Is managerial ability a moderator? The effect of credit risk and liquidity risk on the likelihood of bank default

This study investigates the effect of credit and liquidity risks as well as the moderating role of managerial ability on the likelihood of European commercial bank default during the period 2006 to 2017. We employ data envelopment analysis and a tobit model to measure banks' efficiency, the z-score to measure the likelihood of their default, and perform endogeneity and model specification robustness tests. Our results reveal that both risks significantly affect the likelihood of bank default and that the high skill of managers does not attenuate this effect. Rather, in the case of credit risk, managerial ability extenuates this effect. Managerial overconfidence and narcissism may explain the latter result. Another plausible explanation is that highly skilled managers who are likely to be rewarded with performance-based compensation schemes may be incentivized to hide bad news for an extended period of time. Such a scenario would increase the likelihood of bank default.     

The impacts of Gramm–Leach–Bliley bank diversification on value and risk

Combined abnormal returns from U.S. bank holding company acquisitions during 2001–2011 suggest that diversification into investment banking, securities brokerage and insurance under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 creates value. Exceptional returns depend on contributing factors; the most robust are that the acquirer is large and has experienced negative returns over the prior year (characteristics consistent with models of optimal diversification). Results are inconclusive on whether the impact of acquirer size is a too-big-to-fail effect, but acquirer characteristics are associated with adverse consequences: large size is associated with increasing systematic risk, and falling acquirer values are associated with increasing idiosyncratic risk.     

What drives investment bank performance? The role of risk,liquidity and fees prior to and during the crisis

This paper examines factors that affect the performance of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland. In particular, we focus on the role of risk, liquidity and investment banking fees. Panel analysis shows that those variables significantly impact upon performance as derived from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Given our sample also comprises the financial crisis, we further test for regime switches using dynamic panel threshold analysis. Results show different underlying regimes, in particular over the financial crisis. In addition, a strong positive effect of Z-Score on performance for banks in the regime of low default risk is reported, while fee-income ratio has also a positive impact for banks with low level of fees. On the other hand, liquidity exerts a negative impact. Notably, there is a clear trend of mobility of banks across the two identified threshold regimes with regard to risk a year before the financial crisis. Our results provide evidence that recent regulation reforms regarding capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are on the right track and could enhance performance.     

Is bank default risk systematic?

We evaluate the impact of commonly used indicators of bank distress on broad (i.e. sector and country) risks. This issue deserves special attention in the banking industry where there is a strong degree of interconnectedness among institutions and the default of a single bank may cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bankrupt the entire system. Using several measures of individual bank risk our results show that these measures have a direct impact on European banking (i.e. systemic) stock market risk. We also provide strong evidence suggesting that, for listed banks, default risk tends to be systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable).     

The Wall Street Journal 华尔街日报 Forbes Family in IRS Tax Dispute

Steve Forbes and members of his family are enmeshed in a tax dispute with the IRS tied to their publishing company＇s former New York headquarters.     

The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets using a sample composed of 34 banks from Central and Eastern Europe for a period spanning from 2005 through 2012. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between central bank transparency and financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. On the other side, increased central bank transparency significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of banks. The relationship is influenced by the restrictiveness of regulatory framework. We argue that a more transparent central bank is beneficial for the banking sector from a microprudential perspective. However, it may create incentives for financial institutions to engage in risky activities and through herd behavior may increase individual contribution to the risk of the banking system.     

Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd–Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance,a review

This article is a review of a 531 page book that in turn is a review and evaluation of the 2319 page Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by Congress on July 16, 2010. The overriding theme of the book is to pose two approaches to attaining financial stability in the future. One approach is to establish a council of wise men and women supported by an army of highly skilled professional financial economists to formulate and implement regulations designed to prevent future financial crises that wreak havoc on the real economy and require financial support from taxpayers. This is the approach of the Dodd–Frank Act. The second approach proposed by the authors of this book is to design a taxing system that taxes systemically important financial institutions on the basis of their contribution to systemic risk. Borrowing ideas from the literature on the taxation of negative externalities their view is that financial institutions that create crises should pay for the clean-up. They also argue that requiring the financial polluters to pay for the creation of systemic risk will reduce the supply of systemic risk. The reader is invited to decide which approach is best.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

Should bank capital regulation be risk sensitive?

We present a screening model of the risk sensitivity of bank capital regulation. A banker funds a project with uninsured deposits and costly capital. Capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the choice of the probability of default (PD). The project’s loss given default (LGD) is the banker’s private information. The regulator receives a noisy signal about the LGD and imposes a minimum capital requirement. We show that the optimal sensitivity of capital regulation is non-monotonic in the accuracy of risk assessment. If the signal is inaccurate, the regulator should use risk-insensitive capital requirements. Given sufficient accuracy, the regulator should separate types via risk-sensitive capital requirements, reducing the risk-sensitivity of bank capital as accuracy improves.     

A closer look at the relationship of entry-level bank employees’ leadership attributes and customer satisfaction

The purpose of this quantitative research was to measure customer satisfaction with bank tellers and bank teller leadership attributes and to determine the relationships between the two and the effect of gender on the ratings. Data were collected at three bank branches in West Amman-Jordan with 126 bank customers. The results revealed statistically significant differences in the ratings of the leadership attributes: Ethics had highest ratings while innovation had the lowest ratings. There were significantly different gender ratings in two leadership attributes such that women’s ratings were higher than the men’s in bank knowledge and communication leadership attributes. Also, men and women differed significantly on satisfaction; women were more satisfied than men. Moreover, results revealed that satisfaction correlated directly, strongly, and significantly with all five leadership attributes. Additionally, results showed that bank knowledge, innovation, and gender all made unique and statistically significant contributions to predicting satisfaction with bank tellers.     

Geopolitical,economic uncertainty and bank risk: Do CEO power and board strength matter?

This study examines whether economic and geopolitical uncertainties affect bank risk. Using a sample of 574 banks from 19 countries for 2009–2020, our findings show that increasing economic and geopolitical uncertainty significantly constrain the bank risk and worsens its stability. Furthermore, we explore whether CEO power and board strength have played a moderate role in mitigating the adverse impact of economic and geopolitical uncertainty on bank risk. The finding shows that CEOs' power and strong boards improve the bank's performance and minimize the adverse effects of economic and geopolitical uncertainty on bank risk. The results are robust to alternative bank risk, economic uncertainty, and geopolitical uncertainty measures and address endogeneity. Additional analyses on bank heterogeneity show that the bank stability of listed, domestic and private-owned banks is more immune to such uncertainty.     

The short-term effects of foreign bank entry on domestic bank behaviour: Does economic development matter?

This paper investigates the short-term effects of foreign bank entry on the behaviour of the domestic banking sector. We hypothesise that these effects are dependent on the level of economic development of the host country. Our investigation shows that at lower levels of economic development foreign bank entry is generally associated with higher costs and margins for domestic banks. At higher levels of economic development the effects appear to be less clear: foreign bank entry is either associated with a fall of costs, profits and margins of domestic banks, or is not associated with changes in these domestic bank variables.     

Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk

Based on a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 2002 to 2012, this paper shows that bank loan securitization has a significant and positive impact on both Z-scores and the likelihood of bank failure, indicating a short-term risk reduction and a long-term risk increase effect. We also find disparate impacts between mortgage and non-mortgage securitization. Loan sale activities are found to have a similar impact to securitization.     

The effect of bank capital on lending: Does liquidity matter?

This paper uses a sample of quarterly observations of insured US commercial banks to examine whether the effect of bank capital on lending differs depending upon the level of bank liquidity. We find that the effect of an increase in bank capital on credit growth, defined as growth rate of net loans and unused commitments, is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity only for large banks and that this positive relationship has been more substantial during the recent financial crisis period. This result suggests that bank capital exerts a significantly positive effect on lending only after large banks retain sufficient liquid assets.     

What drives bank securitisation? The Spanish experience

This paper analyses the reasons why Spanish banks securitised in the period 2000–2007 on such a large scale that Spain has become the European country with the second-largest issuance volume after the UK.     

The determinants of household’s bank switching

We investigate households’ bank switching exploiting a unique representative dataset from Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth that follows the households and their bank(s) over time. First, we document that bank switching is quite prevalent in our sample, with almost a quarter of households changing their main bank in a biannual horizon. Next, we relate the decision to switch to the features and dynamics of household bank relationship, and to the characteristics of both households and banks. In line with the switching cost theory, we find that using more than a single bank, as well as the intensity (number of services used), and the scope (bank services used) of the relationship with the main bank play a role in shaping the households’ decision to switch. Moreover, bank switching is strongly and positively correlated with both taking out and having paid off a mortgage.     

Central bank digital currencies and the international payment system: The demise of the US dollar?

The international monetary system is marked by a hierarchical relationship between currencies, where the US dollar is widely used. Recently, central banks have started to launch Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), which, in contrast to cryptocurrencies, are issued by monetary authorities. The purpose of this paper is (i) to analyse and explain domestic retail CBDCs in detail, and (ii) to assess whether the creation of CBDCs poses a threat to the US dollar as the key currency of the international monetary and financial system. It will be argued that, despite the innovations a CBDC may bring, the role of the US dollar will not be affected by the introduction of multiple CBDCs (mCBDCs) alone. Although mCBDC arrangements might decentralise the international payment system, the underlying structures supporting today's unipolar system would not automatically change. It is crucial that central banks work together to establish an alternative international monetary system.     

Has exchange risk depressed international trade? The impact of third-country exchange risk

This paper argues that the effect of exchange risk on bilateral and aggregate trade flows should be analyzed by including the impact of third-country exchange risk factors in addition to direct bilateral or multilateral risk. After a theoretical examination of these effects, US bilateral export flow to its six largest trading partners are analyzed empirically. I find individuality and jointly significant third-country risk effects in most cases. In contrast to some recent bilateral efforts, I find a steadily growing negative impact on trade flows from exchange risk during floating. And in contrast to recent aggregate trade flow studies, I conclude that there was no temporary decline in exchange risk during the late 1970s.     

What firm risk factors drive bank loan pricing and other terms? Evidence from China

This study investigates how firm risk factors affect bank loan pricing. Although firm-specific stock price crash risk affects bank loan costs directly, it also prompts other risks, including financial restatement and litigation, which in turn trigger higher bank loan costs. Strong internal and external governance mechanisms help reduce agency problems and improve information transparency, alleviating the adverse effect of stock price crash risk on loan costs. Our results confirm that bankers take good corporate governance into account in their bank loan decisions. We also show that bond investors price the adverse effect of stock price crash risk, prompting higher corporate bond costs. Futher evidence suggests that banks impose stricter non-price terms, such as smaller loan size, shorter loan maturity, and a higher likelihood of collateral requirement, on firms with higher crash risk.     

Does foreign bank penetration affect the risk of domestic banks? Evidence from emerging economies

We investigate whether foreign bank penetration affects the risk of domestic banks in emerging economies. By using bank-level data from 35 markets during the period of 2000–2014, we find significant evidence that the risk of domestic banks increases with the presence of foreign banks in the host economy, and this finding is shown to be consistent in a series of robustness tests. We also find that the incidence of such effects is more pronounced for domestic banks which are less efficient and less based on traditional activities. Foreign banks exert more pronounced impacts on domestic banks’ risk when they enter the host market via M&A, as opposed to greenfield investments, and when they belong to foreign conglomerates which provide strong internal support.