共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 312 毫秒
1.
We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: houses (stand for “indivisible objects”) are to be allocated to agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; houses are initially unowned; agents initially do not own houses; the remaining agents (the so-called “existing tenants”) initially own the remaining houses (each owns one). In this setting, we consider various randomized allocation rules under which voluntary participation of existing tenants is assured and the randomization procedure either treats agents equally or discriminates against some (or all) of the existing tenants. We obtain two equivalence results, which generalize the equivalence results in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Sönmez and Ünver (2005). 相似文献
2.
3.
Fabrizio Cipollini Giampiero M. Gallo Edoardo Otranto 《International Journal of Forecasting》2021,37(1):44-57
In this paper, we suggest how to handle the issue of the heteroskedasticity of measurement errors when specifying dynamic models for the conditional expectation of realized variance. We show that either adding a GARCH correction within an asymmetric extension of the class (-), or working within the class of asymmetric multiplicative error models () greatly reduces the need for quarticity/quadratic terms to capture attenuation bias. This feature in can be strengthened by considering regime specific dynamics. Model Confidence Sets confirm this robustness both in- and out-of-sample for a panel of 28 big caps and the S&P500 index. 相似文献
5.
6.
This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality , , in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and item prices that guarantee certain stability properties parametrized by the numbers and . The quality measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the larger and the closer the fit. For this notion provides a graceful degradation for the conditional equilibria of Fu, Kleinberg and Lavi (2012) which are exactly the local equilibria of quality . For the local equilibria of quality are more stable than conditional equilibria. Any local equilibrium of quality provides, without any assumption on the type of the agents’ valuations, an allocation whose value is at least the optimal fractional allocation. In any economy in which all agents’ valuations are -submodular, i.e., exhibit complementarity bounded by , there is a local equilibrium of quality . In such an economy any greedy allocation provides a local equilibrium of quality . Walrasian equilibria are not amenable to such graceful degradation. 相似文献
7.
8.
9.
10.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.