Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults,self-cures and securitization

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis.     

Bank capital buffers in a dynamic model

We estimate a dynamic structural banking model to examine the interaction between risk-weighted capital adequacy and unweighted leverage requirements, their differential impact on bank lending, and equity buffer accumulation in excess of regulatory minima. Tighter risk-weighted capital requirements reduce loan supplies and lead to an endogenous fall in bank profitability, reducing bank incentives to accumulate equity buffers and, therefore, increasing the incidence of bank failure. Alternatively, tighter leverage requirements increase lending, preserve bank charter value, and incentives to accumulate equity buffers leading to lower bank failure rates.     

Testing macroprudential stress tests: The risk of regulatory risk weights

We compare the capital shortfall measured by regulatory stress tests, to that of a benchmark methodology — the “V-Lab stress test” — that employs only publicly available market data. We find that when capital shortfalls are measured relative to risk-weighted assets, the ranking of financial institutions is not well correlated to the ranking of the V-Lab stress test, whereas rank correlations increase when required capitalization is a function of total assets. We show that the risk measures used in risk-weighted assets are cross-sectionally uncorrelated with market measures of risk, as they do not account for the “risk that risk will change.” Furthermore, the banks that appeared to be best capitalized relative to risk-weighted assets were no better than the rest when the European economy deteriorated into the sovereign debt crisis in 2011.     

Are Commercial Mortgage Defaults Affected by Tax Considerations?

We study whether tax considerations are an important determinant of commercial mortgage default. We also study whether large lenders are better informed, or better at interpreting information for lending purposes, and hence have lower foreclosure rates; whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, and hence have lower foreclosure rates on larger loans; and whether commercial mortgage defaults are related to debt service coverage and loan-to-values, both initial and contemporaneous. The paper’s main findings are fourfold. First, holding all else equal, there is evidence that tax considerations influence investors’ decisions about when to “put” assets to lenders. The results are consistent with the argument of Constantinides (J Financ Econ 13:65–89, 1984). Second, the evidence suggests that large lenders are especially knowledgeable about commercial mortgage borrowers and commercial property markets, in that they have lower foreclosure rates than smaller lenders. Third, on the question of whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, we find that larger loans have, on average, lower default rates than smaller loans. Fourth, the findings suggest that lower default rates are associated with higher debt service coverage ratios, both initial and contemporaneous.     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis

Which theory can quantitatively explain the rise in mortgage defaults during the U.S. mortgage crisis? This paper finds that the double‐trigger hypothesis, which attributes mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event such as unemployment, is consistent with the evidence. By contrast, a traditional frictionless default model strongly overpredicts the increase in default rates. This paper provides microfoundations for double‐trigger behavior in a model where unemployment causes liquidity problems for the borrower. This framework implies that mortgage crises may be mitigated at a lower cost by bailing out borrowers instead of lenders.     

Posted rates and mortgage lending activity

In many metropolitan areas (MSAs) newspapers post mortgage terms for lenders in a manner designed to permit an easy comparison of discount points and note rates. Using these advertised rates for 73 lenders in three MSAs we examine 1) how applicants respond to short-run changes in relative rates, and 2) the relationship between the services provided and quality of applications received by lenders and their long-term market positions. We find that applicant flows increase when lenders lower their rates. We also find that persistent cross-lender differences in rates are associated with differences in product quality reflected in processing times, loan sales, and FHA/VA lending; and that high-risk borrowers tend to apply to lenders posting above-average rates.     

The relationship with REITs and bank loans: Capital structure perspectives

This paper discusses a research strategy which determines the optimum capital structure strategy and sets a reasonable required return of two-dimensional mortgages for borrowers and lenders with trade-off theory. We derived the optimum capital structure strategy of REITs and assess the mortgage risk premiums for lender. The results indicate that the REITs should maximize the value themselves by adjusting the optimum loan-to-value, make the most efficient use of the money. The lenders should seek borrowers who can pay mortgage interest continuously. At the same time, by maximizing mortgage premiums, they can set strategic objectives.     

An empirical analysis of home equity loan and line performance

Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.     

Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?

Banks can choose to keep loans on balance sheet as private debt or transform them into public debt via asset securitization. Securitization transfers credit and interest rate risk, increases liquidity, augments fee income, and improves capital ratios. Yet many lenders still retain a portion of their loans in portfolio. Do lenders exploit asymmetric information to sell riskier loans into the public markets or retain riskier loans in portfolio? If riskier loans are indeed retained in portfolio, is this motivated by regulatory capital incentives (regulatory capital arbitrage), or a concern for reputation? We examine these questions empirically and find that securitized mortgage loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio, providing evidence consistent with either the capital arbitrage or reputation explanation for securitization.     

Risk-weighted capital requirements and portfolio rebalancing

We use a 2013 Norwegian policy reform to study how banks react to higher capital requirements and how these adjustments transmit to the real economy. Using bank balance sheet data, we document that banks raise capital ratios by reducing risk-weighted assets. Most of the reduction in risk-weighted assets is accounted for by a reduction in average risk weights. Consistent with this reduction in risk, we document a substantial decline in credit supply to the corporate sector relative to the household sector. We also show that banks react to higher requirements by increasing interest rates, consistent with the reduction in corporate credit growth being supply driven. Using administrative loan level tax data, we document a reduction in lending on the firm level. This is robust to controlling for firm fixed effects, thereby accounting for potential firm-bank matching. Finally, we find that the reduction in bank lending has a negative impact on firm employment growth and that this effect is driven by small firms.     

Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans

We examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators’ capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have ‘skin in the game’ and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders’ incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.     

Subprime Lenders and Mortgage Market Completion

Without a subprime market, some borrowers by virtue of poor credit history, unstable income, and other characteristics are unable to qualify for a mortgage. With a subprime market, there is a more complete credit supply schedule with the market pricing for poorer credit quality in the mortgage rate. By completing the capital market, subprime lenders reduce borrowing constraints. The result is a social welfare gain. Low-credit applicants otherwise denied funding are able to qualify by paying higher interest rates in exchange for offering more equity or lower loan-to-value ratios. This prediction is consistent with the subprime applicants financing or refinancing their mortgages at relatively low loan-to-value ratios.     

The effect of foreclosure laws on securitization: Evidence from U.S. states

A mortgage that defaults is more likely to enter foreclosure rather than renegotiation if it has been securitized in the private non-agency market, according to previous research. We study whether this foreclosure-propensity affects lenders’ securitization decision ex-ante. Due to the higher foreclosure probability, the value of a mortgage should be more sensitive to foreclosure costs if it is securitized. Comparing loans made in the same metropolitan area but under different foreclosure laws, we find that lenders are less likely to securitize mortgages in states with higher foreclosure costs, as measured by laws requiring judicial foreclosure. Two additional results are consistent with the proposed channel. First, the effect increases for loans with higher expected default rates and disappears for mortgage-like loans not subject to these laws. Second, the effect of judicial requirements increases for loans with higher expected default rates, consistent with differences in loss given default driving the results. Borrowers in states without judicial requirements also get riskier loans.     

The pass-through of bank capital requirements to corporate lending spreads

We study the impact of higher bank capital requirements on corporate lending spreads using granular bank- and loan-level data. Our empirical strategy employs the heterogeneity in capital requirements across banks and time of implementation in Switzerland. We find that changes in the capital deviation from the regulatory minimum affect lending spreads asymmetrically. In response to a reduction in the capital deviation, banks with deficits with respect to their risk-weighted capital requirement raise spreads relative to banks with surpluses and de-leverage. Banks respond to higher requirements by raising spreads and, for deficit banks, by cutting lending.     

Adverse selection in mortgage securitization

Using several large data sets of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2007, we find that in the prime mortgage market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in their portfolios. In contrast, these lenders retained loans with lower prepayment risk relative to loans they sold. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for lower prepayment risk. Contrary to the prime market, the subprime market does not exhibit any clear pattern of adverse selection.     

CP3's Standardized Approach for Credit Risk and Current Capital Requirements

This paper reports estimated risk-weighted assets at 27 New York banks after applying the provisions of the Standardized Approach, both singly and in combination. The provisions that lead to estimated decreases in risk-weighted assets had greater impact than provisions that lead to estimated increases. This finding implies that using Standardized Approach elements to make capital requirements more risk-sensitive will lead to lower levels of required capital, unless regulators also impose a capital charge for operational risk. The effect of the different provisions varied across the 27 institutions, but the results, on average, are consistent with those reported in the third Quantitative Impact Study.     

Bank and Nonbank Lenders and the Commercial Mortgage Market

This paper develops an equilibrium model of the commercial mortgage market that includes the sequence from commitment to origination and allows testing for differences by type of lender. From borrowers, loan demand is based on the income yield, capital gains, and expectations about return distributions. Lenders use prices such as mortgage rates and their distributions, and quantities in underwriting standards. There are separate equilibria in the markets for loan commitments and originations. Bank and nonbank lenders are not restricted to the same lending technology, nor to the weights placed on mortgage rates as opposed to underwriting standards. Empirical results for the United States commercial mortgage market indicate that banks use interest rates in allocating credit while nonbanks rely on underwriting standards, notably the loan-to-value ratio. A consequence is that nonbanks have a clientele incentive towards making low cap rate loans compensated by low loan-to-value ratios.     

What drives mortgage fees in Australia?

We investigate the factors that affect total, ongoing and origination fees of mortgages in Australia during the period 1996 to 2011. We find that banks charge significantly higher total and ongoing fees than mortgage corporations although they require lower origination fees. We also find that fee levels are dependent on loan size, loan‐to‐value ratio and loan features like term of the loan and presence of an offset account. Further, we confirm that lenders trade‐off higher (lower) interest rates with lower (higher) fee levels. Finally, our results show that mortgage fees are significantly affected by market conditions.     

Residential Mortgage Lending and Borrower Risk: The Relationship Between Mortgage Spreads and Individual Characteristics

The mortgage banking environment in Hong Kong is quite different from that in the United States. For example, the secondary mortgage market and mortgage insurance only started after 1997. Using a large data set on mortgages, we examine empirically how mortgage rates in this market vary with various individual borrower, property, and loan characteristics. We find that mortgage rates in Hong Kong do vary with individual characteristics, which suggests credit sorting according to both prepayment risk and default risk, as a higher mortgage rate is found to be related to either higher collateral (a lower loan-to-value ratio) or slower prepayment. The empirical results suggest that lenders in Hong Kong can observe the risk type of individual borrowers to a certain extent and charge a corresponding mortgage spread. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm as in Berger and Udell (1990).