Does formal financial development crowd in informal financing? Evidence from Chinese private enterprises

The relationship between formal and informal finance is uncertain. They serve as substitute for high-quality borrowers but are complement for low-quality borrowers. As formal financial institutions expand, they may concentrate on high-quality borrowers or diversify among borrowers of different qualities. Using unique survey data from Chinese private firms, we are allowed to investigate the relationship for a group of borrowers who were considered as low-quality. We find that formal financial development imposes a crowd-in effect for private firms’ informal financing, especially in East China. There is heterogeneity between East and West China. We document that the crowd-in effect is greater for private firms with bank access or of large size.     

Perverse Effects of an External Ratings-Related Capital Adequacy System

It has recently been proposed that banks should be allowed to hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have received a favourable rating by an approved external credit assessment institution (ECAI), or rating agency. But a plausible model of rating agency behaviour shows that this strategy could have perverse results, actually increasing the risk of deposit insurance outlays. First, there is an issue of signalling, whereby low-ability borrowers may alter their behaviour so as to secure a lower capital requirement for their borrowing. Second, the establishment of a regulatory cut-off may actually reduce the amount of risk information made available by raters. Besides, the credibility of rating agencies may not be damaged by neglect of the risk of unusual systemic shocks, though it is these that cause the major bank failure costs.
(J.E.L.:E53, G21, G33)     

The challenge of rural financial inclusion – evidence from microfinance

Financial inclusion is said to foster development and growth. However, progress in financial inclusion has been slow in rural areas where poverty is most pronounced. This is often attributed to higher transaction costs, higher risks and a more unfavourable contracting environment which makes it more difficult for financial institutions to achieve and maintain sustainability in rural compared to urban areas. Based on data covering 772 microfinance institutions (MFIs) over the period 2008–2013, we test whether rural financial inclusion, notably lending to rural borrowers, is hampered by stronger sustainability challenges than inclusion in urban markets. Our results suggest that a higher share of rural borrowers has no direct effect on MFI sustainability. However, we find that MFIs with a higher share of rural borrowers are less able to exploit economies of scale and productivity effects. Thus, our results provide support for the view that sustainability challenges make it more difficult to achieve progress in financial inclusion in rural than in urban areas.     

On the relationship between financial inclusion and bank performance

This study examines the relationship between various financial inclusion measures and banks' performance across multiple countries with varying institutional, regulatory and income levels. To construct an aggregate bank performance index, we employ principal component analysis, which utilises a set of critical indicators summarised by the CAMEL rating system, including banks' solvency, asset quality, efficiency, profitability and liquidity. Our primary findings indicate that different measures of financial inclusion exhibit varying associations with bank performance. Specifically, there is a trade-off between bank performance and credit deepening, especially in high-income nations. Conversely, in low-income nations, higher financial inclusion, measured by deposits to GDP, number of deposits, and number of borrowers, does not affect bank performance adversely. Banks in low-income nations could achieve significant gains by improving financial access and enhancing regulatory environments.     

Microfinance Control Fraud in Latin America

Over the past three decades, the global microfinance industry has witnessed phenomenal growth in terms of the numbers of borrowers and the total gross loan portfolio outstanding. An application of the criminologists' perspective and Black's theory of control fraud to the global microfinance industry reveals a high degree of overlap between the common characteristics of control frauds and the characteristics of the microfinance industry and suggests that the sector provides a criminogenic environment suitable to Ponzi-type dynamics, including an imperative of growth, misrepresentation of financial and operating performance, a reputation for integrity and innovativeness, concentration in unregulated markets and areas most conducive to accounting fraud, non-transparency and secrecy, dubious accounting methods, lobbying in favor of deregulation, attempts to suborn controls such as accountants, lawyers, regulators, and rating agencies, executive use of the company for personal gain, excessive risk taking at the expense of investors' capital, warnings raised but ignored, and, finally, inevitable collapse. Regulatory interventions are needed to prevent predatory lending and over-indebtedness of poor microfinance borrowers in Latin America and elsewhere. Such regulation, while necessary to protect the poor, is not well liked by the investment community as it places microfinance institutions under local scrutiny, reduces the profitability of the sector, and limits opportunities for control fraud.     

Heterogeneity risks and negative externality

Diversified institutions coexist in financial markets with different degrees of exposure and contribution to the systemic risk. Therefore, the identification and regulation of systemically important institutions are of great significance. This paper investigates the negative externality in a model where the heterogeneity risks of institutions interact and alienate the value of each other, with the bankruptcy risk acting as the kernel factor. The market negative externality increases when the bankruptcy risk is high. Furthermore, as an institution with a minimum tail index, the “first domino” dominates the bankruptcy risk of the market. The first domino accumulation and phantasm are prone to cause systemic crises. The market bankruptcy index decreases as the non-first domino participates in the risk sharing. Finally, we empirically study implications of the above findings for adjusting the market structure and managing risks, in the Chinese financial markets.     

A DSGE model of banks and financial intermediation with default risk

This paper takes the view that a major contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008 was a failure to correctly assess and price the risk of default. In order to analyse default risk in the macroeconomy, a simple general equilibrium model with banks and financial intermediation is constructed in which default-risk can be priced. It is shown how the credit spread can be attributed largely to the risk of default and how excess loan creation may emerge due to different attitudes to risk by borrowers and lenders. The model can also be used to analyse systemic risk due to macroeconomic shocks which may be reduced by holding collateral.     

EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET

Using detailed transactions‐level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no‐arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers.     

Where does the risk lie? Systemic risk and tail risk networks in the Chinese financial market

This paper studies tail risk connectedness and systemic risk in the Chinese financial market in the post-crisis period of 2009–2017. We adopt the conditional value at risk (CoVaR) and complex theory to construct the tail risk connectedness network and identify the systemically important financial institutions during the Chinese financial turbulence. We precisely characterize the dynamic evolution of the tail risk connectedness at the institutional, sector and market levels. We find that, during normal times, the banking sector contributes the most tail risk to the market and that the real estate sector contributes the least. However, during the crisis period, the real estate sector played its role and became the most significant tail risk emitter. In addition, we identify the significant important financial institutions in the Chinese financial market, highlighting the fact that the four state-owned commercial banks and two largest insurance companies dominate. Our results are helpful to both regulators for developing macroprudential supervision policies and investors interested in the Chinese financial market for making risk management strategies.     

Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?

The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks' assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks' risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
(J.E.L.: E53, G21, G33)     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

Natural or unnatural selection? The end of lending relationships for small businesses

We investigate the situation where small business borrowers and banks end their lending relationships. If credit allocation is efficient, banks terminate their relationships with risky borrowers. Alternatively, small business borrowers are more likely to end their relationships when they have poor investment opportunities and do not require borrowed funds. However, if the soft budget constraints of banks or credit crunches are a significant problem, banks are likely to continue their relationships with risky firms or end their relationships with nonrisky firms, which is representative of an unnatural credit allocation. Using Japanese firm-level data, we show empirically that these relationships end naturally, with natural credit allocation supported even during the recent global financial crisis.     

Systemic Characteristics of Financial Instability

I describe how in the new paradigm of a Competitive, Efficient, and Frictionless Economy (CEFE), introduced in Falahati (2019), macroeconomic imbalances with fluctuating levels of liquidity emerge endogenously. This provides a solid foundation for studying Minsky’s views on financial instability in an economy with a banking and risk-underwriting system. I identify an inverse relationship between liquidity premia and risk premia, which leads to endogenous risk-premium rating cycles, including credit-risk-premium rating cycles, and macroeconomic swings. Ceteris paribus, lower liquidity increases the prices of contracts covering risks (e.g., credit default swaps), whist it decreases prices of all other assets. The opposite occurs with higher liquidity. I analyze operations of banks, risk-underwriters, and the State/Central Bank, and present a new theory of banking which improves current understandings. This theory explains how a banking system uses the floating capital of the economy more efficiently, while it also generates greater systemic risks, compared to an economy without banks. I show how the banking system can induce macroeconomic booms and busts and generate endogenous asset price bubbles and bursts. I highlight other systemic problems of the economy and derive their implications for improving the financial management of the economy and its institutions.     

Feedback effects between credit ratings and financial markets

Credit rating agencies often make sharp adjustments in their pronouncements during times of stress in financial markets. These adjustments typically happen with a delay relative to shocks in market prices. Since prices convey information about what market participants are doing and thinking, it is likely that rating agencies take into account market prices when issuing their pronouncements.In order to understand the relationship between credit ratings and financial prices, we develop a model of debt roll-over in which rating agencies incorporate information publicly available in financial markets. We find that (1) rating agencies respond to market prices, i.e. nonfundamental price volatility can shift financing conditions from a low risk spread and high credit rating equilibrium to an equilibrium with high spread and low rating, and (2) rating agencies can anchor expectations about the equilibrium in financial markets, thus serving as an antidote to nonfundamental price volatility.     

The Definition of the Grading Scales in Banks' Internal Rating Systems

An internal risk rating system can be defined as the process used to classify bank borrowers into categories of different credit riskiness. Most of the related literature has investigated various aspects of this process, but the problem of defining the categories and the distribution of borrowers into the different classes or grades has received rather less attention, other than noting that the number of grades and their dispersion should achieve a meaningful differentiation of risk. An appropriate definition of the grading scale is of primary importance because the probability of default associated to each grade is the key inputs of capital allocation systems at many best-practice banks and is the core of the January 2001's new proposal of the Basel Committee for the calculation of capital requirements. Statistical techniques such as cluster analysis can help in identifying distinct subgroups of borrowers possessing the same creditworthiness. We use a logit model to estimate individual default probabilities for four categories of borrowers and apply cluster analysis to assign borrowers to each grade. However, since cluster analysis is not a purely mechanical process, but requires examination of the nature of observations and of the objective of clustering, the ultimate choice of the most appropriate grading scale for a given portfolio relies on empirical grounds. A sufficient granularity and an appropriate quantification of risk must be balanced.
(J.E.L.: G21, G22, G33)     

Catastrophe theory and the financial crisis

This paper develops and estimates catastrophe‐augmented models of the financial crisis. We employ catastrophe theory to explain discontinuous jumps in state variables of dynamic systems. We estimate an augmented bank failure model showing that the buildup of risk and an increase in the Federal Funds rate combined with low reserves (negative insurance effect) have been the main drivers of the financial crisis. Therefore, macroprudential policy and rating agencies play a key role in preventing the buildup of (systemic) risk and preventing the economy from entering a bifurcation area.     

我国企业债券融资、财务风险和债券评级

影响我国债券评级的决定因素有以下三点:(1)影响债券评级最关键的因素是发债企业总资产的规模,即企业资产规模越大,其评级越高;(2)政府政策对该发债项目或行业支持与否时债券评级有正的影响,即发债项目或其所在行业是有国家政策明确支持的,其评级可能越高;(3)企业的财务风险如资产负债率和长期负债比率等对债券评级没有显著的影响,企业的绩效如资产收益率对债券评级也没有显著的影响.目前评级机构的评级不能反映企业财务风险与绩效的好坏,债券上市后评级的动态调整也几乎不存在.这说明我国目前企业债券市场的信用风险评级与欧美的债券市场存在极大的差异.     

Social collateral,dynamic incentives,and joint liability in a two‐step trust game: Lending to the unbankable

Asymmetric information and lack of collateral creates a suboptimal allocation of financial resources to those in most need. When uncollateralised borrowers approach financial institutions, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection results in no lending. Conversely, group‐lending contracts—joint liability, dynamic lending, and social cost for defaulting—control for information asymmetries and create a co‐operative trust game between borrowers leading to an undominated optimal strategy to repay, and therefore, for the lender to Give. Group lending proves superior to typical individual borrowing and lending when no collateral is available. Social collateral and trust are fundamental pieces of the successful work of MicroFinance. Resulting contracts and correspondent payoffs are Pareto efficient.     

A decomposition approach to analysing racial and gender biases in Farm Service Agency's lending decisions

This study provides a different perspective in revisiting the racial and gender discrimination issue at the Farm Service Agency (FSA). Employing the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition method, this study analyses disparities in approved loan amounts among racial and gender classes of borrowers. This study's results indicate substantial differentials in approved loan amount gaps between racial and gender classes, favouring white and female borrowers, respectively. Further scrutiny of the borrowers’ comparative financial conditions presented to FSA to support their loan applications, however, indicate that these borrower groups significantly dominate their peers in a number of measures that indicate their financial strengths and relatively greater capability to repay their future lending obligations. Hence, this study's results can hardly be construed as evidence of biased lending decisions as these borrower groups should rightfully be offered more favourable loan terms, such as larger loan amounts, by the FSA.