When the Music Stops Playing: Post-litigation Relationship Dissolution in Franchising

Franchise relationships engender franchisor–franchisee conflicts and are prone to premature dissolution. Building on agency theory and institutional theory, this study examines what specific reasons – from both franchisors’ and franchisees’ perspectives – may cause post-litigation relationship dissolution (PLRD) and how franchise regulations moderate these relationships. We argue that both franchisor and franchisee may misrepresent themselves before their relationship begins (adverse selection) and behave opportunistically after the contract is signed (moral hazard), that is, ‘dual agency’. Based on 20-year archival records of franchisor–franchisee relationship histories gleaned from multiple data sources, we found that PLRD is likely to be caused by franchisors’ passive moral hazard and by franchisees’ active moral hazard. In addition, franchisor adverse selection has a greater impact on PLRD than franchisee adverse selection. With regards to regulatory influences, the presence of relationship law weakens the impact of franchisees’ passive moral hazard, but not their active moral hazard, on PLRD. Contrary to what we hypothesize, the presence of registration law amplifies the impact of franchisee adverse selection on PLRD. Ultimately, this study creates a better understanding of the antecedents and curbing mechanisms of PLRD in franchising.     

Brand equity heterogeneity among strategic groups in service franchising

Independent franchisees work cooperatively with service franchisors to strengthen the franchisor's brand name. However, agency theory predicts that franchisor inputs such as brand names and operational routines might be harmed by franchisees' free riding. In addition, previous literature has addressed the issues of strategic group emergence and performance differences between groups in recent decades. Thus, this study builds upon an emerging symbiotic view of franchising behind agency theory and incorporates a strategic groups level of analysis to investigate whether franchisees have strong incentives to maintain standards as franchisor seeking market penetration. By investigating potential brand equity differences among service franchisors for Taiwanese telecommunications service chains, this study found that different strategic groups exist in service franchising chains. From replication testing, the current results demonstrate that service franchising brand equity heterogeneities exist among franchisors within and across strategic groups. Therefore, this study broadens agency theory's explanation of service franchising.     

Crossing mother: Entrepreneur-franchisees' attempts to reduce franchisor influence

Contractual terms guide many entrepreneur-franchisees' actions with the franchisor. However, it is impossible for franchisors to completely specify all future actions. They compensate by continually attempting to influence franchisees, using what franchisees perceive as suasion in their ongoing interactions. We develop a theoretical framework for understanding the informal interaction dynamics between franchisors and franchisees.Most franchise arrangements include the payment of royalties based on sales. This encourages a growth-oriented strategy, usually appropriate for the franchisees during the initial stages of their operations. Whereas a franchising strategy can reduce entreprenerial risk for franchisees, it does not eliminate it. Thus, as sales of the franchisees increase, profit-oriented strategies will be favored because they represent the payoffs that accrue to continuing entrepreneurial effort and risk-taking. These strategies may be in opposition to franchisors' sales orientation when market conditions do not allow continual growth without margin penalties. A research model is developed, depicting the relationship between franchisees' strategies and performance, and the moderating effect that contractual goals and franchisees' perception of franchisors' attempts at suasion have on this relationship. A set of research hypotheses was then empirically tested using a large sample of franchisees from the commercial truck retailing industry.The results indicate that sales-growth and profit-growth goals are not always congruent. Balancing the goals of the franchisor and franchisee did not appear to be a popular option; either one or the other was emphasized. More importantly, the results indicate that when franchisees perceive attempts by franchisors to use suasion, lower levels of profits result, but there is no corresponding increase in the level of sales.In the long-term, franchisors are likely to determine that current contractual arrangements are not protecting their longer term interests. Thus, they will be expected to attempt to modify franchise contracts in ways that force franchisees to implement sales-gain strategies. This will require that entrepreneur-franchisees anticipate future events more carefully at the time they are examining the original franchise contract. Because most entrepreneurs are concerned with immediate survival at the start-up stage, this makes examination of the contract less likely to happen; the franchise option is attractive because it reduces such risks.We recommend that entrepreneurs write ex ante contingent claims contracts that ensure a gradual reduction of franchisor influence. Although this would assume a power or knowledge balance that favors the franchisees, which is unlikely during the start-up phase, it will change over time as franchisees gain a better understanding of the local competitive dynamics. Thus, it may well serve the franchisees to take a defensive posture or push a royalty arrangement that decreases the emphasis on sales over time. This is most likely to be effective where the entrepreneur is considering several competing franchises at the time of the signing of the contract.Finally, we recommend that entrepreneur-franchisees should not assume that the expert advice offered by their franchisor is always in their best interests. Although technical advice is more likely to be unbiased and should be fully exploited, as this is what makes the franchise valuable, strategic advice, or that which relates to goal setting may well be colored by the financial interests of the franchisor. Franchisors are unlikely to consider the possibility that franchisees would be better served by formulating their own strategies, nor are they likely to consider that the franchise network would be better off, in the longer term, by the collective impact associated with numerous franchisees independently formulating their own strategies. In short, although we do not suggest that franchisees should always assume that “crossing mother” is the best response to all perceived franchisor-suasion efforts, they should carefully examine all strategic advice.     

Antecedents of early terminations in franchising: franchisor versus franchisee cancelations

Franchisors capitalize on franchisee entrepreneurial capacity to grow. However, enabling franchisees to develop their ventures may damage system consistency. This dilemma makes conflict particularly prevalent in the field of franchising. Nevertheless, prior research has reported an incomplete picture of factors leading to serious disagreement and premature termination in franchise partnerships. We address this gap, first, by adding the entrepreneurial autonomy of franchisees as a relevant but underexplored source of conflict and, second, by providing a more fine-grained analysis of franchisors’ versus franchisees’ drivers of termination. Specifically, we focus on the controversial issues of pricing and local advertising policies and analyze how expanding franchisees’ entrepreneurial autonomy in these decision areas is related to contract terminations depending on who ended the relationship (the franchisor or a franchisee). The study also highlights less controversial requirements and conditions (e.g., upfront investments, franchisor experience …) that may reduce early terminations. Our empirical objectives are met by using survey data from a sample of franchisor companies. The results show how the performance outcomes of entrepreneurial autonomy differ depending on the decision area in which it is exercised. Results also throw light on the consequences of various critical franchise policies that may be masked if both types of termination (franchisors vs. franchisees) are considered together.     

“Conflict-performance assumption” or “performance-conflict assumption”: Insights from franchising

Franchising is an organizational governance form where relational and formal contracts complement each other and where franchisor and franchisees together may obtain better performance than working alone. Although relational contracts may adapt to changing environments, they are not as efficient in ambiguous settings. In franchised stores, liability for low performance is not always clear. Indeed, franchisor and franchisees work in close collaboration, and, therefore, this ambiguity on causes of low performance may lead to conflicts. The franchising literature, as far as we know, has addressed practitioners' concerns regarding performance on one side, and conflicts on the other side, but no study has exclusively focused on low performance and the emergence of conflicts. Our research contributes to the franchising literature by filling this relative gap and, contrary to “conflict-performance assumption” (Pearson, 1973; Duarte and Davies, 2003) held in the broader context of distribution channels, we consider low performance to be a cause, rather than a consequence, of franchisor/franchisee conflicts. This empirical study deals with franchising in France, the leading market in franchising in Europe and the third largest in the world. We used a qualitative approach based on 44 in-depth interviews with 27 franchisors and executives/high-level managers of franchise chains, as well as 17 franchisees from various industries to get a dual, and so more complete, assessment of franchising practitioners' views of performance-related conflicts. Our research findings show that franchisees, as independent small business owners, give priority to financial results compared to other goals and they are driven to continuously improve the performance of their store(s). When expectations are not met, franchisees sometimes blame franchisors because they are interdependent in their success and liability is not straightforward. As a collaborative team, franchisors and franchisees may benefit from minimizing conflicts and preventing them with the careful selection and management of franchisees that share franchisor's values and have internal locus of control.     

Influence of franchisee selection criteria on outcomes desired by the franchisor

Agency theory suggests that an efficient contract between a franchisor (principal) and a franchisee (agent) could be established by the use of selection criteria that would screen prospective franchisees based on their likely future outcomes desired by their franchisors. Franchisors can use franchisee selection criteria as a key input control to enhance the outcomes of their future franchisees. This article examines the relationship between key franchisee selection criteria such as franchisees’ financial capability, experience and management skills, demographic characteristics, attitude toward business dimensions (perceived innovativeness, desire for personal development, seek work-related challenges, personal commitment to the business, and business risk-taking), and key measures of outcomes desired by franchisors (perceived cooperation, satisfaction with the business decision, and franchisee opportunism). The findings show that certain franchisee attitudes toward business can be used as an effective input control strategy by franchisors because they explain a substantial portion of the variance in franchisees’ outcome desired by franchisors.     

Franchise management capabilities and franchisor performance under alternative franchise ownership strategies

Franchising is a key entrepreneurial growth strategy, but a well-known downside is franchisee free-riding. Drawing upon alliance capabilities research, we describe franchise management capabilities and suggest that they are one way franchisors reduce free-riding and thus enhance performance. We also submit that these capabilities are especially helpful for “plural form” franchisors who own outlets in parallel with franchisees. Using a sample of 229 franchisors, we show that franchise management capabilities relate positively to franchisor performance among plural form franchisors. For “turnkey” franchisors who franchise all, or almost all, outlets these capabilities relate indirectly to performance through lower opportunism and improved brand reputation. Franchise management capability is therefore an important new theoretical construct linking franchising to franchisor performance.     

Franchising growth and franchisor entry and exit in the U.S. market: Myth and reality

Franchising has been and continues to be a very popular way to do business for a number of retailers and service businesses. However, the type of franchising that has been growing the most, namely business-format franchising, has not grown at the kind of phenomenal rates that the trade press often suggests. Since the Department of Commerce (DOC) canceled its publication Franchising in the Economy, we no longer have access to census-type data on franchising in the U.S. However, looking at the period during which the DOC did publish these data, one finds that the number of business-format franchisors is highly correlated with the number of units in these chains. Thus, we use data from recent issues of various franchisor directories to assess the number of franchisors in the U.S., and infer from this how business-format franchising has grown in the U.S. We find that business-format franchising has been growing over the last decade at a rate that is, at best, commensurate with the growth of the economy as a whole.We believe that the confusion about the extent of growth in franchising arises, in part, from the fact that many new firms enter into franchising each year, leading to the notion that this way of doing business is growing tremendously. However, we show that many firms also exit from franchising each year, for a net growth rate much below the entry rate.This paper shows that franchising is not a panacea for entrepreneurs, whether franchisor or franchisee. From the franchisor's viewpoint, the high rate of exits suggests that many firms fail despite franchising, and many others choose to stop franchising after trying it for a few years. Clearly, these firms have found that franchising is not right for them. Furthermore, the results show that the characteristics of the chain at the time it becomes involved in franchising, as described in the main franchisor directories—such as the royalty rate, the advertising fee, the franchise fee, the amount of capital required, and the sector of operation—have little capacity to explain “survival.” The main variable that affects “survival” among those that are typically reported in franchisor listings is the number of years that the franchisor has been in business before starting to franchise. Hence our results suggest this is one dimension in which franchisors can make decisions that affect the probability that they will be successful in franchising. Although we are unable to explain most of the variance in outcome, the results mostly imply that other, less easily observed or quantified characteristics of the chain and the franchisor, such as maybe the “innovativeness” of the product, the amount of support provided to franchisees, the financial backing of the franchisor, etc., likely influence “success” the most, and thus, are worth investigating further.From the perspective of franchisees, the amount of exit found here suggests that in the majority of systems, franchisees cannot expect that their franchisor will be around for the whole duration of their contract—which averages about 15 years according to the Department of Commerce. This does not mean that the majority of franchised businesses will find themselves in an “exiting” system—a small minority of very well-established franchisors accounts for the majority of franchised businesses, and these are likely to remain successful for years to come. But entrepreneurs buying franchises from less established systems are likely to face franchisor exit, either failure or departure. This paper confirms that franchisees should thoroughly investigate the franchise system they want to invest in, going beyond the information about royalty rates, advertising rates, rankings, etc., found in franchisor directories, and toward more product, market, and other less easily accessible information about the chain.     

Multi-unit versus single-unit franchising: assessing why franchisors use different ownership strategies

The aim of this article is to examine what factors underlie the choice of organisational form when franchisors add new franchised units to their networks. Franchisors may grant new units to existing franchisees (multi-unit franchising (MUF)) or to new franchisees (single-unit franchising). We find that this choice depends on the existence of contractual problems (namely adverse selection and moral hazard) and several network characteristics influence the magnitude of these problems. In particular, we found a positive relationship between the intensity of the use of MUF and network size, geographical concentration of the units of the network, and industries where customers tend to be non-repetitive.     

An Empirical Analysis of Franchisee Value-in-Use, Investment Risk and Relational Satisfaction

An exchange perspective of franchising recognizes the important role that both the franchisor and franchisee assume in developing and maintaining sustainable relationships. However, should franchisees not perceive value in the quality of provided products or services, some incentive misalignment between agent and principal is likely (e.g. free riding, non-compliance with system standards), potentially resulting in greater perceptions of financial risk, diminished levels of franchisee satisfaction, reduced unit performance and conflict ( [Harmon and Griffiths, 2008] and [Kaufmann and Dant, 1998] ). A greater understanding of franchisee perceptions of value is very important if ongoing satisfaction in the franchising relationship is the goal. This paper, therefore, makes a significant contribution to such an understanding by empirically testing the dimensions of value that influence franchisee perceptions of risk and relationship satisfaction. Moreover, we make important comparisons across gender, the results of which provide rich information. In theoretical terms, we advance the literature in the context of value and franchising and, in practical terms, the results, by managing for performance (financial risk and relationship quality), assist franchisors in developing, delivering and managing what is of value to their franchisees. Furthermore, the findings of this study provide a solid platform for future research in this area.     

Franchising and the domain of entrepreneurship research

In this essay, we explore the relationship between franchising and entrepreneurship in general, and their research domains in particular. We begin by categorizing the focus of various representative definitions of entrepreneurship as: (1) traits, (2) processes, or (3) activities, and adopt the view that identifying the unique research domain of entrepreneurship is a more worthwhile endeavor than attempting to reach definitional consensus. We subsequently discuss the differences between entrepreneurship in the manufacturing and retailing contexts, and the particular features of franchising as it relates to the study of retailing entrepreneurship. Specifically, four areas are examined: the franchisor’s role in creating an innovative concept, the franchisee’s role in bringing the franchisor’s concept to new markets, the franchisee’s acceptance of risk, and the special issues surrounding the pervasive practice of multi-unit franchising. We conclude with a brief discussion of the reasons for including the study of franchising, franchisors, and franchisees as integral areas within the distinctive domain of entrepreneurship research, and similarly exhort franchising researchers to explore the implications of their work for the study of entrepreneurship.     

The effect of organizational context on entrepreneurial strategies in franchising

Franchising systems play a vital role in the creation of new jobs and economic development. Although the role of the franchisor as entrepreneur is generally assumed, there has been limited research on the conduct of entrepreneurial activities in the franchising system as a whole. In particular, researchers and practitioners need to better understand the influences of organizational context on entrepreneurial activities system-wide.The research reported in this article examines the influences of the organizational context of the franchisor on the entrepreneurial strategies of franchisors, their innovation efforts, and franchisor support of entrepreneurial activities by franchisees. Specifically, this study examines how the organizational context variables of size, age of the franchise, its growth rate (both absolute and relative), and time in franchising affect franchisee perceptions of entrepreneurial strategies of their parent franchisor, their innovation efforts, and franchisor managerial support for entrepreneurial activity and innovation by the franchisee.Franchisee perceptions of their parent franchisors’ entrepreneurial strategies were assessed with respect to four dimensions identified in previous research as central to an entrepreneurial orientation: low concern for stability, willingness to take risks, aggressiveness in competition, and proactiveness (in seeking new opportunities). Innovation by franchisors was measured with respect to introduction of new products and techniques.Drawing on research that emphasizes the importance of instituting special organizational devices and rewards and recognition systems for promoting entrepreneurial activity, franchisor support for franchisee entrepreneurial activity and innovation (e.g., the development of new products and services, new techniques to improve customer service) was measured by the importance franchisees assigned to the use of a franchise council, the recognition of new ideas at the annual meeting of the franchise system, and the presence at franchisor headquarters of a champion for innovation.Consistent with other studies examining the influence of organizational context, it was hypothesized that organizational size and age would be negatively related to franchisee assessments of entrepreneurial strategies, the introduction of new products and techniques, and franchisor managerial support for franchisee entrepreneurial activity and innovation. In contrast, rapid growth was hypothesized to be positively associated with entrepreneurial strategies and support for franchisee innovation. No hypotheses were proposed with respect to time in franchising.Results of the study showed, as hypothesized, that franchisor size was associated with a concern for stability and strategies that were risk averse, cooperative, and reactive rather than proactive. However, size was positively associated with the frequent introduction of new products and also positively related to franchisor support for franchisee innovation. Contrary to expectations, age was positively associated with entrepreneurial strategies including a low concern for stability and an aggressive style of competition. In addition, age was positively associated with the introduction of both new products and new techniques. Relative growth, rather than an absolute rate of growth, was associated with all of the entrepreneurial strategies except risk-taking as well as with the frequent introduction of new products. Although no hypotheses were proposed for time in franchising, the findings show that it is associated with a greater concern for stability as well as the infrequent introduction of new products and techniques.The findings from this study suggest that franchisors need to institute measures to counteract the potentially deleterious influences of franchise system size on the entrepreneurial orientation within their franchising systems. It also suggests the resources of a large organization need to be combined with the flexibility of smaller units for competitive advantage. Entrepreneurial activity by franchisors and franchisees implies a partnership in adapting to the environment and can provide a competitive advantage. The challenge for franchisors will be managing new ideas from the field and adapting to a competitive environment while at the same time preserving the integrity of the franchising system.     

How Do Franchise Contracts Evolve? A Study of Three German SMEs*

Although contracts are crucial for franchisors in managing relationships with franchisees, franchising research has not adequately investigated whether and how franchisors learn about effective contracts. This paper explores the evolution of formal contracts used by three German chains from the restaurant, hotel, and retailing industries. We describe the nature of learning involved in designing contracts in the sampled chains, and suggest reasons why contracts change over time. Despite the fact that drafting contracts with independent entrepreneurs is one of the important tasks the franchisor is rewarded for, we found that franchisors remain boundedly rational and therefore are unable to completely anticipate undesirable franchisee behavior and to incorporate suitable safeguards. We develop propositions to suggest that: (1) learning explains contract design capability better than does foresight, (2) a new management and the pursuit of uniformity lead to contract changes, and (3) the presence of an active franchisee council promotes the efficiency of the contract change process. We offer implications of our findings for theory, practice, and research.     

Franchisee Selection for Social Franchising Success

Franchisee selection is a major input for franchising success. In this article, we argue that franchisee selection criteria do not differ between social and commercial franchising. They may be even more relevant for obtaining social franchising success. We discuss criteria for franchisee selection and present details of our multiple case study research to support the argument. Our study finds that evolved social franchisors do adopt similar selection criteria as commercial franchisees. In addition, constraints faced with franchisee selection among commercial franchisors are reflected also among social franchisors. We contribute to franchising literature by extending commercial franchisee selection criteria to social franchisee selection. A major managerial implication of this research is that existing franchising professionals could easily assist new social franchisors in developing their social franchisees. Future research could be study criteria weights and methodology adopted for making final selection. A new research direction could involve studying if selection criteria would differ based on (a) social cause and (b) franchisee location.     

Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising

This paper examines antecedents of ex-ante voluntary information disclosures for standardized contracts in entrepreneurial networks. Entrepreneurs (e.g., franchisors) may make such disclosures to prospective business partners in order to signal profitability of partnering, attract financial and managerial resources, and develop their entrepreneurial networks. In practice, only a fraction of franchisors make financial performance representations (FPRs), an ex-ante voluntary information disclosure to prospective franchisees. We address gaps in the signaling, voluntary information disclosure, franchising, entrepreneurship, and small- and medium-enterprise (SME) literatures. We draw on signaling theory to develop a theoretical framework and investigate factors that influence a franchisor’s disclosure decision. We evaluate hypotheses from our theoretical framework through econometric analyses of multi-sector panel data for the US franchising industry. We estimate a logit model and use lagged independent variables to address our dichotomous independent variable and potential endogeneity, respectively. Our results support the view that firms signal their quality through FPRs to attract potential business partners and expand their entrepreneurial networks. Beyond the extant literature, we find that rigorous partner qualification is another driver of voluntary information disclosure in franchising. Our findings also provide empirical support for the complementary role played by multiple quality signaling mechanisms used by franchisors and yield public policy implications for franchising.     

Why do entrepreneurs use franchising as a financial tool? An agency explanation

When and why one type of entrepreneur (franchisor) attracts to its ventures another type of entrepreneur (franchisees) instead of passive investors is a central concern in entrepreneurship literature. Based on the informativeness principle of the principal–agent model, we claim that franchisees are not such an expensive financial tool as has been argued in the literature because their compensation (return) is more efficiently designed: it directly depends on variables which are under franchisees' control. We therefore link agency and financial explanations for franchising. Most of our findings show that, once the agency argument is controlled for, the higher the cost of alternative funds for the franchisor (estimated through different variables), the more the franchisor will rely on expansion through franchising as opposed to company-ownership. We interpret this as a clue that franchising is also used as a financial capital source.     

Why franchise companies expand overseas

Business format franchising is becoming an increasingly international activity. From 1971 to 1985, U.S. franchisors added foreign outlets at a rate of 17% per year, almost twice as fast as they added domestic outlets (Aydin and Kacker 1990). As a result, by 1990 more than 350 U.S. companies had more than 32,000 franchised outlets overseas. By 2000, 60% of all franchisors in the United States are expected to have outlets overseas (Hoffman and Preble 1993).This study examines the 815 largest U.S. franchisors to understand what capabilities encourage them to expand overseas. It finds that the key capability that predicts the intent to expand overseas is superior capability to reduce franchisee opportunism. Franchisors who seek foreign franchisees have developed a greater capability to bond against and monitor potential franchisee opportunism. The data show that these differences are consistent across all industries in which franchising takes place.The results of this study indicate that foreign entrepreneurs can identify the American franchisors most likely to expand overseas by looking at their pricing structure and their monitoring capabilities. The easy identification of characteristics from which to find American franchisors will help to reduce the search costs of potential foreign franchisees. This reduction in search costs will make the establishment of international franchise relationships less expensive.This study also provides guidance to franchisors interested in expanding overseas. The results show how franchisors can structure their franchise relationships to reduce potential franchisee opportunism. This ability to reduce franchisee opportunism will make it easier for franchisors to enter high-growth foreign markets using the franchising business mode.This study also has implications for researchers. It suggests that international business research examine further the mechanisms by which firms make contractual modes of international business work. Whereas many firms may internalize international market transactions under conditions likely to lead to market failure, the large number of franchisors who use franchising as an international expansion mode despite conditions of market failure suggests that more attention be paid to mechanisms that companies can use to reduce the probability of failure of international contractual transactions. By helping to explain how franchisors monitor foreign franchisees or bond them against opportunistic behavior, this study suggests that the international business literature develop a more complex understanding of the workings of international business transactions than the simple choice of internalization or contractual entry modes.     

Franchisor Insolvency in Australia: Profiles,Factors, and Impacts

Franchisor failure is enduring and important in terms of cost, nationally and internationally. This article presents research into Australian franchisor firms that went into a form of bankruptcy protection known in Australia as “voluntary administration.” The research was driven by the commonality and divergence of the interests of franchisors and franchisees. The article provides an insight into franchisor failure and its effect on franchisees. It presents the substantial literature survey that was used to frame questions for franchisor administrators to understand issues associated with franchisors in administration. The limited data demonstrate diversity in the treatment of franchisees during the franchisor's administration. In Australia, franchisees remain a captive, financially committed counterparty during insolvency and potentially deliver a great financial benefit to the franchisor's creditors. The article concludes that administration of franchisors does not take into account the distinct relationship between franchisors and their franchisees and provides policy recommendations to address this matter.     

A longitudinal study of franchisor failure according to Altman’s Z model

Purpose: The foremost objective of this study is to obtain segments/clusters of franchisors that are more likely to fail. A second aim is to evaluate the influence of the usual variables of the franchise contract on the solvency of franchises.

Design/methodology/approach: This study set up a database with information collected from several Spanish franchising yearbooks and franchisors’ websites to establish the census of Spanish franchisors. This article worked with a census of the franchises operating in Spain from 2001 to 2011. Latent class regression analysis is used.

Findings: This research found four segments or classes of franchisors with regard to their failure pattern. In addition, this article defined the most influential variables in the franchisors’ risk of failure. The relationships between the variables that define a franchise contract and the Z scores of Altman’s model have been extracted. The dependent variable has been the Altman’s Z model and the independent variables are those that define the franchise contract.

Research implications: This methodology offers potential franchisees a new criterion for assessing the franchise chains they are investigating, taking into account their risk of failure. This allows franchisees to better highlight those franchisors that have a lower crash risk and avoid the damage incurred by the closure of the chain. The information provided for franchisees should be accessible, usable, and suitable to help franchisees to choose the best franchise systems in which to invest. This methodology is of course very useful for franchisors, because they can comprehend their financial situation and how they could manage the franchising variables in order to improve their solvency.

Practical implications: All the segments are solvent, except Segment 3. The distinguishing feature of this segment is that over 64 percent of the firms are retailer chains. In addition, more than 20 percent of the franchises from our database are in financial danger, and this is the group where the number of service companies is lower.

Originality/value: This research is unique in two ways. First, this study presents a new methodology in this field that allows researchers to use the historical-financial data of franchisors, and the information of the franchise contract to predict franchisor failure. Second, this article helps franchisees to make their own decisions on the basis of the franchisors’ level of risk of failure. Third, this research offer a theoretical contribution about franchisor failure, this topic is scarcely treated by academic literature.