Bank credit risk and structural credit models: Agency and information asymmetry perspectives

This work investigates the effects of agency and information asymmetry issues embedded in structural form credit models on bank credit risk evaluation, using American bank data from 2001 to 2005. Findings show that both the agency problem and information asymmetry significantly cause deviations in the credit risk evaluation of structural form models from agency ratings. Five independent factors explain a deviation of 42.6–78.3% and should be incorporated into future credit risk modeling. Additionally, both the effects of information asymmetry and debt-equity agency positively relate to the deviation while that of management-equity agency relates to it negatively.     

Bank loan loss accounting treatments,credit cycles and crash risk

Banks that follow conditional conservatism in their loan loss accounting treatments benefit from a reduction in crash risk. The key discretionary loan loss accounting channels are provisions and allowances. We show that conditional conservatism reduces crash risk of small banks during periods of credit contraction and boom. Interestingly, for large banks, crash risk is not reduced by more conservative accounting even for those with higher levels of opacity. Hence regulation prompting for more conservative bank loan loss accounting does not present a significant opportunity to limit systemic effects arising from abrupt price declines in the stocks of large banks.     

农业发展银行信贷风险问题研究

本文研究农业发展银行信贷风险问题。     

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.     

Limited arbitrage between equity and credit markets

We document that short-horizon pricing discrepancies across firms' equity and credit markets are common and that an economically significant proportion of these are anomalous, indicating a lack of integration between the two markets. Proposing a statistical measure of market integration, we investigate whether equity–credit market integration is related to impediments to arbitrage. We find that time variation in integration across a firm's equity and credit markets is related to firm-specific impediments to arbitrage such as liquidity in equity and credit markets and idiosyncratic risk. Our evidence provides a potential resolution to the puzzle of why Merton model hedge ratios match empirically observed stock-bond elasticities (Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008) and yet the model is limited in its ability to explain the integration between equity and credit markets (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001).     

Bank capital and equity investment regulations

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability.     

Bank asset transparency and credit supply

Review of Accounting Studies - We employ the European Central Bank’s Loan-level Reporting Initiative as a shock to banks’ asset disclosures. We find that after the disclosure...     

Bank capital regulation and credit supply

Banks can meet the need to increase their capital ratio either by issuing new equity or by reducing loans. It is generally known that banks prefer to reduce assets due to the high cost of equity. With a simple banking model we show that, if incumbent shareholders are to benefit, banks may prefer to reduce loans, even though they can recapitalize by issuing new equity without any cost. The result holds when banks hold relatively small amounts of long-term loans, or when the economy is in downturn.     

Bank lending opportunities and credit standards

This article empirically tests the hypothesis that credit-screening standards can be first increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the bank's pool of potential borrowers, which in turn may vary through the business cycle or across different segments of the lending markets. A key implication is that banks with lending opportunities toward the middle of the quality spectrum can have loan portfolios that perform better than do the portfolios of banks with loan-origination opportunities that are either too weak or too strong. Using banks’ volume of secondary-market loan sales as a proxy for the richness of lending opportunities, I find an inverse U-shaped relation between the performance of banks’ loan portfolios and their activity in the loan sales market. The pattern deserves scrutiny for its policy implications, as many regulators hold the view that countercyclical variation in credit standards may have a destabilizing effect on business cycles.     

新形势下农业发展银行信贷风险管理初探

随着粮食流通体制市场化改革的推进 ,农发行面临的信贷风险防范形势和外部环境正发生着深刻的变化 ,焦点问题与突发情况时有发生 ,给基层行信贷管理带来了新变数 ,提出了新要求。针对当前各种信贷风险的特点和发展趋势 ,结合基层农发行的工作实践 ,笔者对市场化条件下的信贷风险管理略作分析与探讨。一、粮棉流通市场化条件下信贷风险的基本态势1、政策性风险呈三个特征 :一是粮食市场全面放开后 ,农发行实行“区别对待、分类指导”的信贷政策 ,由解决“卖粮难”形成的收购资金供应刚性降低 ,政策性风险有所下降 ;二是由于产区与销区粮食购…     

Same firm,two volatilities: How variance risk is priced in credit and equity markets

Variance risk premia (VRP) based on equity and credit market information for the same firm differ substantially in magnitude. VRP is strongly dependent on firm characteristics. Higher-leveraged and larger firms have lower VRP. The smirk in the plot of VRP vs. leverage is higher for low-levered firms than for high-levered firms. This smirk is more pronounced in the credit market than in the equity market. VRP, and especially credit VRP, correlates with higher future returns and is a priced source of risk in both markets.     

Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.     

Bank credit rationing and the customer relation

This paper investigates the theory that preference in situations of bank rationing is given to those customers with the strongest customer relation. It has shown that, within a certainty model where competitive pressure among banks requires full compensation for other bank relationships, neither deposit levels nor intertemporal demand would produce the preferential treatment claimed. It has also been shown that the prime borrowers would be unable to bargain effectively for credit line protection from such occasions of credit restriction.     

Bank interest rates and credit relationships in Italy

When evaluating the performance of a financial system in supporting the investment activity of the corporate sector, a distinction is usually drawn between “banking economies” and “market economies”, the former being characterized by long-term relations between banks and the industrial sector. Although theoretical studies and empirical results seem to agree that lending relationships increase the available quantity of capital to firms, they have little to say on the cost of bank credit: it is not clear whether a close relationship with a main bank would allow the borrower to pay a lower interest rate or expose him to a monopolistic rent. Using a unique data-set reporting detailed information on the evolution over time of individual bank–borrower relationships in Italy, we show evidence that a main bank provides credit at a lower cost and that some competition helps to reinforce the commitment between the borrower and the bank.     

Operational risk and equity prices

We use an empirical model to categorize firms into portfolios based on operational risk. Using these portfolios, we show that a strategy of buying firms in the highest decile of operational risk and shorting firms in the lowest decile of operational risk earned a positive but insignificant risk-adjusted average return of 0.72% per month from 1990 to 2000. However, from 2001 to 2010, the same strategy earned a significantly negative risk-adjusted average return of ?1.50% per month. This change occurred during a time characterized by an increasing number of high profile operational losses and regulatory changes surrounding operational risk.     

Counterparty credit risk and the credit default swap market

Counterparty credit risk has become one of the highest-profile risks facing participants in the financial markets. Despite this, relatively little is known about how counterparty credit risk is actually priced. We examine this issue using an extensive proprietary data set of contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotes by 14 different CDS dealers selling credit protection on the same underlying firm. This unique cross-sectional data set allows us to identify directly how dealers' credit risk affects the prices of these controversial credit derivatives. We find that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The magnitude of the effect, however, is vanishingly small and is consistent with a market structure in which participants require collateralization of swap liabilities by counterparties.     

Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and financial distress

We derive the optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowingfirm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establishwhether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholdersare necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensurethat it cannot collude with a healthy firm's owners to seekunnecessary concessions or to collude with a distressed firm'sowners to claim that the firm is healthy. To prove that a requestfor concessions has not come from a healthy firm/bank coalition,the bank must hold either a very small or a very large equitystake when the firm enters distress. To prove that a distressedfirm and the bank have not colluded to claim that the firm ishealthy, the bank may need to hold equity under routine financialconditions.     

Up and down credit risk

This paper discusses the main modeling approaches that have been developed for handling portfolio credit derivatives, with a focus on the question of hedging. In particular, the so-called top, top down and bottom up approaches are considered. We give some mathematical insights regarding the fact that information, namely the choice of a relevant model filtration, is the major modeling issue. In this regard, we examine the notion of thinning that was recently advocated for the purpose of hedging a multi-name derivative by single-name derivatives. We then illustrate by means of numerical simulations (semi-static hedging experiments) why and when the portfolio loss process may not be a ‘sufficient statistic’ for the purpose of valuation and hedging of portfolio credit risk.     

Information risk and credit contagion

This paper demonstrates a positive relationship between information risk and the credit contagion effect. We use abnormal changes in the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads to measure the contagion effect, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts as a proxy for information risk. We find that firms with higher information risk suffer a greater contagion effect that occurs in advance to the credit default events. This finding is robust under controls of key firm-specific characteristics and general condition of stock and credit markets.