Economic efficiency,antitrust and rate-of-return

This paper examines the economic consequences of using excessive rates-of-return to detect and prosecute cartels. We find that this policy leads to inefficient factor utilization, but always increases output and welfare. The rate-of-return policy may yield greater social gains than a welfare-based antitrust policy.     

Depreciation,investor compensation,and welfare under rate-of-return regulation

Depreciation schedules allocate capital expenditure over time. Investors are properly compensated under any full depreciation schedule, when the allowed rate of return plus inflation adjustments to the rate base just equal the investors' nominal discount rate. Whether changes in this nominal rate are reflected in adjustments to the rate base or the rate of return, depreciation schedules can be chosen to generate efficient time paths of output prices. Practical limits on depreciation schedules, nominal rates, or information may affect the choice between adjusting the rate base or rate of return for temporal changes in capital cost.     

Discussion of exports and antitrust: Complements or substitutes?

The increasing international openness of the U.S. economy should provide a strong impetus for industrial organization economists to turn their attentions to international trade and investment. The study by Clark, et al. is a bold attempt to address the positive economics of a vexing policy issue that lies in the nexus of domestic competition and foreign trade. Their results do not yet provide a confident basis for policy-setting, but the paper is a promising start for the search for empirical regularities.     

中国的经济结构、增长速度与能源效率

从我国能源利用效率变动的历史轨迹可以发现,2000-2005年我国单位GDP能源消耗呈上升趋势.能耗上升的主要原因:从经济结构的角度来看,主要是高耗能产业发展加速,能源消费向高耗能行业集中;国际产业分工低端化,工业增加值率下降;在能源进口不断增长的同时,高载能产品出口大幅度增长.从经济增长的角度来看,速度过快,超过我国经济增长潜力,导致能源过度投入.为提高我国能源利用效率,应采取必要的政策和法律措施:把提高能源与资源利用效率、减少污染作为经济结构调整的重要标准;运用宏观调控手段,保持经济的适度增长;完善能源价格体系,充分发挥价格税收的调节作用;把提高能源利用效率作为自主创新和技术进步的重要目标;运用法律与行政手段,加强能源生产与消费的外部性监管.     

The implications of economic efficiency for US telecommunications policy

Subsidizing local residence telecommunications service from toll services has produced large distortions in US state and interstate toll markets. While both the business and residence groups as a whole would benefit from lower toll prices and higher residence prices, the fact that toll usage is concentrated means that most residence subscribers would be made worse off. It is therefore politically difficult to implement efficient telecommunications pricing. However, this same concentration of toll usage makes it advantageous for large toll users to bypass the local network to escape the subsidy-laden carrier access charges. Such a bifurcation of the telecommunications network has the potential for making most residence subscribers even worse off than they would be under an efficiency- enhancing reduction in toll prices.     

浅谈提高经济效益的途径

讲求经济效益是人们从事一切活动的基本原则,也是我国经济建设中的核心问题。在竞争日趋激烈的商品经济中,提高经济效益已经成为企业的中心工作。     

Civil antitrust sanctions and cartel stability

A simple model is used to examine the effects of accumulating civil damage liability on the stability of collusive agreements. We demonstrate that all collusive agreements have a built-in upper bound wherein it is no longer profitable to continue collusive activity. A consequence of this upper bound is that the well known "final period problem" comes into play leading to cartel instability. A modification of the initial model demonstrates how a statute of limitations on antitrust actions can mitigate or eliminate the final period problem. Finally, we discuss how the statute of limitations works in practice.     

对发挥施工机械设备效益的探讨

阐述了发挥施工机械设备效益是提高建筑施工企业劳动生产效率的重要条件,及建筑施工企业合理配置好机械设备的方法,并探索施工机械设备使用社会化之路,提出管理好施工机械设备的措施。     

Exports and antitrust: Complements or substitutes?

Conflicting arguments have recently been voiced concerning the impact of antitrust statutes on the export performance of U.S. industries. On the one hand, opponents of vigorous enforcement have argued that antitrust constraints prevent firms from achieving efficiencies, thereby hampering competitiveness on world markets. On the other hand, proponents of antitrust have argued that vigorous enforcement tempers monopolistic pricing, thereby improving export performance. This paper presents an empirical test of these competing arguments. Our results indicate that Sherman Act Section 1 (price-fixing) enforcement has a positive effect on export shares, while Clayton Act Section 7 (merger) enforcement appears to have a negative effect.     

Strategic and deterrent pricing responses to antitrust investigations

This paper examines the issue of the effects of antitrust on pricing through two empirical studies. The first analyzes time series of prices in five industries involved in antitrust cases to determine whether the various stages of the antitrust process influenced pricing behavior. Some evidence of a ‘deterrent’ effect is found, with real prices lower than their pre-investigation level following the conclusion of the case; a major part of the pricing reaction occurs prior to the filing of formal charges. The second study provides additional evidence of the existence of such a ‘strategic’ reaction to the onset of investigation through an examination of prices in 23 industries investigated but not charged with price fixing.     

The antitrust implications of electronic business-to-business marketplaces

Electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) allow networks of buyers and sellers to conduct business online and to exchange information more efficiently using Internet technology. Despite the benefits that e-marketplaces potentially afford firms, concerns have been raised that these markets may damage competition and potentially violate antitrust laws. This study considers the antitrust legislation related to e-marketplaces and examines the possible antitrust concerns that they raise. Potentially anticompetitive features of e-marketplaces are examined and guidance for firm conduct when creating or participating in an e-marketplace is offered.     

An antitrust analysis of non-profit hospital mergers

This paper considers such issues involved in non-profit hospital mergers as relevant product and geographic markets and the impacts of mergers on competition. The roles of non-price competition, entry barriers, and merger-generated efficiencies are considered. Close attention is given to the relevance of the Justice Department Merger guideline to the hospital industry. Through detailed examination of four litigated or challenged cases, the geographic market is shown to depend upon particular medical services. Outpatient services are found to comprise a separate market from inpatient hospital services, and non-profit status is determined to warrant the usual antitrust merger treatment.     

An antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts

Consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market. Bundled loyalty discounts, in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist, have ambiguous welfare effects. Such discounts should not always be treated as a form of predatory pricing. In some settings, they act as tie-in sales. Existing tests for whether such discounts violate competition laws do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus. We apply a new test to an illustrative example based on SmithKline that assumes the “tied” market has homogeneous goods. If the tied market is characterized by Hotelling competition, bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price. In numerical examples, we find that this can deter entry or induce exit.     

A panel data analysis of code-sharing,antitrust immunity,and open skies treaties in international aviation markets

This paper estimates the effects of code-sharing, antitrust immunity, and Open Skies treaties on prices, output, and capacity using an eleven-year panel of U.S.-Europe data. Code-sharing and immunized alliances are found to have significantly lower prices than does traditional interline (multi-carrier) service, but the effects are smaller in magnitude than those found in previous results that rely on cross-sectional data. Statistical tests that prices for immunized alliance service are equal to online (single carrier) service often cannot be rejected, providing additional evidence that immunity grants allow immunized carriers to internalize a double marginalization problem. Estimated output effects, consistent with the price effects, show that alliances are associated with large increases in passenger volumes. Lastly, estimates suggest that capacity expansions associated with “Open Skies” treaties are due entirely to expansion by immunized carriers on routes between their hubs. I would like to thank the editor and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper do not reflect those of the US Department of Justice. All errors are my own     

Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines

This paper shows how antitrust laws against price-fixing can be enforced efficiently in the presence of asymmetric information between the authorities and the industry, and under different regimes of pecuniary punishment. We consider two regimes of fines that are often used in practice. The first involves a fine based on revenues of the industry while the second is related to the damage caused to consumers. The analysis shows that since investigation is costly, it is optimal from a welfare point of view to tolerate some degree of collusion in both cases. Comparing the deterrence levels, we show that no regime is a priori better than the other. In addition, we show that for industries where the possibilities of collusion are small, the first system dominates the second in terms of efficiency. Conversely, for high possibilities of collusion, the second system is better.