On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

Numeric or weighted distribution? The effect of different channel performance metrics on market share

Abstract

Previous studies have found a convex relation between weighted measures of distribution and market share for consumer products in developed economies, while companies in emerging markets often use a non-weighted (numeric) distribution measure to manage their channel strategy. In contrast to the markets with high retail concentration, the numeric distribution could be best suited to a more fragmented retail market in which the percentage of physical distribution is important. We investigate the effects of expanding numeric versus expanding weighted distribution by studying stores in channels and regions characterized by structural differences in an emerging market. Our data come from retail audits in Brazil and include 91 soft drink manufacturers, 195 brands and 1,110 stock-keeping units. Our study highlights the importance of numeric distribution as a performance measure in this market. Additionally, we show that the effects of numeric and weighted distribution on market share vary by region and channel format.     

Leveraging Distribution to Maximize Firm Performance in Emerging Markets

Despite the rise of emerging markets as lucrative destinations for business expansion, marketing literature in this area is largely anecdotal and conceptual. Further, owing to the largely unorganized retail structure in emerging markets, managers tend to make sub-optimal marketing-mix decisions by taking an aggregate view of their distribution network. In this study, we develop an econometric model to help firms develop a multichannel distribution strategy in emerging markets while accounting for (a) own-marketing mix, (b) competitive actions, (c) brand-level heterogeneity, and (d) dependencies that may arise between product offerings. The proposed model is tested on longitudinal data from a large Indian CPG manufacturer. The results indicate that firms must consider store format-specific distribution elasticities (as opposed to aggregate effects), especially in an emerging market, where the role of distribution is critical in brand success. Further, depending on the offering, price (own- and cross-) and advertising elasticities could vary even though the brand is essentially the same. Also, we find that there are significant dependencies between product forms that need to be considered when designing the marketing mix. Finally, we provide re-allocation recommendations to help managers choose the level of store format distribution in order to maximize profits. The proposed distribution re-allocation strategy resulted in an average of 7.7% increase in profits across three product forms for the focal firm.     

Expanding to direct channel: Market coverages as entry barrier

A direct marketer can be either a manufacturer selling directly to the final consumers or a retailer that sells an assortment of products from multiple manufacturers. From a manufacturer's point of view, expanding to an online direct channel seems very attractive because intermediaries can be bypassed in reaching final consumers, while the Internet has substantially lowered the entry barrier. With the rapid diffusion of electronic commerce, numerous manufacturers have been considering a direct online channel as an alternative or a supplement to existing retailer channels. However, we observe in the real market that not many manufacturers are fully engaged in online retailing. One major factor frequently mentioned is the conflict with existing dealers who will not be pleased with a manufacturer's attempt to cannibalize their sales. This paper attempts to provide another explanation by comparing theoretical market coverage of manufacturers in a direct channel and a channel with intermediaries. We show that the direct channel can support fewer firms than the traditional retailer channel does, which becomes an effective entry barrier to latecomers. In equilibrium, the products are positively but finitely differentiated in their qualities, and the top two quality tiers would capture more than 75% of the direct channel's market potential (i.e., the “finiteness property”). Thus latecomers would find it difficult to gain a substantial market share against the existing pioneers in the competitive direct market unless they can find other meaningful ways to differentiate horizontally. The sales data of the online retail industry supports our finding.     

Export Involvement and Channel Conflict in a Manufacturer-Intermediary Relationship

Numerous articles have been published regarding the strained relationships between highly involved export manufacturers and their international intermediaries. While channel conflict is frequently cited as a major reason for such strained trade relationships, few research studies examine the relationship between a manufacturer's export involvement and channel conflict. In this paper, we develop hypotheses linking the three major domains of export involvement to the initial stages of channel conflict. The results indicate that a manufacturer's conflict with its principal international intermediary decreases with greater manufacturer dependence on the principal intermediary, increases as resources are committed to exporting, and decreases with the manufacturer's foreign market knowledge.     

Decomposing the effect of advertising: What happens in the retail channel?

The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness.     

Selling Versus Leasing of Durable Goods: The Impact on Marketing Channels

While many durable products are sold through intermediaries, there is limited understanding of how channel performance is influenced by transactions involving durable goods in a competitive market. In particular, extant research shows that intermediaries can significantly impact the leasing versus selling policy of a monopolistic manufacturer. This article seeks to fill that gap by examining the selling versus leasing choice of duopolistic manufacturers in the context of decentralized channels. Our analysis demonstrates that in addition to the unique equilibrium of selling, a prisoner's dilemma may arise where both manufacturers are better off if they were to lease their products.     

Retail services and firm profit in a dual-channel market

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays use online technology to engage in direct sales. The mix of retailing with a direct channel adds a new dimension of competition and complementarity to a product's distribution channels. Our model focuses on the strategic role played by the retail services in a dual-channel competitive market. The manufacturer uses a direct channel as an effective tool to motivate the retailer to improve its retail services and profits from it. While operated by the manufacturer to motivate retailer to perform more effectively from the manufacturer's perspective, the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because the retailer can obtain a lower wholesale price from the manufacturer and a higher sales volume from the improved retail services. In our research, our results suggest that the improved retail services effectively alleviate the channel competition and conflict and improve the supply chain performance in a competitive market.     

Information asymmetry, pricing strategy and firm's performance in the retailer- multi-channel manufacturer supply chain

In this research paper, we assume a retailer-multi-channel manufacturer (with online and traditional retail channels) supply chain where both the multi-channel manufacturer and the retailer have private information about the state of consumer demand. In this setting, we examine the effect of an information sharing strategy on both firms' performance. Our results show that the multi-channel manufacturer always benefits from an information sharing strategy. When the product is highly compatible with the online channel, information sharing becomes much more valuable to the multi-channel manufacturer. On the other hand, the retailer's performance is not impacted by an information sharing strategy. Thus, a bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing for the multi-channel manufacturer and retailer so that an information sharing equilibrium can be reached. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify probable paths of future research.     

Dual Control of Salesforce in Partially Integrated Channels

A manufacturer using a partially integrated channel (PIC) dispatches its own salesforce to the retailers that it sells through. The manufacturer salesforce in a PIC is simultaneously subject to controls by the manufacturer and the retailer, which we call dual control. Despite its increasing prevalence, how dual control influences salesforce performance remains understudied. We develop a discriminating alignment framework through two steps to answer this question. The first step examines the influence of a controller on the efficacy of a control mechanism. The efficacy of a control mechanism varies with the party that exerts control. The second step expands this logic to dual control. The performance effect of dual control is equivocal: It may have a positive, negative, or no influence on salesforce performance depending on discriminating alignment. To improve salesforce performance, a manufacturer’s control and a retailer’s control must compensate for each other’s weaknesses. Empirical tests based on matched dyadic data of dual control of salesforce by apparel manufacturers and retailers support our predictions with considerable theoretical and managerial implications.     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.     

信息共享下双渠道制造商与零售商协调研究

随着internet的应用越来越广泛,许多制造商不仅使用传统的销售商渠道销售产品,而且通过网上直销的方式进行产品销售,双渠道增加了渠道之间的竞争。零售商为了在渠道竞争中获得优势,可以通过花费一定的成本增加零售产品价值。通过建立博弈模型分析强势制造商在对零售商信息完全、信息不完全情况下的定价策略,分析得出制造商获得零售商信息的价值,以及零售商愿意向制造商分享成本信息时的临界收益,旨在提出参考建议。     

Dyadic specific investments,absorptive capacity,and manufacturers' market knowledge acquisition: Evidence from manufacturer–distributor dyads

How do manufacturers acquire market knowledge through their partnerships with distributors? This study sheds light on this interesting question by investigating how specific investments (SIs) from both manufacturers and their distribution partners affect the manufacturers' learning about market demands and trends. Using paired-data collected from 225 manufacturer–distributor dyads in China, we find that the SIs of manufacturers and distributors both independently and interactively enhance manufacturers' acquisition of market knowledge from their distributors. In addition, manufacturers' absorptive capacity positively moderates the effect of SIs on manufacturers' learning from distributors.     

Store Brand Quality and Retailer’s Product Line Design

This study analyzes a retailer’s store brand quality decision in vertically differentiated product categories. We analyze a game theoretic model composed of one or two national brand manufacturers and a retailer, who strategically chooses the quality level(s) of its store brand(s) relative to the well-established national brand position(s) to maximize its category profit. Our analysis reveals that the nature of a retailer’s store brand quality positioning is quite different from the manufacturer’s national brand positioning decision, and that the best position for a store brand is not “as close to a national brand as possible” as previous studies suggest. Instead, the optimal quality position of each store brand is remarkably sensitive to the distribution of consumers’ willingness-to-pay. In particular, the relative proportions of quality sensitive consumers and price sensitive consumers determine the balance of three key strategic forces — the market expansion force, the retail margin force, and the consumer profitability force, leading to different optimal product line designs for store brands across different category environments. Interestingly, against multiple incumbent national brands, the retailer’s optimal product line design includes a store brand positioned at the highest quality level in the category only if most consumers are moderately quality conscious. We also analyze the implications of national brands’ brand equity for retailers’ store brand strategy.     

International trade intermediaries and the transfer of marketing knowledge in transition economies

The process of market reform that characterizes the move away from regimes of central planning in transition economies creates a need for managers to acquire the techniques and skills of marketing. In contrast with an extant emphasis on inward direct investment, this study examines the role played by international trade intermediaries in the transfer of marketing knowledge across borders. Data collected from manufacturers in central China reveal that the value of marketing knowledge transferred is contingent upon intermediary performance of export marketing services and the likelihood of intermediary replacement.     

Slotting Allowances in China: Perspectives of a Large Manufacturer Versus a Large Retailer in the China Grocery Market

ABSTRACT

Slotting allowances and contractual marketing agreements pervade the retail environment in the United States. They represent a profit center for large retailers who exercise market power and represent a cost center for large manufacturers. Many manufacturers have alleged that they are “held captive” to procure prime retail space. Despite the influx of retailers and manufacturers based in the United States, the deployment of slotting allowances in China is less prevalent but does pervade the grocery sector. The purpose of this study is therefore to explore the attitudes of large Western manufacturers and retailers toward the issue of slotting allowances in the China grocery market through a qualitative study. In-depth interviews were conducted with key decision-makers from Coca-Cola (manufacturer) and Carrefour (retail hypermarket) to critically explore their attitudes toward slotting allowances. The interviews reveal principal differences grounded in cultural norms.     

Selecting optimal intermediary channels in emerging markets: The case of Vietnamese toiletries

Abstract

Domestic distribution in Vietnam is characteristic of an emerging market in the beginning stages of modernization, with frequent changes in retail format, a fragmented distribution structure, and ambiguous regulations. This study uses field surveys and comparative analyses of individual enterprises in Vietnam’s toiletry products industry to identify suitable channel strategies for emerging markets in the early stages of distribution modernization. The results indicate that partnership channels are more suitable than hierarchy and market governance channels. Moreover, among the various types of intermediaries, distributors provide a key role in emerging markets where transportation functions are undeveloped. Finally, the study investigates the various methods of partner selection, finding that effectiveness-oriented networks are superior to large-scale efficiency-oriented networks because they have greater channel coverage in modernizing emerging markets. The findings demonstrate the optimal channel structures and partner selection criteria for distributors in emerging markets.     

Violation behavior in vertical restraint: Empirical analyses in the case of retail price maintenance

An extensive body of work within the marketing and economics literature has been devoted to studying vertical restraints, yet only a few researchers have investigated the violation behavior of retailers. In this paper, we investigate violation behavior in the context of retailer price maintenance. We investigate this behavior using a unique data set from a subsidy program in China, which includes transaction-level information that shows retail price maintenance (RPM) practices in multiple product categories by multiple manufacturers across multiple markets. The results from our fixed effects regression show that retailer violations are more likely to occur when intra-product competition is high. However, how retailer violation likelihood varies with inter-product competition may depend on the product category. We find that inter-product competition, is negatively associated with the likelihood of violation, for “less popular” product categories in the program such as washing machines, air conditioners, etc., but is positively associated with the likelihood of violation for “popular” product categories such as refrigerators, televisions, and cell phones. Our research provides some of the first empirical evidence about retailer violation behavior under RPM in the world’s largest emerging market by focusing on the relationship between violation behavior and market structure. We discuss the implications for monitoring efforts of manufacturers and regulators.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.