Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princes

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are cash shells that try to buy private operating firms to which they confer a public-listing status. Private operating firms tend to use SPACs as an alternative way to get listed, particularly in years with weak IPO activity and volatile markets, such as 2008 and 2009. In these two years, approximately 31% of firms went public through a SPAC acquisition rather than through an IPO. Our results from the analysis of 127 SPAC acquisitions and 1128 IPOs during the wave of “new-generation” SPACs starting in 2003 lend support to the conjecture that particular small and levered firms with low growth opportunities tend to use this vehicle. SPAC acquisitions also may be fueled by the cash-out motives of existing shareholders. Venture capitalists and private equity investors tend to refrain from using SPAC acquisitions as an exit route. Tracking long-term abnormal returns, we find that SPAC firms are associated with severe underperformance in comparison to the market, the industry and (comparable) IPO firms.     

Investment income taxes and private equity acquisition activity

Utilizing a novel identification strategy, we uncover evidence that reducing the investment income tax rate increases acquisition activity by private equity acquirers. Applying a difference-in-difference methodology, we find that acquisitions sponsored by private equity firms nearly doubled following the investment income tax rate reductions associated with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. We attribute our findings to private equity fund structures and managing partners’ ability to capture the expected benefit of lower capital gains tax rates. These findings are robust to controlling for target shareholders’ tax incentives, as well as firm, industry, and macroeconomic factors possibly influencing acquisition activity.     

Founders,heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States

We argue that information about firm activities can vary substantially in the presence of founder or heir ownership, thereby influencing the risks borne by minority investors. We explore two hypotheses with regard to these controlling shareholders and corporate transparency, focusing on their role as monitor in-place and their potential to exploit firm opacity to accrue private benefits of control. To test these notions, we create an opacity index that ranks the relative transparency of the two thousand largest industrial US firms and find founder and heir ownership in 22% and 25% of these firms, respectively. Our analysis indicates that, in large, publicly traded companies, both founder and heir firms are significantly more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms. We also find that founder and heir-controlled firms exhibit a negative relation to performance in all but the most transparent firms. Surprisingly, additional tests reveal that concerns about divergences in ownership versus control (management type, dual class shares, and board influence) appear to be substantially less important than corporate opacity in explaining the performance impacts of founder and heir control. Finally, we decompose corporate opacity into disclosure and market scrutiny components, finding that the disclosure quality component appears to be of greater importance to investors. However, irrespective of whether these controlling shareholders create or stay in the firm because of corporate opacity, our analysis suggests that founders and heirs in large, publicly traded firms exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors.     

Does shareholder coordination matter? Evidence from private placements

We propose a new role for private investments in public equity (PIPEs) as a mechanism to reduce coordination frictions among existing equity holders. We establish a causal link between the coordination ability of incumbent shareholders and PIPE issuance. This result obtains even after controlling for alternative explanations such as information asymmetry and access to public markets. Improved equity coordination following a private placement leads to favorable debt renegotiations within one year of issuance. Mitigating coordination frictions among shareholders ultimately decreases the odds of firm default in half.     

Information disclosure,firm growth,and the cost of capital

We study how information disclosure affects the cost of equity capital and investor welfare in a dynamic setting. We show that a firm’s cost of capital decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) a certain threshold. The threshold growth rate is higher when the firm’s cash flows are more persistent, or when other firms in the economy are growing at low rates. While current shareholders always prefer maximum public disclosure, future shareholders’ welfare decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) the threshold.     

Private equity exits after IPOs

We examine post-IPO exits of private equity sponsors of portfolio firms via follow-on secondary equity offerings and third party takeovers. Sponsors retain considerable ownership in listed portfolio firms for lengthy periods after IPOs, well beyond lockup expiration. After private equity post-IPO secondary offerings, corporate profitability is strongly superior to benchmark firms, indicating portfolio firms are successfully prepared for private equity's subsequent exit. Nevertheless, share prices fall at offering announcements, reflecting the failure of private equity sponsors to exit stakes in listed entities at the high premiums paid in third party takeovers, premiums that are invariably shared equally with public shareholders.     

Access to private equity and real firm activity: Evidence from PIPEs

We study how access to private equity financing affects real firm activities using a broad panel of publicly traded U.S. firms that raise external equity through private placements (PIPEs) between 1995 and 2008. The public firms relying on PIPEs are generally small, high-tech firms that cannot finance investment internally and likely face severe external financing constraints; PIPEs are by far the most important source of finance for these firms. We show that firms use PIPE inflows to maintain extremely high R&D investment ratios and to build substantial cash reserves. We also use GMM techniques that control for firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of the decision to raise private equity and find that PIPE funding has a substantial impact on corporate investment in cash reserves and R&D, and a smaller but significant impact on investment in non-cash working capital, but little impact on fixed investment or acquisitions. Our estimates indicate that R&D investment initially increases by $0.20–$0.25 for each dollar of private equity flowing into the firm, and that PIPE funds initially invested in cash ultimately go to R&D. These findings offer direct evidence that access to private equity finance has an important effect on the key input that drives innovation at the firm- and economy-wide levels.     

Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy

This study examines the impact of concentrated founder ownership on related party transactions (RPTs) for Indian firms. We find that concentrated founder ownership is positively related to RPTs and is more likely to encourage RPTs that are beneficial for the minority shareholders. We also observe that RPTs are associated with higher firm value. This relationship is more pronounced for business group firms and firms with more highly concentrated founder ownership. We show that the reputation incentive plays a very important role in founders’ decisions, and they use RPTs as an efficient transaction mechanism.     

The determinants of the voting premium in Italy: The evidence from 1974 to 2003

We examine the voting premium in Italy in the period 1974 to 2003, when it ranged from 1% to 100%. At firm level, the measure of the price differential between voting and non-voting stocks cannot be fully explained without taking into account the effect of the largest shareholder’s identity. Family-controlled firms have higher voting premiums, especially when the family owns a large stake in the company’s voting equity and the founder is the firm’s CEO and/or Chairman. We explain this result by showing that families attach greater importance to control and are more prone than other types of controlling shareholders to expropriate the non-voting class of shareholders.     

The fast track IPO – Success factors for taking firms public with SPACs

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are shells initiated with the sole intent of acquiring a single privately held company. SPAC shareholders vote on this acquisition, and in this paper we identify the factors that affect approval probability. Surprisingly, the data indicate more experienced managers and boards do not enhance the probability of deal approval. Similarly, glamor underwriters and larger underwriter syndicates are less likely to be associated with successful SPACs. Further, we find a negative relation between the presence of active investor (hedge funds and private equity funds) shareholdings in a SPAC and approval probability.     

MARKET EXPECTATIONS AND THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF EQUITY ISSUANCE

We examine how the wealth effects of equity offers are influenced by investors' expectation of the equity type (public or private) to be issued. Firms deviating to the public market may be issuing when information asymmetry or agency costs are high, and their wealth effects are more negative than for firms that are anticipated to issue equity publicly. Firms deviating to the private market, however, may signal firm undervaluation or monitoring benefits and experience more positive wealth effects than firms that are expected to issue equity privately. For the private issues, public market accessibility appears to influence the wealth effects.     

Public Equity and Audit Pricing in the United States

To what degree are audit fees for U.S. firms with publicly traded equity higher than fees for otherwise similar firms with private equity? The answer is potentially important for evaluating regulatory regime design efficiency and for understanding audit demand and production economics. For U.S. firms with publicly traded debt, we hold constant the regulatory regime, including mandated issuer reporting and auditor responsibilities. We vary equity ownership and thus public securities market contextual factors, including any related public firm audit fees from increased audit effort to reduce audit litigation risk and/or pure litigation risk premium (litigation channel effects). In cross‐section, we find that audit fees for public equity firms are 20–22% higher than fees for otherwise similar private equity firms. Time‐series comparisons for firms that change ownership status yield larger percentage fee increases (decreases) for those going public (private). Results are consistent with litigation channel effects giving rise to substantial incremental audit fees for U.S. firms with public equity ownership.     

Private matters

Why do private firms stay private? Empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, as most private firms in the U.S. do not report their financial results. We investigate why private status matters by taking advantage of a unique dataset of large, leveraged private firms with SEC filings. Unlike a number of other studies, we find that neither the existence of growth opportunities, nor the desire of firm founders to diversify, is a principal determinant of the decision whether or not to retain private status. Rather, the existence of private benefits of control appears to serve as the most significant incentive to stay private. Family-controlled firms have significantly lower probabilities of filing for an IPO, while a board structure that grants management relatively more autonomy lowers the probability of an IPO filing as well. Cross-sectional analysis of profitability and ex post performance suggests that while private benefits of control may encourage firms to stay private, they do not have detrimental effects on firm efficiency. In contrast, firms controlled by private equity specialists appear to place a low value on control benefits and are likely to go public as a means of cashing out.     

Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.     

Returns to acquirers of privatizing financial services firms: An international examination

While the literature reports improved performance for privatizing firms, banking markets are different. Many privatizing financial services firms face unique problems such as an overhang of problem loans and weak credit cultures and legal systems. We investigate the returns to successful bidders in privatization acquisitions of financial services firms, examine short-horizon performance, and test whether such acquisitions result in a change in risk for the bidding firm. Our results show that the cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of bidding firms are positive, perhaps reflecting initial optimism that the foreign firm acquiring the privatizing firm would share in the success associated with privatization. Bidders also experience an increase in their total risk following the acquisition.     

Governance Structure and Firm Performance in Private Family Firms

Although a large proportion of firms are family owned and most family firms are private, our understanding of private family firms is limited. Using confidential information on family relationships between board members, CEOs, and shareholders, this is the first study to provide large‐scale evidence on the association between governance structure and firm performance in family‐controlled private firms. Our sample is unique as it covers almost all private limited liability firms in Norway, spans 11 years, traces firm ownership to ultimate owners, and identifies family relationship using data on kinship, marriage, and adoption. The results show a U‐shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. Higher ownership of the second largest owner, higher percentage of family members on the board, stronger family power, and smaller boards are associated with higher firm performance. In addition, the positive association between the ownership of the second largest owner and firm performance also occurs when the second largest owner is a member of the controlling family, but the association is stronger when the second largest owner is a non‐family member. We further test the relative importance of these test variables and find that ownership structure is more associated with firm performance than board structure.     

Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups

We examine whether firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols) benefit from acquisitions they make or whether such acquisitions provide a way for controlling shareholders to increase their wealth by increasing the value of other group firms (tunneling). We find that when a chaebol-affiliated firm makes an acquisition, its stock price on average falls. While minority shareholders of a chaebol-affiliated firm making an acquisition lose, the controlling shareholder of that firm on average benefits because the acquisition enhances the value of other firms in the group. This evidence is consistent with the tunneling hypothesis.     

Investor protection and cross-border acquisitions of private and public targets

We examine the announcement-period acquirer returns and target values for a large sample of cross-border acquisitions by U.S. firms, differentiating between private and public targets and paying particular attention to the legal protection of minority shareholders in the target country. For high-protection target countries, acquirer announcement-period returns are significantly negative for public targets and significantly positive for private targets. For low-protection target countries, the acquirer returns are significantly positive for public targets and insignificantly different from zero for private targets. For public targets, acquirer returns are decreasing and target-firm values and acquisition premia are increasing with the level of investor protection. For private targets, investor protection does not affect acquirer returns or target-firm values. We find that bidder returns decrease with the level of creditor protection in the target country and increase with the quality of accounting standards. Our results also show that in low- protection countries, firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, such as higher insider ownership, may substitute for the lower level of investor protection.     

Wealth transfer,signaling and leverage in M&A

Merger activity amplifies the conflict of interest between a bidder's different classes of security holders. This study examines how equity returns and credit default swap spreads are affected by acquisition-driven changes in firm leverage. We develop an improved proxy for predicted leverage changes which includes transaction financing and find it has a positive relationship with both equity returns and credit spreads. Using data for North American firms that made acquisition announcements between 2008 and 2014, we find that in leverage increasing mergers, bidding firm shareholders gain while bondholders lose. While these results are consistent with the wealth transfer literature we show that the gains to bidders' shareholders and losses to bidders' bondholders are caused by the change in leverage, not the form of payment or its signaling effect as is commonly documented.     

Multiple founders and firm value

In this paper, we highlight the existence of multi-founder firms, which were founded by multiple individuals (with no family connections) who are still actively involved in the firm as directors and/or managers. These firms provide a unique setting to shed further light on the net valuation effects of founder involvement. In particular, multi-founder firms provide us with the opportunity to examine the benefits and costs to shareholders of multiple founders involved as directors, CEOs and managers in the same firm. Our analysis indicates that multi-founder firms are more valuable than all other types of firms, including single-founder firms and family firms, with the valuation premium positively related to the number of founders involved in the firm. Further analysis confirms that this valuation premium is linked to the direct involvement of the multiple founders as directors and CEOs. However, further founder involvement in vice president positions has a negative relationship with firm value.