Calculating The Cost of Capital of an Unlevered Firm For Use in Project Evaluation

The adjusted present value requires an estimate of the cost of equity of an unlevered firm. Traditional approaches for calculating this cost assume that firms maintain a constant market-value percentage of debt when in fact firms typically use a book-value percentage of debt. In this paper, we present an approach to correctly estimate the cost of equity of an unlevered firm whenever the firm fails to maintain a constant market-value-based leverage ratio. We also demonstrate that both the Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1980) approaches may yield substantial valuation errors when firms determine debt levels based on book-value percentages. In contrast our method makes no errors as long as managers know the marginal tax benefit of debt.     

The value of tax shields IS equal to the present value of tax shields

Fernandez [2004b. The value of tax shields is not equal to the present value of tax shields. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 145–165] argues that the present value effect of the tax saving on debt cannot be calculated as simply the present value of the tax shields associated with interest. This contradicts standard results in the literature. It implies that, even though the capital market is complete, value-additivity is violated. As a consequence, adjusted present value formulae of a standard sort cannot be used. Also, Fernandez's argument implies that the value of the tax saving differs from conventional estimates by a considerable amount. We reconcile Fernandez's results with standard valuation formulae for the tax saving from debt. We show that, as one would expect, the value of the debt tax saving is the present value of the tax savings from interest. The apparent violation of value-additivity in the Fernandez paper comes from mixing the Miles and Ezzell and Miller and Modigliani leverage policies.     

On the Weighted Average Cost of Capital with Personal Taxes

This paper considers the impact of personal taxation on the Miles and Ezzell (1980) result that the weighted average cost of capital is the appropriate rate for discounting after corporation tax cash flows in an MM (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963) perfect capital market with corporation tax. An analogous result, incorporating a capital gains tax adjustment, is derived for the personal tax case, and its application to the UK tax system is considered.     

Expected Inflation and the Constant‐Growth Valuation Model*

In the presence of inflation, the standard Constant‐Growth valuation model found throughout the finance literature is not valid in cases where a company either (1) makes no net new investments or (2) invests only in zero Net Present Value projects. If expected inflation is positive, the generally accepted and widely used expression for the value of the firm under either of these two conditions seriously understates the true value of the firm, even with modest levels of inflation. The authors also show that the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), as developed by Modigliani and Miller (M&M), will be misleading if inflation is positive. They provide an adjustment factor that corrects this deficiency of the M&M model. Finally, the authors show that the WACC formula developed by Miles and Ezzell is correct when the parameters are stated in nominal terms, and therefore no adjustment is necessary.     

The cost of capital and optimal financing policy in a dynamic setting

This paper revisits the Modigliani–Miller propositions on the optimal financing policy and cost of capital in a dynamic setting. In an environment without taxes and bankruptcy costs, the results are generally consistent with the Modigliani–Miller Propositions 1 and 2. However, the first proposition should be presented and interpreted more carefully, as given firm characteristics, there is only one optimal capital structure. Thus, a firm’s capital structure is relevant. A relaxation of assumptions about either taxes or bankruptcy costs leads to conclusions that are generally different from those in Modigliani and Miller (1958). The model predicts that leverage and sales-to-capital ratios decrease but firm size and capital stock increase with the subjective discount factor of the firm’s manager if there are taxes and bankruptcy costs. The empirical analysis supports these predictions.     

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure

The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environments considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits greater leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will still do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agency costs are low.     

THE FAMA‐FRENCH MODEL,LEVERAGE, AND THE MODIGLIANI‐MILLER PROPOSITIONS

For a cost‐of‐equity model to conform to the Modigliani‐Miller cost‐of‐capital propositions, any sensitivity coefficients in the model must be related to the firm's leverage. In this paper I apply these principles to the Fama‐French model for the cost of equity and develop the relation between its sensitivity coefficients and firm leverage. I then examine an empirical process developed by Fama and French (1997) to model the evolution through time of their sensitivity coefficients and show that this empirical process is inconsistent with the Modigliani‐Miller propositions. Separable functions are proposed for these sensitivity coefficients that are consistent with the Modigliani‐Miller propositions.     

Presidential Address: Collateral and Commitment

Optimal dynamic capital structure choice is fundamentally a problem of commitment. In a standard trade‐off setting with shareholder‐debtholder agency conflicts, full commitment counterfactually predicts the firm would rely almost exclusively on debt financing. Conversely, absent commitment a Modigliani‐Miller‐like value irrelevance and policy indeterminacy result holds. Thus, the content of dynamic trade‐off theory must depend on the commitment technology. In this context, collateral is valuable as a low‐cost commitment device. Because ex ante optimal commitments are likely to be suboptimal ex post, observed capital structure dynamics will exhibit hysteresis and depart significantly from standard predictions.     

Debt Tax Shields Around the OECD World

Taxes affect a company’s optimal capital structure, value, and cost of capital, but their impact depends on the tax regime of the country where the company operates. The OECD classifies the tax regimes of its member countries in seven groups. In this paper we offer a general model that encompasses those seven groups. We show that tax benefits of debt vary significantly across tax systems, and that using either Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) or Miller’s (1977) formulas in other tax regimes can lead to quantitatively important mistakes. We also find a significantly positive relationship between average leverage in OECD countries and our indicator of tax shields.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

Managerial entrenchment, equity payout and capital structure

I develop a contingent claims model to examine the impacts of managerial entrenchment on capital structure and security valuation. The analysis shows that managers’ self-interested leverage choices deviate significantly from the optimal leverages that maximize firm values, partially explaining the suboptimal leverage ratios observed empirically (Graham, 2000). Both the extent and sensitivity of the deviations are affected by firm characteristics, debt features and default solutions. The shareholder-manager conflicts over risk level and cash payout vary dynamically with a firm’s financial health. Managerial entrenchment does not mitigate the agency problems of debt since managers’ discretionary decisions on milking properties or asset substitution could be driven by incentives to increase their own utility.     

Debt and market incompleteness

This paper provides a capital structure equilibrium analysis in an environment characterized by market incompleteness and risky debt. Market incompleteness, together with a comparative advantage for corporate borrowing, leads to a Miller (1977)-type capital structure equilibrium wherein each firm within an industry faces an indeterminate debt level. However, at the aggregate-industry level, corporations act as financial intermediaries to generate cross-sectional capital structure patterns across industries, despite the fact that rents associated with financial intermediation services dissipate in equilibrium for any particular firm. Additional implications are drawn for observed cross-sectional and time-series regularities in capital structure.     

Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital

We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] , the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage‐related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt.     

SIMULTANEOUS DEBT AND EQUITY ISSUES AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE TARGETS

Numerous empirical studies find evidence that managers behave as if they pursue target debt ratios. A possible alternative to the use of conventional, separate issuances of debt and equity to effect desired adjustments toward a target ratio is the simultaneous issuance of such securities. We extend prior research on such issues by exploring their use in the pursuit of capital structure targets. We find that the issuance of securities in general and the use of simultaneous issues of debt and equity in particular are at least partially influenced by where a firm's capital structure is relative to the average position in its industry. Further, shareholders' reactions to the announced plan to issue and to the issuance of securities are influenced, in part, by whether the issue moves the firm toward or away from the average capital structure in the industry. We also find evidence that the infrequent use of simultaneous issues relative to unaccompanied debt and equity issues is explained by their comparative flotation costs.     

TEXTBOOK INCONSISTENCIES IN GRAPHING VALUATION EQUATIONS: A FURTHER NOTE

In this note, the authors demonstrate that if a firm's leverage ratio is measured by debt-to-total value (debt-to-equity) in the pure capital structure rearrangement framework implicit in research reported by Modigliani and Miller (e.g., debt-to-equity exchanges), the market value of levered equity will be a concave (convex) function, and the market value of debt will be a convex (concave) function. These nonlinearities exist even without bankruptcy costs.     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.     

A Reconsideration of Tax Shield Valuation

A quarter‐century ago, Miles and Ezzell (1980) solved the valuation problem of a firm that follows a constant leverage ratio L = D/S. However, to this day, the proper discounting of free cash flows and the computation of WACC are often misunderstood by scholars and practitioners alike. For example, it is common for textbooks and fairness opinions to discount free cash flows at WACC with beta input β _S = [1 + (1 ? τ)L]β_u, although the latter is not consistent with the assumption of constant leverage. This confusion extends to the valuation of tax shields and the proper implementation of adjusted present value procedures. In this paper, we derive a general result on the value of tax shields, obtain the correct value of tax shields for perpetuities, and state the correct valuation formulas for arbitrary cash flows under a constant leverage financial policy.     

Corporate Policy and Market Value: A q-Theory Approach

In this paper, we show that Tobin's q has a significant predictive power in explaining valuation consequences of major corporate policy variables. Our empirical results reveal that, depending upon whether a firm is overinvesting or underinvesting, financial markets respond quite differently to its capital structure, dividend payout, financial slack, and R & D decisions. Overall, the empirical results suggest that both high debt ratios and greater payouts are favorably viewed by the market when firms are overinvesting. For firms with growth opportunities, however, large debt is unfavorably viewed by the market. In addition, financial slack and R & D expenditures are favorably received by the market for growth firms but not for overinvesting firms.     

资本结构选择偏好、成长性与公司绩效

本文通过基于不同资本结构选择偏好和成长性分类对上市公司资本结构和绩效的关系进行研究,研究发现:我国上市公司资本结构与绩效整体呈负相关;考虑内生性基础上,资本结构对绩效的负面影响提高了;不同负债水平下,资本结构对绩效的影响存在显著差异,且负债水平越高,资本结构对公司绩效的影响越大;在不同成长性水平下,资本结构与绩效都是负相关的,且成长性越低负面影响越大。     

Screening,Market Signalling,and Capital Structure Theory

This paper develops an equilibrium model in which informational asymmetries about the qualities of products offered for sale are resolved through a mechanism which combines the signalling and costly screening approaches. The model is developed in the context of a capital market setting in which bondholders produce costly information about a firm's a priori imperfectly known earnings distribution and use this information in specifying a bond valuation schedule to the firm. Given this schedule, the firm's optimal choices of debt-equity ratio and debt maturity structure subsequently signal to prospective shareholders the relevant parameters of the firm's earnings distribution.