on their own but, rather, use their patents to block others from production act as patent trolls.     

Managing technology licensing for stochastic R&D: from the perspective of an enterprise information system

Enterprise information technology (IT) plays an important role in technology innovation management for high-tech enterprises. However, to date most studies on enterprise technology innovation have assumed that the research and development (R&D) outcome is certain. This assumption does not always hold in practice. Motivated by the current practice of some IT industries, we establish a three-stage duopoly game model, including the R&D stage, the licensing stage and the output stage, to investigate the influence of bargaining power and technology spillover on the optimal licensing policy for the innovating enterprise when the outcome of R&D is uncertain. Our results demonstrate that (1) if the licensor has low (high) bargaining power, fixed-fee (royalty) licensing is always superior to royalty (fixed-fee) licensing to the licensor regardless of technology spillover; (2) if the licensor has moderate bargaining power and technology spillover is low (high) as well, fixed-fee (royalty) licensing is superior to royalty (fixed-fee) licensing; (3) under two-part tariff licensing and the assumption of licensors with full bargaining power, if a negative prepaid fixed fee is not allowed, two-part tariff licensing is equivalent to royalty licensing which is the optimal licensing policy; if negative prepaid fixed fee is allowed, the optimal policy is two-part tariff licensing.