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1.
Australian State governments have begun to increase royalty rates and other mineral taxes. The most instructive approach to taxation policy for the minerals sector is to set up a general model of mines which year the optimal structure of taxes. A model of mine production under uncertainty is presented. The optimal tax is a single tax with two parts. a bonus bid and conditional tax payments based on the ex-post rent of the mine. The actual structure of taxes levied by State and Commonwealth governments is seen to be distinctly sub-optimal in several respects. Proposals to move the actual to word the optimal structure are made, recognizing some of the constraints on information and the maximum acceptable rate of tax reform . 相似文献
2.
Borys Grochulski 《Journal of Economic Theory》2010,145(3):908-943
We study the structure of optimal wedges and capital taxes in a dynamic Mirrlees economy with endogenous distribution of skills. Human capital is a private, stochastic state variable that drives the skill process of each individual. Building on the findings of the labor literature, we construct a tractable life-cycle model of human capital evolution with risky investment and stochastic depreciation. In this setting, we demonstrate the optimality of (a) a human capital premium, i.e., an excess return on human capital relative to physical capital, (b) a large intertemporal wedge early in the life-cycle, and (c) a non-zero intratemporal wedge even at the top of the skill distribution at all dates except the last date in the life-cycle. The main implication for the structure of optimal linear capital taxes is the necessity of deferred taxation of physical capital. The average marginal tax rate on physical capital held in every period is zero in present value. However, expected capital tax payments do not equal zero in every period. Necessarily, agents face negative expected capital tax payments early in the life-cycle and positive expected capital tax payments late in the life-cycle. 相似文献
3.
Royalty reform and illegal reporting of harvest volumes under alternative penalty schemes 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Gregory S. Amacher Erkki Koskela Markku Ollikainen 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,38(2):189-211
We study royalty reform in a timber concessions framework. Illegal logging in the form of underreporting of harvesting is
modeled. Harvesters can be either risk neutral or risk averse. Detection of illegal logging by the government is imperfect
and costly. We focus on the government’s policy problem, solving first for socially optimal royalty and auditing levels, and
then examining a revenue-neutral reform toward this benchmark. We find that higher royalty progression will always decrease
actual harvest volume regardless of risk preferences for the harvester, but the effect of a reform on reported harvest volume
is sensitive to the penalty scheme imposed by the government. If the fine is levied on evaded royalty payments, then higher
royalty progression may increase reported harvest volume. But when the fine is levied on undeclared harvest volume, the reverse
happens. Higher royalty regression increases actual harvest volume under both penalty schemes, but it may decrease reported
harvest volume. Higher regression will increase undeclared harvest volume when the fine is levied on evaded royalty payments.
相似文献
4.
In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses. 相似文献
5.
We study the effects of introducing payouts on corporate debt and optimal capital structure in a structural credit risk model à la Leland (1994) . We find that increasing the payout parameter not only affects the endogenous bankruptcy level, which is decreased, but modifies the magnitude of a change on the endogenous failure level as a consequence of an increase in risk‐free rate, corporate tax rate, riskiness of the firm and coupon payments. This simple analytical framework is able to capture realistic insights about optimal leverage, spreads and default probabilities more in line with historical norms (if compared to Leland’s results) and closer to predictions obtained through more sophisticated models. 相似文献
6.
In most countries, average income varies with age. In this paper we investigate if and how it is possible to enhance the redistributive mechanism by relating tax payments to age. Using an OLG model where some individuals are low skilled all their life while others are low skilled when young but high skilled when old, we first show how an age dependent optimal income tax can Pareto improve upon an age independent income tax. We then characterize the optimal age dependent income tax. A tax on interest income is part of the optimal tax structure. 相似文献
7.
Is tax competition good for economic growth? We address this question using a simple model of endogenous growth. Governments in a system of many small jurisdictions benevolently maximize the welfare of immobile residents. Quadratic (de‐)installation costs limit the mobility of capital. We look at optimal taxation and long‐run growth, and we analyse the effects of cost parameter variations on taxation and growth. A race to the bottom in capital tax rates is only one possibility; the relationship between capital mobility and capital tax rates is not monotonic. Growth and capital mobility are unambiguously positively related. 相似文献
8.
Hikaru Ogawa 《Bulletin of economic research》2000,52(2):151-166
One clear result in the tax competition literature is that, when head taxes on immobile residents are available, the optimal capital tax rate for local government is zero. However, zero tax rate, when resident taxes are available, is incompatible with the phenomenon actually observed. In most countries, local governments use capital taxes as policy variables for choosing a nonzero tax rate. This paper presents a model of a two‐period economy with imperfect mobile capital to explain the behaviour of local government providing capital subsidies on capital. It further examines an equilibrium tax rate where local government’s objectives include Niskanen‐type revenue‐maximizing. 相似文献
9.
Should housing capital be taxed like other forms of capital? We analyze this question within a version of the neoclassical growth model. We derive the optimal tax treatment of housing capital vis‐à‐vis business capital allowing for relatively general household preferences. In the first‐best, the tax treatment of business and housing capital should always be the same. In the second‐best, in contrast, the optimal tax treatment of housing capital depends on the elasticities of substitution between nonhousing consumption, housing, and leisure. This is because housing taxation may be used to alleviate the distorting effect of taxing labor. As a result, the optimal tax treatment of housing capital may be different from that of business capital. We complement these analytical results with a numerical analysis. 相似文献
10.
Abstract We analyze the impact of labour market rigidities on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries. Following a shift from a competitive to a unionized labour market in both countries, the capital tax can be adjusted upward in the country with the less rigid labour market, whereas the capital tax is always adjusted downward in the other country. Moreover, by reducing the labour cost differential between countries, trade liberalization gives rise to tax and welfare convergences. Finally, when a country adopts a flexible labour market, the unionized country may attract the majority of capital. 相似文献
11.
Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction
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Jun‐ichi Itaya Makoto Okamura Chikara Yamaguchi 《The Canadian journal of economics》2016,49(4):1599-1630
This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium‐sized country is similar to that of the large or small country. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one, the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail. We also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non‐member countries worse off, which stands in sharpe contrast with previous studies, such as Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Bucovetsky (2009). 相似文献
12.
The paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. Regions' choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme. This framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes [Boadway, R., Flatters, F., 1982. Efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government: a synthesis and extension of recent results, Canadian Journal of Economics 15, 613-633; Weingast, B.R., 2006. Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Implication for Decentralized Democratic Governance and Economic Development, Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University]. We show that tax competition distorts (downwards) public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes. However, the equalization schemes remain beneficial not only for the federation and, under a low degree of regional asymmetry, also for each region. 相似文献
13.
Mining royalties provide a volatile source of revenue for state governments in Australia. We explore the effects of changes in royalty revenue received by a state government on current-year budget decisions about expenditure, tax revenue and the budget surplus. The literature postulates different models for how lower-level government budget decisions respond to a revenue windfall from a higher level of government. Empirical evidence on these models over 1998–2019 provides strong evidence that over a half of a royalty windfall becomes a change in budget expenditure. Estimates of changes to tax revenues and the surplus are not definitive nor robust. 相似文献
14.
Hannu Piekkola 《Journal of Economics》1995,62(3):295-322
In a two-period overlapping-generations model, residence criteria are shown to be optimal with lump-sum transfers to the younger generation in a dynamically efficient open economy even if all wage income, corresponding to rent income under exogenous labor supply, is not taxed away. When tax revenues are also distributed to the older generation — which indeed may be desirable for short-term intergenerational welfare distribution reasons — a weighted average rule is derived for optimal international taxation. The taxation of domestic savings income follows the inverse elasticity rule in respect to savings and, surprisingly, higher investment elasticity increases the tax level. Finally, for a small open economy and for large identical economies, tax competition with a mixed scheme of residence-based taxes and source-based subsidies yields the same tax policy as tax cooperation with no restrictions on the domestic and international capital income tax instruments. 相似文献
15.
Kamal Saggi 《European Economic Review》2002,46(1):189-200
We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives. 相似文献
16.
This paper examines a model in which growth takes place through investment-specific technological change, which in turn is determined endogenously through research spending. In particular, the role of the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction is explored. It is shown that the effect of a change in the capital tax rate on the growth rate can depend on the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction. Research subsidies tend to have a larger impact on the growth rate than would an investment tax credit of the same magnitude. Increases in the capital tax rate can increase the growth rate of the economy, even in the absence of externalities. In contrast to the existing literature, the welfare cost of capital taxation in this model can be negligible. There may be multiple tax rates on capital that achieve the same growth rate. It is demonstrated that in the presence of certain types of positive externalities, the optimal growth rate can be attained through the use of capital taxes—rather than subsidies. 相似文献
17.
Mervyn A. King 《Journal of public economics》1975,4(3):271-279
Theoretical models of the incidence of the corporate profits tax differ as to whether the tax distorts the allocation of resources, or is a lump-sum tax on the owners of capital. These differences derive from the assumptions made about the special provisions of the tax system with regard to the deduction of interest payments and investment expenditure. Two non-distortionary systems are identified which are shown to be equivalent to a capital levy when the tax is introduced and a zero tax on profits. Under the present UK system, however, a higher rate of corporation tax stimulates investment. 相似文献
18.
This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects. 相似文献
19.
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view. 相似文献
20.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(4-5):921-933
This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. The consequences of land taxation critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and increases national wealth and consumption when the land tax revenues are distributed as lump-sum payments. If the proceeds from land taxation are used to finance unproductive government expenditure, the land tax will be neutral in its effects on the capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the land rent tax spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation and ambiguously affects the capital stock and labor. 相似文献