Debt Tax Shields Around the OECD World

Taxes affect a company’s optimal capital structure, value, and cost of capital, but their impact depends on the tax regime of the country where the company operates. The OECD classifies the tax regimes of its member countries in seven groups. In this paper we offer a general model that encompasses those seven groups. We show that tax benefits of debt vary significantly across tax systems, and that using either Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) or Miller’s (1977) formulas in other tax regimes can lead to quantitatively important mistakes. We also find a significantly positive relationship between average leverage in OECD countries and our indicator of tax shields.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

Economic policy uncertainty and leverage dynamics: Evidence from an emerging economy

We test capital structure adjustments under dynamic trade-off theory using the standard partial adjustment framework, in light of long- and short-run economic policy uncertainties (EPU). Analysing a sample of Indian firms listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE500) for 2009 to 2018, we report a positive association between EPU and leverage but a negative association between EPU and speed of adjustment. An additional analysis indicates that the positive influence of long-run policy shocks on leverage is channelled through the growth prospects available to them. The leverage of firms in industries that are more sensitive to government subsidies reports a stronger positive association between the two variables both in the long and short run. Also, analysis using the suppliers of credit emphasizes that the increase in cost of debt drives the positive association between EPU and leverage for Indian firms. By delving into the mechanisms that impact the association between EPU and speed of adjustment, we find that the negative impact of EPU on leverage adjustments is moderated through the change in investments and the cost of debt only in the long run. The group affiliated firms display a strong positive association between EPU and leverage but a stronger negative association between EPU and speed of adjustment. Our results are robust across alternative measures of EPU, leverage, technique vis-à-vis endogeneity, large sample (4165 listed Indian companies) and heterogeneities based on firm size.     

Corporate governance and the dynamics of capital structure: New evidence

The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations.     

Optimal capital structure and the impact of time-to-build

We develop a dynamic investment options model with optimal capital structure and evaluate the effect of time-to-build on firm value and leverage choices. With time-to-build the firm increases initial leverage in order to reduce the impact of delayed cash flows resulting from time-to-build. The impact of time-to-build is more severe the higher the revenue volatility and competitive erosion, and when the firm issues long-term debt. Time-to-build is shown to have a substantial impact on firm values for plausible parameter values.     

Debt shifting in Europe

This article aims to analyze the link between subsidiary capital structure and taxation in Europe. First we have introduced a trade-off model, which looks at a MNC’s financial strategy and in particular debt shifting from low-tax to high-tax jurisdictions. By letting the MNC choose both leverage and the debt shifting percentage, we depart from the relevant literature which has mainly focused on the latter. Using the AMADEUS dataset we show that: (i) in line with the relevant literature, subsidiary leverage increases with its tax rate; (ii) contrary to previous work, the parent company tax rate does not have a negative effect on subsidiary leverage. More specifically, its effect is estimated to be nil when statutory tax rates are used. When however, effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs), accounting for cross-border effects, are used, the impact of parent company taxation on subsidiary leverage is positive.     

How does uncertainty influence target capital structure?

This study investigates how uncertainty affects firms’ target capital structure using a panel data set of U.S. public manufacturers between 2003 and 2018 and finds that high-uncertainty firms have 10.1 (8.1) percentage points lower mean book (market) targets than low-uncertainty firms. This study also shows that the uncertainty effect on leverage targets is greater than the impact of firm size, market-to-book ratio, assets tangibility, R&D intensity, and industry median leverage, making uncertainty the most critical among all time-varying determinants of leverage targets. Further, this study finds that heightened uncertainty decreases debt tax shields, increases potential financial distress costs, and exacerbates debtholder–shareholder conflicts, thereby leading to a lower optimal or target leverage ratio.     

Human Capital,Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure

We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.     

Capital Structure and Firm Efficiency

Abstract:  This paper investigates the relationship between firm efficiency and leverage. We consider both the effect of leverage on firm performance as well as the reverse causality relationship. In particular, we address the following questions: Does higher leverage lead to better firm performance? Does efficiency exert a significant effect on leverage over and above that of traditional financial measures of capital structure? Is the effect of efficiency on leverage similar across different capital structures? What is the signalling role of efficiency to creditors or investors? Using a sample of 12,240 New Zealand firms we find evidence supporting the theoretical predictions of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Efficiency measured as the distance from the industry's 'best practice' production frontier is positively related to leverage over the entire range of observed data. The frontier is constructed using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. Using quantile regression analysis we show that the reverse causality effect of efficiency on leverage is positive at low to mid-leverage levels and negative at high leverage ratios. Firm size also has a non-monotonic effect on leverage: negative at low debt ratios and positive at mid to high debt ratios. The effect of tangibles and profitability on leverage is positive while intangibles and other assets are negatively related to leverage.     

Financial leverage and corporate taxation: evidence from German corporate tax return data

To estimate the impact of profit taxation on the financial leverage of corporations, this study uses a pseudopanel constructed from comprehensive corporate tax return microdata for the period 1998–2001, which saw the introduction of major corporate tax reform in Germany. Financial leverage refers to the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. The endogeneity of the firm-specific marginal after-financing corporate income tax rate is controlled for by an instrumental variable approach. The instrument for the observed marginal tax rate is the counterfactual tax rate that a corporation would have faced in a particular period had there been no endogenous change, triggered by the tax reform, of its financial leverage and tax base. This counterfactual tax rate is derived from a detailed microsimulation model of the corporate sector, based on tax return microdata. The marginal tax rate has a statistically significant and relatively large positive effect on corporate leverage; for firms reporting positive profits, an increase of the marginal tax rate of 1 % would increase the financial leverage by approximately 0.7 %, on average. The debt ratio is less responsive to tax incentives for small corporations and firms facing high economic risks.     

Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing

A capital structure theory based on corporate control considerations is presented. The optimal debt level balances a decrease in the probability of acquisition against a higher share of the synergy for the target's shareholders. This leads to the following implications: (i) the probability of firms becoming acquisition targets decreases with their leverage, (ii) acquirers' share of the total equity gain increases with targets' leverage, (iii) when acquisitions are initiated, targets' stock price, targets' debt value, and acquirers' firm value increase, and (iv) during the acquisition, target firms' stock price changes further; the expected change is zero and the variance decreases with targets' debt level.     

Optimal Capital Structure,Endogenous Bankruptcy,and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

This article examines the optimal capital structure of a firm that can choose both the amount and maturity of its debt. Bankruptcy is determined endogenously rather than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition or by a cash flow constraint. The results extend Leland's (1994a) closed-form results to a much richer class of possible debt structures and permit study of the optimal maturity of debt as well as the optimal amount of debt. The model predicts leverage, credit spreads, default rates, and writedowns, which accord quite closely with historical averages. While short term debt does not exploit tax benefits as completely as long term debt, it is more likely to provide incentive compatibility between debt holders and equity holders. Short term debt reduces or eliminates “asset substitution” agency costs. The tax advantage of debt must be balanced against bankruptcy and agency costs in determining the optimal maturity of the capital structure. The model predicts differently shaped term structures of credit spreads for different levels of risk. These term structures are similar to those found empirically by Sarig and Warga (1989). Our results have important implications for bond portfolio management. In general, Macaulay duration dramatically overstates true duration of risky debt, which may be negative for “junk” bonds. Furthermore, the “convexity” of bond prices can become “concavity.”     

Corporate Debt Value,Bond Covenants,and Optimal Capital Structure

This article examines corporate debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework. It derives closed-form results for the value of long-term risky debt and yield spreads, and for optimal capital structure, when firm asset value follows a diffusion process with constant volatility. Debt values and optimal leverage are explicitly linked to firm risk, taxes, bankruptcy costs, risk-free interest rates, payout rates, and bond covenants. The results elucidate the different behavior of junk bonds versus investment-grade bonds, and aspects of asset substitution, debt repurchase, and debt renegotiation.     

Leverage,output effects,and the M-M theorems

This paper uses the Capital Asset Pricing Model to link the financial policy of the firm with the firm's real decisions including output, input mix, and investment. Whereas the M-M leverage theorems were derived for a given set of real decisions, this paper considers the impact of leverage on firm optimization when interest is tax-deductible. In general, leverage impacts upon factor proportions, capital stock, and output decisions. In the final proposition, the author demonstrates that the ‘cost of capital’ need not decline with leverage even in perfect capital markets and with default-free debt.     

Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.     

Does ambiguity matter for corporate debt financing? Theory and evidence

Traditional tradeoff theories puzzlingly predict that firms use high leverage, issue debt carrying a high duration and low yield spread, and have optimal debt policies highly affected by managerial risk-shifting behavior. We offer an ambiguity-based explanation for these corporate debt puzzles. The key intuition is that ambiguity-averse managers hold the worst-case belief about EBIT growth, resulting in upward (downward) distortion of bankruptcy (restructuring) probability. While firms under ambiguity aversion take less leverage, optimal leverage increases with ambiguity (if holding information constraints fixed). Our theoretical predictions about the impact of ambiguity aversion on corporate debt financing are supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, we document that the tradeoff models allowing for ambiguity aversion achieve a better performance in fitting real data, and information-constraint heterogeneities can be a distinctive determinant of leverage variations.     

Debt Management under Corporate and Personal Taxation

The presence of long-term debt in a corporation's capital structure is shown to give rise to a valuable tax-timing option that can be exercised by the firm on behalf of its shareholders. This option, which is not available if the firm is fully equity financed, implies that leverage will have a positive tax effect on total firm value even if there is no such effect associated with the tax deductibility of the coupon interest payments on debt. The more volatile interest rates and bond prices are, the more valuable the tax-timing option and the larger the favorable impact of debt on shareholder wealth.     

Taxes and capital structure: evidence from firms' response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986

While the theoretical relation between taxes and capital structurehas been extensively analyzed, the empirical evidence on thisissue has thus far been inconclusive. One of the main difficultiesconfronting previous empirical studies of the cross-sectionalrelationship between taxes and leverage was the control of interveningvariables. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), which drasticallychanged the tax regime, provides a unique opportunity to assessthe interaction between taxes and leverage decisions in a controlledenvironment. We test the relationship between leverage and certaintax-related variables for a large sample of companies in theyears surrounding the enactment of the TRA. The results supportthe tax-based theories of capital structure. The findings indicatethat there exists a substitution effect between debt and nondebttax shields, and that both corporate and personal tax ratesaffect leverage decisions.     

宏观调控与房地产上市公司资本结构调整

本文研究了宏观调控对房地产上市公司资本结构的影响及其资本结构调整方式的变化。研究发现,宏观调控之后,房地产上市公司总负债率显著提高;借款的期限发生了显著变化,长期借款显著增加而短期借款显著减少,但总的有息负债没有发生显著变化;房地产上市公司的贸易应付款显著增加,这是资产负债率显著提高的主要原因。对房地产上市公司宏观调控前后融资方式变化的研究发现,随着宏观调控带来的银行信贷政策的趋紧,房地产企业融资方式出现了多元化,新的融资工具得以出现和发展,金融市场的完全性提高。研究表明,在金融市场不完全和管制环境下,资本结构并不完全是企业自主决策的结果。宏观政策和资本市场供给条件,可能是中国企业资本结构是最重要的影响因素。     

Capital structure,credit risk,and macroeconomic conditions

This paper develops a framework for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and dynamic capital structure choice. We begin by observing that when cash flows depend on current economic conditions, there will be a benefit for firms to adapt their default and financing policies to the position of the economy in the business cycle phase. We then demonstrate that this simple observation has a wide range of empirical implications for corporations. Notably, we show that our model can replicate observed debt levels and the countercyclicality of leverage ratios. We also demonstrate that it can reproduce the observed term structure of credit spreads and generate strictly positive credit spreads for debt contracts with very short maturities. Finally, we characterize the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the pace and size of capital structure changes, and debt capacity.