研究型大学、教师行为与科研激励合同：基于委托代理关系的分析

作为研究型大学的主体,教师的行为受到科研激励机制的影响。大学通过激励机制来规范教师的行为,教师则通过自身的努力获取收益和规避风险。文章基于大学和教师之间的委托代理关系,在不对称信息条件下探讨大学和教师应如何订立科研激励合同。结果表明：当不考虑监控成本时,在最优显性激励合同中加入外控变量可以使得风险成本和激励成本下降,从而降低代理成本。在大学和教师的长期合作中,则必须充分发挥隐性激励合同的作用。     

基于委托代理的区域高校协作激励机制设计

区域化的经济发展为区域高等院校协作提供了现实需求,加强高等教育区域协作已经成为必要,而如何设计有效的激励机制是协作成功与否的关键。本文通过建立地方政府和高校之间的协作机制模型,研究了我国区域高等院校协作中的委托代理问题和激励机制设计问题,并通过对模型的优化得到相应的激励机制。     

基于委托-代理模型的二次供水监管与激励研究

供水管理部门与物业管理公司在二次供水过程中有着明显的委托-代理关系,通过对二者的委托-代理关系进行模型构建与分析,得出结论认为物业管理公司的努力程度除受自身的经营管理能力和运营成本的影响外,还需要供水管理部门依据物业管理公司的能力系数、成本系数、风险偏好以及检验费用系数、不可控的环境条件等因素,设计合理的契约合同加强对二次供水过程的监管与激励,并提出相关建议。     

论企业风险对冲与管理者激励

本文根据委托代理理论,利用风险管理决策的效用原则,分析企业管理者不同薪酬制度下的风险偏好和风险管理决策;进一步说明股东可以通过设计不同的管理者薪酬计划,校正管理者在风险管理决策中的利益动机,进而使管理者制定的风险管理决策符合股东价值最大化目标。     

Incorporating morale into a classical agency model: implications for incentives, effort, and organization

This paper incorporates morale into a standard principal-agent model. When morale is observable, the worker’s effort level, the optimal piece rate, and the firm’s expected profits are all generally increasing in the worker’s level of morale. Furthermore, under reasonable conditions, higher-morale individuals are more responsive to incentives. Finally, when considering morale interdependence, conditions are derived which determine optimal organization strategies in terms of pooling or separating workers, and corresponding staffing policies are discussed.      

On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard

This paper shows that the marginal value of a “small amount of non-output information” is generally non-positive in the context of the standard principal-agent model involving moral hazard, which suggests a non-concavity in the value of information. However, when both the principal and the agent are risk neutral, even a small amount of non-output information may exhibit a positive incremental value in presence of a liability constraint.      

基于传统文化的产品感性品质创新理论探讨

产品感性品质的创造及创新是超竞争时代的必然选择。本文从理论上对感性品质创新要素进行归纳,在此基础上,得出传统文化对感性品质创新的效用模型。在最后,提出在我国充分挖掘传统文化元素进行产品感性品质创新的路径建议。     

The Spatial Effects of Wage or Property Tax Differentials, and Local Government Choice between Tax Instruments

This paper considers the spatial effects (on wages, employment, and business capital as functions of location) of a localized differential in source-based wage tax rates or business property tax rates between (for example) a central city and the surrounding suburbs. A simple model is used in which business production uses only labor and capital inputs. Consumers have fixed residential locations but may commute to work. Wage and property tax differentials have effects that are similar in some ways but different in other ways. If given a choice, a local government would choose to set its business property tax rate equal to zero and use only a wage tax.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.     

举例探讨亏损弥补的新旧会计处理政策

财务会计上的亏损是指当年总收益小于当年总支出。在计算应纳税所得额时,依照税法的规定将纳税年度的收入总额减去不征税收入、免税收入和各项扣除后,其结果有可能小于零,这小于零的数额即税法规定中的亏损。税法中的亏损和财务会计中的亏损含义不同,其处理方法也不同。     

作业预算对企业内部契约的改进研究

在委托代理理论下,预算管理是实现企业外部契约的内部契约保障机制,可以较好地协调各级委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突。但传统的预算管理模式重点研究所有者对高层管理人员的激励与约束经济权衡,忽视了企业治理结构下权力的分层授权控制理论,造成了高层管理人员对中低层管理人员及操作人员控制与考核的理论与实务缺失。本文认为,采用作业预算可以填补传统预算管理存在的空白,对企业的内部契约进行有效改进,设计出可靠的业绩合同和业绩评价体系,能降低契约中的代理成本和博弈成本。     

杭州市管线共同沟发展模式的研究

管线共同沟建设是城市基础设施集约化发展的重要体现,现阶段国内许多城市重视,但仍有诸多阻力。本文以杭州市管线共同沟发展现状为基础,对杭州市管线共同沟发展中将遇到的问题做了分析,提出了杭州市未来管线共同沟发展模式,推进杭州市共同沟向网络化、系统化发展,为政府决策作参考。     

配电网无功损耗补偿技术分析及线损管理

在对供电企业的经营管理水平和生产技术水平进行衡量和考核的过程中线损是非常重要的一个指标。本文主要对配电网的无功损耗补偿技术和线损管理进行了分析。     

从经济学角度透视CPA诚信危机

近几年,注册会计师(CPA)行业造假事件层出不穷,公众对于CPA出具的审计报告是否具有可信性已产生极大的怀疑。针对CPA诚信危机这一现象本文从经济学角度加以剖析。     

The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money

We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the nonseparable form u(y−c(a))$u(y-c\left(a\right))$ where y$y$ is the contractual payoff and c(a)$c\left(a\right)$ is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost c(a)$c\left(a\right)$ and with distributions of returns y$y$ that depend on a$a$. The decision problem is shown to be concave if the primitive of the cdf of returns is jointly convex in a$a$ and y$y$, a condition we call Concavity of the Cumulative Quantile (CCQ) and which is satisfied by many common distributions. Next we apply CCQ to the distribution of outcomes (or their likelihood-ratio transforms) in the principal-agent problem and derive restrictions on the utility function that validate the first-order approach. We also discuss another condition, log-convexity of the distribution, and show that it allows binding limited liability constraints, which CCQ does not.     

基于信息耗损与补偿的会计加总分析——《企业会计准则第30号——财务报表列报》评价

从信息论的角度看,会计实际上是一个数据加总与分解的过程,如果信息使用者的偏好不变,其加总数据必然导致信息耗损,分解数据则必然导致信息补偿。2006年初新颁布的《企业会计准则第30号——财务报表列报》对利润表的列报方式做了较大的变动。本文借鉴信息熵理论,构建了有别于传统的报表编制评价模型,并通过对2001~2005年某上市公司的利润表进行重述,实际考察了《企业会计准则第30号》对利润表的信息耗损与补偿,在此基础上给出了报表编制的一般性程序。     

提高供、配电线损变损功率因数无功补偿的几种方法

针对工业用电企业供配电系统线路长、分布广、电压等级复杂和井下供配电特殊的特点,节能降耗,本文着重抓好供配电系统的合理布局、适时更新改造、提高功率因数等文章中提出了有效措施。