Price cap regulation and water quality

Journal of Regulatory Economics - A number of studies suggest that price cap regulation may reduce the quality of the regulated good. This paper analyzes the impact on drinking water quality of a...     

Monopoly regulation when customers need to make sunk investments: evidence from the Swedish district heating sector

Regulatory agencies routinely seek to promote price stability. A rationale for this practise might be that regulators seek to protect customers’ relationship-specific sunk investments. We develop a simple model which confirms that commitments to future rigid prices may increase welfare when customers need to make such investments. We use data from the Swedish district heating sector during the 1998–2007 period to explore the impact of monopoly pricing decisions on the take-up rate of district heating.     

Price transmission and asymmetric adjustment in the Spanish dairy sector

Asymmetric threshold vector error correction models are applied to monthly price data to analyse price relationships and patterns of transmission among farm and retail markets for a variety of dairy products in Spain. The results suggest that asymmetries affect a conspicuous part of the raw milk processed in Spain. Implications for the organizational structure of Spanish dairy markets are offered.     

Price regulation of drugs: Lessons from Germany

This paper purports to explain the pricing policy of pharmaceutical companies in Germany prior and after the introduction of reference prices (RP) in 1989. First, the threat of such regulation may have kept prices finite despite a completely insured market. Next, the pricing policies of both the producer of an innovative drug and of a competing generic under RP are predicted. These predictions are then confronted with actual pricing policy for three products in the guise of case studies. Finally, the impact of modified copayment rules on pricing decisions is analyzed.The authors would like to thank Dr Michael Wiegand (Bonn) for valuable information and two anonymous referees for helpful criticisms.     

Poland's agricultural sector under transformation

The Polish agricultural sector and food processing industry was the first industry to follow market economy because of agriculture's significance in the Polish economy and the dominant role of private ownership in agriculture. Full price liberalization, internal convertibility of the Polish currency, and liberalization of foreign trade completely changed the situation in agriculture. The main objective of this paper is to test the existence of market processes using monthly data from the agriculture and food processing industry covering the time period 1990–92. The largest part of the estimation is dedicated to agricultural products' and foodstuffs' prices. Typical demand-supply relations are observed on the pig, cattle, and milk markets only. In many equations, such variables like imports and exports of agricultural goods are not significant.     

水价冲击波透视

在长年干旱缺水的大西北，流传着一句口头语：水贵如油!然而，离开了极其缺水的特定环境，泱泱大国有多少人会意识到水的珍贵呢?水是生命之源。几年前，一位西方学者对人类的水需求进行长期研究后发出警告，大意是说：总有一天，人类获取水资源，会变得像现在获取石油那样不容易!也许，知道这个警告的不少人觉得是危言耸听。也许，更多的人还不知道这个警告。水，作为一种已经变得十分紧缺的资源，仍然那样浪费地使用，仍然那样廉价地使用，仍然那样不加节制地使用!值得庆幸的是，近两年来，国人开始探讨水权，阶梯式水价，侠水体制改革，市场化用水机制建立等问题……一场关于水价改革的冲击波正在扩散!     

Interdependence between regulation and technological innovation in the telecommunications sector

Telecommunications has attracted increasing public attention because of technological and regulatory dynamics which have transformed this into the backbone of the future information society. This article foucses on the interrelationship between technological development and regulation in three sections. First, attention is paid to technological development and the question as to what degree regulation is determined by technology. Next is discussed the role of European Union regulation, which affects technological innovation and diffusion in many direct and indirect ways. The final section address the remaining role of national regulation.     

Interdependence between regulation and technological innovation in the telecommunications sector

Telecommunications has attracted increasing public attention because of technological and regulatory dynamics which have transformed this into the backbone of the future information society. This article foucses on the interrelationship between technological development and regulation in three sections. First, attention is paid to technological development and the question as to what degree regulation is determined by technology. Next is discussed the role of European Union regulation, which affects technological innovation and diffusion in many direct and indirect ways. The final section address the remaining role of national regulation.     

Productivity and environmental regulation: the effect of the nitrates directive in the French pig sector

This paper measures the ensuing changes in productivity in the French pig sector following the introduction of the European regulation addressing water pollution by nitrates from agriculture. Productivity is measured using the Malmquist–Luenberger index. The sources of changes in productivity observed are examined by breaking down this index into its technical progress and efficiency components. The results show that in the early stages, increases in productivity were stimulated by increased efficiency, before being driven by technical progress. The estimations regarding the sources of efficiency gains for the farms in the sample (technical efficiency, efficiency of scale and environmental efficiency) are then used to estimate the indirect costs and benefits (or negative costs) linked to the introduction of the environmental regulation controlling the disposal of organic manure and the management of nitrogen surplus from pig farms. The existence of a “win-win” effect as regards the Porter hypothesis relation between efficiency and environmental regulation is highlighted for the French pig sector.      

反倾销:有条件地限制价格竞争的规则

本文基于双赢的研究思路，对WTO反倾销规则进行整体而非具体规则的解析，结果发现反倾销具有力图限制进口产品以低价营销的方式对进口成员市场进行过度抢占的功能。其目的是为更多的国家走向贸易自由化提供一种安全性保障，也为一个国家从以自然资源与劳动力廉价为核心的价格竞争优势，向以追求创新为特色的非价格竞争优势转换提供了基于双赢的导向。     

Private and public sector regulation of competitively tendered contracts

This paper addresses two contractual issues using a sample of competitively tendered contracts for cleaning services. First, the paper considers the characteristics that distinguish private from public sector organisations in their methods of selection and regulation of contractors. Secondly, the paper examines the perceived effectiveness of such regulatory mechanisms in terms of compliance with contract specifications and overall assessment of quality. Econometric analysis reveals that private sector organisations differ from their public sector counterparts in the selection procedures of contractors. Moreover, significant differences emerge in the apparent efficacy of a range of regulatory instruments in assuring contractual performance.We are grateful to Jörg Finsinger and participants at the Industrial Organization Conference in Vienna (1992) for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Guaranteed return regulation: a case study of regulation of water in California

Price cap regulation (PCR) arose out of dissatisfaction with rate-of-return regulation (ROR). In energy and water there has been a move away from PCR into an extended form of ROR, referred to as guaranteed return regulation (GRR). It is employed to implement policies that legislators are unwilling to apply by transparent methods, namely taxation, but willing to apply opaquely through the regulatory process. GRR does not promote efficiency and, as the California experience shows, the guarantees it provides are limited. Its success in California has been mixed and it should be considered to be a work in progress and open to improvements, some of which are outlined.     

Price cap regulation: A case study of some pitfalls of implementation

There has been considerable discussion of price-cap regulation as an alternative to traditional rate-of-return regulation. This paper examines some of the practical pitfalls of price-cap regulation. First, a model of a terminating price cap is developed. Next, this model is used to propose some problems of implementation. These problems are evaluated in the context of a case study of the Tucson Electric Power Company, which faced a type of price cap for several years in the 1980s. Extensions of the specific case to more general lessons about price-cap regulation are considered.     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.     

Price regulation,product location,and welfare

This paper investigates the imposition of a binding price ceiling and how it affects overall welfare and the location of a monopolist that is price-discriminating between two markets. The analysis shows that the imposition of a price-ceiling induces the monopolist to locate at the regulated market and that the imposition may actually reduce welfare. The setting is extended to a duopoly market. Two types of regulation are considered. The welfare implications of the regulations are discussed.      

Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers

This paper incorporates rent seeking from state coffers into a general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenous policy. Self-interested individuals try to extract, for personal benefit, part of tax revenues that could be used to finance public investment. We solve for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in individual agents' behavior. The determinants of rent seeking in general equilibrium are identified and we consider the efficient size of public sector given the rent-seeking activity. Cross-country data from 108 rich and developing countries provide support for our predictions.     

The impact of regulation on productivity growth: An application to the transmission sector of the interstate natural gas industry

We estimate a regulated cost function to examine the contributions of technical change, scale economies, and regulatory bias to productivity growth in an eleven-year, twenty-firm panel of interstate natural gas pipeline companies. We derive the unregulated cost function from the regulated cost function to produce estimates of movements in the unconstrained production technology. We find that the regulation constraint is binding in most years and that scale economies explain 38 percent more growth in the unconstrained production space than they do in the regulation-constrained production space.We are grateful to Gary Biglaiser, David Guilkey, C. A. Knox Lovell, and Helen Tauchen for their suggestions, and to Karen Bauer, Philip Budzik, Ronald Colter, and Mary Streitwieser for their assistance in compiling the data sample. We are also grateful to the participants at the Georgia Productivity Workshop and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions.     

Licensing under vertical product differentiation: Price vs. quantity competition

This paper develops a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation where two domestic firms incur variable costs of quality development. These domestic firms can purchase a superior foreign technology through licensing. Outcomes between Bertrand and Cournot competition are compared. We find that licensing raises domestic welfare, and domestic welfare is higher in Bertrand than in Cournot competition regardless of whether or not domestic firms engage in licensing. Non-exclusive licensing is also found to benefit the domestic country more than exclusive licensing.     

Price differentials in a homogenous product market: The case of water

This paper examines the existing price differentials for raw water along the Rio Grande. An extremely active spot market for this good, more than 926 transactions have been made over a five-year time period. Statistical analysis shows a significant difference between the price paid for water by irrigators or municipalities and industry. Even if price differentials did exist at the beginning, convergence would be expected over time for this homogenous good. However, statistical analysis shows no sign of convergence. Investigations have suggested that differentials may continue to exist due not to the lack of information, but to misinformation.     

Electricity sector reform in developing countries: an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization,competition and regulation

Electricity sectors in both developed and developing countries have been subject to restructuring to introduce private capital and increase competition. Although the effects of such reforms in a number of the developed economies are now well documented, the experience of developing countries is much less well researched. This paper provides an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, competition and regulation on the performance of the electricity generation industry using panel data for 36 developing and transitional countries, over the period 1985–2003. The study identifies the impact of these reforms on generating capacity, electricity generated, labor productivity in the generating sector and capacity utilization. The main conclusions are that on their own privatization and regulation (PR) do not lead to obvious gains in economic performance, though there are some positive interaction effects. By contrast, introducing competition does seem to be effective in stimulating performance improvements.