各国金融监管体系的对比及对我国的启示

随着金融混业成为国际发展趋势,各国的金融监管体制从目前来看可分为以下几类：统一监管模式、分头监管模式、牵头监管模式、“双峰式”监管模式和美国的伞形监管＋功能监管的金融监管体系。我国现行的分业监管模式存在着监管手段落后、缺乏量化指标、法律不健全、多头监管和信息不共享等问题,明显不适合金融业进一步发展的内在要求。外国金融监管模式的转变为我们提供了许多可以借鉴的经验。     

南非金融监管改革新框架及其启示

2008年全球金融危机暴露出南非金融监管体制的内在缺陷.2013年12月南非政府正式发布名为《金融部门监管法案》的金融监管改革方案征求意见稿,启动了公开咨询程序.“准双峰”监管模式将取代既有的金融监管体制.南非新金融监管模式对我国金融监管强化宏观审慎和微观审慎监管相结合、完善金融消费者权益保护、明确法定金融监管协调机制等方面具有一定的借鉴意义.     

澳大利亚与英国双峰监管模式的比较研究

金融监管的双峰理论起源于英国,由澳大利亚于1998年率先开始实践并良好运行至今,而英国在金融危机后的监管体系改革中也转向了双峰监管模式,可见双峰监管模式有着独特的魅力与实践意义。通过对比两国双峰监管模式在机构设置、监管思路、双峰机构独立性等方面的不同,分析双峰监管模式的内涵与特点,以期为我国金融监管制度改革提供一种模式选择。     

美国监管模式改革对我国的启示

2007年的美国次贷危机重创了全球经济,为此美国推出了新的金融监管法案,对伞形金融监管模式进行了根本的变革,建立金融市场的全面监管体系.我国现行的监管模式是“分业监管”,在该体制下三大监管主体各司其职,交叉业务极少,在监管上存在着明显的差异性和局限性.近年来由于金融控股公司和金融机构混业经营的出现,分业监管已不能适应不断发展的金融体系.因此我们有必要借鉴美国的经验以改善我国的金融监管体系.本文认为在对我国现行监管模式进行完善时应从国际金融业混业经营的现状出发,结合美国监管模式改革对我国的启示,改革现行金融监管模式,建立统一的、全局统筹的金融监管机构     

金融结构、风险结构与我国金融监管改革

金融结构演化的不同阶段会产生不同的金融风险结构,要求有相应的金融监管模式与之相适应.本文在梳理国内外相关文献的基础上,提出了银行导向型、市场导向型和金融证券化型的三个层次金融结构,分析了每一金融结构下金融风险结构的特征及其监管要求.通过比较次贷危机以来以美国、英国和澳大利亚为代表的三类主要金融监管模式,本文认为短期我国可采用类似美国的“多元监管者”模式,中长期可以澳大利亚的“双峰监管者”或者英国的“单一监管者”模式为改革方向.     

牵头监管模式：我国金融监管的现实选择

我国现行的金融分业监管体制存在着诸多问题。在目前“一行三会”的金融监管体制下,采取牵头监管模式,是解决监管中存在问题的有效办法。该监管模式是一种介乎于分业监管与统一监管之间的过渡模式,兼有统一监管的雏形,此种“温和式”的改革,更符合我国国情和更具可操作性。     

金融监管演进的制度逻辑与中国的选择——基于对美国监管制度变迁的思考

金融监管的制度演进遵循着特定的发展路径,十八世纪末至今美国金融体系所经历的冲击和变革,以及因此带动的金融监管体制演变,是研究监管制度变迁的重要背景与素材。2008年金融危机的发生使看似完善的美国金融监管制度受到了空前挑战,也促使新的一轮监管改革全面启动。此轮改革不但重塑了美国国内金融业发展模式和监管体制,还将对全球金融体系的未来走向产生持续影响。我国应当从美国金融监管的历次变革中汲取经验教训,适时推动我国监管体制改革以适应金融业发展需要。     

金融监管演进的制度逻辑与中国的选择--基于对美国监管制度变迁的思考

金融监管的制度演进遵循着特定的发展路径,十八世纪末至今美国金融体系所经历的冲击和变革,以及因此带动的金融监管体制演变,是研究监管制度变迁的重要背景与素材。2008年金融危机的发生使看似完善的美国金融监管制度受到了空前挑战,也促使新的一轮监管改革全面启动。此轮改革不但重塑了美国国内金融业发展模式和监管体制,还将对全球金融体系的未来走向产生持续影响。我国应当从美国金融监管的历次变革中汲取经验教训,适时推动我国监管体制改革以适应金融业发展需要。     

我国金融监管模式的选择

全球金融业务日益向混业经营方向转变,与之相适应的金融监管模式也日益朝着混业监管的方向演变。我国金融监管制度可借鉴美国的分层监管模式与欧洲的单层监管模式,通过短期性的过渡性改革和长期目标改革,逐步完善我国的金融监管模式。     

美国监管模式改革对我国的启示

2007年的美国次贷危机重创了全球经济,为此美国推出了新的金融监管法案,对伞形金融监管模式进行了根本的变革,建立金融市场的全面监管体系。我国现行的监管模式是"分业监管",在该体制下三大监管主体各司其职,交叉业务极少,在监管上存在着明显的差异性和局限性。近年来由于金融控股公司和金融机构混业经营的出现,分业监管已不能适应不断发展的金融体系。因此我们有必要借鉴美国的经验以改善我国的金融监管体系。本文认为在对我国现行监管模式进行完善时应从国际金融业混业经营的现状出发,结合美国监管模式改革对我国的启示,改革现行金融监管模式,建立统一的、全局统筹的金融监管机构。     

Europe's single market for financial services: views by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee

Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas.The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on US banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe, Japan and Latin America.The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) from its counterparts in the US and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation–states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.     

英国金融监管改革新架构及其启示

2007年全球金融危机以来,英国推出了一系列金融监管改革措施。2009年,保守党上台后推行了更为系统和严格的改革方案,打破了英格兰银行、金融服务局(Financial Services Authority,FSA)、财政部"三权分立"的监管模式。FSA将被分拆,其相关职能将由央行框架内的三个机构承担,英格兰银行被赋予全面监管的权力;在微观审慎监管层面,采用"双峰监管"模式,加强对金融消费者的保护,同时设立了特殊处理机制以应对突发事件。英国的新监管框架对我国金融监管强化宏观审慎和微观审慎监管相结合、完善金融消费者权益保护、设立特殊处理机制等方面具有一定的借鉴意义。     

"Marking-to-Market" and Treasury-Bill Futures Prices: Some Empirical Evidence

Financial economists have not found empirical evidence of a “marking‐to‐market” effect in Treasury‐bill futures contracts, despite a firm theoretical basis for its existence. Therefore, we speculate that confounding effects, possibly due to liquidity preferences, influence futures‐forward price spreads. By using an empirical specification that allows for both effects, we present empirical evidence that Treasury‐bill futures‐forward price spreads are sensitive to the volatility of the underlying commodity in ways predicted by the theory of the marking‐to‐market effect.     

BEHIND THE CORPORATE HEDGE: INFORMATION AND THE LIMITS OF "SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION"

The article begins by setting out three alternative conceptions of the corporate objective function. Relying on this framework, it shows that legal analyses tend to neglect conflicts between the interests of the corporate entity and the interests of shareholders over the amount of corporate risk-taking. Financial analyses tend to ignore both constraints on managerial discretion imposed by law and a fundamental ambiguity the author identifies in the “shareholder wealth maximization” assumption that underlies such analyses. This ambiguity arises in part from market “frictions”–particularly, the investor uncertainty and heightened price volatility that stem from informational “asymmetry.” Such an information gap between management and outside investors (along with market “irrationality”) can cause material disparities between the actual trading price and the intrinsic value (or what the author calls the “blissful price”) of a company's shares. As a consequence, corporate hedging that maximizes actual share values may not maximize intrinsic values (and vice versa), thus giving rise to a managerial dilemma. Previous analyses have also failed to give adequate consideration to the expectations of shareholders. If, for example, the shareholders of a natural resource company are seeking a relatively “pure play” on that resource–in part because they believe the company's management has no comparative advantage in managing price risks–corporate hedging that increases shareholder wealth may re-duceshareholder welfare. In this sense, the usual “shareholder wealth maximization” directive is not only ambiguous, but also incomplete. These problems stem not only from informational asymmetry, but from other institutional realities (such as the “political” taint associated with reported derivative losses of any kind) that raise the information costs of using derivatives. The article concludes with some suggestions for improving disclosure of corporate risk management “philosophy.” Better disclosure may not only help reduce such information costs, but could also encourage corporations to find–and stick to–their derivatives niche.     

《银行资本充足率监管征求意见稿》的影响研究

2011年5月,银监会下发了融合《巴塞尔协议II》及《巴塞尔协议III》内关于资本计量、管理等内容的《银行资本充足率监管征求意见稿》,这标志着金融危机后我国的新监管标准即将落地。该监管新规将使国有五大行资本充足率下降。五大行可以从补充资本、降低加权风险资产、增强资本管理能力等方面应对监管新规。     

金融消费者保护：后危机时代金融监管的新主题

金融消费者保护既是金融监管的应有之义和基础价值,更是后危机时代西方国家金融改革与治理的新主题。在国内,与金融消费权益纠纷案件日益增多不匹配的是,现有处理模式包括法律体系、机构体系、途径体系等无法有效适应这一新情况,重构以金融消费者保护为主题的全新金融监管模式势在必行。     

An examination of the perceptions of auditors and chief financial officers regarding principles versus rules based accounting standards

The debate over the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by United States issuers, or its convergence with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) has been going on for several years now. However, as of this writing, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has still not taken a definitive position on the issue. This is in part due to issues involving the cost of adoption, independence concerns relating to the IFRS promulgation body, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the debate over which type of accounting standards is superior for financial reporting: IFRS, which are said to be “principles-based,” or U.S. GAAP, which are said to be “rules-based.” In this paper we examined the views of two stakeholders in the U.S. financial reporting system, auditors in large public accounting firms and Chief Financial Officers in the Fortune 1000. We elicited their perceptions involving ten situations where specific rules are incorporated in U.S. GAAP. We asked if the elimination of the specific rule would be likely to better achieve the “qualitative characteristics of useful financial information” as defined by the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 2010 (FASB 2010) and the similar document adopted by the IASB at the same time (IASB 2010). We found that in eight of the ten situations both groups preferred the rules-based accounting regime (the current U.S. GAAP rules) over a principles-based approach.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

Die Einheitlichkeit der europ?ischen Aufsichtsarchitektur und die Besonderheit der Versicherungswirtschaft

The powers and the margin of discretion enjoyed by the European Supervisory Authorities within the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision are considerably wider than under the German Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz. As a consequence, the particular role which the insurance sector plays within the framework of prudential supervision threatens to come under pressure by new regulatory approaches of EIOPA either in the form of legally binding technical standards or non-binding guidelines. However, the business model of the insurance sector should at least prevent an intrusive regulation in the field of financial stability since insurance companies tend to be more robust in financial crises than credit institutions.     

Tratamiento contable de las transacciones separadas en las combinaciones de negocios Proceso armonizador de la normativa contable internacional (IFRS) y americana (FAS)

Amendments made to 2007 Financial Accounting Standards ¾FAS 141 (R)¾ and 2008 International Financial Reporting Standards ¾IFRS 3 (R)¾ in order to harmonize the accounting aspects of operations concerning a business combination, have shown the existence of certain transactions that are not part of the combination itself, which are called “separate transactions”. The definition and delimitation of business combinations “separate transactions” is dispersed in both standards, at times with a little clarifying result. Therefore, this paper aims to facilitate the reader’s understanding of their accounting treatment to address the problem of identifying those transactions that occur, or not, as a result of a business combination, the accounting treatment for this dilemma and its effect on the recognition and valuation of goodwill.