Resilience and Dynamism of Embedded Financial Transactions in Cameroon

Following the recent financial crisis, institutional economists have issued a “call” for institutionalist research on alternative financial systems. While suggestions have been forthcoming, (for example, in Volume 48, Issue 4 of the Journal of Economic Issues), most have centered on national-level innovations in advanced capitalist countries, prompting further calls for “community” and individual level anti-capitalist financial relations. With this article, we respond to such calls. We show how networks of finance in Cameroon bridge the formal/informal dualisms in lending/savings activities. We demonstrate that any debates about whether to formalize informal financial institutions or leave them alone weaken in Cameroon because, through networks, people access both formal and informal financial institutions for different purposes and at various stages in the life of these institutions. This dynamism explains why, in spite of the growth of money markets in Cameroon, informal financial institutions have not disappeared, nor declined. In fact, they have expanded, contrary to predictions in existing new institutional economics research. While informal institutions have evolved, they have not necessarily become formal banks, microfinance, or stock markets. Rather, the informal financial institutions have adopted and adapted in terms of both lending and saving practices in a country where growing formal financialization has become the norm. Our findings challenge neoclassical and new institutional economics theories about money, credit, and the actors in the money market.     

Explaining informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern Europe: an institutional asymmetry perspective

The aim of this paper is to propose and evaluate a new institutional theory explanation for patients making informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern Europe. This views informal payments by patients to healthcare professionals as arising when formal institutional failures lead to an asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten rules of informal institutions. Reporting a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of the prevalence of informal payments by patients in Central and Eastern European countries, a strong association is revealed between the level of asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions, and the propensity to make informal payments. The association between informal payments and various formal institutional imperfections is then explored to evaluate which structural conditions might reduce this institutional asymmetry, and thus the propensity to make informal payments. The paper concludes by exploring the implications for tackling such informal practices.     

Religious Identity,Informal Institutions,and the Nation-States of the Near East

This paper uses the Near East as a case study to describe how religious identity became a source of preference formation and a cause of social cleavage. It formulates the concepts of identity-sharing groups and resource-sharing groups to bridge between religious identity's social-psychological aspects and its socioeconomic effects. The paper then argues that social cleavages among religious identity-sharing groups generated informal institutions that are incompatible with the abstract formal institutions of the nation-states of Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. That incompatibility hobbles efforts of formal state institutions to promote economic development, and instead restrains economic growth by intensifying existing conflicts among groups. It suggests that a state that could promote economic development would be the one that recognizes and supports the informal, localized institutions and allows those of them with common features to evolve into abstract formal institutions.     

Trade,trust and the rule of law

Well-functioning institutions, both formal (i.e. rule of law) and informal (i.e. trust), facilitate economic exchange. To investigate the nature of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, we analyze bilateral trade patterns in a sample of 16 European countries between 1996–2009. Our results show that trust and rule of law are substitutes, as the positive effect of trust on trade is conditional on the quality of the rule of law. When the rule of law of the importing country increases relative to that of the exporter, the effect of trust on trade decreases. The decline in the effect of trust on trade is less for importers than for exporters, a result that can be attributed to the risk of non-payment that exporters run.     

Confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This article uses survey data to investigate the relationship between citizens’ confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). We find an endogenous substituting relationship and that the different institutional structures currently existing in the two entities in BiH are significantly linked to respondents’ confidence in formal and reliance on informal institutions. In addition, perceptions of higher indirect costs of institutions and a lack of their improvement are associated with a lower confidence in formal and a greater reliance on informal institutions; the minority ethnic groups in each region are less confident in formal and rely more on informal institutions compared to the majority group; and more reliance on informal institutions is found amongst males and respondents from urban areas.     

我国三十年来农村地区金融改革的逻辑轨迹——基于新比较经济学分析框架的研究

文章基于新比较经济学的分析框架,从正规金融和非正规金融两个方面来论述三十年来中国农村地区金融改革的基本逻辑。研究认为,农村金融发展滞后于农村经济发展的原因是政府对农村金融的控制方式不尽合理。文章充分肯定了国家2005年至今的改革措施,认为新型金融机构的引进将成为建立完善的农村金融体系的契机。     

制度参数、国家规模与后发国"蛙跳"

文章首先构建了一个有关先发国家与后发国家之间技术扩散的正规模型,该模型将制度背景作为一个参数引入,借以从形式上分析制度背景对技术进步及经济增长过程的影响;模型的动态分析从形式上展现了后发国家在技术水平上超越先发国家("蛙跳")的全过程,并推论出后发国成功实现"蛙跳"的先决条件是:后发国由制度参数与经济规模参数所决定的综合参数能够由比先发国低的值跃升为比先发国高的值。此外,文章还基于经济制度由相关利益主体间制度博弈均衡所决定的这一分析框架,进一步尝试性地解释了制度参数变化的非均匀性,并对中国未来实现"蛙跳"的可能性进行了分析。     

Is institutional improvement possible?

A substantial literature shows that economic prosperity is dependent on the quality of economic institutions. Countries with low-quality institutions remain poor while countries with high-quality institutions prosper. Improvement in institutional quality brings with it economic growth. Poor countries must improve their economic institutions to escape poverty; so, if a poor country’s institutional structure is unlikely to improve, that suggests dismal prospects for economic growth and an escape from poverty. An examination of institutional quality over 30 years indicates that countries with low-quality institutions have improved their institutional quality, which demonstrates that poor countries are not stuck with low-quality institutions. They can improve their institutions, and consequently, can generate economic growth and escape poverty.     

Environment, human development and economic growth

Over the last few years, environmental issues have entered into policy design, particularly development and growth policies. Natural resources are considered necessary production inputs and environmental quality is considered a welfare determinant. The integration of environmental issues into economic growth and development theories and empirics is currently widely analyzed in the literature. The effects of natural resources endowment on economic growth are mainly analyzed through the so-called Resource Curse Hypothesis (RCH) whereas the effects of economic growth on environmental quality are part of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Furthermore, recent contributions on RCH and EKC have shown the important role of institutions and human development dimensions in building a sustainable development path. In this paper, we attempt to analyze the causal relationships between economic growth, human development and sustainability combining the RCH and EKC models and adopting a human development perspective. Results confirm the importance of high institutional quality and investments for human capital accumulation in order to build a sustainable development path.     

Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

集群创新网络形成与演进的动因及其作用机制——以绍兴纺织产业集群为例的质性研究

从复杂系统理论、制度理论和组织学习理论等多个理论视角,讨论了集群创新网络形成与演进的动因,提出了集群创新环境因素和集群创新主体因素两类动因,并讨论了各动因间的相互关系。认为:集群创新环境因素通过影响集群创新主体因素中的经济理性动因和企业家动因进而影响其创新合作行为,从而导致不同形态特征的集群创新网络形成;集群创新环境的演进也是通过借助集群创新主体因素中的经济理性动因和企业家动因的传导进而使集群创新网络发生演进的。以绍兴纺织产业集群的创新网络为例,对其特性和结构进行了质性研究。研究结果进一步佐证了正式制度对集群创新网络形成与演进的作用主要是通过影响经济理性动因中的创新合作利益来实现的,非正式制度主要是通过影响企业家动因中的企业家精神和企业家认知来实现的。     

China’s rural institutions and governance since the beginning of the rural reform

ABSTRACT

This paper looks at how China governs its vast rural territories. The structure of rural governance relies not only on the extent and form of the state’s authority, but also on the principal–agent relationship between the state and local stakeholders, as well as the role of the informal institutional arrangements that serve as the foundation for rural governance. China’s 40 years of reform and opening have led to the transformation of rural China into urban and rural China. The rules and order of informal institutions have evolved and changed significantly, and the cost-benefit structure of formal state governance has been amended. The appropriate rural governance system for village transformation improves the performance of the country’s direct governance and the entrustment–agent system for village governance. Further, the rural governance system balances formal and informal institutions to achieve an effective institutional arrangement.     

Institutions and the financial development–economic growth nexus in sub-Saharan Africa

Using a sample splitting approach that does not impose an exogenous quadratic term, we examine the effect of financial development on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa by allowing the link to be mediated by the level of institutions. Our findings reveal a disproportionate growth-enhancing effect of finance, given countries’ distinct level of institutional quality. More specifically, when the International Country Risk Guide-based measure of institutions is used as the threshold variable, below the optimal level of institutional quality, financial development does not significantly promote economic growth. For countries with institutional quality above the threshold, higher finance is associated with growth. However, when institutions are measured by World Governance Indicators proxy, we find a significant effect of financial development, irrespective of whether a country is below or above the threshold. Interestingly, the growth-enhancing effect of finance is greater for low-institution countries relative to high-institution countries. Thus, through its ability to provide some crucial roles, the well-developed financial sector may also perform the function of sound institutions in influencing economic growth.     

Engines of Growth in China: The Limits of Informal Institutions

Abstract:

Since the 1978 reforms, China has experienced rapid economic and social development. GDP growth has been in the double digits on average yearly, creating the fastest sustained economic growth recorded by a major economy in history. Not only did this transform the economy and society at large, China reached important milestones in terms of reducing poverty and creating prosperity in a short period of time. This article uses the conceptual framework of new institutional economics to examine China’s economic growth and how growth has been achieved largely by ‘informal institutions’ that are grounded in culture, customs, and private interactions that emerge spontaneously. The trajectory by which these informal institutions left their imprint on China’s complex economic landscape and how they can constrain future economic growth are also of central importance. After examining decentralization and risk management practices, property rights, and the legal system, we emphasize the importance of creating formal institutions necessary for long-term growth, most importantly innovation. Preliminary evidence shows total factor productivity is tapering off which may reflect the constraints of China’s institutional environment. This ought to be reversed if China is to enjoy long-term sustained growth.     

Interrelationship among institutional infrastructure,technological innovation and growth. An empirical evidence

This paper uses a multi-equation model to achieve an overall study of two key factors which explain growth, technology and institutions. The paper focuses on the process of the accumulation of these factors and the interrelationship arising among them. A theoretical model is given, together with empirical evidence for the joint impact of these factors on economic growth in a wide-ranging sample of countries between 1985 and 1997. This paper also contributes certain novel aspects in the variables employed. Thus, an indicator of human capital and an index reflecting institutional infrastructure have been used. The human capital indicator considers health, formal education, informal education and accumulated experience. It embraces a wider range of factors than the variables conventionally used in empirical studies. As to the institutional infrastructure index, it has been constructed on the basis of six institutional sub-indices, comprising voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Thus, the index constructed captures a greater wealth of the items commonly covered by the concept of institutions.     

Is Tinkering with Institutional Quality a Panacea for Firm Performance? Insights from a Semiparametric Approach to Modeling Firm Performance

There is a large and growing literature on the impact of institutional quality on economic performance and the broad consensus is that “good” institutions facilitate better economic performance. The literature that provides micro‐level support for the policy discourse about institutional quality does not, however, account for significant intra‐country variation in reactions of firms to changes in business environments, even within the same industry, and it generally ignores the possibility that the impact of institutional quality on firm performance may not be neutral. In this paper, we analyze the impact of institutions on firm performance using an approach that enables us to overcome these problems with the stylized approach. Using cross‐country firm‐level data, we demonstrate that not only does the marginal impact of institutional quality vary significantly within countries, but also that the impact is economically significant only at the two extremes of the distribution. We view this as prima facie evidence that policies that tinker with institutional quality on the basis of the popular wisdom about the impact of these institutions on the average firm may not have the desired or expected impact, at least at the micro level.     

Do island states have better institutions?

Since the end of World War II, the number of countries in the world has increased dramatically. Many of these newly independent countries are small both in terms of population and geography, and several are islands. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of island status and country size on institutional quality, and to determine if these institutional effects can explain the relatively strong economic performance of islands and small countries. I distinguish between political institutions (Democracy) and economic institutions (Rule of Law). One of the main findings of this paper is that the relationship between island status and institutional quality is significantly positive, and that these results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Further, I find that country size is negatively related to institutional quality, which is in keeping with previous results. These results provide further support for the hypothesis that institutions account for these countries’ relatively better economic performance.     

正式制度与非正式制度如何驱动社会创业——基于效率驱动型国家的QCA研究

社会创业已成为解决社会问题的重要手段,然而对于如何驱动社会创业尚未有定论。以23个效率驱动型国家为研究样本,整合正式制度与非正式制度的5个前因条件,应用QCA方法,探讨了影响国家社会创业活跃度的多重并发因素与复杂因果机制。研究发现：①高社会创业活跃度的驱动机制分为两条路径,即政策-规范-价值观型和规范-价值观-教育型。第一条路径是正式制度与非正式制度要素间的联动匹配,第二条路径是非正式制度要素间的联动匹配;②非正式制度在影响人们社会创业选择时具有重要作用,影响程度甚至超过了正式制度;③政府政策与创业教育之间具有替代作用,即当社会规范与文化价值观水平较高时,只要拥有完善的政府政策,或者良好的创业教育,就能驱动形成较高的社会创业活跃度;④非高社会创业活跃度的驱动机制分为4条路径,且与高社会创业活跃度的驱动路径存在非对称性关系。     

Financial development,financial liberalization and social capital

The relationship between financial liberalization policies and financial development is controversial. The impact of these policies differs greatly across countries. In the literature, the quality of formal institutions has been identified as an important source of this heterogeneity, as countries with a weak institutional environment generally fail to benefit from financial liberalization. Using panel data covering 82 countries for the period 1973–2008, we find evidence that social capital may substitute for formal institutions as a prerequisite for effective financial liberalization policies. In particular, we find that during the post Washington-consensus period countries with a high prevailing level of social capital can ensure that financial liberalization positively influences financial development, despite the poor quality of their formal institutions.