Precautionary Saving and Consumption Smoothing across Time and Possibilities

This paper examines how aversion to risk and aversion to intertemporal substitution determine the strength of the precautionary saving motive in a two-period model with Selden/Kreps–Porteus preferences. For small risks, we derive a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive that generalizes the concept of "prudence" introduced by Kimball (1990b) . For large risks, we show that decreasing absolute risk aversion guarantees that the precautionary saving motive is stronger than risk aversion, regardless of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Holding risk preferences fixed, the extent to which the precautionary saving motive is stronger than risk aversion increases with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We derive sufficient conditions for a change in risk preferences alone to increase the strength of the precautionary saving motive and for the strength of the precautionary saving motive to decline with wealth. Within the class of constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, constant-relative risk aversion utility functions, these conditions are also necessary.     

Optimal insurance contract and coverage levels under loss aversion utility preference

This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously and determines the optimal coverage levels with respect to deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance, and, by assuming that the insured has an S-shaped loss aversion utility, the insured would retain the enormous losses entirely. The representative optimal insurance form is the truncated deductible insurance, where the insured retains all losses once losses exceed a critical level and adopts a particular deductible otherwise. Additionally, the effects of the optimal coverage levels are also examined with respect to benchmark wealth and loss aversion coefficient. Moreover, the efficiencies among various insurances are compared via numerical analysis by assuming that the loss obeys a uniform or log-normal distribution. In addition to optimal insurance, deductible insurance is the most efficient if the benchmark wealth is small and upper-limit insurance if large. In the case of a uniform distribution that has an upper bound, deductible insurance and optimal insurance coincide if benchmark wealth is small. Conversely, deductible insurance is never optimal for an unbounded loss such as a log-normal distribution.     

Welfare effects of information and rationality in portfolio decisions under parameter uncertainty

We analyse and quantify, in a financial market with parameter uncertainty and for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion investor, the utility effects of two different boundedly rational (i.e. sub-optimal) investment strategies (namely, myopic and unconditional strategies) and compare them with each other and with the utility effect of full information. We show that effects are mainly caused by full information and predictability, being the effect of learning marginal. We also investigate the saver's decision regarding whether to manage her/his portfolio personally (DIY investor) or hire, against the payment of a management fee, a professional investor and find that delegation is mainly motivated by the belief that professional advisors are, depending on investment horizon and risk aversion, either better informed (‘insiders’) or more capable of gathering and processing information, rather than possessing the ability to learn from financial data. In particular, for very short investment horizons, delegation is primarily, if not exclusively, motivated by the beliefs that professional investors are better informed.     

Insurance demand in the presence of loss-dependent background risk

We analyze insurance demand when insurable losses come with an uninsurable zero-mean background risk that increases in the loss size. If the individual is risk vulnerable, loss-dependent background risk triggers a precautionary insurance motive and increases optimal insurance demand. Prudence alone is sufficient for insurance demand to increase in two cases: the case of fair insurance and the case where the smallest possible loss exceeds a certain threshold value (referred to as the large loss case). We derive conditions under which insurance demand increases or decreases in initial wealth. In the large loss case, prudence determines whether changes in the background risk lead to more insurance demand. We generalize this result to arbitrary loss distributions and find conditions based on decreasing third-degree Ross risk aversion, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion, and Arrow–Pratt temperance.     

Flexible Spending Accounts as Insurance

We model flexible spending accounts (FSAs) as a special type of insurance policy. We prove the following results given losses drawn from a continuous distribution: (1) the optimal election amount, F^*, is increasing in the consumer's level of risk aversion; (2) F^* is increasing in the level of the maximum loss; If utility is decreasing in absolute risk aversion (DARA), then F^* is (3) decreasing in income and (4) increasing in the marginal tax rate.     

Explaining the equity premium in Hong Kong with C-CAPM: The use of emigration growth as an instrument

We test the C-CAPM with CRRA utility using Hong Kong data. In 2SLS regressions, we obtain rather high estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which could explain the high equity premium in Hong Kong. Because we use lagged emigration growth as an instrument in the first-stage regression, which has significant negative impact on future stock market return in Hong Kong, the first-stage R² and F-statistics are rather high and the weak instrument critique of the validity of 2SLS regressions is potentially resolved. Weak-instrument-robust tests also confirm that the degree of risk aversion is indeed high for Hong Kong.     

Correspondence between lifetime minimum wealth and utility of consumption

We establish when the two problems of minimizing a function of lifetime minimum wealth and of maximizing utility of lifetime consumption result in the same optimal investment strategy on a given open interval O in wealth space. To answer this question, we equate the two investment strategies and show that if the individual consumes at the same rate in both problems—the consumption rate is a control in the problem of maximizing utility—then the investment strategies are equal only when the consumption function is linear in wealth on O, a rather surprising result. It then follows that the corresponding investment strategy is also linear in wealth and the implied utility function exhibits hyperbolic absolute risk aversion.      

Risk aversion under preference uncertainty

We show that if an agent is uncertain about the precise form of his utility function, his actual relative risk aversion may depend on wealth even if he knows his utility function lies in the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions. We illustrate the consequences of this result for optimal asset allocation: poor agents that are uncertain about their risk aversion parameter invest less in risky assets than wealthy investors with identical risk aversion uncertainty.     

Generalized Disappointment Aversion and Asset Prices

We characterize generalized disappointment aversion (GDA) risk preferences that can overweight lower‐tail outcomes relative to expected utility. We show in an endowment economy that recursive utility with GDA risk preferences generates effective risk aversion that is countercyclical. This feature comes from endogenous variation in the probability of disappointment in the representative agent's intertemporal consumption‐saving problem that underlies the asset pricing model. The variation in effective risk aversion produces a large equity premium and a risk‐free rate that is procyclical and has low volatility in an economy with a simple autoregressive endowment‐growth process.     

Two Paradigms and Nobel Prizes in Economics: a Contradiction or Coexistence?

Abstract Markowitz and Sharpe won the Nobel Prize in Economics for the development of Mean‐Variance (M‐V) analysis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for the development of Prospect Theory. In deriving the CAPM, Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin assume expected utility (EU) maximisation in the face of risk aversion. Kahneman and Tversky suggest Prospect Theory (PT) as an alternative paradigm to EU theory. They show that investors distort probabilities, make decisions based on change of wealth, exhibit loss aversion and maximise the expectation of an S‐shaped value function, which contains a risk‐seeking segment. Can these two apparently contradictory paradigms coexist? We show in this paper that although CPT (and PT) is in conflict to EUT, and violates some of the CAPM's underlying assumptions, the Security Market Line Theorem (SMLT) of the CAPM is intact in the CPT framework. Therefore, the CAPM is intact also in CPT framework.     

Liquidity Premia and Transaction Costs

Standard literature concludes that transaction costs only have a second‐order effect on liquidity premia. We show that this conclusion depends crucially on the assumption of a constant investment opportunity set. In a regime‐switching model in which the investment opportunity set varies over time, we explicitly characterize the optimal consumption and investment strategy. In contrast to the standard literature, we find that transaction costs can have a first‐order effect on liquidity premia. However, with reasonably calibrated parameters, the presence of transaction costs still cannot fully explain the equity premium puzzle.     

Loss aversion and the price of risk

This paper derives a simple theoretical relationship between the degree of loss aversion, the concavity/convexity of the value function, and the equilibrium market price of risk. We show that while the degree of loss aversion is key in determining the market price of risk, the convexity/concavity of the value function is much less important in this respect. The theoretical relationship obtained is tested empirically by using international data from 16 different countries during over 100 years, as documented by Dimson et al. [Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns, 2002 (Princeton University Press)]. The empirical data yield an estimate of λ=2.3 for the loss aversion index. This value is in striking agreement with estimates obtained in the very different methodology of laboratory experiments of individual decision-making.     

Public Versus Private Insurance with Dual Theory: A Political Economy Argument

This paper analyzes the political support for public insurance in the presence of a private insurance alternative. The public insurance is compulsory and offers a uniform insurance policy. The private insurance is voluntary and can offer different insurance policies. Adopting Yaari's [Econometrica, 55, 95–115, 1987] dual theory to expected utility (i.e., risk aversion without diminishing marginal utility of income), we show that adverse selection on the private insurance market may lead a majority of individuals to prefer public insurance over private insurance, even if the median risk is below the average risk (so that the median actually subsidizes high-risk individuals). We also show that risk aversion makes public insurance more attractive and that the dual theory is less favourable to a mixed insurance system than the expected utility framework. Lastly, we demonstrate how the use of genetic tests may threaten the political viability of public insurance.     

Myopic loss aversion,reference point,and money illusion

We use the portfolio selection model presented in He and Zhou [Manage. Sci., 2011, 57, 315–331] and the NYSE equity and US treasury bond returns for the period 1926–1990 to revisit Benartzi and Thaler’s myopic loss aversion theory. Through an extensive empirical study, we find that in addition to the agent’s loss aversion and evaluation period, his reference point also has a significant effect on optimal asset allocation. We demonstrate that the agent’s optimal allocation to equities is consistent with market observation when he has reasonable values of degree of loss aversion, evaluation period and reference point. We also find that the optimal allocation to equities is sensitive to these parameters. We then examine the implications of money illusion for asset allocation. Finally, we extend the model to a dynamic setting.     

Multivariate risk aversion and uninsurable risks: Theory and applications

The objective of this paper is to develop conditions for global multivariate comparative risk aversion in the presence of uninsurable, or background, risks, and thus generalize Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] and Karni [1979,1989]. We analyze von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility functionsas well as smooth preference functionals which are nonlinear in distribution but locally linear in probabilities. In each case we provide an economic application which illustrates how our theorems can be used. We analyze a risk sharing, a portfolio choice, and a labor supply problem for VNM utility functions, and the optimal allocation of effort to risky technologies in the presence of a random supply (or quality) of a public good for nonlinear preference functionals. We consider thecase where the random variables are mean-independent as well as the case where they are independent. In the labor supply application for VNM utility functions, we show that if the two risks are independent, the comparative statics effect of greater risk aversion on labor supply in the presence of a background non-wage income risk is determined by a monotonic relationship between labor supply and the wage rate under certainty. That is, we extend the applicability of the Diamond-Stiglitz [1974]-Kihlstrom-Mirman [1974]single-crossing property to the case where an independent background risk is present.     

Time‐Varying Risk–Return Trade‐off in the Stock Market

We uncover a strong comovement of the stock market risk–return trade‐off with the consumption–wealth ratio (CAY). The finding reflects time‐varying investment opportunities rather than countercyclical aggregate relative risk aversion. Specifically, the partial risk–return trade‐off is positive and constant when we control for CAY as a proxy for investment opportunities. Moreover, conditional market variance scaled by CAY is negatively priced in the cross‐section of stock returns. Our results are consistent with a limited stock market participation model, in which shareholders require an illiquidity premium that increases with CAY, in addition to the risk premium that is proportional to conditional market variance.     

Asset Allocation and the Liquidity Premium for Illiquid Annuities

Academics and practitioners alike have developed numerous techniques for benchmarking investment returns to properly adjust seemingly high numbers for excessive levels of risk. The same, however, cannot be said for liquidity, or the lack thereof. This article develops a model for analyzing the ex ante liquidity premium demanded by the holder of an illiquid annuity. The annuity is an insurance product that is akin to a pension savings account with both an accumulation and decumulation phase. We compute the yield (spread) needed to compensate for the utility welfare loss, which is induced by the inability to rebalance and maintain an optimal portfolio when holding an annuity. Our analysis goes beyond the current literature, by focusing on the interaction between time horizon (both deterministic and stochastic), risk aversion, and preexisting portfolio holdings. More specifically, we derive a negative relationship between a greater level of individual risk aversion and the demanded liquidity premium. We also confirm that, ceteris paribus, the required liquidity premium is an increasing function of the holding period restriction, the subjective return from the market, and is quite sensitive to the individual's endowed (preexisting) portfolio.     

Voluntary Contributions with Uncertainty: The Environmental Quality

This article presents a model in which production causes pollution that diminishes the welfare of its agents. Each agent is concerned with the quality of its environment and may voluntary contribute to improve it by financing depollution technology. The effectiveness of this technology on the quality of the environment is uncertain. We show that if an agent is sufficiently risk averse, voluntary contribution is a decreasing function of the average efficiency of depollution technology. If, on the contrary, the pollution effect is weaker than the substitution effect, the opposite holds. We show that precaution about environmental quality has two possible consequences that depend on agents' risk aversion. Therefore, the implications of a precautionary attitude lead us to consider the agents' risk-aversion characterization, which implies knowledge about prudent attitude.     

Takeover defenses,golden parachutes,and bargaining over stochastic synergy gains: a note on optimal contracting

We incorporate managerial risk aversion and stochasticity of takeover synergy gains into Harris’ (Harris, E.G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. Rand Journal of Economics 21, no. 4: 614–25. bargaining model for the coexistence of antitakeover defenses and golden parachutes in corporate charters. We show that: (i) it is not always optimal that the target-firm shareholders adopt antitakeover defenses, (ii) the size of the golden parachute is proportional to the riskiness of the synergistic gains, and (iii) the target-firm shareholders are unequivocally better-off with golden parachutes than takeover-contingent stock options.