Corporate governance,external market discipline and firm productivity

Using a sample of Australian companies over the 2000–2005 period, we examine the impact of internal corporate governance on firm's total factor productivity, taking into account the interaction between internal governance and external market discipline. Our empirical findings point to a substitution effect between product market competitiveness and firm-level corporate governance. Overall, internal corporate governance mechanisms – more efficient boards and greater CEO stock-based compensation – are effective instruments for improving firm productivity. However, internal governance is less effective when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. We find only weak empirical support for an association between firm's ownership structure and productivity, and no support for an association between industry takeover intensity and firm productivity.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and the Wealth Effect of R&D Spending Changes

This article examines whether corporate governance and product market competition interact to affect the profitability of corporate research and development (R&D) investments. Firms announcing R&D spending changes experience positive and significant wealth effects, and these effects are mainly driven by good‐governance firms. Investors appear to view announcements of R&D spending changes undertaken by firms with stronger shareholder rights as evidence of value creation. Moreover, the favorable wealth effects are stronger for good‐governance firms in noncompetitive industries than in competitive industries, supporting the argument that good governance substitutes for product market competition.     

Determinants and consequences of tournament incentives: A survey of the literature in accounting and finance

This paper synthesizes the theoretical underpinnings of tournament models, reviews the extant empirical literature on the determinants and consequences of tournament incentives, critiques the findings and offers suggestions for future research. We synthesize findings from 63 empirical papers and find that several firm-level fundamental and corporate governance variables affect the structure of corporate tournaments. Our review of the consequences of tournament structure reveals that tournaments affect financial reporting and auditing as well as firm-level operational and capital market-based outcomes. This review reveals that the existing accounting and finance literature lacks a strong justification for why one theory rather than another is favored. Moreover, based on potential problems that may exist in empirical models, this review also offers some methodological implications for empirical tournament studies.     

市场竞争、EVA评价与企业过度投资

在国资委对央企全面推行经济增加值(EVA)业绩考核之际,本文利用央企控股上市公司的数据,实证检验了EVA对企业过度投资的影响。研究发现,EVA评价体系的实施可显著降低央企过度投资;进一步研究显示,市场竞争环境差异对EVA抑制过度投资的效果产生显著影响,竞争度越高的行业EVA抑制企业过度投资的作用更为明显;反之则并不显著。本文研究结论支持了EVA评价机制应用的有效性,但也从产业竞争角度证明市场经营环境的改善是进一步提升EVA业绩评价体系有效性充分发挥的关键。     

企业环境信息披露影响因素实证分析:2010~2011年A股重污染行业上市公司观察

以2010～2011年A股重污染行业上市公司作为研究对象,从产品市场竞争、公司治理角度考察了企业环境信息披露的影响因素。结果显示：公司治理结构的合理安排能够对提升企业环境信息披露质量产生一定的积极作用,但是产品市场竞争与公司治理机制之间的关系尚不明确。本文的研究结论意味着,在我国当前的制度背景下,要提高企业环境信息披露水平,保护利益相关者利益,有必要继续完善上市公司治理结构;同时,本研究也说明产品市场竞争并不能解释重污染行业企业环境信息披露的动机。     

Corporate Governance and Issues From the Insurance Industry

In this article, we review the literature and empirical research on the nature and consequences of corporate governance. We particularly assess the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and risk taking. While the article analyzes the general literature on corporate governance in publicly listed firms, we also discuss issues pertaining to the insurance industry. The article identifies avenues for future research.     

The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk

Recent corporate events have brought a heightened public awareness to corporate governance issues. Much work has been accomplished to date, but it is clear that much more remains to be done. This paper provides a review of empirical research in four relevant areas of corporate governance. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of (a) the role that outside directors play in monitoring managers, (b) the emerging literature on the impact of board diversity, (c) the existence of and incentives for corporate executives to manage firm earnings, and (d) managerial incentives to bear risk.     

Determinants and consequences of debt maturity structure: A systematic review of the international literature

We conduct a systematic review of the international research on the determinants and consequences of debt maturity structure in the accounting, finance, and corporate governance literature. Our review reveals that a large volume of empirical research has been conducted on the determinants of debt maturity structure, and we categorize these determinants into the following five factors: (1) firm specific; (2) tax; (3) corporate governance; (4) country-level institutional; and (5) macroeconomic. The literature on the consequences of debt maturity structure is relatively scant and generally focuses on the effect of debt maturity structure on financial reporting quality and investment and financing decisions. We consider endogeneity as one of the major concerns in the reported empirical studies that, unless addressed satisfactorily, may render some of the findings untenable. Based on the review, we also provide several future research directions.     

Did Good Corporate Governance Improve Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis?

This paper focuses on the effects of corporate governance on bank performance during the financial crisis of 2008. Using data on large publicly traded U.S. banks, we examine whether banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms were associated with higher profitability and better stock market performance amidst the crisis. Our empirical findings on the effects of corporate governance on bank performance are mixed. Although the results suggest that banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms were associated with higher profitability in 2008, our findings also indicate that strong governance may have had negative effects on stock market valuations of banks amidst the crisis. Nevertheless, we document that banks with strong corporate governance practices had substantially higher stock returns in the aftermath of the market meltdown, indicating that good governance may have mitigated the adverse influence of the crisis on bank credibility.     

The Voluntary Restructuring of Large Firms In Response to Performance Decline

Much of the research on corporate restructuring has examined the causes and aftermath of extreme changes in corporate governance such as takeovers and bankruptcy. In contrast, we study restructurings initiated in response to product market pressures by “normal” corporate governance mechanisms. Such “voluntary” restructurings, motivated by the discipline of the product market and internal corporate controls, will play a relatively more important role in the 1990s due to a weakening in the discipline of the takeover market. Our data suggest that the firms retrenched quickly and, on average, increased their focus. There is no evidence of abnormally high levels of forced turnover in top managers. There is, however, a significant and rapid cut of 5% in the labor force. Further, the cost of goods sold to sales and labor costs to sales ratios both decline rapidly, more than 5% in the first two years after the negative earnings. The firms cut research and development, increased investment, and also reduced their debt/asset level by over 8% in the first year after the negative earnings. We also document the reasons management and analysis reported for the negative earnings. Overwhelmingly the firms blame bad economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, foreign competition.     

Product market competition,ultimate controlling structure and related party transactions

Previous studies have shown that product market competition has an important effect on corporate strategies and internal governance mechanisms. Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2009, we explore the relationship between product market competition and normal related party transactions and find a significant positive relationship. In addition, we investigate the substitutive effect of product market competition and the cash flow rights owned by ultimate controlling shareholders on the extent of normal related party transactions. In particular, our results suggest a positive relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and normal related party transactions that is strongest in noncompetitive industries and weakens as product market competition increases.     

Corporate governance and the stock market reaction to new product announcements

This study examines the explanatory power of corporate governance mechanisms on the wealth effect of firms?? new product strategies. We show that board size, board independence, audit committee independence, CEO equity-based pay, analyst following and shareholder rights are all of significance in explaining the variations in the wealth effect of new product introductions. Our results reveal that the new product strategies announced by firms with better corporate governance mechanisms tend to receive higher stock market valuations than those of firms with poorer governance mechanisms. This study provides empirical support for the notion that enhanced governance mechanisms can reduce both agency and information asymmetry problems for firms announcing new products.     

CEO Ownership,Stock Market Performance,and Managerial Discretion

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. A strategy based on public information about managerial ownership delivers annual abnormal returns of 4% to 10%. The effect is strongest among firms with weak external governance, weak product market competition, and large managerial discretion, suggesting that CEO ownership can reverse the negative impact of weak governance. Furthermore, owner‐CEOs are value increasing: they reduce empire building and run their firms more efficiently. Overall, our findings indicate that the market does not correctly price the incentive effects of managerial ownership, suggesting interesting feedback effects between corporate finance and asset pricing.     

The rise of corporate governance in corporate control research

This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various ownership groups, the impact of internal governance structures, the effects of regulatory changes on specific industries and evidence on bidding strategies in takeovers. This analysis leads us to our second task – to examine the evolution of corporate control research, broadly defined. Our analysis shows a movement in research from mergers and acquisitions to a broader analysis of corporate governance, especially internal governance features. We suggest that there is a trend toward an increase in the relative importance of internal governance compared to discipline from the market from corporate control. This trend reflects an important change over the past several decades in the means through which the market disciplines corporate behavior.     

EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND THE COST OF EQUITY FINANCING

We examine whether and how competitive pressure in the product market influences the cost of equity capital. Using a large panel of U.S. public firms, we find that intensification of product market competition results in lower equity financing costs. Our results are statistically significant and economically sizable. In line with the view of the disciplinary role of product market competition, we show that corporate governance, payout policy, and investment policy are channels through which competitive pressure influences the cost of equity capital.     

Consequences of local social norms: A review of the literature in accounting,finance, and corporate governance

We synthesise the empirical archival research on the consequences of local social norms on accounting, finance, and corporate governance outcomes in an international setting. The literature reviewed is premised on the theory that corporations do not make decisions, but managers do, and managers are likely to be influenced by the socioeconomic environment of the region in which they operate and/or by the people with whom they interact. To provide a structure to our review, we identify social capital, religiosity, gambling norms, and corruption culture, as four constructs of local social norms and link these with financial reporting and external auditing, financial, investment, and dividend decisions, capital market consequences and finally, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility behaviour of firms. We highlight some limitations of the existing research and offer some suggestions for future research.     

卖空与创新:A股公司融券试点的证据

本文依托中国A股市场2010年开始实施的融券试点,在通过多时点双重差分和倾向得分匹配等计量方法控制内生性的基础上,实证检验了卖空对上市公司创新行为的促进作用.结果 表明:(1)加入融券标的后,卖空公司的创新数量和创新质量都有显著提高;(2)对于金融市场欠发达、治理水平较差的公司,这种作用更明显;(3)在使用融券余额作为卖空势力的测度并用ETF基金持股比例作为工具变量进一步控制内生性以后,以上结论仍然成立.卖空有助于降低创新企业的信息不对称性和加强对经理人的薪酬激励,进而促进了企业的创新.因此,取消卖空限制将有助于中国企业的创新和资本市场的健康稳定发展.     

Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic Alliances, and Product Market Relationships

This paper examines long-term block ownership by corporations and performance changes in firms with corporate block owners. We also examine potential reasons for corporate ownership including benefits in product market relationships, alleviation of financing constraints, and board monitoring by corporate owners. We find the largest significant increases in targets' stock prices, investment, and operating profitability when ownership is combined with alliances, joint ventures, and other product market relationships between purchasing and target firms, especially in industries with high research and development. Our findings are consistent with the conclusion that block ownership by corporations has significant benefits in product market relationships.     

股票增值权激励有效吗

股票增值权是上市公司对管理层实施激励的重要做法，在我国大型国有控股境外上市公司中普遍采用。本文以中国石化为研究对象，对实施股票增值权计划后的公司财务绩效、治理机制与管理层代理成本、股票市场反应等作了实证检验。本文认为，股票增值权计划对公司财务绩效提升、治理机制改善具有一定的积极正面效应；股票增值权在等待期结束后的开始行权年度激励效果最大；股票市场对股票增值权的行权存在着过度反应。最后本文提出了改进股票增值权激励的政策建议。