Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy

The article examines (i) why low-quality private labels are introduced in some product categories and not in others, (ii) how the existence of a low-quality private label affects the pricing of a competing national brand, and (iii) how consumers’ surplus and welfare are affected by private labels. We find that the potential for private label introduction may—in return for national brand exclusivity in that particular retail store (exclusive dealing)—lead to price concessions from the producer of the national brand. If the national brand producer decides not to offer an exclusivity contract, a private label is introduced. In this case, private label introduction may lead to higher retail prices on national brands, which can be detrimental to consumer welfare as well as total welfare. We argue that our results have important implications for the interpretation of empirical results and the public policy towards national brands     

Warranty markets and public policy

Search equilibrium models in the Economics of Information concern themselves exclusively with consumer ignorance of the prices that different firms charge. Legal regulation dealing with information, on the other hand, concerns itself primarily with contact terms. In particular, firms are often required to warrant against product related defects on the supposed ground that firms respond to consumer ignorance only by degrading contract quality. This paper is the beginning of an attempt to make the Economics of Information useful to policymakers. It models a market for warranties under imperfect information and shows that firms are more likely to respond to consumer ignorance by raising prices for the warranties that consumers prefer rather than deleting warranties from consumer contracts. Hence, policymakers should be concerned more with reducing supracompetitive prices than with “improving” contract quality.     

Woodsy the optimal owl: Environmental campaigns, norms, and implications for public goods policy

Norms regarding private provision of a public good (e.g. cutting down on energy use, not littering) can affect the marginal gains from contributing to a public good and therefore people's decisions about contributing to the public good. A model is proposed in which norms of private contributions to a public good can be influenced by public policy, and these norms affect people's self-image, which derives from a comparison of one's own contribution with the norm contribution. In this context, we examine the conditions under which private contributions to a public good are efficient, and the conditions under which policy affecting these norms improves social welfare. We find that (1) a benevolent social planner who fails to account for private provision norms will underprovide the public good, and (2) public policy that attempts to raise the norm contribution of private provision can increase social welfare if the effect of raising the norm does not have an extreme negative effect - either extremely small or extremely large - on peoples' self-image.     

Labour markets, liquidity, and monetary policy regimes

Abstract.  We develop an equilibrium model of the monetary policy transmission mechanism that highlights information frictions in the market for money and search frictions in the labour market. The information friction increases the persistence in the response of interest rates following monetary policy regime shifts. This occurs because agents have incomplete information about the nature of the shifts and optimally update their inflation forecasts using an 'adaptive' expectations rule. The search friction transmits the interest rate movements to the labour market by affecting job creation activities; together, the two frictions imply that unemployment reacts very gradually to monetary policy shocks. JEL Classification: E4, E5     

Location and ownership of public goods

We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership.     

Health investment, saving, and public policy

Abstract.  This paper develops an overlapping‐generations model in which agents invest in health to prolong life in both working and retirement periods. It explores how unfunded social security with or without health subsidies affects life expectancy, economic growth, and welfare. In particular, by extending life at a possible cost of capital accumulation, health subsidies and a pay‐as‐you‐go pension can improve welfare, especially in the short run. JEL classification: I12, J14, J18, O11     

Directed search, unemployment and public policy

Abstract .  We examine the effects of public policy parameters in a simple directed search model of the labour market, and contrast them with those in standard random matching models with Nash bargaining. Both finite and limit versions of the directed search model are considered, and the value of the limit model as an approximation of the finite one is assessed. As with the random matching model, job creation is the key channel through which the policy parameters affect the equilibrium of the directed search model. Both comparative static effects of the policy parameters and optimal configurations are identified.     

Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used.     

Domestic rivalry and export performance: theory and evidence from international airline markets

Abstract .  The much studied relationship between domestic rivalry and export performance consists of those supporting a national-champion rationale, and those supporting a rivalry rationale. While the empirical literature generally supports the positive effects of domestic rivalry, the national-champion rationale actually rests on firmer theoretical ground. We address this inconsistency by providing a theoretical framework that illustrates three paths via which domestic rivalry translates into enhanced international exports. Furthermore, empirical tests on the world airline industry elicit the existence of one particular path – an enhanced firm performance effect – that connects domestic rivalry with improved international exports.     

Price rules, wage indexing, and optimal monetary policy

There has been a recent increased interest in a monetary price rule. This paper analyzes the efficiency of such a monetary rule within the context of a rational expectations macro model. We compare the price rule with the standard money rule and interest rate rule. We find that as the supply shock variance approaches zero the price rule dominates both a money and interest rate rule. We then investigate the efficiency of these alternative money rules when we allow wage indexation to the price level.     

Infant mortality,relative income and public policy

Do health outcomes depend on relative income as well as on an individual's absolute level of income? We use infant mortality as a health status indicator and find a significant and positive link between infant mortality and income inequality using cross-national data for 93 countries. Holding constant the income of each of the three poorest quintiles of a country's population, we find that an increase in the income of the upper 20% of the income distribution is associated with higher, not the lower infant mortality. Our results are robust and not just caused by the concave relationship between income and health. The estimates imply a decrease in infant mortality by 1.5% for a one percentage point decrease in the income share of the richest quintile. The overall results are sensitive to public policy: public health care expenditure, educational outcomes, and access to basic sanitation and safe water can explain the inequality–health relationship. Thus, our findings support the hypothesis of public disinvestment in human capital in countries with high income inequality. However, we are not able to determine whether public policy is a confounder or mediator of the relationship between income distribution and health. Relative deprivation caused by the income distance between an individual and the individual's reference group is another possible explanation for a direct effect from income inequality to health.     

Economic policy uncertainty,financial markets and probability of US recessions

We use probit recession forecasting models to assess the ability of economic policy uncertainty indexes developed by Baker et al. (2013) to predict future US recessions. The model specifications include policy indexes on their own, and in combination with financial variables, such as interest rate spreads, stock returns and stock market volatility. Both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis suggests that the policy uncertainty indexes are statistically and economically significant in forecasting recessions at the horizons beyond five quarters. The index based on newspaper reports emerges as the best predictor, outperforming the term spread at the longer forecast horizons.     

Export market correlation and strategic trade policy

In the traditional models of strategic trade policy pioneered by Brander and Spencer, exports of the domestic firm, engaged in a Cournot-Nash competition with the foreign firm in a neutral market, must be subsidized to maximize national welfare. We demonstrate that when the firms play the Cournot-Nash game in two stochastic and positively correlated markets, it may be optimal to tax exports to the more volatile market while subsidizing it in the other. The policy combination reduces the amplitude of aggregate profit and raises the utility of the risk-averse firm in a manner similar to the theory of portfolio choice. JEL Classification: F12, D18
Marchés d'exportation co-reliés et politique commerciale stratégique. Dans les modèles traditionnels de politique commerciale stratégique proposés par Brander et Spencer, les exportations de la firme nationale, qui est engagée dans une concurrence à la Cournot-Nash avec une firme étrangère dans un marché neutre, doit être subventionnée si l'on veut maximiser le niveau national de bien-être. On montre que, quand les entreprises jouent un jeu à la Cournot-Nash dans deux marchés d'exportation stochastiques et positivement co-reliés, il peut être optimal de taxer les exportations vers le marché le plus volatile et de subventionner les exportations vers l'autre marché. Cette combinaison de politiques réduit l'amplitude de variation des profits agrégés et augmente l'utilité de l'entreprise qui a une aversion au risque d'une manière qui ressemble à ce qui se passe dans la théorie des choix de portefeuilles.     

Giving overseas and public policy

Remarkable numbers of people give to overseas development charities. The aim of this paper is to consider how such overseas giving is best modelled and the implications for public policy. Widely used theories of charitable giving, based on warm-glow or the provision of public goods, provide insight but are not fully satisfactory as explanations of giving for the specific purpose of development. Instead, an “identification” approach to individual giving is proposed here that combines the results focus of the public goods formulation with the scale of the warm-glow model. The theoretical model is used to examine the implications for public policy, including the extent to which official aid crowds out private giving and how public policy should take account of private willingness to make charitable transfers overseas.     

Microfinance institutions and public policy

Many governments and nongovernmental organizations have adopted policies to promote the growth of microfinance institutions (MFIs). The appropriate level and form of support for MFIs are discussed in this paper on the basis of a review of key MFI characteristics. Governments are also responsible for the regulation of MFIs; here, some principles concerning the extent and coverage of MFI regulation and supervision are developed.     

Unemployment equilibrium and economic policy in mixed markets

This paper features a simple static Cournot-Nash model of an exchange economy with two productive sectors at flexible prices and wages. The traders in the atomless sector are price-takers, while the atoms behave strategically. We focus on the consequences of strategic interactions on the market outcome. Firstly, strategic interactions create underemployment on the labor market. Secondly, when the number of atoms increases without limit, the CWE coincides with the competitive equilibrium. Thirdly, we compare the welfare reached by traders at both equilibria. Fourthly, we consider the implementation of a tax levied on strategic supplies. Finally, we compare the approach retained with the monopolistic competition framework.     

Monetary policy with sticky prices and segmented markets

Summary. We consider a sticky-price model with segmented asset markets, and examine its implications for monetary policy. Our finding is, first, that the response of the money supply growth rate to a money demand shock required to stabilize inflation is not affected by the existence of a liquidity effect, but the response of the nominal interest rate is. Second, when the monetary authority adopts a Taylor rule, whether or not it should be active to obtain local determinacy of equilibria depends on the existence of a liquidity effect. Our results suggest that the monetary authority should be careful about the existence and the degree of a liquidity effect particularly when the nominal interest rate is used as the policy instrument.Received: 11 February 2004, Revised: 1 November 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: E3, E4, E5.