Price,online coupon,and store service effort decisions under different omnichannel retailing models

This paper explores three omnichannel retailing models—that is, a Buy-Online, Pick-Up In-Store (BOPS) model, a Showroom model, and an Interactive model (a model that combines the characteristics of BOPS and Showroom)—under which the retailer offers coupons online and invests in service efforts offline. For each omnichannel retailing model, three coupon distribution scenarios (i.e. no coupon, coupon with a common value, and coupon with a different value) are discussed to investigate coupon promotion policies and omnichannel operation strategies. Profits in the omnichannel system and under each model are compared by deriving three decision values: price, coupon value, and service effort. The key findings show that the retailer achieves profit improvement when the incremental purchasing reaches a large value. In addition, a great service effort coefficient leads to a high price, service effort, and retailer profit. The service effort and coupon value in the Showroom model are the largest among the three omnichannel models, while its profit is the lowest. Conversely, although the retailer invests less in service effort, and the price and coupon value are not too large in the BOPS model, the retailer still gains the highest profit. Additionally, in the BOPS model, it is profitable for the retailer to distinguish the coupon value for the online-only and BOPS channels when consumers are less sensitive to the online-only channel’s coupon. However, in the Interactive model, the retailer derives increasing profit by providing coupons with a common value for the online-only and BOPS channels.     

Coupon Trading and its Impacts on Consumer Purchase and Firm Profits

When a retailer distributes manufacturer coupons to consumers without perfectly identifying their product valuations, consumers may have incentives to trade coupons. We develop a model to capture the coupon trading phenomenon and compare three scenarios: (I) no coupon, (II) coupon without trading, and (III) coupon with trading. We find that coupon trading can increase the profits of either the retailer or the manufacturers, but not at the same time. The retailer benefits from coupon trading when the coupon market is competitive and consumer hassle cost is low, while the manufacturers benefit from coupon trading when the coupon market is uncompetitive and consumer hassle cost is high. In addition, coupon trading does not always increase total demand. Firms benefit from coupon trading by charging higher prices, which leads to a decreased total demand. As a result, consumers end up with a higher average cost under coupon trading. We also compare coupon trading with improved coupon targeting, and find that coupon trading may allow firms to gain higher profits than improved coupon targeting. Further, we extend the main model to a competitive setting where the products are substitutable, and find that the main results still hold. Finally, we employ numerical analysis to identify the optimal coupon face values in different scenarios, and the results suggest that coupon trading combined with incentive mechanisms may lead to Pareto improvement for the channel as a whole.     

Digital coupon promotion and platform selection in the presence of delivery effort

In recent years, physical retailers have started selling products to consumers through either third-party or self-operated online platforms. Doing so, they face demand which depends on digital coupon promotions, delivery effort by the platform (i.e., deliver products from retailers to consumers), and channel preference. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine the interactions between the physical retailer's distribution channel choices and coupon promotions. In normal operation, retailers prefer to pay lower fees to the third-party platform, but we find, counterintuitively, that when carrying on a digital coupon promotion, the retailer can be better off paying a higher participation fee to the third-party platform. We also identify the conditions under which the retailer prefers the third-party platform over the self-operated platform with and without coupon promotions. Furthermore, we show that digital coupon promotions and delivery effort boost the retailer's profits by price discriminating among consumers with differing purchase utilities.     

Effects of sales promotion type and promotion depth on consumer perceptions: the moderating role of retailer reputation

This study uses a between-subjects experimental design to test the effect of two sales promotion formats (coupon versus markdown) with either high and low face values on consumer attitudes toward the deal, perceived product quality, and purchase intentions. The reputation of the retailer offering the deal is predicted to moderate the relationship between the promotional offer and consumer responses. Consumers perceive product quality to be higher when offered a high value coupon vs. markdown but there is no significant difference in perceived quality across promotion types when the promotion face value is low. When a deep price discount is offered by a retailer with a negative reputation, however, consumers have more favorable attitudes toward the deal and higher purchase intentions when provided with a markdown vs. coupon. Conversely, a high value coupon elicits more favorable evaluations than a markdown when the retailer has a positive reputation. When the value of the promotion is low and the retailer has a positive reputation, consumers have more positive deal attitudes and purchase intentions when offered a markdown vs. coupon. There is no significant difference in the effects of promotion type when the retailer has a negative reputation. The findings therefore establish retailer reputation as an important moderator of sales promotions effectiveness. This research is limited by the use of a single product category and a student sample. Process measures are also needed to validate the proposed theoretical conceptualization. The results provide managers insight into the type and value of the sales promotion to offer based on consumer perceptions of the retailer's reputation in the market.     

Retail services and firm profit in a dual-channel market

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays use online technology to engage in direct sales. The mix of retailing with a direct channel adds a new dimension of competition and complementarity to a product's distribution channels. Our model focuses on the strategic role played by the retail services in a dual-channel competitive market. The manufacturer uses a direct channel as an effective tool to motivate the retailer to improve its retail services and profits from it. While operated by the manufacturer to motivate retailer to perform more effectively from the manufacturer's perspective, the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because the retailer can obtain a lower wholesale price from the manufacturer and a higher sales volume from the improved retail services. In our research, our results suggest that the improved retail services effectively alleviate the channel competition and conflict and improve the supply chain performance in a competitive market.     

Pricing and coordination with consideration of piracy for digital goods in supply chains

Sales of digital goods via traditional channels are affected by those on digital channels, and thus a competitive relationship often exists. In addition, due to the ease of piracy, digital goods may suffer from a fall in demand, which intensifies competition. This study considers a single supplier who sells digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through two independent and different retail channels, such as traditional and digital ones, which may compete with each other in terms of service and price. To consider the effects of piracy on demand, a Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal gain-sharing ratio and the equilibrium prices for all channel members with an aim to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. It is found that an increase in piracy would force retailers to compete in a smaller market, and thus lead to a decrease in profits for each channel member. Therefore, a retailer who has a greater market share and is capable of managing a lower piracy rate would gain more profits by setting a higher price.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

Coupons and private labels: A cross-category analysis of grocery products

This article examines the influence of coupons on private label shares of grocery products. The impact of national brand and private label coupons, distributed by manufacturers and retailers, is examined. A consumer framework and a typology of coupon effects are developed to explain different types of coupon usage behavior. Aggregate scanner panel data on 480 product categories are used in the analysis. Both the type of coupon and the method of distribution (by manufacturer or by retailer) are found to be important determinants of private label share response. Couponing activities by the national brand manufacturer are negatively related to private label share, thus indicating that they may be effective deterrents of private label penetration. However, couponing activities related to private labels do not help increase private label shares. The surprising finding is that national brand store couponing activity is positively related to private label share.     

A comparative analysis of marketing promotions and implications for data analytics

Retailers use many different marketing promotions to increase sales and profits. These promotions include price reductions, coupons, cash mail-in rebates, free gift cards, and buy-one-get-one (BOGO) discounts. The type of promotion used results in different outcomes for demand, profit, average price, consumer surplus, and sales taxes collected. We perform comparative analysis of these five promotions and their outcomes. We show that for the same discount amount, price reductions result in the lowest average price. For products with weakly diminishing consumer utility and low consumer stockpiling, BOGO promotions result in the largest demand, profit, consumer surplus, and taxes collected. Cash mail-in rebates may result in large profit and taxes collected, but they perform poorly in terms of average price paid and consumer surplus. We also find that a retailer offering a delayed incentive (i.e. gift cards and mail-in rebates) offers a larger reward but provides lower consumer surplus than when offering an immediate incentive (i.e. price reduction and BOGO). In a segmented market with a price-insensitive consumer segment, immediate incentives have the disadvantage of allowing price-insensitive consumers arriving during the promotion to obtain the discount, which reduces the discount effectiveness. The addition of more retailer objectives to maximizing profit, such as demand maximization or consumer surplus, increases the effectiveness of immediate incentives. We also provide a framework for estimating the important parameters for evaluating promotion effectiveness using readily available transactional data and examine its accuracy using a simulation experiment.     

Competitive sustainable processes and pricing decisions in omnichannel closed-up supply chains under different channel power structures

In recent years, omnichannel retailing and remanufacturing issues have rapidly emerged in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The omnichannel is a combination of online and in-store retailing, and it affects supply chain relationships and channel power structures by changing value creation processes. It allows consumers a hybrid shopping experience where they can order products online and pick them up in the store or test in-store and buy online (TSBO). Despite this practice, no studies exist on CLSC considering omnichannel retailing under different channel power structures. We investigate the TSBO retailing strategy and its impact on CLSC profit considering price competition between manufacturer and remanufacturer under Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), Vertical Nash (VN), and cooperation (CO) models game settings. In this paper, mathematical models are developed to drive the optimal solution. A two-part tariff coordination mechanism (i.e., IS model) is also used to integrate all supply chain members. The proposed models examine the environmental and social welfare benefits of adopting green innovation products and remanufacturing processes in omnichannel retailing. A numerical study is carried out to illustrate the proposed models' application. The results show that the IS model can synchronize the economic, environmental, and social aspects leading to significant increases in performance. Total supply chain profit under the CO model is the highest. The manufacturer and remanufacturer generate higher profits in the MS model, whereas the retailer makes higher profits in the RS and VN models. When a manufacturer only wants to increase profit with green processes and is not concerned about omnichannel processes, more resources must be allocated for green innovation.     

Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer's profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturer's marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.     

Coupons in context: discounting prices or decreasing profits?

A coupon is a commonly used sales promotion device offering the user a discount on the purchase of a product. Consumer coupon offerings are also becoming increasingly diverse: from “% off” and “$ off” to “Buy one, Get one free” (BOGO) offers and co-promotions (Buy X, Deal on Y). This paper reports the results of three experiments that examine whether the economic value of a coupon is a source of information to infer the price of the product/service, and the quality of the product/service, which inference can undercut the economic value, with resulting consequences for deal evaluations and purchase intentions. The framework predicts, and empirical results show, that increasing the value of the coupon does not always improve deal evaluations or purchase intentions. This could imply lower profits for the company. The presence of past price information about the brand, information about prices of other brands offered by the company, and information about competitors’ prices moderate the impact of coupon value on brand-related inferences. When such alternate sources of information are present and are diagnostic of the price of the promoted product, consumers are less likely to infer price and quality from the value of the coupon and higher coupon values are more likely to increase deal evaluations and purchase intentions. Implications for managers designing and communicating promotions are offered.     

The dark side of up-selling promotions: Evidence from an analysis of cross-brand purchase behavior☆

This research investigates how up- and down-selling promotions affect customers’ cross-brand purchasing and churn behavior at a multi-brand retailer. We employ a hidden Markov model that accounts for the dynamics of customers’ latent brand preferences and attrition and captures the resulting purchase behavior in response to promotional offers. Using data on coupon promotions and purchase transactions from an online retailer, we find that coupons for a higher-end brand increase customers’ likelihood of purchasing the brand. While this suggests that the retailer can increase its short-term revenues by sending coupons for the higher-end brand to customers of the lower-end brand, we find that customers up-sold via coupons are more likely to switch back to the lower-end brand, in comparison to other customers of the higher-end brand, limiting the positive effect of up-selling promotions in the long term. Moreover, lower-end brand customers’ promotion-induced brand switching leads to their increased attrition from the retailer, which negatively affects long-term purchase behavior and revenues. In contrast, when triggered by down-selling coupons, customers’ brand switching does not impact their attrition. Based on these findings, we demonstrate how our model-based approach can assist marketers’ multi-brand couponing decisions.     

The effects of mobile promotions on customer purchase dynamics

While mobile promotions have become increasingly popular in recent years, limited research has examined the effects of mobile promotions over time. This research investigates the effects of two popular types of promotional offers, price discount and non-price free sample coupons, on purchase behavior. To this end, we present a dynamic model of customer purchase behavior that incorporates time-varying effects of mobile coupons, enabling us to investigate both the short-term and longer-term effects of mobile promotions. Using transaction and mobile promotion data, we find that both price discount and free sample coupons increase customers' purchase likelihood and expenditures during the coupon redemption period. We also find that free sample coupons have an enduring effect that increases the purchase propensity beyond the promotion period, thereby contributing to incremental purchases over a longer period of time. We demonstrate how our approach can help marketers improve mobile couponing decisions by considering the dynamic effects of mobile promotions that manifest over time.     

Efficient replenishment in the distribution channel

Efficient replenishment (ER), a business process that involves the reduction of order cost to facilitate deliveries of goods from the manufacturer to the retailer, is becoming increasingly important in distribution channel management. While a well-executed ER program is expected to lower total channel costs and increase channel profit, very little is known about how this incremental channel profit is distributed between the manufacturer and the retailer and how it varies across the two common channel relationship structures, retailer price leadership and manufacturer price leadership.In this paper, we develop the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer gain more or less from the adoption of ER based on a game theoretic channel model of bilateral monopoly under the two channel relationship structures. We develop analytic results on the impact of ER on purchase quantity, price and the distribution of profits in three cases, namely, (1) when only the retailer adopts ER, (2) when both the manufacturer and the retailer adopt ER, and (3) when the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated in the distribution channel, which adopts ER.The results, which can be generalized for all demand functions, show that the manufacturer benefits from the retailer's adoption of ER only when the manufacturer's holding cost relative to the retailer's is sufficiently large, relative to its order cost relative to the retailer's. By adopting ER, the retailer gains more than what the manufacturer gains even if the manufacturer is the price leader. Both the parties are likely to gain more if they both adopt ER than if only the retailer adopts ER. The incremental channel profit due to the retailer's ER adoption is highest in a vertically integrated distribution channel and is greater in a retailer-led channel relationship than in a manufacturer-led relationship.     

Estimating the effects of higher coupon face values on the timing of redemptions,the mix of coupon redeemers,and purchase quantity

One of the key decisions a manager must make in designing a coupon promotion is to decide on the face value. In this study we examine the effects of higher face values on coupon redemption timing, category purchase timing, the mix of buyers who redeem the coupon, and purchase quantity. Data from a field experiment on coupon face values are used to test the hypotheses. A new method of measuring the effects of a coupon on category purchase timing is proposed. We find that coupons per se tend to advance category purchase timing, but higher face values do not increase the magnitude of this effect. Surprisingly, higher face values appear to increase redemption rates for both the prior nonbuyers and prior buyers of the brand in a similar way. However, higher face values have little effect on the package size purchased, the number of units purchased, or the total quantity (package size times units) purchased.     

Strategic Role of Retailer Bundling in a Distribution Channel

We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the manufacturer in form of a lower wholesale price. This finding contributes a novel rationale for retailer bundling to the bundling literature. Whenever the bundling option causes this concession-extraction effect, the retailer always benefits from the lower wholesale price. The manufacturer, nevertheless, does not necessarily suffer because bundling can lead to a higher consumer demand. We also show that the manufacturer's marginal production cost plays a critical role in driving the retailer's bundling decision, concession extraction behavior and consequently the total channel profit.     

Bridge,Focus, Attack,or Stimulate: Retail Category Management Strategies with a Store Brand

We investigate a monopolist retailer's category management strategy where the main strategic decisions are how to horizontally position a store brand relative to the incumbent national brands and how to price the store and national brands for retail category profit maximization. We analyze a market composed of two consumer segments with differing tastes and heterogeneity with respect to willingness to pay and a product category consisting of two competing national brands and one store brand. We find that contrary to the existing literature, it is not always optimal for a retailer to position its store brand against the leading national brand; instead there are many situations where it is best to position the store brand close to the weaker national brand or to position it in the “middle” so it appeals to both national brands' target segments. In the process we identify four distinct category management strategies that a retailer can use with a store brand. In three of these the optimal store brand price is the brand's monopoly price, while in the remaining one strategy the price is lower. We also suggest an easy to implement means for a retailer to determine which strategy is best to use, depending on the particular competitive environment present before the introduction of the store brand and the relative quality of the store brand. We find that the store brand entry is most beneficial to the retailer when the national brands are moderately differentiated. Finally we show that introducing a store brand not only allows the retailer to garner a higher share of the channel profits through higher retail margins, but also often provides the retailer the benefit of increases in national brand unit sales as well as incremental sales from the store brand. JEL Classification: M310     

Competitive location-based mobile coupon targeting strategy

At present, retailers are increasingly targeting consumers based on consumers' geographic locations by distributing mobile coupons. We develop a theoretical model to compare uniform coupon targeting with one-to-one coupon targeting for two competing retailers with asymmetric mobile accessibilities. We find that retailers engage in targeting promotion only when the marginal cost of targeting is not too high. Adopting uniform coupon targeting does not necessarily lead to the prisoner's dilemma. Additionally, the asymmetry of mobile accessibility lessens inter-firm price competition. Finally, our results further demonstrate that marketers should switch from offensive to defensive targeting as the marginal cost of targeting declines.