Towards a credit network based early warning indicator for crises

This paper presents an agent based model which underlines the importance of credit network and leverage dynamics in determining the resilience of the system, defining an early warning indicator for crises. The model reproduces macroeconomic dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous banks and firms in an endogenous credit network. Banks and firms are linked through multiple credit relations, which derive from individual target leverage choices: agents choose the more convenient leverage level, according to a basic reinforcement learning algorithm. Simulations are calibrated on balance sheet data of banks and firms quoted in the Japanese stock-exchange markets from 1980 to 2012.     

Determinants of financial distress and bankruptcy in highly levered transactions

Prior literature on highly levered transactions (levered buyouts or levered recapitalizations) has emphasized either changes in governance or the structuring of their financing in helping these firms avoid financial distress or bankruptcy. Observing a sample of HLTs over time, we observe that debt composition is a more critical influence than proposed changes in governance for the likelihood of an HLT avoiding financial distress or bankruptcy. Such evidence is consistent with the [Chemmanur, T. & Fulghieri, P. (1994). Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt. Review of Financial Studies 7, 475–506] model and suggests that the critical factor is the ability to informally renegotiate debt terms with a few lenders.     

New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule

Concede-and-divide is a well-known and widely accepted procedure to solve bankruptcy situations involving two agents. In a recent paper, Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004) characterize it by means of a new property, called securement, that imposes a lower bound on the awards agents might obtain. This property can be naturally decomposed in two more elementary ones. We show that each of these components, together with a suitable version of monotonicity and the standard property of self-duality, also characterize concede-and-divide. We also show that one of these components characterizes the rule, when combined with the standard property of minimal rights first.     

Assessing bankruptcy prediction models via information content of technical inefficiency

We use a stochastic frontier model with firm-specific technical inefficiency effects in a panel framework (Battese and Coelli in Empir Econ 20:325–332, 1995) to assess two popular probability of bankruptcy (PB) measures based on Merton model (Merton in J Financ 29:449–470, 1974) and discrete-time hazard model (DHM; Shumway in J Bus 74:101–124, 2001). Three important results based on our empirical studies are obtained. First, a firm with a higher PB generally has less technical efficiency. Second, for an ex-post bankrupt firm, its PB tends to increase and its technical efficiency of production tends to decrease, as the time to its bankruptcy draws near. Finally, the information content about firm’s technical inefficiency provided by PB based on DHM is significantly more than that based on Merton model. By the last result and the fact that economic-based efficiency measures are reasonable indicators of the long-term health and prospects of firms (Baek and Pagán in Q J Bus Econ 41:27–41, 2002), we conclude that PB based on DHM is a better credit risk proxy of firms.     

Financial Distress Prediction in an International Context: A Review and Empirical Analysis of Altman's Z‐Score Model

This paper assesses the classification performance of the Z‐Score model in predicting bankruptcy and other types of firm distress, with the goal of examining the model's usefulness for all parties, especially banks that operate internationally and need to assess the failure risk of firms. We analyze the performance of the Z‐Score model for firms from 31 European and three non‐European countries using different modifications of the original model. This study is the first to offer such a comprehensive international analysis. Except for the United States and China, the firms in the sample are primarily private, and include non‐financial companies across all industrial sectors. We use the original Z′′‐Score model developed by Altman, Corporate Financial Distress: A Complete Guide to Predicting, Avoiding, and Dealing with Bankruptcy (1983) for private and public manufacturing and non‐manufacturing firms. While there is some evidence that Z‐Score models of bankruptcy prediction have been outperformed by competing market‐based or hazard models, in other studies, Z‐Score models perform very well. Without a comprehensive international comparison, however, the results of competing models are difficult to generalize. This study offers evidence that the general Z‐Score model works reasonably well for most countries (the prediction accuracy is approximately 0.75) and classification accuracy can be improved further (above 0.90) by using country‐specific estimation that incorporates additional variables.     

Financial factors and company investment decisions in transitional China

We investigate the propensity of Chinese publicly listed firms to invest in response to financial factors, according to the a priori degree of a firm's information problems: industry sector, ownership structure and firm size. The firms in primary and tertiary industries are found to be liquidity‐constrained in their investment decisions. The investment‐cash flow sensitivity of the firms in secondary industry indicates that they lost privileged access to credit in the course of China's market transition. However, we find no evidence that financial liberalization resulted in an easing of financing constraints for small‐ and medium‐sized firms. Our result indicates that agency problems, stemming from a state‐controlling pyramidal ownership structure, are responsible for the misallocation of internal funds. The importance of bankruptcy and agency costs in relation to debt finance for certain types of borrowers reflects the transitional nature of the financial environment facing Chinese firms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

利益相关者与资本结构决策

传统权衡理论中的破产成本主要考虑的是,由重组或清算所带来的法律成本和管理成本之类的直接破产成本,以及由股东和债权人之间的矛盾而引起的在企业财务危机期间发生的间接破产成本。现代权衡理论基于利益相关者的考虑拓展了以前的间接破产成本内涵,主要是考虑了企业财务危机或破产清算给其他利益相关者带来的危害。这不但使企业的资本结构决策渗入了更多的战略因素,而且可以解释现实中许多企业的看似保守的融资行为。     

Monitoring costs and trade credit

This paper addresses the question of why nonfinancial firms engage in lending to their business partners. Such lending or trade credit is modeled as a second layer of financial intermediation. It is shown that when it is costly for a bank to inspect the borrower’s revenue but not for the borrower’s business partner, then saving in monitoring costs due to the business partner’s informational advantage may lead to trade credit. The trade off is between monitoring fewer firms and monitoring larger firms that may entail an adverse scale effect. The results are consistent with the existing empirical evidence on bankruptcy costs and on the incidence of trade credit. Welfare analysis in terms of total surplus shows that the equilibrium lending arrangement is not necessarily optimal.     

消费信贷与社会信用体系建设探讨

对于如何建立社会信用制度体系，加速消费信贷的发展，仁者见仁，智者见智，本文就如何构建我国信用体制，并以次促进消费信贷的发展进行理论性研究和探讨。     

Obstacles to Successful Highlander Colonization of the Amazon and Orinoco Basins

Abstract . Highlander settlement of the Amazon and Orinoco lowlands east of the Andes has increased to the point where every nation from Venezuela to Bolivia presently has active colonization programs and policies. Colonization alleviates social and economic stresses in the highlands and western coastal cities and contributes to a fuller utilization of national sources. Spontaneous colonization has proven more successful than government-directed efforts. Shortages of adequate roads and public services and difficulties in obtaining clear land titles and sufficient credit seriously hinder the pioneers. To succeed, individual colonists must also learn new lowland farming techniques and products, develop an ability to cooperate with fellow settlers, and overcome discouragement brought on by isolation and loneliness. In spite of these obstacles, the colonization effort serves both the personal and nationalistic interests of those involved and can be expected to continue.     

Do adjustment costs explain investment-cash flow insensitivity?

In this paper, I explain two “puzzles” that have been observed in firm level data. First, firms that display a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow (commonly believed to be an indicator of liquidity constraints) usually have large unutilized lines of credit which, presumably, could be used to overcome the shortage of funds. Second, firms that are perceived to be extremely liquidity constrained actually show very little sensitivity of investment to cash flow.I show how a dynamic model of firm investment with liquidity constraints and non-convex costs of adjustment of capital can explain these facts. These two features together imply that firms need to have a certain threshold level of financial resources before they can afford to increase investment. Once they cross this threshold, firms’ investment will be positively correlated with their financial resources until they reach their desired level of capital stock. However, even if investment is sensitive to cash flow, firms may borrow below their credit limit to guard against future bankruptcy or binding liquidity constraints.     

Temporarily asymmetric information and labour contracts

Under the assumption that workers are more heavily credit rationed than firms, the standard model of testing and self-selection in the labour market is extended. The two main findings are that ex post inefficient termination may be used as a self-selection device and that when workers can be of more than two different productivities, only the best worker should be overpaid.     

Network capability,innovativeness, and performance: a multidimensional extension for entrepreneurship

Abstract

Small- and start-up firms in the high-tech industry usually engage in networking to overcome resource, knowledge, and competence constraints in creative, innovation-based competition. Quite often, however, network relationships fail due to lack of network capability (NC), defined as the ability to manage and gain benefits from external relationships. In the present study, we propose and examine an updated five-dimension NC construct and test its effect on innovativeness and performance. Two independent high-tech samples of small firms and start-ups support measurement properties of the proposed NC construct and suggest that the often-overlooked dimension in NC research of network relationship building is important to include in a complete NC construct. Doing so can help explain organizational innovativeness and effects on the customer, sales, and innovation performance more effectively. As a result, we find support for the proposed NC scale and the importance of network capabilities for small companies and start-ups to remain competitive.     

Surviving chapter 11: Why small firms prefer supplier financing

This research examines the value of trade credit relationships for small firms. We initially document the benefits of trade credit relationships and_explain why small firms in financial distress tend to prefer trade credit from suppliers over bank financing. Banks do not agree to debt reduction, additional financing, or deviate from absolute priority. Implicitly, banks’ interests are best served by forcing liquidation through Chapter 7. Secured suppliers with pre-petition debt tend to provide debtor-in-possession financing, while unsecured suppliers are more likely to agree to deviations from absolute priority. Hence, suppliers’ interests are best served by facilitating reorganization through Chapter 11.     

Developing and Utilizing Network Resources: Roles of Political Skill

This study examines the role of political skill in the development and utilization of network resources at the individual level. Drawing on the behavioural and network perspectives as well as political skill literature, we propose that political skill increases one's network resources (developing network), which will benefit his/her performance and career success. Moreover, political skill is hypothesized to strengthen the relationships between network resources and performance and career outcomes (utilizing network). A two‐wave study on a sample of 281 supervisor–subordinate dyads from six electronic firms in China confirms our hypotheses. Our examination of the dual role of political skill facilitates a better understanding of the networking process from the perspective of individual skill/behaviour, thus enriching the behavioural theory and network literature. Implications are discussed and directions for future research are suggested.     

Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

This paper examines how the presence of an antitrust authority (AA) affects market‐sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other’s markets. The set of agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This paper shows that in the absence of an AA, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, and in the presence of an AA, more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a procompetitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.     

Too dynamic to fail: empirical support for an autocatalytic model of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis

Solomon and Golo (Account Econ Law 3(3):167–260, 2013) have recently proposed an autocatalytic (self-reinforcing) feedback model which couples a macroscopic system parameter (the interest rate), a microscopic parameter that measures the distribution of the states of the individual agents (the number of firms in financial difficulty) and a peer-to-peer network effect (contagion across supply chain financing). In this model, each financial agent is characterized by its resilience to the interest rate. Above a certain rate the interest due on the firm’s financial costs exceeds its earnings and the firm becomes susceptible to failure (ponzi). For the interest rate levels under a certain threshold level, the firm loans are smaller then its earnings and the firm becomes ‘hedge.’ In this paper, we fit the historical data (2002–2009) on interest rate data into our model, in order to predict the number of the ponzi firms. We compare the prediction with the data taken from a large panel of Italian firms over a period of 9 years. We then use trade credit linkages to discuss the connection between the ponzi density and the network percolation. We find that the ‘top-down’–‘bottom-up’ positive feedback loop accounts for most of the Minsky crisis accelerator dynamics. The peer-to-peer ponzi companies contagion becomes significant only in the last stage of the crisis when the ponzi density is above a critical value. Moreover the ponzi contagion is limited only to the companies that were not dynamic enough to substitute their distressed clients with new ones. In this respect the data support a view in which the success of the economy depends on substituting the static ‘supply-network’ picture with an interacting dynamic agents one.     

Credit allocation and the financial crisis: evidence from Spanish companies

The worldwide financial crisis of 2007–2008 raised serious concerns about the soundness of banks’ activities and about the extent to which banking regulation should supervise banks’ investment decisions. We contribute to this topic by examining the Spanish case, which has been emblematic of the bubble and burst dynamics in the credit market. In particular, we study the allocation of bank credit among Spanish companies from 1999 to 2014, showing that larger companies accumulated greater amounts of bank loans per unit of total assets, thus leading to a notable concentration. We also find that, during the Spanish boom period, bank loans shifted from the manufacturing to the construction industry, and in particular to the largest companies of the latter sector. This happened in spite of the high leverage of large construction firms, which was increasing also due to their growing debt. We argue that the higher operating benefits, reflecting the increase of the housing price during the boom period, overvalued construction firms as potential borrowers. The bankruptcy of several large construction companies during the Spanish crisis supports the need for monitoring and regulation, to avoid an excessive concentration of bank credit to a few large companies, especially if they belong to a specific sector.

     

Lasting lending relationships and technical efficiency. Evidence on European SMEs

Linking the theoretical predictions of the research on lending relationships with those of the literature on managerial incentives, we investigate whether the duration of credit relationships impacts on SMEs’ technical efficiency. Our hypothesis is that the balance between costs and benefits of enduring banking relationships might have heterogeneous effects on managers’ incentives depending on the level of firms’ indebtedness. Using a large sample of European SMEs, observed in the period 2001–2008, and adopting both parametric and non-parametric measures of efficiency, we find that the positive impact of longer lending relationships on efficiency decreases as indebtedness increases, suggesting that moral hazard problems may endanger firms’ technical efficiency.     

On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives

ABSTRACT

Despite the obvious problems associated with collections, firms routinely sell on credit. Conventional wisdom suggests offering credit is a necessary evil when dealing with insistent cash-constrained customers. This paper provides a more positive view of trade credit. We find that offering credit can enhance the efficiency of incentive contracts with sales personnel. In effect, with a credit sale, a client gets a second chance to generate enough cash. The client's second chance gives the sales agent another opportunity to demonstrate his past diligence to the firm. Moreover, to limit the risk associated with the fact that even a high-quality client may fail to eventually come up with funds, the firm relies on the accrual system. In particular, the agent's (discretionary and early) choice of the bad debt allowance conveys his private information regarding client quality; the payments associated with subsequent collections/default keep such reporting in check.