An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which the theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport. We find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit to doing so. These findings suggest that the PS mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation.     

Manipulable behavior in international trade

In this paper, we present a Cournot duopoly model to analyze the manipulated behavior in international trade. The WTO is assumed as an arbitrator for the exchange in an oligopolistic industry and sets tariff rules according to the SDT principles; a firm's cost is private information both for the WTO and the foreign rivalries. Subsequent to our analysis of several cases we find that a firm may misreport to the WTO for more production revenue and the government may collude with a firm for higher welfare. It is shown that the misreporting and collusion incentives are related to the WTO tariff rule, the misreported cost and market size. Furthermore, a strategy proof tariff rule has been designed in which firms can never make his revenue better off by misreporting production cost.     

Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition

We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in equilibrium, few are predicted to misreport. It is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest. We test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it. This finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations.     

INFLUENCING THE PUBLIC AND EFFICIENCY IN BUREAUCRATIC PROVISION

Abstract.  In the present paper a public bureau can extract additional budgetary allocations, not only by misreporting its production cost to its oversight committee but also by 'influencing' the perceptions of the public at large. I juxtapose the bureau's ability to influence the public with its ability to misreport to the oversight committee, and find that influencing the public might support an efficient level of production by invoking a separating equilibrium. However, a pooling equilibrium involving either overproduction or underproduction of output cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, overproduction could occur even when the bureau cares only about extracting excess budget and not increasing output per se.     

'Errors & Omissions' in the Reporting of Australia's Cross-Border Transactions

The study is motivated by the consideration that large and variable statistical discrepancies in key economic performance data and successive data revisions may distort the conduct of economic policy and its subsequent evaluation. Its specific object is the exploration of the statistical properties of Australia's cross-border transactions records: the structural stability of reported errors & omissions and the convergence of reported transactions over successive revisions. The major positive findings are that there is only limited evidence of convergence of measured to true magnitudes of cross-border transactions; that there is robust evidence of structural instability of the balancing item; and that financial sector transactions appear increasingly to constitute the major source of misreporting of balance of payments outcomes.     

Income Underreporting and Tax Evasion in Italy: Estimates and Distributional Effects

The paper estimates the extent of evasion of personal income tax (PIT) in Italy by integrating two methods that the literature has previously applied separately. The consumption-based method introduced by Pissarides and Weber (1989) is used to estimate misreporting of income in micro data collected in the household IT-SILC survey. We adopt an econometric specification close in spirit to that of Feldman and Slemrod (2007), which allows us to estimate income misreporting at different rates for different income sources. The misreporting estimates are then used in the discrepancy method to correct the incomes compared with administrative registered data. The comparison provides new estimates of evasion of personal income tax by type of income, region and income class. The estimates are used to improve microsimulation analyses of the distributional impact of tax evasion.     

Disability Retirement in a Welfare State

The increasing number of disability pensioners may put a strain on the welfare state. In this paper, we try to assess the effect of financial incentives on disability entrance. A sample of Norwegians on long-term sick leave at the beginning of 1989 is examined as of the end of 1989, and the exit routes are studied in a multinomial logit model. The results indicate that the incentive effects of wages are larger than the disincentive effects of benefits. Furthermore, there is no evidence that having a "subjective" diagnosis affects the probability of becoming a disability pensioner.
JEL Classification : H 55; I 18; J 26     

Financial incentives and retirement: evidence from federal civil service workers

We examine the retirement behavior of federal civil service workers employed by the Department of Defense. These workers provide an interesting population for studying retirement because they face relatively simple financial incentives, high quality administrative data are available, and they are not covered by the Social Security system. We find that these workers respond to their financial incentives in a similar manner to what others have found when analyzing much different retirement systems. We also find no evidence of “excess retirement” at key ages of the Social Security system, which does not support the existence of societal-wide norms regarding retirement.     

分税制改革与中国地方政府的基础设施投资偏好*——基于财政激励假说的实证分析

已有文献认为,晋升政治激励是解释中国地方政府基础设施投资偏好的主要原因。但统计数据却表明,1995年以前基础设施资本存量增长速度与GDP增长速度是重合的,1995年以后基础设施资本存量的增长速度明显超过了GDP增长速度。由于改革以来晋升政治激励并未发生变化,因此已有文献无法解释1995年前后两个时期里为何出现基础设施增长模式的差异。本文提出的财政激励假说认为,分税制改革所带来的财政激励变化,是导致地方政府投资在1995年以后变得偏好于基础设施的主要原因。笔者利用省级面板数据对上述假说进行了检验,发现财政激励假说可以很好地解释分税制改革前后地方政府基础设施投资偏好的变化。这意味着进一步完善分税制对改进地方政府的支出偏好是至关重要的。     

Accountability,incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools

The recent federal education bill, No Child Left Behind, requires states to test students in grades 3 to 8 each year and to judge school performance on the basis of these test scores. While intended to maximize student learning, there is little empirical evidence about the effectiveness of such policies. This study examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in the Chicago Public Schools in 1996–1997. Using a panel of student-level, administrative data, I find that math and reading achievement increased sharply following the introduction of the accountability policy, in comparison to both prior achievement trends in the district and to changes experienced by other large, urban districts in the mid-west. However, for younger students, the policy did not increase performance on a state-administered, low-stakes exam. An item-level analysis suggests that the observed achievement gains were driven by increases in test-specific skills and student effort. I also find that teachers responded strategically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions—by increasing special education placements, preemptively retaining students and substituting away from low-stakes subjects like science and social studies.     

A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies

Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting. Received: December 20, 1995; revised version: December 6, 1996     

Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information

We introduce differential information in the asset market model studied by Cheng J Math Econ 20(1):137–152,1991, Dana and Le Van J Math Econ 25(3):263–280,1996 and Le Van and Truong Xuan J Math Econ 36(3): 241–254, 2001. We prove an equilibrium existence result assuming that the economy’s information structure satisfies the conditional independence property. If private information is not publicly verifiable, agents have incentives to misreport their types and therefore contracts may not be executed in the second period. We also show that under the conditional independence property equilibrium contracts are always executable.     

信息不对称、分成契约与超限额采伐--中国国有森林资源变化的理论分析和实证考察

本文回顾了改革开放以来国有林业企业管理体制的演变 ,通过多任务委托代理模型探讨了这一演变过程中利润分成和采伐限额两个不相容的政府政策激励对国有林业企业经营者激励的影响 ,特别是信息不对称条件下其对木材采伐的影响 ,从而解释了国有林业企业普遍存在的超限额采伐的经济原因。通过全国 2 8个省 5次全国森林资源普查的面板数据 ,通过使用国有林业企业的平均面积作为政府与国有林业企业委托—代理关系中信息不对称的代理变量 ,从实证上验证了信息不对称将会导致超限额采伐和国有林资源增长率下降的假说     

GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT

We study a principal–agent relationship with auditing in which information from an audit is ‘soft’– by conducting an audit, the principal observes the agent's private information, but cannot obtain verifiable evidence on the information. Moreover, the principal's auditing effort is unverifiable in our model. Therefore, besides the agent's misreporting incentive, there is the principal's incentive to accuse the truthful agent even without auditing. If the principal's auditing effort is verifiable, granting no exit option to the agent is optimal although the principal can still accuse a truthful agent after the audit. We show that when the principal's auditing effort is unverifiable, granting an exit option to the agent and auditing are complementary. Without granting an exit option to the agent, no auditing is optimal, and the principal grants an exit option to conduct a sincere audit, which in turn mitigates the agent's misreporting incentive. Our analysis also reveals that, when the cost of auditing is sufficiently large, the principal conducts more sincere audits with a smaller amount of penalty.     

Transplant quality and patients? preferences in paired kidney exchange

Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor-patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider the quality of the matches between patients and donors. Limitations on the number of simultaneous required operations imply that every efficient PKE program introduces incentives for the patients to misreport how they rank the option of remaining in dialysis with respect to the available kidneys. Truthfully revealing their preferences is however, the unique protective (lexicographic maximin) strategy for patients under pairwise exchange maximizing PKE programs.     

HIV／AIDS防治中的医患交往艺术——一个景颇村寨中的信任表达

本世纪以来，中国各艾滋病重度流行地区的防治运动往往面临着过度“行政依赖”的制度困境，然而，本文在中国西南边境线上的一个景颇村寨中发现了例外。当地的官方防疫体制通过在终端启用代理人——乡村医生——来进行实际干预，极大规避了阳性群体对于防疫体制的过度依赖，以及由此造成的消极的社会道德后果。来自田野的事实证明，围绕着防疫实践的医患交往在信任机制的组织下，不仅柔和了官方防疫体制与对象间的文化张力，还通过策略而技巧的实践过程增强了对阳性人群的控制能力，并反过来强化了医患间的信任纽带。总的来说，医患间的交往艺术让医学权力的运作得以情境化，实现了社会控制的本意。     

所有利益相关者参与公司治理并非最有效率

利益相关者公司治理模式强调所有利益相关者的利益最大化,从其目标本身来看,是无可非议的。但该模式通过管理层的广泛任务和分享控制权来内部化股东行为的负外部性,容易产生管理层激励设计难、融资和决策效率低等问题。本文认为,所有利益相关者参与公司治理并不是保护其利益的有效制度安排,而应该在坚持股东价值的范式下,通过契约和法律形式实现其他利益相关者的利益保护。     

“Fifty in five”: The prospects for merger in the electric utility industry

By analyzing four case studies of merger attempts between electric utilities, we conclude that there are not strong incentives for a wave of combinations in the industry. Potential synergy gains do not provide a strong motivation since they are likely already being captured through joint ventures and coordination agreements. Those that still exist would most likely be distributed to rate payers by regulatory decisions. Managerial incentives of the bidder are countered by the desire of target management to remain independent. Potential gains to the financial community from a wave of mergers are large, but the regulatory process provides a dampening of this otherwise strong incentive.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

Taxes and entrepreneurial risk-taking: Theory and evidence for the U.S.

How does the tax law affect individual incentives to engage in entrepreneurial risk taking? We first show theoretically that taxes can affect incentives due to differences in tax rates on business vs. wage income, due to differences in the marginal tax rates faced on losses vs. profits through a progressive rate structure and through the option to incorporate, and due to risk sharing with the government. We then provide empirical evidence using U.S. individual tax return data that each of these aspects of the tax law have clear effects on individual behavior, and together have had large effects on the amount of entrepreneurial risk taking.