Financial analysts and price discovery

We show that whether or not a bank/brokerage firm has top‐rated financial analysts and high Wall Street Search rankings for their research is significantly related to that firm's contribution to price discovery, the process by which information is incorporated into stock prices. Our study relates cross‐sectional characteristics of the quality of brokerage research, the asymmetric information environment, and order flow volume to a microstructure measure of price discovery developed by Granger and Gonzalo. We measure analysts’ research quality with an industry‐specific ranking by institutional investors, with an opinion survey of trading desk personnel, and with the number of top 3 analysts across all industries employed by the bank/brokerage firm.     

The Effects of Disclosure and Analyst Regulations on the Relevance of Analyst Characteristics for Explaining Analyst Forecast Accuracy

We posit and find an effect of disclosure and analyst reporting regulations implemented from 2000 through 2003 (including Regulation Fair Disclosure, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the Global Settlement Act) on the importance of analyst and forecast characteristics for analyst forecast accuracy. Following the enactment of these regulations, more experienced analysts and All‐Star analysts do not maintain their superior forecast accuracy, and analysts employed by large brokerage houses perform worse than other analysts. In addition, we find a decrease in the importance of analyst effort, the number of industries and firms followed, days elapsed since the last forecast, and forecast horizon. While the importance of bold upward forecast revisions does not change, bold downward revisions lose their relevance for forecast accuracy after 2003. Finally, we find an increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy. We find that the importance of these characteristics varies with the precision of publicly available information. Specifically, the decrease in the importance of most analyst and forecast characteristics and the increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy are greater when the precision of publicly available information is low. Overall, our results suggest that the positive effects of experience, effort, brokerage house size and All‐Star status on forecast accuracy in the pre‐regulation period were because of the information advantages that these analysts enjoyed (rather than their ability to generate private information). In contrast, our results suggest that prior forecast accuracy is related to analysts’ ability to generate private information.     

Analyst characteristics, timing of forecast revisions, and analyst forecasting ability

We first examine whether analysts with certain characteristics that prior research has identified are related to superior forecasting ability systematically time their forecast revisions later in the fiscal quarter. We then examine whether this superior ability persists after controlling for the timing advantage by using relative forecast error, a measure that largely eliminates the timing advantage of recent forecasts. Using a sample of quarterly earnings forecast revisions over the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009, we find that analysts with more firm-specific and general experience and more accurate prior-period forecasts, analysts employed by larger brokerage firms, and analysts who follow fewer industries and companies tend to revise forecasts later in the quarter. We also find that analyst characteristics that are positively correlated with revision timing are negatively related to relative forecast errors. These results are consistent with analyst characteristics being useful proxies for analyst forecasting ability and analysts with greater ability revising forecasts later in the quarter.     

The Client Is King: Do Mutual Fund Relationships Bias Analyst Recommendations?

This paper investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell‐side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds, we find that an analyst's recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst's brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client's portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However, this favorable recommendation bias toward a client's existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and, in the long run, for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business‐related analysts. In addition, we find that, subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms, analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure.     

The supply of analysts and earnings forecasts

Using a unique set of hand-collected data, this study examines whether a larger supply of prospective analysts leads to existing financial analysts' higher earnings forecast accuracy. We analyze the effect of the analyst supply proxied by the number of universities and the number of finance and economics universities located in the same city as the headquarters of brokerage firms. Our findings suggest that brokerage firms located closer to a larger supply of potential analyst candidates are associated with higher analyst forecast accuracy, as observed by a lower forecast error. We further find that the degree of employed analysts' effort acts as a mediator between the supply of prospective analysts and the accuracy of their earnings forecasts.     

Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors

Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations over the 1994–2000 period, we find that analysts’ recommendations relative to consensus are positively associated with investment banking relationships and brokerage pressure but negatively associated with the presence of institutional investor owners. The presence of institutional investors is also associated with more accurate earnings forecasts and more timely re-ratings following severe share price falls.     

The determinants of analyst-firm pairings

This paper explores the determinants of observed analyst-firm pairings. We adopt an analyst/brokerage house perspective that allows us to examine not only firm-level characteristics as in prior research, but also attributes of the analyst and the analyst’s brokerage house that may drive these pairings. Our empirical analyses provide two primary insights. First, analyst characteristics such as industry expertise and relative experience, and brokerage house characteristics such as continuity of coverage, are associated with the decision to follow a firm. Second, there is substantial variation in the association between firm, analyst, and brokerage house characteristics and the decision to follow a firm; this occurs across individual analysts as well as across different types of brokerage houses. Overall, our results provide further insights into the factors leading to observed analyst-firm pairings, and indicate that these factors vary across analysts and their brokerage houses – suggesting richer associations than the average firm-level relationships documented by prior research.     

Stock Prices and the Supply of Information

We develop a model in which the dependence of the brokerage commission rate on share price provides an incentive for brokers to produce research reports on firms with low share prices. Stock splits therefore affect the attention paid to a firm by investment analysts. Managers with favorable private information about their firms have an incentive to split their firm's shares in order to reveal the information to investors. We find empirical evidence that is consistent with the major new prediction of the model, that the number of analysts following a firm is inversely related to its share price.     

Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm's information environment.     

Relationship Incentives and the Optimistic/Pessimistic Pattern in Analysts' Forecasts

We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within‐period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell‐side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger when the analysts have a good relationship with management than when their only incentive is to be accurate. Debriefing results indicate that analysts are aware of this pattern of forecasts, and believe that this benefits their future relationships with management and with brokerage clients. The analysts most frequently cite favored conference call participation and information access when describing benefits from maintaining good relationships with management. Our results suggest the following: The optimistic/pessimistic pattern in forecasts is in part a conscious response to relationship incentives, information access is perceived to be a major benefit of management relationships, and recent regulatory changes may have lessened but have not eliminated this conflict of interest source.     

An examination of factors affecting Chinese financial analysts’ information comprehension,analyzing ability,and job quality

This paper examines various factors affecting Chinese financial analysts’ information comprehension, analyzing ability and job quality. We hypothesized that financial analysts with better educational background, more experience, superior resources provided by large brokerage firms and more information sources have better information comprehension, stronger analyzing ability, and higher job quality. Using a survey method to collect data, we found that information sources have a significant impact on analysts’ information comprehension, analyzing ability and job quality. Specifically, analysts tend to exhibit greater information comprehension and better job quality when they conduct more company-level surveys. Additionally, when they have more access to firms’ indirect information, analysts tend to have a stronger analyzing ability and better job quality. We also found that analysts’ educational background has a positive impact on their analyzing ability while analysts’ work experience improves their job quality. This study’s results indicate that financial analysts are still a fledgling profession in current China, and the capabilities of Chinese financial analysts need to be improved through additional training and continued education. Moreover, our study is important in highlighting the urgency of fostering the development of the financial analysis profession in China.      

Stock index adjustments and analysts’ forecast optimism: A quasi-natural experiment on the CSI 300 Index

As stock index adjustments comprise a basic system of capital market, their potential influence on analysts’ earnings forecasts is worthy of research. Based on a research sample of 23 adjustments to the CSI 300 Index from June 2007 to June 2018 and the backup stocks announced during the same period, this study examines the impact of additions to stock index on analysts’ forecast optimism using a staggered difference-in-differences model. The research results show that after stocks are added to the stock index, analysts’ earnings forecast optimism about these stocks increases significantly. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that this increase is more significant when the market is bullish, institutional ownership is low, the ratio of listed brokerage firms is low, star analyst coverage is low, firms show seasoned equity offering activity, the ratio of analysts from the top five brokerage firms ranked by commission income is high, and the analysts’ brokerage firms are shareholders. However, analyst-level tests find that analysts’ ability helps to reduce the impact of additions to stock index on earnings forecast optimism. Furthermore, additions to stock index significantly increase analyst coverage and forecast divergence. Economic consequences tests find additions to stock index significantly increases stock price synchronization, which is partly mediated by analysts’ earnings forecast optimism. This study enriches the literature on the impact of basic capital market systems and analyst behavior. The findings suggest that investors should rationally evaluate analysts’ earnings forecasts for stocks added to the stock index and obtain further information from various channels to improve asset allocation efficiency.     

Self‐Selection and the Forecasting Abilities of Female Equity Analysts

This paper investigates whether there are systematic differences between the forecasting style and abilities of female and male analysts, and whether market participants recognize these differences. My key conjecture is that only female analysts with superior forecasting abilities enter the profession due to a perception of discrimination in the analyst labor market. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that female analysts issue bolder and more accurate forecasts and their accuracy is higher in market segments in which their concentration is lower. Further, the stock market participants are aware of the male–female skill differences. They respond more strongly to the forecast revisions by female analysts even though those analysts get less media coverage. The short‐term market reaction is incomplete, however, because it is followed by a strong post‐revision drift. The perception of abilities is similar in the analyst labor market, where female analysts are more likely to move up to high‐status brokerage firms, while their downward career mobility is lower. Collectively, these results indicate that female analysts have better‐than‐average skill due to self‐selection and market participants are at least partially able to recognize their superior abilities.     

Firm-specific information,analysts' superiority and investment value

Using a sample of Chinese security analysts’recommendations from 2005 to2010,we examine the source of analysts’superiority and the investment value of their recommendations.Using a calendar-time portfolio approach,we find that,on average,analysts’recommendations are valuable and that analysts are better at analyzing and transferring firm-specific information than market-wide or industry-level information.In addition,we show that the investment value of recommendations increases as firm-specific information becomes more important in stock pricing.Our empirical results are useful in guiding investors and helping brokerage houses to evaluate the output of research departments.     

The Effect of Organizational Climate on Sell-side Analyst Turnover and Performance

This paper investigates whether and how organizational climate (OC) in brokerage firms affects analyst turnover and performance. We find that firms with a lower-rated OC have a higher likelihood of analyst turnover. Also, when analysts leave and switch brokerage firms, they are more likely to move to a firm with a higher-rated OC and will deliver more accurate forecasts after switching firms. However, the performance improvements in better-rated OC firms are significant only for the initial years of the analysts’ employment in the new firms. We also show that OC-related analyst turnover negatively affects the performance of incumbent analysts, especially for those non-All-Star incumbent analysts, while these adverse performance effects are also transitory and last for two years only. Thus, our findings indicate that OC only has a short-lived effect on the behaviour of both leaving and remaining analysts, which challenges the long-held assumption that investments in a positive OC will always be associated with lower employee turnover and higher individual performance. We explain our results as arising from the high levels of labour mobility within the brokerage industry and the transparency of analyst forecasts as a public performance measure.     

How do financial analysts implement the Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation framework?

In this study, we investigate how financial analysts implement the Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation framework. Although SOTP constitutes a popular valuation approach among sophisticated practitioners and investors, it is mostly ignored by researchers and academics. We adopt a structured content analysis of 265 equity research reports written by 33 investment brokerage houses for 140 UK-based firms. We find that analysts typically use EBITDA multiples to implement SOTP. Furthermore, financial analysts are more likely to consider SOTP the dominant or preferred valuation model in their report. We show that managers disclose a greater quantity of segmental information if their firms are considered difficult to analyze and value by investors and creditors, thereby decreasing the information asymmetry with their capital providers. In specific circumstances, we document that financial analysts identify more segments in their SOTP analysis compared to the reportable segments in the firms' annual reports based on IFRS 8. We argue that the financial analysts' choice to employ a greater number of segments in their SOTP models might be primarily driven by their effort to support their reports' optimistic target prices. Finally, although SOTP seems theoretically ideal to estimate the value of a multi-segment firm, we do not find empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that SOTP significantly outperforms a full-blown Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model, when the latter is used separately to value the company as a whole.     

Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?

Research optimism among securities analysts has been attributed to incentives provided by underwriting activities. We examine how analysts’ forecast and recommendation optimism varies with the business activities used to fund research. We find that analysts at firms that funded research through underwriting and trading activities actually made less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than those at brokerage houses, who performed no underwriting. Optimism was particularly low for bulge underwriter firm analysts, implying that firm reputation reduces research optimism. There is also evidence that analysts at retail brokerage firms are more optimistic than those serving only institutional investors. We conclude that analyst optimism is at least partially driven by trading incentives.     

Brokerage trading volume and analysts’ earnings forecasts: a conflict of interest?

Review of Accounting Studies - Using unique new data, we examine whether brokerage trading volume creates a conflict of interest for analysts. We find that earnings forecast optimism is associated...     

Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell-Side Analysts

This paper examines the trade‐generation and reputation‐building incentives facing sell‐side analysts. Using a unique data set I demonstrate that optimistic analysts generate more trade for their brokerage firms, as do high reputation analysts. I also find that accurate analysts generate higher reputations. The analyst therefore faces a conflict between telling the truth to build her reputation versus misleading investors via optimistic forecasts to generate short‐term increases in trading commissions. In equilibrium I show forecast optimism can exist, even when investment‐banking affiliations are removed. The conclusions may have important policy implications given recent changes in the institutional structure of the brokerage industry.