Old‐age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

This paper introduces an overlapping‐generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labour income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where low‐income and high‐income individuals form a coalition in favour of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle‐income individuals favour a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with a borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youth consumption.     

A Note on Public Input Specifications

Public or fiscal policy is sometimes concerned with the provision of some infrastructure. This paper deals with the specification of such infrastructures as public inputs. Among other things, and in contrast to relevant literature, it is shown that there is no identity between various public inputs concepts. Thus, the results help to avoid misspecifications and may contribute to better public policy designs concerning the provision of infrastructures.     

Role of honesty in full implementation

This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents’ preferences for understanding how the process concerning honest reporting works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the central planner. We show that the presence of such preferences functions in eliminating unwanted equilibria from the practical perspective, even if the degree of the preference for honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail free and involve only small fines.     

Formula apportionment vs. separate accounting: A private information perspective

In 2002, the European Commission recommended that member countries use formula apportionment procedures to tax multinational companies. This departure from the standard separate accounting (transfer pricing) approach is an attempt to reduce the costs and distortions associated with auditing transfer prices. Unfortunately, apportionment formulas create their own economic distortions and, contrary to popular belief, they do not eliminate distortions due to asymmetric information between the multinational and the national tax authorities. In this paper, I explicitly model the role of private information in two tax competition games: one in which tax liabilities are calculated under formula apportionment and one in which tax liabilities are calculated under separate accounting and transfer prices are audited. Switching to a formula apportionment system affects the after-tax profit of multinationals and the tax revenues paid by both domestic and foreign firms. The direction and magnitude of the changes depend on the accuracy of the auditing technology and non-monotonically on multinational costs. The switch will have different effects on the tax receipts from domestic and foreign firms.     

Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used.     

Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization

Starrett (1972) [33] and Boyd and Conley (1997) [7] approaches to externality modeling are unified by distinguishing between producible and nonproducible public commodities. Nonconvexities are associated with detrimental producible public commodities but not with nonproducible public commodities in Boyd and Conley (1997) [7]. Disposability properties (costly or costless) imply that producible public commodities are either by-products (e.g., pollution) or joint-products (e.g., national defense). Markets fail for both beneficial and detrimental by-products. Nonconvexities imply that price-based equilibria, e.g., Pigovian tax equilibrium, may not be Pareto-efficient. Foley's (1967, 1970) [17] and [18] “public competitive equilibrium” combines price and quantity signals with a unanimity criterion and restores the equivalence between equilibrium and efficiency.     

Accountability and Rendering of Accounts: New Approaches for the Public Sector

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, we attempt to analyze the new concepts of accountability and rendering of accounts that have been adopted in the business world over the last few years and their application to public institutions. Aspects involved in defining stakeholders, corporate governance, intermediate financial information, performance indicators, publication of reports on external control and channels for publication of financial information are also dealt with. The second part of the paper consists of an empirical study of how Catalan municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants render accounts to citizens by means of the Internet.     

Pure eclecticism—The tool kit of the constitutional economist

It is claimed here that the epistemics of constitutional economics has hitherto at best played a minor role but that dwelling on the epistemics might prove useful to understand why the positive branch of constitutional economics is not as far advanced as its normative counterpart. Four possible methods-namely comparative institutional analysis, economic history, conjectural history, and laboratory experiments-are analyzed with regard to their epistemic potential. It is hypothesized that conjectural history promises only little potential while the other three methods can be used to complement each other.     

Implications of happiness research for environmental economics

Using happiness data to study economic issues is a burgeoning field in recent economic literature. This paper shows that happiness research has considerable potential for environmental economic analysis. The paper discusses some implications of happiness research for environmental policy analysis, specifically with respect to the level of socially optimal environmental quality. It discusses evidence that consumer choice may be not utility maximizing and systematically distorted away from intrinsically motivated options, especially environment-friendly consumption. Finally, the paper describes how happiness data can be used in a novel approach to the monetary valuation of environmental quality and discusses the associated benefits and problems in relation to conventional methods.     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

Efficiency in Crime Prevention: A Case Study of the Lisbon Precincts

This paper analyzes the technical efficiency of the Lisbon police precincts in order to investigate its performance. A stochastic cost frontier model is used to generate efficiency scores, assuming that efficiency is time varying. It investigates its efficiency and finds that the results are, at best, mixed since the efficient scores are low and not time varying. Therefore, an alteration of management procedures is proposed in order to enable efficiency to be increased based on a governance–environment framework.Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia/MCT under FCT/POCTI partially funded by FEDER is gratefully appreciated. The authors also thank the participants at the International Atlantic Economic Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–13, 2004 for helpful comments. For our mistakes, the usual disclaimer applies.     

Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment

We let subjects in a voluntary contribution experiment make non-binding numerical announcements about their “possible” contributions and, in some treatments, send written promises to contribute specific amounts. We find that announcements were responded to both by others’ announcements and by real play, for example announcements led to costly punishment when found to be misleading. We also find that adding pre-play announcements to treatments with punishment can increase efficiency by letting cost-free warnings substitute for costly punishment. The threat of punishing false announcements and promises helps reduce false signals, but only when promise statements can be sent is the effect sufficient for achieving greater efficiency.     

Nonprofits and public good provision: A contest based on compromises

Two competing nonprofits with ideologically distinct missions compete for donor funding to provide an indivisible public good in a population with heterogeneous preferences. This paper examines the extent to which (average) public values are undermined and nonprofits’ ideology compromised in a contractual game in which the right to provide the public good is the outcome of competition between nonprofits. We also scrutinize the roles of (i) cooperative versus competitive contracting, (ii) multiple public goods, (iii) enforceability of actions and (iv) observability of nonprofit costs in determining the equilibrium terms of the contract. In each case, the intensity of the ideological divide between the donor and the nonprofits jointly impact the degree to which compromises are made in terms of both the public's and nonprofit's missions, and the ability on the part of the donor to reap double (cost-saving and strategic) financial gains.     

Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities

We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.     

Reliability of individual valuations of public and private goods: Choice consistency, response time, and preference refinement

We examined the reliability of a large set of paired comparison value judgments involving public goods, private goods, and sums of money. As respondents progressed through a random sequence of paired choices they were each given, their response time decreased and they became more consistent, apparently fine-tuning their responses, suggesting that respondents tend to begin a hypothetical value exercise with relatively imprecise preferences and that experience in expressing preference helps reduce that imprecision. Reliability was greater for private than for public good choices, and greater for choices between a good and a monetary amount than for choices between two goods. However, the reliability for public good choices was only slightly lower than for the private goods.     

Agriculture production versus biodiversity protection: The impact of North-South unconditional transfers

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether international income transfers can improve or worsen the global level of biodiversity and global social welfare by changing the relative contributions to biodiversity protection and to agricultural production. Because of the public good nature of biodiversity, Warr's neutrality theorem suggests that such transfers may have no effects at all (Warr, 1983). A model is developed, based on the simplifying assumption that northern countries have little biodiversity whereas southern countries are endowed with natural capital in the form of (generally unspoilt) biodiversity-rich land. Southern countries allocate optimally land and capital to two competing productive activities, agriculture and eco-tourism. When transfers are organized from the North to the South, we show that Warr's neutrality theorem collapses. Transfers can either reduce or increase the natural capital in the South, depending on some empirically verifiable hypotheses concerning the characteristics of the eco-tourism and agricultural production functions. In addition, we demonstrate that welfare improvements can be obtained even with reductions in the level of biodiversity.     

Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects

In this paper we examine a group formation problem, where heterogeneous individuals partitioned themselves into communities, each choosing its own public project from the given space of feasible projects. The model is that of “horizontal product differentiation” where individuals display distinct preferences over the policy space. We consider the notion of “efficient” configuration that minimizes the total project-related costs and aggregate personalized costs of all individuals, and “sustainable” configurations, those are immune against breakaways by subgroups of individuals. Our main result is that, with a unidimensional project space and single-peaked personalized costs, every efficient partition is sustainable.     

Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior

We perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in the public-good and gift-exchange game. We find that participants classified as cooperators in the public-good game tend to reciprocate higher wages in the gift-exchange game with higher levels of effort. Non-cooperators do not exhibit such tendency. Both types offer similar wages.     

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.     

Real exchange rates,asset prices and terms of trade: A theoretical analysis

This paper develops a continuous-time two-country dynamic equilibrium model, in which the real exchange rates, asset prices, and terms of trade are jointly determined in the presence of nontradable goods. The model determines the relation between the financial markets and real goods markets in the world economy and their responses to various shocks under the home bias assumption. A positive domestic supply shock induces a positive return on the domestic asset markets and a deterioration of terms of trade that improves the foreign output and boosts the foreign asset markets. Demand shocks act in the opposite way. This model also analyses the impact of change in the relative price of nontradable to tradable goods on the terms of trade and asset markets. A higher productivity growth in tradable goods than in nontradable goods leads to a higher relative price of nontradable to tradable goods, which appreciates the real exchange rate, deteriorates the terms of trade, and depresses the domestic and foreign asset markets. A lower relative price of nontradable goods depreciates the real exchange rate, improves the terms of trade, and lifts both the domestic and foreign asset markets.