An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

Contagion across Eurozone’s sovereign spreads and the Core-Periphery divide

This paper investigates the causes of disproportionate increases of sovereign yields with respect to the interest rate on the 10 years German Bund within the Eurozone. Empirical evidence drawn from the Bank for International Settlements dataset on banks’ portfolios shows that rapid financial integration, following the launch of the monetary union, resulted in excess exposure of Core countries’ banks in the Peripheral countries’ financial assets. In order to endogenize the possibility of contagion effects, we conduct econometric estimates through a Global Vector Autoregressive model, where each country’s spread depends upon all Eurozone countries’ spreads. Results show that after the burst of the financial crisis the Core countries’ sovereign yields are essentially determined by the international risk aversion, whereas the spreads of Peripheral countries mainly depend on fundamentals, namely the public debt/GDP ratio and the Real Effective Exchange Rate values with respect to the Eurozone average. These results are supported by the estimate of an impulse response analysis. Macroeconomic failures in public finances and competitiveness seem to originate the exceptional increases in sovereign spreads of the Periphery, through a contagion effect which is limited to this group of Eurozone countries.     

Evidence of cross-asset contagion in U.S. markets

This study examines evidence of cross-asset contagion among REIT, money, stock, bond, and currency markets in the US from 2006 to 2012, which covers the subprime and European sovereign debt crisis. We apply the Granger causality test and a vector auto-regression to examine the change of causality structure. Our results show that contagion exists from medium-term bond markets to equity markets; REIT, money markets and short-term bond markets show little evidence of cross-asset contagion with other markets; and the currency market shows high co-movement and contagion with equity markets. Our findings provide more rewarding asset reallocating strategies for the investors who invest in both bond and equity markets before a crisis to consider reallocating their portfolio into REIT and money markets to benefit from diversification during a crisis period.     

On the time-varying relationship between EMU sovereign spreads and their determinants

We use a dynamic multipath general-to-specific algorithm to capture structural instability in the link between euro area sovereign bond yield spreads against Germany and their underlying determinants over the period January 1999–August 2011. We offer new evidence suggesting a significant heterogeneity across countries, both in terms of the risk factors determining spreads over time as well as in terms of the magnitude of their impact on spreads. Our findings suggest that the relationship between euro area sovereign risk and the underlying fundamentals is strongly time-varying, turning from inactive to active since the onset of the global financial crisis and further intensifying during the sovereign debt crisis. As a general rule, the set of financial and macro spreads' determinants in the euro area is rather unstable but generally becomes richer and stronger in significance as the crisis evolves.     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

Contagion of the Global Financial Crisis and the real economy: A regional analysis

This paper investigates the contagion effects of the Global Financial Crisis (2007–2009) by examining ten sectors in six developed and emerging regions during different phases of the crisis. The analysis tests different channels of financial contagion across regions and real economy sectors by utilizing dynamic conditional correlation from the multivariate Fractionally Integrated Asymmetric Power ARCH (FIAPARCH) model. Evidence shows that the GFC can be characterized by contagion effects across regional stock markets and regional financial and non-financial sectors.However, Developed Pacific region and some sectors in particular Consumer Goods, Healthcare and Technology across all regions seem to be less affected by the crisis, while the most vulnerable sectors are observed in the emerging Asian and European regions. Further, the analysis on a crisis phase level indicates that the most severe contagion effects exist after the failure of Lehman Brothers limiting the effectiveness of portfolio diversification.     

Emerging market sovereign bond spreads,credit ratings and global financial crisis

This paper investigates the impacts of sovereign credit ratings and global financial conditions on the evolution of EMBI Global (EMBIG) spreads for a panel of 23 developing countries by using daily data for the period between 1998 and 2012. To this end, we employ not only the conventional panel estimation procedures, but also the recent methods tackling with either cross-sectional dependence stemming from common global shocks or a potential endogeneity. Our results suggest that credit ratings along with global financial conditions re the main determinants of EMBIG spreads. The determinants of EMBIG spreads are not invariant to speculative and investment grade episodes and transitions between them. The recent global crisis changed the determinants of EMBIG spreads and led to credit ratings' impact to converge between speculative and investment grade countries.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

TIME‐VARYING VOLATILITY,DEFAULT, AND THE SOVEREIGN RISK PREMIUM

This article studies how volatility changes affect sovereign spreads in strategic default models. Volatility changes affect savings and sovereign spreads. However, the impact of volatility shocks is state dependent; when the economy has a low debt, an increase in volatility is prone to generate precautionary savings. Instead, with high debt, an increase in volatility is likely to induce an even further increase in debt and spreads, both in endowment and production economies. I document a positive correlation between sovereign spreads and aggregate income volatility for a set of European economies during the debt crisis, consistent with the model's implications.     

What can wavelets unveil about the vulnerabilities of monetary integration? A tale of Eurozone stock markets

The study has two main objectives: (i) to investigate whether there is pure contagion or fundamental-based contagion/interdependence among the Eurozone equity markets (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Netherlands), attributable to the shocks stemming from nine major crises around the world (ii) to investigate the evolution of market integration, whether mainly short-run or long-run. Wavelet decompositions, in both its discrete and continuous forms, are employed to unveil the multi-horizon nature of co-movements, volatility and lead–lag relationships. This is to unveil the path of linkages and the behavior underlying the transmission mechanism of financial shocks across major Eurozone stock markets. Evidence also supports the presence of common shocks whereby equity markets in Eurozone are significantly affected by episodic crisis events globally. Prior to the recent subprime crisis, contagion effects have generated short-term shocks that may potentially involve, among other factors, excessive channels. In stark contrast, the most recent US subprime crisis and EMU sovereign debt crisis reveal the evidence of fundamental-based contagion. We also find the increasing short-run and long-run stock market integration, driven by several stages of the establishment of EMU. Policy implications for regulators and investors are discussed in the context of continued monetary integration.     

Macroeconomic variables and the sovereign risk premia in EMU,non-EMU EU,and developed countries

This project studies and models key macroeconomic variables and their impact on sovereign risk premia across select European economies and developed countries. The sample is divided into three groups of countries: those in the European Monetary Union (EMU); the standalone economies outside the EMU but members of the broader European Union (EU); and other developed economies. The main subject of examination across all three groups is the impact of macroeconomic variables on sovereign borrowing costs. EU countries have experienced high financial stress and a rapid rise in the credit default swaps (CDS) spreads during the EMU debt crisis. A nonlinear vector smooth transition autoregressive model is applied to investigate such a regime change in the finance-output link using sovereign CDS and industrial production index. The paper finds that regime-switching takes place rather suddenly in most EMU countries. The study concludes that due to the potential spillover effects in the EU as a whole, the individual country macroeconomic indicators were less reflected in the financial stress and spillover and contagion effects became dominant.     

Determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU: An optimal currency area perspective

In the light of the recent financial crisis, we take a panel cointegration approach that allows for structural breaks to the analysis of the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in nine economies of the European Monetary Union. We find evidence for a level break in the cointegrating relationship. Moreover, results show that (i) fiscal imbalances – namely expected government debt-to-GDP differentials – are the main long-run drivers of sovereign spreads; (ii) liquidity risks and cumulated inflation differentials have non-negligible weights; but (iii) all conclusions are ultimately connected to whether or not the sample of countries is composed of members of an Optimal Currency Area (OCA). In particular, we establish (i) that results are overall driven by those countries not passing the OCA test; and (ii) that investors closely monitor and severely punish the deterioration of expected debt positions of those economies exhibiting significant gaps in competitiveness.     

Risks of Latin America sovereign debts before and after the financial crisis

We investigate the financial determinants of the return and volatility of sovereign CDS spread from six major Latin American countries before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Other than CBOE VIX index, we also find that global factors including US Baa–Aaa default yield, TED spread and US Treasury rate all contribute to the changes in these sovereign CDS spread. Although global risk aversion (VIX) is a significant determinant of sovereign debt spread, in the years after the crisis, the emphasis has shifted towards short-term refinancing risk (TED). Furthermore, the risk of Greek sovereign debt crisis also transmitted Latin American CDS spreads immediately, but only in the post-Lehman sub-period. These findings provide implications for international bonds and credit derivatives trading strategies.     

Tree networks to assess financial contagion

We propose a two-layered tree network model that decomposes financial contagion into a global component, composed of inter-country contagion effects, and a local component, made up of inter-institutional contagion channels. The model is effectively applied to a database containing time series of daily CDS spreads of major European financial institutions (banks and insurance companies), and reveals the importance of monitoring both channels to assess financial contagion. Our empirical application reveals evidence of a high inter-country and inter-institutional vulnerability at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and during the sovereign crisis in 2011. The results identify France as central to the inter-country contagion in the Euro area during the financial crisis, while Italy dominates during the sovereign crisis. The application of the model to detect contagion between sectors of the European economy reveals similar findings, and identifies the manufacturing sector as the most central, while, at the company level, financial institutions dominate during the 2008 crisis.     

Has co-movement dynamics in emerging stock markets changed after global financial crisis? New evidence from wavelet analysis

In this article, we revisit the issue of contagion, interdependence and changes in correlation structure after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 between developed and emerging markets in a time-frequency domain using a wavelet-based approach for the period spanning over 1 January 1999 to 8 November 2016. We report evidences of: (a) weaker contagion for Latin American emerging markets during GFC, (b) a strong contagion effect for emerging markets in Europe and the Middle East and (c) a fall in long-run co-movements after GFC, which means by investing in emerging markets, the diversification benefits can be derived in the long run. We report evidence of coexistence of contagion and permanent change in correlation structure.     

Islamic financial markets and global crises: Contagion or decoupling?

This paper investigates the contagion effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (ESDC) on Islamic equity and bond markets. Using a sample of Islamic stock indices from various developed and emerging markets and the global Islamic stock and bond (sukuk) indices, we explore asymmetric conditional correlation dynamics across stable and crisis periods and across the two crises. The results fail to provide strong contagion evidence between conventional and Islamic equity and bond indices, supporting the decoupling hypothesis of the Islamic securities. Our findings imply that Islamic equities and bonds may provide a cushion against risk and instability, particularly in periods of turmoil. The small number of contagion cases mostly relates to the ESDC and developed Islamic stock indices. The findings also show that the Islamic emerging stock indices in the BRICS provide the most effective international portfolio diversification benefits compared to the Islamic developed indices.     

One crisis,two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems

This article explores the link between the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the different government interventions aimed at rescuing financial institutions on the significant increase of the costs of public debts as measured by the interest rate spreads with respect to Germany. We show evidence on the existence of a statistically significant link between the two crises embodied by capital injections and government guarantees. More specifically, the two types of government interventions have a negative impact on the cost of the sovereign debts under study. This empirical result can explain why the sovereign debt crisis immediately followed the subprime crisis.     

Sovereign Reputation and Yield Spreads: A Case Study on Retroactive Legislation

This paper uses recent legislation in Austria to establish a link between sovereign reputation and yield spreads. In 2009, Hypo Alpe Adria International, a bank previously co‐owned by the regional government of Carinthia, had been nationalized by Austria's central government in order to avoid a default triggering multi‐billion Euro local government guarantees. In 2015, special legislation retroactively introduced collective action clauses allowing a haircut on both the bonds and the guarantees while avoiding formal default. We document that legislative and administrative action designed to partly abrogate the guarantees resulted in a loss of reputation, leading to higher yield spreads for sovereign debt. Our analysis of covered bonds uncovers an increase in yield spreads on the secondary market and a deterioration of primary market conditions.     

Does local and Euro area sentiment matter for sovereign debt markets? Evidence from a bailout country

Does sentiment impact the sovereign debt markets? This article investigates whether lagged domestic and Euro area irrational sentiment (optimism or pessimism unwarranted by fundamentals) predicts future sovereign bond spreads, in Portugal, between January 2000 and December 2013. We find that domestic and Euro area sentiment negatively forecasts total return spreads and that this effect is stronger during the bailout period. Also, we find that the business sentiment is even most noticed. Therefore, Portuguese sovereign debt market is prone to the influence of investors’ sentiment.     

Can fiscal rules improve financial market access for developing countries?

A number of countries have introduced fiscal rules to deter fiscal profligacy, enhance the credibility of fiscal policy, and reduce borrowing costs. In this paper, we examine the outcome of fiscal rules in terms of improving financial market access for developing countries. We use entropy balancing and various propensity score matching. We find that the adoption of fiscal rules reduces sovereign bond spreads and increases sovereign debt ratings for a sample of 36 developing countries, which are part of the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBIG), for the period 1993-2014. We explain this finding by the effect of fiscal rules on the credibility of a country's fiscal policy: more credible governments are rewarded in the international financial markets by low sovereign bond spreads and high sovereign debt ratings. These results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications. We also show that this favorable effect is sensitive to several country structural characteristics. Our findings confirm that the adoption and sound implementation of fiscal rules is an instrument for policy makers to improve developing countries’ financial market access.