Does bank capital reduce liquidity creation?

This paper investigates the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Analyzing an unbalanced panel of 11,617 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2016, we find a negative association between regulatory capital and on-balance-sheet liquidity creation, but positive associations for small banks and after the financial crisis. Further, we observe lower liquidity creation among banks that participated in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results are largely robust to several alternate variable proxies and model specifications. Our findings suggest that “one-size-fits-all” policy may have some unintended consequences for banks.     

Is bank default risk systematic?

We evaluate the impact of commonly used indicators of bank distress on broad (i.e. sector and country) risks. This issue deserves special attention in the banking industry where there is a strong degree of interconnectedness among institutions and the default of a single bank may cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bankrupt the entire system. Using several measures of individual bank risk our results show that these measures have a direct impact on European banking (i.e. systemic) stock market risk. We also provide strong evidence suggesting that, for listed banks, default risk tends to be systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable).     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

What’s the contingency? A proposal for bank contingent capital triggered by systemic risk

Contingent capital (coco) automatically recapitalizes the banking system during financial crises if the trigger mechanism is properly designed. We propose a dual trigger mechanism based on: (1) aggregate systemic risk in the banking system, measured using CATFIN, and (2) the individual bank’s contribution to overall systemic risk, measured using delta CoVaR. The dual trigger is highly correlated with system-wide insolvency risk and prices systemic risk. We set different triggers for banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers. Using the 99% cut-off, systemic coco issued by Lehman and Bear Stearns would have been triggered in November 2007, months prior to their actual demise.     

Do bank regulation,supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (,  and ), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?

This paper empirically examines how capital affects a bank’s performance (survival and market share) and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the US over the past quarter century. We have two main results. First, capital helps small banks to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and normal times). Second, capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Additional tests explore channels through which capital generates these effects. Numerous robustness checks and additional tests are performed.     

Should the insurance industry be banking on risk escalation for solvency II?

Basel II introduced a three pillar approach which concentrated upon new capital ratios (Pillar I), new supervisory procedures (Pillar II) and demanded better overall disclosure to ensure effective market discipline and transparency. Importantly, it introduced operational risk as a standalone area of the bank which for the first time was required to be measured, managed and capital allocated to calculated operational risks. Concurrently, Solvency II regulation in the insurance industry was also re-imagining regulations within the insurance industry and also developing operational risk measures. Given that Basel II was first published in 2004 and Solvency II was set to go live in January 2014. This paper analyses the strategic challenges of Basel II in the UK banking sector and then uses the results to inform a survey of a major UK insurance provider. We report that the effectiveness of Basel II was based around: the reliance upon people for effective decision making; the importance of good training for empowerment of staff; the importance of Board level engagement; and an individual's own world view and perceptions influenced the adoption of an organizational risk culture. We then take the findings to inform a survey utilizing structural equation modelling to analyze risk reporting and escalation in a large UK insurance company. The results indicate that attitude and uncertainty significantly affect individual's intention to escalate operational risk and that if not recognized by insurance companies and regulators will hinder the effectiveness of Solvency II implementation.     

Should this team be saved?

As far as anyone could tell, Vigor Skin Care's star was rising, mostly on the strength of Ageless Vigor, its new line of enriched skin cleansers and cosmetics. In fact, this evening, the three employees responsible for developing the product line were slated to receive the parent company's highest award for performance. But CEO Peter Markles knew that despite the accolades, the business unit--and its "fearsome threesome"--had hit a rough patch in recent months. When Peter took the reins four years ago, Vigor Skin Care was the sleeping dog of the health-and-beauty industry; his challenge was to rejuvenate the maturing business. He knew a turnaround would require equal parts discipline, politics, and creativity--so he pulled together a team that could address those needs. Peter relied on Sandy Fryda, Vigor's longtime marketing director, to help him navigate the tricky political waters at headquarters. And he tapped 30-year-old Josh Bartola, a maverick contributor to Vigor Skin Care's research group, for his independent spirit and new product ideas. Their all-consuming, intensely collaborative efforts resulted in the successful Ageless Vigor line. Then reality set in. The team found the day-to-day operations of manufacturing Ageless Vigor, for all their necessity and urgency, a bit tedious. Peter felt relegated to troubleshooting distribution problems. Josh was having meetings with executives from another division who were actively recruiting the wunderkind. And Sandy was simply on the verge of burnout. Tonight, at the award ceremony, there would be speeches and applause and toasts. But tomorrow, Peter would have to face the question: Should he try to salvage the Ageless Vigor team? Four commentators offer their advice in this fictional case study.     

Did capital infusions enhance bank recovery from the great recession?

This paper investigates the long-run recovery experience of US banks that received capital infusions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Based on a dynamic recovery model, our results show that recovering CPP banks tended to be in better financial condition than other CPP banks. Long-run event study analyses of common stock prices reveal that, in the quarter after repayment of TARP funds, CPP banks experienced economically large and significant buy-and-hold wealth gains of 14%, equivalent to approximately $329 billion. We conclude that TARP was successful in fostering bank financial and stock price recovery.     

Information asymmetry and bank regulation: Can the spread of debt contracts be explained by recovery rates?

We investigate whether the spread of corporate debt contacts can be explained by their ultimate recovery rates. Using the actual realized recovery rates of defaulted debt instruments issued in the US from 1962 to 2007, we find that recovery rate is reflected in the spread at issuance, and that this relationship has become more significant since commercial banks were allowed to underwrite corporate securities. Our further investigation indicates that the enhanced informativeness of recovery rate can be attributed to the lowering of information asymmetry of individual firms. Besides, the relation between the spread at issuance and the recovery rate is stronger for weak corporate governance and non-investment grade issuers. Our conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues, potentially omitted variables and alternative model specifications.     

Financial systemic risk: Taxation or regulation?

This paper describes financial systemic risk as a pollution issue. Free riding leads to excess risk production. This problem may be solved, at least partially, either by financial regulation or by taxation. From a normative viewpoint, taxation is superior in many respects. However, reality shows that financial regulation is adopted more frequently. This paper makes a positive, politico-economic argument. If the majority chooses regulation, the level is likely to be too harsh. If it chooses taxation, then the level is likely to be too low. Due to regressive effects, a tax on financial transactions receives low support from a majority of low polluting portfolio owners. The same kind of majority may strategically choose regulation in order to burden the minority with a larger share of the cost of reducing systemic risk.     

The effect of bank capital on lending: Does liquidity matter?

This paper uses a sample of quarterly observations of insured US commercial banks to examine whether the effect of bank capital on lending differs depending upon the level of bank liquidity. We find that the effect of an increase in bank capital on credit growth, defined as growth rate of net loans and unused commitments, is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity only for large banks and that this positive relationship has been more substantial during the recent financial crisis period. This result suggests that bank capital exerts a significantly positive effect on lending only after large banks retain sufficient liquid assets.     

Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?

This paper analyzes the optimal nonlinear schedule of taxes and subsidies on remittances from emigrants. The analysis identifies conditions under which emigrants remitting small amounts of income face positive average and marginal subsidies on their remittances, whereas emigrants remitting relatively large amounts of income face positive marginal taxes. In this way, the tax system improves the distribution of income by indirectly taxing the “brain drain,” while simultaneously encouraging remittances that tend to go to low-income residents.     

Can unpredictable risk exposure be priced?

We study the link between beta predictability and the price of risk. An investor who desires exposure to a certain risk factor needs to predict what next period’s beta will be. We use a simple model to show that an ambiguity averse agent’s demand is lower when betas are hard to predict, leading to a reduction in risk premiums. We test the implications for downside betas and VIX betas. We find that they have economically and statistically small prices of risk once we account for the fact that an investor cannot observe ex-post realized betas when determining asset demand.     

Does cross-border syndication affect venture capital risk and return?

Venture capital (VC) cross-border syndication has increased significantly in recent years. This study examines the risk and returns of investments of US–European cross-border syndicates in US portfolio companies. We use a large sample of investments across four financing stages, and highlight several noteworthy differences between cross-border syndicates and previous US-only evidence. By comparison, US–European syndicates are larger than US-only syndicates, involve younger VCs, and focus more on later financing stages. Controlling for sample selection bias caused by the endogenous choices of exit route and exit timing, we examine the risk and returns of investments backed by cross-border syndicates. Consistent with evidence from US-only syndicates, alpha and beta decrease monotonically from the earliest (start-up) stage to the later stages of financing.     

Should the government be running job centres?

Most people find their jobs by means other than job centres. Since they are not a monopoly, what reason is there for government to run them? Can it even tell whether they are being run efficiently?     

Is there cyclical bias in bank holding company risk ratings?

This paper examines whether bank holding company (BHC) risk ratings are asymmetrically assigned or biased over business cycles from 1986 to 2003. In a model of ratings determination which accounts for bank characteristics, financial market conditions, past supervisory information, and aggregate macro-economic factors, we find that bank exam ratings exhibit inter-temporal characteristics. First, exam ratings exhibit some evidence of examiner bias for several periods analyzed. When the business cycle turns, examiners sometime depart from standards that they set during the previous phases of the cycle. However, this bias is not widespread or systematic. Second, exam ratings exhibit some inertia. Our results suggest that examiners rate on the side of not changing (rather than upgrading or downgrading) an institution’s exam rating. Third, we find robust evidence of a secular trend towards more stringent examination BHC ratings standards over time.     

The wolves of Wall Street? Managerial attributes and bank risk

We find that chief executive officers and chief financial officers exert significant individual effects on bank risk. Manager transitions, including transitions generated by plausibly exogenous manager departures, lead to abnormally large changes in bank risk. We demonstrate that the effects of managers on bank risk are sizable and manager-specific. The effects are also partly anticipated by the board because they are reflected in managers’ pay. However, wide-ranging personal attributes, including biographical, experience, and compensation data, only explain a small share of managers’ impact on bank risk. This implies that attempts to rein in bank risk-taking by targeting manager characteristics will be challenging for investors and regulators.