UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND REPETITIVE PUBLIC OFFERINGS

A recent examination of underwriter reputation and initial public offerings (IPOs) suggests that one of the reasons prestigious underwriters market low-risk IPOs is to increase the expected present value of subsequent offerings. There is a greater likelihood that a firm issuing low-risk IPOs will be a viable future operation with the potential for subsequent offerings than a firm issuing high-risk IPOs. I examine the hypothesis that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is negatively related to IPO risk. In addition to finding support for this hypothesis, I show that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is positively related to the IPO underwriter's reputation and negatively related to the IPO gross spread. Finally, I find that the likelihood of firms switching IPO underwriters for subsequent offerings decreases with increasing IPO underwriter reputation.     

Foreign Entry into Underwriting Services: Evidence from Japan's “Big Bang” Deregulation

We examined the effect of foreign entry into bond market underwriting activity using issue‐level data from the Japanese “Samurai” and euro–yen bond markets. We found that the fees charged by Japanese underwriters were higher on average than those of foreign underwriters, but the difference could be explained by conditioning on issue characteristics. Our results also suggest that bond issuers sorted properly across underwriters, as switching across underwriter nationalities would be expected to result in higher fees. However, the savings enjoyed by firms issuing with foreign underwriters were modest and statistically insignificant, while those of firms issuing with Japanese underwriters were substantial and statistically significant. This result suggests that Japanese underwriters priced their services aggressively over the sample period, perhaps in an effort to retain or gain market share. This conjecture is supported by a matching exercise that examined the liberalization of foreign underwriter access to the Samurai bond market, using euro–yen bond issues as a control. Foreign entry led to a statistically and economically significant decrease of 16 basis points on average in underwriting fees in the Samurai bond market. Overall, our results suggest that the international market for Japanese bond underwriting services was partially segmented by nationality as issuers appear to have preferred habitats, but that liberalization increased overall market competition.     

Debt Issue Costs and Issue Characteristics in the Market for U.S. Dollar Denominated International Bonds

This paper analyzes the issue costs and initial pricing of bonds in the international market. In particular, we investigate the determinants of three components of issue costs: underwriter fee, underwriter spread (the difference between the offering price and the guaranteed price to the issuer), and underpricing (the difference between the market price and the offering price). Total underwriter compensation increases with the bonds' credit risk and maturity, but it is insignificantly related to issue size. Interestingly, underwriters appear to price some issue characteristics directly (by adjusting the fee) and other characteristics indirectly (by setting the guaranteed price). The two compensation components (fee and spread) are negatively related to each other. We provide evidence that this trade-off is consistent with income tax considerations, as well as with two-tier pricing by underwriters. We find no evidence of underpricing.     

On investment banker monitoring in the new issues market

This article primarily addresses two largely unanswered questions in the financial economics literature: (i) is there a demand for lead bank monitoring in the initial public offering (IPO) market?, and (ii) does monitoring by the lead investment banker lead to better post-issue performance? We find evidence consistent with the demand for underwriter monitoring in the IPO market. We examine variables which proxy for the incentives of lead underwriters to supply monitoring post-issue. These variables include lead investment bank reputation and whether warrants are issued to the underwriter by the issuing firm. We find that lead bank reputation is positively associated with the post-issue performance of IPO firms. We also examine whether additional value added monitoring is provided by unaffiliated analysts. The number of unaffiliated analysts following is positively correlated with post-issue performance. Our results are consistent with third party monitoring in the new issues market.     

Underwriter reputation and underpricing: evidence from the Australian IPO market

Dimovski and Brooks (J Intern Financ Mark Inst Money 14:267–280, 2004b) examined 358 Australian industrial and mining company initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 1999 to report that more money was left on the table by IPOs that engaged underwriters than those that did not engage underwriters. Loughran and Ritter (Autumn 5–37, 2004) suggested that the negative relation between underwriter reputation and underpricing has reversed in the 1990s with U.S. IPOs. The main purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing in terms of Australian IPO data. In this paper, we use 380 Australian industrial company IPOs from 1994 to 2004 to perform the empirical study. Our results suggest that more prestigious underwriters are associated with a higher level of underpricing. Other variables that are found to be significant in explaining the level of IPO underpricing are market sentiment, share options, total capital raised and underwriter options.     

A Reexamination of the Costs of Firm Commitment and Best Efforts IPOs

Ritter [14] documents that best efforts IPOs are, on average, more costly to issue than firm commitment IPOs. This paper explains the phenomenon. Two component costs of going public are analyzed: underpricing and underwriter compensation. The model, based on a disagreement about firm value between underwriters and issuers, shows that underpricing is higher for firms using best efforts contracts as these firms, on average, are more speculative. Underwriter compensation is hypothesized to be higher for firms using best efforts contracts because of the high costs of market making for these firms in the aftermarket and the high distribution costs associated with the high risk of a failed offer. Empirical tests strongly support the propositions.     

Wanna Dance? How Firms and Underwriters Choose Each Other

We develop and test a theory explaining the equilibrium matching of issuers and underwriters. We assume that issuers and underwriters associate by mutual choice, and that underwriter ability and issuer quality are complementary. Our model implies that matching is positive assortative, and that matches are based on firms' and underwriters' relative characteristics at the time of issuance. The model predicts that the market share of top underwriters and their average issue quality varies inversely with issuance volume. Various cross‐sectional patterns in underwriting spreads are consistent with equilibrium matching. We find strong empirical confirmation of our theory.     

Underwriter reputation and the quality of certification: Evidence from high-yield bonds

This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market in which certification of issuer quality is most valuable to investors owing to low liquidity and issuing firms’ high opacity and default risk. We find bonds underwritten by the most reputable underwriters to be associated with significantly higher downgrade and default risk. Investors seem to be aware of this relation, as we further find the private information conveyed via the issuer-reputable underwriter match to have a significantly positive effect on at-issue yield spreads. Our results are consistent with the market-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism.     

Do you really want to ask an underwriter how much money you should leave on the table?

This paper analyses whether the owners of companies seeking to list will leave less money on the table if underwriters are employed to price and market the issue. Our findings indicate that limited liability and Industrial company initial public offerings (IPOs) that have used underwriters have left more money on the table than those not employing underwriters. Not only is there a direct cost in employing an underwriter but this study suggests there might also be an indirect cost. We also find that a positive forecast earnings per share yield may be useful in reducing the amount of money left on the table.     

Underwriter Spread, Underwriter Reputation, and IPO Underpricing: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis

This paper studies the relationships between underwriter reputation, underwriter spread, and IPO underpricing. We consider the information content of underwriter spread and find that it conveys information pertinent to IPO quality. Because underwriter spread is endogenous, underpricing and underwriter spread are jointly determined in a simultaneous equation system. Also, we examine the IPO market for evidence of segmentation, and our results suggest some market segmentation. Underwriter spread impacts initial underpricing for a group of medium-reputation underwriters, while underpricing affects underwriter spread for groups of low- and high-reputation underwriters. Consequently, high-risk IPOs may not be priced the same way as low-risk IPOs. We attribute this finding to regulation, competition, and/or market segmentation.     

Two‐Sided Matching: How Corporate Issuers and Their Underwriters Choose Each Other

In this article, the authors update and confirm the findings of a 2005 article that was the first to view corporate underwriter choices as the outcome of a two‐sided matching process in which issuers look to the abilities of the underwriters offering their services and underwriters focus on the quality of the issuers that wish to use their services. This view offers a contrast with both the conventional representation of issuer‐underwriter associations as one‐sided decisions (by either issuers or underwriters) and the classical economist's representation of a competitive market in which prices serve as the primary market‐clearing mechanism. In their examination of both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during the period 1980–2010, the authors continue to find strong evidence that higher‐quality issuers associate with more reputable underwriters and lower‐quality issuers match with lower reputation underwriters. Moreover, when examining cases of underwriter switching between an IPO and SEOs by the same issuer, they find that cases involving the largest divergence in the relative rankings of issuer and underwriter were the most likely to produce a change of underwriter—and that issuers that experienced larger post‐ IPO increases in quality were more likely to find more reputable underwriters for their SEOs (than for their IPOs). The authors also find that the larger the number of offerings brought to market in a given year, the smaller the market share of the top‐tier underwriters, likely reflecting the willingness of the most reputable underwriters to turn down business to maintain quality and reputation. Finally, the most reputable underwriters appear to benefit from the fact that the issuers whose IPOs they underwrite end up raising larger amounts of capital, both at the time of the IPO and in the larger and more frequent seasoned offerings by such issuers that come after the IPO. This evidence in support of two‐sided matching suggests that, especially for high‐quality issuers, the reputation of the underwriters they contract with for security offerings is likely to be more important than the underwriting fees they incur. What's more, the authors' finding that the most reputable underwriters are less likely to lose high‐quality clients and have more stable market share—and that the higher‐quality issuers they attract end up raising larger amounts of capital over their lives as public companies—suggests that underwriters' investments in building and preserving their reputations have a large expected payoff.     

The Underwriter Persistence Phenomenon

This study presents new evidence that initial IPO returns have persistent underwriter‐specific components. These components cannot be explained by existing measures of underwriter quality, underwriter service, or controls for several known predictors of initial IPO returns. Tests that trace the roots of persistence most broadly support theories of asymmetric information among underwriters. I present such a model, and consistent with its predictions, I find that high underpricing underwriters (1) are responsible for a majority of the partial adjustment phenomenon, (2) make more informed analyst revisions, (3) experience superior market share growth, and (4) are more likely to serve an institutional clientele.     

Underwriter learning about unfamiliar firms: Evidence from the history of biotech IPOS

This study examines the ability of underwriters to properly value unfamiliar firms prior to issuance. I use a sample of IPOs in biotechnology, a relatively new but thriving industry. The first American biotech IPO was in 1980. Through the end of 2004, almost 500 biotech IPOs have appeared in the public market. I find that biotechnology differs from other industries in the attributes of individual firms valued by the market. In particular, R&D and the quality of human capital (e.g., star scientists on the staff) are much more important for biotech valuations. I find also that underwriters appeared not to appreciate this distinction for early biotech IPOs; in those cases, first-day market returns were predictable by firm attributes not used by underwriters to establish IPO issue prices. I also find that underwriters have learned over time, albeit slowly. Over the 20+ years of biotech history, IPO issue prices have become more dependent on firm attributes unique to biotechs while first-day market returns have become less predictable.     

Underwriter Reputation,Issuer Ownership,and Pre‐IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the correlation between pre‐initial public offering (pre‐IPO) earnings management and underwriter reputation for issuers with different ownership structures in China. We document a significantly inverse relationship between underwriter reputation and pre‐IPO earnings management for non‐state‐owned enterprises (NSOE) issuers only, while no significant association is found for state‐owned enterprises (SOE) issuers. We also find that for the NSOE new issue market, underwriter reputation is positively correlated with issuer post‐IPO performance indicating that prestigious underwriters can incrementally improve issuer post‐IPO performance.     

Underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese IPOs: the role of underwriter reputation

This study examines the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-run performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2006. This sample period is notable for the implementation of a verification and approval system that occurred during it, which provided underwriters more freedom to price IPOs. We develop two alternative proxies to measure underwriter reputation based on either the ratio of the total gross proceeds raised or the number of IPOs managed by each underwriter. We find that underwriter reputation does not affect the level of underpricing, but that the level of long-run underperformance is significantly mitigated when IPOs are managed by more prestigious underwriters.     

IPO市场承销商声誉机制的形成机理及实证检验

本文认为，考虑到中国IP0市场的特殊背景，承销商声誉的形成高度依赖于证券监管力量。本文实证结果显示，中国IPO市场承销商声誉的阶段性积累虽已初具雏形，但并没有形成明朗的分化，承销商声誉机制在一定程度上仍处于缺位状态。制度的市场化改革取向和外部约束力量的增强，是中国承销商声誉阶段演进的动力。同时，IPO市场上监管制度的缺陷以及由此导致的监管效率低下、市场约束机制弱化，是阻碍承销商声誉阶段性推进的主要原因。     

Heterogeneous Beliefs,IPO Valuation,and the Economic Role of the Underwriter in IPOs

We empirically analyze the economic role of the underwriter in initial public offerings (IPOs), distinguishing between the “certification” and “market power” hypotheses. We find that equity in high‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs is priced higher and further away from intrinsic value than that in low‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs. Our results are robust to controlling for the endogenous selection of firms to take public by underwriters. Overall, our results support the market power hypothesis and reject the certification hypothesis, indicating that the role of underwriters is to obtain the highest possible valuation for the IPOs that they back rather than to price the equity close to intrinsic value.     

Are there long-run implications of analyst coverage for IPOs?

Analyst coverage has been cited increasingly as an important attribute in the selection of an underwriter for a firm about to go public. However, it has also been alleged that affiliated analysts provide biased research. In this study, we examine these interrelated issues by examining the long-run performance of IPOs with coverage from their managing underwriters in a 1993–2003 sample. We find that (1) analysts’ research coverage from their managing syndicate is not related to long-run performance; (2) long-run performance is not different for firms that receive all-star analyst coverage; and (3) investors are not systematically worse off for following lead underwriter recommendations.     

When the Underwriter Is the Market Maker: An Examination of Trading in the IPO Aftermarket

This paper examines aftermarket trading of underwriters and unaffiliated market makers in the three-month period after an IPO. We find that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker; he takes substantial inventory positions in the aftermarket trading, and co-managers play a negligible role in aftermarket trading. The lead underwriter engages in stabilization activity for less successful IPOs, and uses the overallotment option to reduce his inventory risk. Compensation to the underwriter arises primarily from fees, but aftermarket trading does generate positive profits, which are positively related to the degree of underpricing.