Measuring Takeover Premiums in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: Insights from Turkey

We investigate whether the merger announcement dates provided in a popular mergers and acquisitions (M&A) database, SDC, serve as accurate event dates for estimating the wealth effects of mergers on target firms located in Turkey. We find that 74 percent of SDC’s merger announcement dates are preceded by merger-related events such as merger rumors, target firms’ search for potential acquirers, and early-stage merger negotiation announcements. Target cumulative abnormal return (CAR) estimates around these early dates are almost twice as large as the CAR estimates around SDC’s merger announcement dates. We argue that our findings have implications for the recently flourishing cross-border M&A literature.     

U.S. and Japanese macroeconomic news and stock market volatility in Asia-Pacific

I use a new comprehensive dataset to analyze the impact of ten U.S. and six Japanese macroeconomic announcements on stock market volatility in Japan, Hong Kong, South-Korea and Australia. A GARCH model that allows for multiplicative announcement effects and asymmetries is employed. Overnight conditional variances are significantly higher on announcement days and significantly lower on days before and after announcements, especially for U.S. news. The impact of announcements on implied volatilities, in contrast, is much weaker. Out-of-sample trading strategies that systematically buy delta-neutral straddles on announcement days generate statistically significant profits, but these disappear after transaction costs are taken into account.     

DIVIDEND CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS AND EARNINGS VOLATILITY AND TIMING

Recent modeling using the asymmetric information framework suggests that the magnitude of a market response to dividend change announcements should be related to the timing of the dividend announcement vis-a-vis the earnings release and to the stability of those earnings. The announcement effects of regular quarterly dividend changes are tested and these effects are related to the percentage change in the dividend yield, to the stability of the firm's earnings, to the timing of dividend and earnings announcements, and to the level of earnings compared with prior quarters. Analysis indicates that significant relationships exist between the announcement effect and changes in the dividend yield, and whether the dividend change is positive or negative. Only weak evidence exists that dividend announcement effects are larger when current earnings are unknown.     

Post-split underreaction: The importance of prior split history

The magnitude of the underreaction following a stock split is different depending on the number of splits that have already occurred. The first three splits are followed by abnormal profitability and significant underreaction, which are outcomes consistent with managers using splits to signal favorable information about the firm's prospects. However, abnormal profitability fails to materialize and the underreaction gradually dissipates with each subsequent split suggesting the efficacy of a split announcement as a vehicle to convey information is not constant but steadily reduces with each successive split. The underreaction is distinct from any short-term announcement effects and indicates the market does not immediately impound the split's information content. There is no significant change in liquidity around each consecutive split confirming that the underreaction is not explained by microstructure effects. As is the case with other corporate events, the market interprets the content of announcements already made multiple times differently from announcements made less often.     

Open-Market Stock Repurchase and Stock Price Behavior When Management Values Real Investment

This paper provides a simple explanation of open‐market stock repurchases and the stock price behavior surrounding them. There is ex ante asymmetry of information with regard to the private benefits that corporate managers can attain from real investments. In our model, open‐market repurchase announcements reveal information about the managers' private benefits when real investment opportunities are unprofitable in terms of firm values. This study differs from previous studies in that we show that announcements of open‐market repurchase programs can be believable without the restriction that the announcements are commitments. Empirically, the model simultaneously predicts that a stock price will drop prior to an open‐market repurchase announcement and will rise in response to the announcement. These predictions are consistent with stylized facts.     

Information Content of Insider Trading Around Corporate Announcements: The Case of Capital Expenditures

There is gathering evidence of insider trading around corporate announcements of dividends, capital expenditures, equity issues and repurchases, and other capital structure changes. Although signaling models have been used to explain the price reaction of these announcements, a usual assumption made in these models is that insiders cannot trade to gain from such announcements. An innovative feature of this paper is to model trading by corporate insiders (subject to disclosure regulation) as one of the signals. Detailed testable predictions are described for the interaction of corporate announcements and concurrent insider trading. In particular, such interaction is shown to depend crucially on whether the firm is a growth firm, a mature firm, or a declining firm. Empirical proxies for firm technology are developed based on measures of growth and Tobin's q ratio. In the underlying “efficient” signaling equilibrium, investment announcements and net insider trading convey private information of insiders to the market at least cost. The paper also addresses issues of deriving intertemporal announcement effects from the equilibrium (cross-sectional) pricing functional. Other announcement effects relate the intensity of the market response to insider trading, variance of firm cash flows, risk aversion of the insiders, and characteristics of firm technology (growth, mature, or declining).     

Information asymmetry and accounting restatement: NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ evidence

We examine the impact of accounting restatement announcement on firms’ value and information asymmetry for both auction market (NYSE-AMEX) and dealer market (NASDAQ) using a public sample of restatement announcements from 1997 to 2005. In both markets, we document economically and significantly negative mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement dates. The restatements attributed to auditors are associated with more negative returns than those attributed to management and the SEC. However, there is no significant difference between market reactions arising from the core and non-core restatements. We also find a significant increase in volume, number of transactions, average order size, volatility, and various measures of spreads after the restatement announcement indicating that restatement announcements diminish company prospects and contribute to increased uncertainty and information asymmetry. Finally, we find that the information asymmetry in the NASDAQ market around the event date is less pronounced than in the NYSE-AMEX market.     

Evolution of market uncertainty around earnings announcements

This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the dynamics of the implied volatility or implied standard deviation (ISD) around earnings announcements dates. The volatility implied by option prices can be interpreted as the level of volatility expected by the market over the remaining life of the option. We propose a theoretical framework for the evolution of the ISD that takes into account two well-known features of the instantaneous volatility: volatility clustering and the leverage effect. In this context, the ISD should decrease after an earnings announcement but the post-announcement ISD path depends on the content of the earnings announcement: good news or bad news. An empirical investigation is conducted on the Swiss market over the period 1989–1998.     

How Do Investors Interpret Announcements of Earnings Delays?

Unlike in the case of delays of 10‐K or 10‐Q filings, the SEC does not require managers to disclose delays of earnings announcements to the public. Thus, for companies that are unable to report earnings by their expected date, managers face a decision: remain silent or announce the delay. Prior research has investigated all earnings delays, whether or not they are accompanied by announcements of the delay announcement, and found that the market reaction is slightly negative, on average, for companies that allow their expected earnings dates to pass without disclosing results. It's not clear, however, whether this negative reaction was due to the absence of news or to the information contained in the announcements of the earnings delays. The authors' recent study documents that earnings delay announcements are associated with an average one‐day abnormal stock return of a negative 6%. This statistically as well as economically significant reduction in value is consistent with anecdotal evidence in the popular business press as well as predictions of disclosure theories, in particular the explanation that concerns about legal liability and managerial reputation motivate managers to disclose bad news. The study also shows that almost all managers who announce earnings delays attempt to influence the market reaction by disclosing the underlying cause. Finally, the study shows that the market reaction to earnings delay announcements is positively related to future earnings changes, consistent with the role of these disclosures in providing a signal of deteriorating financial performance.     

Intraday volatility and trading volume after takeover announcements

This paper examines transactions data regarding the market's reaction to 258 takeover announcements on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1977 to 1989. The study analyzes volatility and volume of target firm's stock during the first trading day following a takeover announcement. A cross-sectional analysis relates this intraday volatility and volume to various aspects of a takeover announcement that proxy for the certainty of payoff to shareholders. Post-announcement volatility is highest when takeover announcements involve share exchange bids which are contested. Trading volume is highest when bids are contested and involve a large initial price change.     

THE RELATION AMONG DIVIDEND POLICY,FIRM SIZE,AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS

In this paper we investigate the role of dividends in explaining the size effect. The previous literature concludes that before the firm's earnings announcement, small firm stock prices impound less information than large firm stock prices. This size effect is evidenced by the greater market reaction to small firm earnings announcements than to large firm earnings announcements. We find that if the dividend announcement precedes the earnings announcement, no size effect exists. The implication is that the information conveyed by dividend announcements includes the information conveyed to investors in large firms by other information sources. However, if the firm does not pay dividends or if the firm's earnings announcement precedes its dividend announcement, the size effect exists. The implication is that dividends do not completely explain the size effect. That is, there are information sources other than dividends that are exclusively available to investors in large firms, and the information provided by these sources is reflected in the stock price of large firms before the earnings announcement.     

货币政策公告、政策不确定性及股票市场的预公告溢价效应——来自中国市场的证据

中国人民银行周期性发布的货币政策相关公告为市场判断货币政策走向提供重要信息。较于实体经济反馈政策信息具有滞后性,股票市场是否在货币政策公告期内及时对政策消息做出反应,即存在公告效应？股票价格是否体现预期货币政策调整带来的不确定性？本文基于2011-2017年A股市场数据,研究我国股票市场在我国货币政策相关公告发布前后几日这一较短窗口区间内的市场反应。结果表明,股市指数在发布货币供应量指标的公告前几天内会出现显著为正的风险溢价,而在指标发布后溢价并不显著,这一现象我们称之为货币政策相关公告的“预公告溢价效应”。本文发现,预公告溢价的产生并非由于市场提前预期到货币政策的走向,而是来源于投资者预先获得了对政策不确定性的溢价补偿。本文进一步就防范系统性风险、从数量型货币政策工具向价格型转变等问题提出了相关政策建议。     

The European Central Bank and green finance: How would the green quantitative easing affect the investors' behavior during times of crisis?

In July 2021, the European central bank (ECB) announced the application of new environmental criteria to purchase private assets as part of its Quantitative Easing (QE) program. Using a Bayesian VAR model with time varying parameters and stochastic volatility (TVP-BVAR-SV), we investigate the transmission of Green bond shocks to the stock market during the pre-and-post COVID-19 pandemic. We document a nonlinear relation between the green bonds and the green equities. Our findings suggest that the ECB's Green QE can drive investors towards green investment in the stock market through the green bond market during the non-crisis period. However, we show that the proper transmission of Green QE shocks to the stock market depends on the economic conditions and could not be effective during the crisis period. Our results also support previous findings that state the growing demand for sustainable investing after COVID-19. These findings have important implications for investment professionals, policymakers, and environmentally concerned actors.     

The liquidity and trading activity effects of acquisition payment methods: Evidence from the announcements of private firms' acquisitions

We investigate how the liquidity and trading activity effects of the announcement of the acquisition of private targets vary by payment method. We find significant increases in trading activity around acquisition announcement dates irrespective of the payment method used; however, fluctuations are lower for acquisitions financed by earnouts and cash. Similarly, the stocks of acquirers using cash and earnouts are also less affected by a general loss of liquidity that accompanies announcements. We show that these effects are explained by the interpretation of cash acquisition by the market as an option used when acquirers perceive no risk of being adversely selected, and the potential of earnout as an adverse selection risk reduction tool.     

Liquidity and Information Flow around Monetary Policy Announcement

We analyze the effects of monetary policy announcements on stock market liquidity using intraday data. We show that the impairment in liquidity associated with policy announcements occurs primarily after, rather than before, the announcements, and is relatively short lived, lasting about 1.5 hours. Liquidity impairment varies proportionately with the information content of the policy announcement, with larger effects associated with unscheduled announcements and scheduled announcements with larger policy surprises. Overall, our results suggest that informed traders have an information processing advantage over uninformed participants rather than access to private information.     

Earnings Announcements and Systematic Risk

Firms scheduled to report earnings earn an annualized abnormal return of 9.9%. We propose a risk‐based explanation for this phenomenon, whereby investors use announcements to revise their expectations for nonannouncing firms, but can only do so imperfectly. Consequently, the covariance between firm‐specific and market cash flow news spikes around announcements, making announcers especially risky. Consistent with our hypothesis, announcer returns forecast aggregate earnings. The announcement premium is persistent across stocks, and early (late) announcers earn higher (lower) returns. Nonannouncers' response to announcements is consistent with our model, both over time and across firms. Finally, exposure to announcement risk is priced.     

The Impact of the Source and Sequence of Information in Primary Equity Offerings

Empirical studies of the announcement effects of equity offerings have generally defined the event date as the earlier of the SEC registration date or the first mention in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), the implicit assumption being that the two types of announcements are equally informative. This study examines whether the source of the event announcement might influence a study's results and whether subsequent announcements from other sources elicit a market reaction. Specifically, this paper investigates whether Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW) announcements that differ in timing from either of these information events elicit a market response and, more important, whether impacts from the DJNW announcements alter the validity of the widely used methodology. The results of the paper indicate that, for issues that are not mentioned in the WSJ Index, there is a negative and significant return on the registration date. However, no matter whether the registration occurs before or after its mention on the DJNW, the share price reaction is greater from mention on the DJNW than at registration. This finding leads to the conclusion that the DJNW should be used as the event date and that press coverage     

Corporate Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Effect: Empirical Evidence from Europe

Corporate real estate disposals have increased in Europe during the past few years. In this research paper, we study market reactions of publicly traded European companies' real estate sale and leaseback announcements during 1998–2004. This study is one of the first ones to study the sale and leaseback impact on corporate value with a pan‐European data. We find that the sale and leaseback announcements have on average positive impact to firm's value which is in line with the previous studies. However, we also find that the positive effect is mainly caused by the deals with high transaction value to company market value ratio. Smaller transactions do not create on average any abnormal returns. Our results support the hypothesis that the positive sale and leaseback announcement effect is a consequence of revealed hidden value of the company's assets. Thus, sale and leaseback can also be seen as a mechanism for revealing the hidden value of company's assets to the market.     

Rumors and pre-announcement trading: why sell target stocks before acquisition announcements?

We track trading activity in the days preceding acquisition announcements for target firms and find that abnormally high trading volume precedes significant price movement. Using additional intraday data, we find increased active-selling in target stocks before acquisition announcements that offsets increased active-buying. This is unexpected because sellers often lose money when an acquisition is announced. After ruling out alternative explanations, we find evidence that sellers are rational investors who trade on the market??s perceived overreaction to takeover rumors. While sellers lose money when a rumor precedes an actual announcement, in most cases rumors fail to materialize into public announcements. We provide evidence that the significant pre-announcement volume we document reflects the market??s processing of highly uncertain information in takeover rumors.     

How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.