Are hedge fund managers skilled?

This study measures the skill of hedge fund (HF) managers by calculating the value added that they extract from capital markets. Applying bootstrapping to control for luck, we find that HF managers are skilled, with the magnitude of the value added depending on the benchmark. Compared to the Vanguard S&P 500 Index Fund and a set of eight Vanguard index funds, HF managers add on average $3.24 million per year and $2.88 million per year, respectively, although these values were higher before the financial crisis of 2007–2008 than afterwards. Finally, we find no evidence that HF managers share this value added with their investors.     

Why do fund managers increase risk?

This paper examines the relationship between the increase in fund risk and subsequent cash flows. We attempt to test the hypothesis that an increase in fund risk actually increases the net flows of equity funds, which is a basic assumption of risk shifting. We find that a change in fund risk has a positive and convex relationship with the fund's net flows. The effect of risk changes on net flows is a natural consequence of its effects on inflows and outflows. This paper's empirical results are robust to return frequency, fund age, and fund size. Our findings create incentives for managers to shift risk as documented in the mutual fund literature.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

Are hedge fund managers systematically misreporting? Or not?

A discontinuity, or kink, at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution has been interpreted as evidence of managers manipulating returns to avoid showing small losses. Instead, we propose alternative explanations for this phenomenon. In particular, we show that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution. This mechanism accounts for almost the entire kink observed in the large, liquid Long-Short Equity style. Furthermore, we show that asset illiquidity and the bounding of yields at zero can generate distribution discontinuities as well. Therefore, we conclude that the observed hedge fund return discontinuities are not direct proof of manipulation.     

Do foreign exchange fund managers behave like heterogeneous agents?

This paper estimates an Heterogeneous Agent Model (HAM) on currency trader indices to explain the large shifts in profitability in currency styles surrounding the global financial crisis. In the model, fund managers allocate capital conditional on recent performance to a value strategy, a momentum strategy, and a carry strategy. Subsequent estimation results reveal that (1) a large part of the behavior of currency managers can indeed be described by these three simple strategies, and (2) currency managers shift capital from recent winning styles to recent losing styles, and hence apply a negative feedback strategy. We finally show that a negative feedback strategy is indeed optimal, but currency managers could improve performance by applying it less aggressively if they were able to.     

US firms – How global are they? A longitudinal study

Many studies examine firm-level internationalisation using measures such as percentage foreign sales, number of foreign subsidiaries and the number of countries in which the firm operates, but few examine the changes in these measures over time. We conduct a longitudinal study of the internationalisation of Russell 1000 US firms between 1996 and 2010, with further categorisations by age, industry and size. We find little change in the number of purely domestic firms, but substantial overall increases in the extent and scope of internationalisation of MNCs, with periods of both de- and re-internationalisation. Firms appear to expand into new regions and increase their foreign sales in those regions in subsequent years. More than half of the MNCs in our sample experienced a decrease in foreign sales after the 2007/08 credit crisis, with relatively few decreases in the regions in which they operate. By 2010 we find that the majority of the MNCs in our sample are pursuing a semi-global strategy.     

Rewarding risk-taking or skill? The case of private equity fund managers

We examine whether typical private equity fund compensation contracts reward excessive risk-taking rather than managerial skill. Our analysis is based on a novel model of investment value, cash flows, and fee dynamics of private equity funds. Given the embedded option-like fee components, our results demonstrate that fund managers indeed have an incentive for excessive risk-taking when only fee income from the current fund is considered. However, when managers also consider potential compensation from follow-on funds, their risk-taking incentives depend on their individual skill levels, and skilled managers will have an incentive to reduce fund risk. We also show that managers must generate substantial abnormal returns in order to compensate investors for the given fee components.     

How much does tax erode fund excess returns?

We model the tax drag from active fund management based on reported monthly holdings of active equity funds. Tax drag erodes 65 percent of the 0.74 percent excess return in Broad Market funds, but only 21 percent of the 1.80 percent excess return in Small-Cap funds for Australian superannuation (pension) fund investors. Tax drag varies with investment style; market state, which is most detrimental during bull markets; and fund turnover. For high-income individual investors, tax drag is exacerbated to the extent that active management only generates meaningful after-tax excess return for Small-Cap funds of certain styles.     

What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.     

How effective are trading pauses?

Exploiting Nasdaq order book data and difference-in-differences methodology, we identify the distinct effects of trading pause mechanisms introduced on US stock exchanges after May 2010. We show that the mere existence of such a regulation makes market participants behave differently in anticipation of a pause. Pauses enhance price discovery during the break but have adverse effects on price stability and liquidity after the pause. We find that pauses ultimately do not “cool off” markets but cause extra volatility. This implies a regulatory trade-off between the protective role of trading pauses and their adverse effects on market quality.     

How costly are debt crises?

The aim of this paper is to assess the short and medium-term impact of debt crises on GDP. Using an unbalanced panel of 154 countries from 1970 to 2008, the paper shows that debt crises produce significant and long-lasting output losses, reducing output by about 10 percent after 8 years. The results also suggest that debt crises tend to be more detrimental than banking and currency crises. The significance of the results is robust to different specifications, identification and endogeneity checks, and datasets.     

Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information?

Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers’ superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy‐sell trade sequences around good‐news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good‐news earnings announcements and being ‘short‐term profiteers’. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad‐news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad‐news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements.     

How suboptimal are linear sharing rules?

The objective of this paper is to analyze criteria for portfolio choice when two investors are forced to invest in a common portfolio and share the proceeds by a linear sharing rule. A similar situation with many investors is typical for defined contribution pension schemes. The restriction implies two sources of suboptimal investment decisions as seen from each of the two investors individually. One is the suboptimal choice of portfolio, the other is the forced linear sharing rule. We measure the combined consequence for each investor by their respective loss in wealth equivalent. We show that significant losses can arise when investors are diverse in their risk attitude. We also show that an investor with a low degree of risk aversion, like the logarithmic or the square root investor, often applied in portfolio choice models, can either inflict or be subject to severe losses when being forced to participate in such a common investment pool.     

How predictable are precious metal returns?

This paper provides strong evidence of time-varying return predictability of three precious metals from January 1987 to September 2014. We use three variations of the variance ratio test, the nonlinear Brock, Dechert and Schieinkman test as well as the Hurst exponent to evaluate the time-varying return predictability of precious metals to reduce the risk of spurious results. Our full sample results report mixed findings where some tests indicate significant predictability while some suggest no predictability. However through a time-varying procedure, we show that each precious metal market goes through periods of significant predictability as well as periods of unpredictability. Therefore this finding suggests that return predictability does vary over time and is not a static, all-or-nothing condition and therefore is consistent with the adaptive market hypothesis. We also show that platinum is the most predictable of the three precious metals and silver the least predictable, which may be of great to investors who include precious metals in their investment portfolios.     

Why are US firms using more short-term debt?

We show that corporate use of long-term debt has decreased in the US over the past three decades and that this trend is heterogeneous across firms. The median percentage of debt maturing in more than 3 years decreased from 53% in 1976 to 6% in 2008 for the smallest firms but did not decrease for the largest firms. The decrease in debt maturity was generated by firms with higher information asymmetry and new firms issuing public equity in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, we show that demand-side factors do not fully explain this trend and that public debt markets' supply-side factors play an important role. Our findings suggest that the shortening of debt maturity has increased the exposure of firms to credit and liquidity shocks.     

Housing, consumption and monetary policy: How different are the US and the euro area?

This paper provides a systematic empirical analysis of the role of the housing market in the macroeconomy in the US and the euro area. First, it establishes some stylised facts concerning key variables in the housing market on the two sides of the Atlantic, such as real house prices, residential investment and mortgage debt. It then presents evidence from Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR) by focusing on the effects of monetary policy, credit supply and housing demand shocks on the housing market and the broader economy. The analysis shows that similarities outweigh differences as far as the housing market is concerned. The empirical evidence suggests a stronger role for housing in the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the US. The evidence is less clear-cut for housing demand shocks. Finally, credit supply shocks seem to matter more in the euro area.     

ESSAY: How actual are democratic virtues?

In 1990 approximately two-thirds of countries in the world did not have democratic regimes, according to Huntington. The obstacles to and forces for democratisation in these countries he divides into three categories: political, cultural, and economic. He gives no importance to technology.The anonimity of MUDs offers to some people the chance to express multiple and often unexplored aspects of the self. But we still do not understand enough the dynamics of virtual experience. Heidegger's The Question Concerning Technology probably concerns us more today than forty years ago.     

How (un) ethical are you?

Answer true or false: "I am an ethical manager." If you answered "true," here's an Uncomfortable fact: You're probably wrong. Most of us believe we can objectively size up a job candidate or a venture deal and reach a fair and rational conclusion that's in our, and our organization's, best interests. But more than two decades of psychological research indicates that most of us harbor unconscious biases that are often at odds with our consciously held beliefs. The flawed judgments arising from these biases are ethically problematic and undermine managers' fundamental work--to recruit and retain superior talent, boost individual and team performance, and collaborate effectively with partners. This article explores four related sources of unintentional unethical decision making. If you're surprised that a female colleague has poor people skills, you are displaying implicit bias--judging according to unconscious stereotypes rather than merit. Companies that give bonuses to employees who recommend their friends for open positions are encouraging ingroup bias--favoring people in their own circles. If you think you're better than the average worker in your company (and who doesn't?), you may be displaying the common tendency to overclaim credit. And although many conflicts of interest are overt, many more are subtle. Who knows, for instance, whether the promise of quick and certain payment figures into an attorney's recommendation to settle a winnable case rather than go to trial? How can you counter these biases if they're unconscious? Traditional ethics training is not enough. But by gathering better data, ridding the work environment of stereotypical cues, and broadening your mind-set when you make decisions, you can go a long way toward bringing your unconscious biases to light and submitting them to your conscious will.