递增阶梯定价、收入再分配效应和效率成本估算

递增阶梯定价政策的分配效应及其效率后果,是价格制定者和学术界评估和完善本轮公共事业阶梯定价政策的重要问题。本文基于理论模型和实证分析,估计了阶梯定价为实现收入再分配的政策目标而导致的效率损失成本。研究发现,随着两级阶梯电价方案实施时间的延长,两类效率成本均在下降,但第一类效率成本下降得更快,第二类效率成本占比有所上升;无论在何种弹性假设下,阶梯定价方案作为一种调节收入分配的手段,均起到了积极作用,但阶梯定价收入再分配的功效不是很大;阶梯分档不合理将严重影响收入再分配效应和效率成本。此外,对分时定价的进一步的研究还发现,峰谷分时定价不利于收入再分配,谷时中等收入家庭的电费支出高于高收入家庭,导致中等收入家庭谷时的福利损失比高收入家庭多。     

阶梯电价,在推行中改进

6月1日起,我国将全面试行居民阶梯式电价。单一的电价收费模式将被随用电量增加呈阶梯状递增的电价定价机制取代。截至目前,已有近20个省市公布了听证方案。＂阶梯＂设计如何兼顾效率和公平？阶梯电价是否只升不降？如何解决地区和季节用电量差异？这些方案设计是否科学合理？居民用电成本将有怎样的变化？这些问题,都是目前民众关心的问题,《商周刊》特别组稿予以关注。     

阶梯定价调整、需求弹性测度与中国电价政策评估

对阶梯电价实施效果进行评估是电价规制者和学术界面临的一个重要问题.本文基于消费者最优选择理论和满足可分性条件的离散/连续选择模型,构建了与消费者福利变化一致估计的阶梯定价无条件需求弹性,并在此基础上对中国阶梯电价政策进行评价.本文利用国家电网及杭州市居民用电的微观调查数据,估计阶梯电价下的价格需求弹性,并通过构建反事实场景,实证分析阶梯电价的实施效果.结果显示:阶梯电价下的无条件价格弹性更大,因而阶梯电价较线性电价时的价格调整对消费数量的影响更强;在阶梯电价中嵌入分时定价,引致峰时电量转移至谷时,促进了削峰填谷目标的实现;峰谷价差和峰谷比变化能有效调节用户总电费支出;阶梯宽度调整促进了不同阶梯用户覆盖目标的实现.     

电力产业化解两难困境的经济学研究

从供需均衡角度分析了长期困扰中国电力产业的两难困境(电力短缺和电价过高),而产生两难困境的根源在于垂直一体化垄断;尽管电力体制改革在一定程度上打破了这种垄断,但是电网公司的输配售一体化垄断仍然成为化解两难困境的梗阻;通过网售分开,在电力产业构建充分竞争的电力市场,有效降低电力的生产和零售成本,成本的降低推动供给曲线向右下方平移,在其他条件不变的前提下实现既降低电价又增加电量的目的,从而有效化解两难困境。     

阶梯电价制度的思考

在经济社会的可持续发展的过程中,能源紧缺、资源浪费等问题层出不穷。因此为了鼓励居民节约用电,实现资源的可持续发展,我国于2012年开始实行居民阶梯电价制度。本文从我国居民阶梯电价制度实施的现状出发,通过分析在制度实行过程中存在的问题,从而提出了关于完善居民阶梯电价制度的几点建议。     

强自然垄断定价理论与中国电价规制制度分析

强自然垄断行业由于其定价方面的两难困境 ,需要规制者对其产品定价进行规制以在厂商利润与社会福利之间进行权衡。边际成本定价原则并不适合于自然垄断厂商。本文在规制定价理论以及激励规制理论的基础上 ,对中国电力定价问题进行了分析 ,认为电价改革的第一步应在发电环节中引入竞争的基础上 ,对不同效率类型的电力厂商设计不同激励强度的定价机制 ,另外本文尝试着对不同技术效率的电力厂商列出了不同激励强度的价格规制方案菜单     

阶梯电价实施及结构设计——基于跨国数据的经验分析

本文使用39个国家和地区的数据,利用选择模型与计数模型,对影响阶梯电价采纳和设计的因素进行了经验分析。结果显示,较高的基尼系数会增加实施阶梯电价的可能性,但较高的居民平均用电价格会阻碍阶梯电价的引入;在阶梯电价设计方面,较高的全社会人均用电量、平均温度、最高档对最低档的电价倍数倾向于引入较高阶梯数的阶梯电价,但是较高的居民平均用电价格会促使选择较低档数的阶梯电价,并且发达国家引入的阶梯电价的阶梯数一般会低于发展中国家的阶梯数。最后,本文检验了我国阶梯电价实施及结构设计的合理性。     

中国居民阶梯电价的设计

作为一种特殊的非线性定价机制,阶梯电价能兼顾多重经济和社会目标已经得到了充分的论证,目前关于阶梯电价的争议主要在于其所包涵的三组参数的设计。而在电价上涨周期中,阶梯电价的设计最重要的是要维护社会福利和保障公平支出,以及弥补电力企业的成本,即建立公平的偿付机制。文章首先在对我国居民收入和电力消费数据分析的基础上,认为四档的阶梯电价更符合我国的实际,并采用最大熵模型来估计居民电力需求的分布函数,并根据覆盖率来计算各阶梯的边界电量,进而根据国际经验给出每档的边际电价。文章设计的阶梯电价的方案具有较强的操作性,且能够进一步对阶梯方案进行初步的评估,因此具有较强的实践意义。     

浅谈阶梯电价方案对电力企业营销管理的影响

生活用电阶梯电价措施作为一种有效的居民用电量调控手段,得到了越来越广泛的使用,因此研究其对于电力企业营销管理的影响有着很强的必要性和实用性。本文介绍了现行的电价措施与阶梯电价的差异,以及阶梯电价措施为电力企业营销和管理的影响。并提出了一些改善目前电力企业营销管理工作的建议。     

阶梯电价引发的创新思考

实行阶梯电价意味着我国电力经济改革和节能环保政策开始向微观经济领域渗透。实施阶梯电价，有利于推动家电行业采用节电技术和开发节电产品，为提高资源利用率起到了很大的促进作用。预计不久的将来，居民生活用水和天燃气等也都将实行“阶梯价格”。阶梯电价出台，也不可能一下子做到尽善尽美。及时发现阶梯电价制度设计中存在的问题，     

Efficiency versus social optimality: The case of telecommunications pricing

Standard arguments for efficiency-based pricing policies break down once it is admitted that no lump-sum transfers and taxes are available. In this paper, it is argued that the appropriate solution is to equate the marginal welfare cost of redistributing income through pricing policies that deviate from marginal cost with the marginal cost of redistribution through the tax and welfare systems. For telecommunications pricing, this solution may be implemented by charging usage prices for long-distance services in excess of marginal cost and making corresponding reductions in fixed access charges. An illustrative example, based on data for Australia, is presented.     

Public goods provision and redistributive taxation

This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. The price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution, and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving (substitution effect). However, redistribution leads to lower consumption for the contributors and therefore has a negative effect on contributions to the charity (income effect). The theoretical model developed in this paper demonstrates that, under a general class of utility functions, the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Hence, charitable giving increases with the tax rate. In purely egalitarian societies, the public good is provided efficiently and the total welfare is maximized independent of the ex-ante income inequality. However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account the cost of effort.     

Pricing Policy Under Double Market Power: Madagascar and the International Vanilla Market

This paper uses a price-leadership model of the international vanilla market to study the welfare consequences of alternative pricing policies for Madagascar, the leader, that also controls domestic production through a single-channel marketing system. Econometric estimates of the model are used for simulations of welfare and revenue changes and internal redistribution of income. Results indicate that Madagascar could have gained between 0.9% and 2.6% of GDP per year on average over the period 1981–91 by following optimal pricing policies, and that producers were overtaxed suggesting that political economy considerations played a role in the pricing decisions.     

递增阶梯定价:一个综述

作为较独特的非线性定价,递增阶梯定价使消费者预算凸边界非光滑,进而导致某些消费者消费决策异度集中而难以甄别。此特征致使递增阶梯定价机制的理论和实证研究非常复杂。鉴于公共资源的特殊性,公共资源定价需要合理地兼顾效率、社会公正和成本完全补偿原则。在多元化目标角度上,本文初步验证了递增阶梯定价机制的最优性,虽然此最优性受制于接入率和特征信息等假定。递增阶梯定价下的需求设定趋于统一但估计方法却趋于复杂化和多样化。关于递增阶梯定价下的(价格和收入)需求效应明显与否的问题存在完全相反的结果,实证研究和理论对其不一致性给出多种解释和探讨。这种差异性可能由于消费者对价格、价格设计者对家庭特征等信息不完全,还可能因为各实证分析结果中的时间、市场或产品特征维度含义差异所致。基于多元化目标和资源特性的递增阶梯定价机制的设计和执行问题,将成为递增阶梯定价理论研究发展的一大方向。     

On The Distributional Effects Of Reducing Capital Taxes*

This article asks whether household heterogeneity and market incompleteness have quantitatively important implications for the welfare effects of tax changes. We compare a representative‐agent economy to an economy in which households face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk. The income process is consistent with empirical estimates and implies a realistic wealth distribution. We find that capital tax cuts imply large welfare gains in the representative‐agent economy. However, when households are heterogeneous, substantial redistribution during transition means that only a minority will support capital tax cuts, whereas most households can expect large welfare losses.     

One size may not fit all: Welfare benefits and cost reductions with optional differentiated household electricity rates

We consider optional time-of-use (TOU) pricing for residential consumers, offered by a publicly regulated electricity supplier, as an alternative to a single TOU or flat rate structure. An equilibrium model explores and quantifies the effects of such pricing on welfare, consumption, and production costs. The supplier offers to each household a menu of possible rate structures obtained by maximizing a collective welfare function subject to three restrictions: Pareto efficiency, incentive compatibility, sufficiency of supplier revenue to cover costs. Simulations based on realistic calibration of the model demonstrate that optional pricing can increase overall consumer welfare and reduce average cost.     

The Marginal Costs and Benefits of Redistributing Income and the Willingness to Pay for Status

The effect of status on aggregate welfare is ambiguous for marginal reforms that redistribute income. If average consumption falls, the change in relative consumption increases household utility but reinforces the decrease in household labor supply, raising welfare cost. For parameterizations of the model developed here, reforms which lower average consumption increase aggregate welfare. Numerical calculations show that status increases marginal welfare cost and marginal net benefit for a demogrant reform. Redistributing to high income households may increase aggregate welfare depending on the definition of average consumption and if the willingness to pay for status increases with income.     

The Collective Household, Household Production and Efficiency of Marginal Reforms

Most research on the welfare properties of taxes employs the unitary model of the household, ignoring household production. A simple model provides expressions for the changes in individual utility given marginal reforms to government policy. It is shown that the burden of a higher tax on household goods falls on the household member that consumes more than they produce or purchase. Numerical calculations show that price substitution (complementarity) between home and market labor increases (decreases) aggregate efficiency costs of a marginal redistribution of income without impacting the intra-household distribution of utility changes. Modeling household goods as public versus private can alter the distributional consequences of marginal reforms.     

On fair allocations

This paper examines the effects of fairness on economic behavior and allocations, where fairness is defined as the absence of envy among consumers. We use the benefit function to investigate the welfare cost of fairness. We show how fairness generates a form of altruism, captured by a “fair expenditure” function that depends on the distribution of welfare. We define the most efficient fair allocations and explore the implications of fairness for economic behavior, pricing and redistribution policies.     

SELF‐REPORTED ECONOMIC CONDITION AND HOME PRODUCTION: INTRA‐HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION IN ITALY

This paper applies a collective model of intra‐household welfare distribution using individual self‐reported data. The model accounts for household production, and self‐reported information on economic condition is used to identify the sharing rule governing the bargaining process in the family. The theoretical framework implies a broad concept of full income, which includes household production as time allocated to domestic activities. We find that self‐reported data on economic status are useful in recovering individual shares of household income and that both wages and non‐strictly‐economic individual variables play an important role in the bargaining process determining the sharing rule in Italy.