A study on the role of guanxi in entrepreneurship and employment

This paper examines the role of guanxi in influencing the decision of an individual to be an entrepreneur facing a risky technology or to become a worker facing an unemployment rate. Individuals are assumed to vary in terms of the strength of their established guanxi that could be utilized either to lower the set-up cost as entrepreneurs or to secure jobs as workers. Compared with the case where guanxi can only be used to reduce the individual's set-up cost to become an entrepreneur, it is shown that if guanxi can also help a worker find a job, then whether the employment rate might be improved or worsened will depend on the absolute risk aversion that is increasing or decreasing in income.     

Increasing returns,entrepreneurship and imperfect competition

We study a simple bilateral oligopoly model in which individual agents, who are initially endowed with capital, decide sequentially (1) whether they want to act as producers (entrepreneurs) or as capital lenders (rentiers) and, then (2) which quantity of capital they would like to borrow or lend, though exchange of capital units against units of the produced good. Production takes place under increasing returns to scale. We show the existence of “natural equilibria”, at which wealthier capital owners become entrepreneurs while the remaining ones decide to be rentiers. We also study the efficiency of equilibria which is shown to increase by replication of the economy, but sometimes to decrease as a consequence of wealth redistribution.We thank an anonymous referee for his insightful comments     

Bitcoin and entrepreneurship: breaking the network effect

This paper explores the question of whether the market process is capable of bringing about a spontaneous monetary switch to a new currency in the presence of strong network effects of the incumbent currency as well as the absence of contingencies such as extreme inflation or political instability. It does so by examining current happenings around Bitcoin. It finds that two mechanisms stand out: the coordinating efforts of the profit-maximizing entrepreneur as well as the ability to use the old and the new currency simultaneously. Specifically, it finds that marginal decisions made by rational agents merely seeking to maximize net private benefit irrespective of the network effect, be it entrepreneurs or users of the new currency, are capable of setting in motion a switch to a new currency. Whether or not these mechanisms play out fully in the case of Bitcoin still remains to be seen.     

Tax competition and the political economy of public employment: a model for Austria

In this work, we simulate the effects of the tax autonomy of the Austrian states on the levels of public employment in each state. We show that depending on the strength of the public sector lobby, tax autonomy would require a reduction of employment in the public sector of between 25 and 35% of the current level. We also show that tax autonomy increases welfare levels by 1–1.5%; that is, the positive change in the disposable income of the workers more than offsets the welfare loss resulting from the lower provision of public goods. Finally, we show that the reduction of public employment is superior in terms of welfare to an alternative scenario in which employment levels are held constant but the wage levels in the public sector are adjusted.     

Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness

Journal of Regulatory Economics - This study empirically investigates the impact of public procurement regulation quality on the competition for tenders and the cost-effectiveness of awarded...     

Prices versus quantities: environmental regulation and imperfect competition

By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and therefore the emissions decisions, of all firms in the market. This paper examines how the welfare implications of strategic behavior depend on how pollution is regulated. Under an emissions tax, aggregate emissions do not affect the marginal cost of polluting. In contrast, the price of tradable permits is endogenous. I show when this feedback effect increases strategic firms’ output. Relative to a tax, tradable permits may improve welfare in a market with imperfect competition. As an application, I model strategic and competitive behavior of wholesalers in a Mid-Atlantic electricity market. Simulations suggest that exercising market power decreased emissions locally, thereby substantially reducing the regional tradable permit price. Furthermore, I find that had regulators opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect competition would have been even greater.     

Ramsey pricing and competition: The consequences of myopic regulation

This paper addresses the welfare consequences of applying the Ramsey rule when the regulated firm is not a monopolist in all of its markets. The partially regulated optimum and the outcome of myopic regulation, the Short-Sighted Ramsey Equilibrium (SSRE), are examined in a differentiated duopoly model. In the optimum, the markup of competitive substitute goods is relatively high. In the SSRE, the regulator is likely to set the price of competitive substitute goods lower than optimal, and complementary goods higher than optimal. Strategic reactions by a competitor may reverse the result.I thank Kenneth Train, Michael Crew (the editor), seminar participants at the University of California, Berkeley, and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Quality competition,welfare, and regulation

In this paper, we study the supply of quality in imperfectly competitive markets, and explore the role of regulation in markets where firms may use both quality and price to compete for customers. In a model where firms first choose qualities and then prices, we find that quality decisions have strategic effects: firms react to quality disadvantages by price reductions. Because of this strategic effect, firms do not have the correct incentive to set socially efficient quality levels. Price and quality competition results in a socially suboptimal quality level. Efficiency can be restored by lump-sum transfers and price regulatory policies. Simple price regulation may result in lower price and higher quality.We thank Nicholas Economides, Randall Ellis, Thomas McGuire, Michael Riordan, and Monika Schnitzer for discussing various issues in this research with us. We are also grateful to a referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The first author acknowledges support from the Management Science Group, Department of Veterans Affairs at Bedford, Massachusetts. The ideas here do not represent those of the Department of Veterans Affairs.     

The impact of entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurship skills and motivation

This paper analyzes the impact of a leading entrepreneurship education program on college students’ entrepreneurship skills and motivation using an instrumental variables approach in a difference-in-differences framework. We exploit that the program was offered to students at one location of a school but not at another location of the same school. Location choice (and thereby treatment) is instrumented by the relative distance of locations to parents’ place of residence. The results show that the program does not have the intended effects: the effect on students’ self-assessed entrepreneurial skills is insignificant and the effect on the intention to become an entrepreneur is even negative.     

Marx on entrepreneurship: A note

This paper argues that in mainstream economics the concept of entrepreneurship is imposed by the theoretical framework adopted in order to justify the source of profits. In contrast, in Marx’s analysis there is a consistent theory of profit which inevitably leads to a specific theory of entrepreneurship. (JEL: B10, B14, B21)     

Network costs and the regulation of wholesale competition in electric power

We characterize the cost function for electric power transmission. It is complex and non-linear, exhibiting scale economies over its range. The social planning problem for network transmission expansion is illustrated with a simple numerical example. The regulatory problem for joint generation and transmission cost minimization is addressed. It is shown that information asymmetries about the transmission cost function can lead to coordination losses when there is competition in the generation segment. We parametrize the tradeoff between potential coordination losses in transmission planning and benefits of competition and examine some potential alternatives for improved regulation of the transmission planning process.     

Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

In a differential game between two symmetric firms, provided with a clean and a dirty production activity, it is analyzed how investment and emissions are affected by environmental regulation. If both firms face the same environmental policy, a stricter policy reduces long-run investment in the dirty activity, while the impact on the clean activity is ambiguous. Both long-run emissions of each firm and total emissions decrease. This result does not necessarily hold if both firms face different policy instruments: Each firm's investment levels increase with a stricter environmental policy towards its rival, which causes more emissions by this firm.     

Measuring bank competition under binding interest rate regulation: the case of China

Many empirical studies suggest that financial reform promoted bank competition in most mature and emerging economies. However, some earlier studies that adopted conventional approaches to measure competition have concluded that bank competition in China declined during the past decade, despite progressive reforms implemented since the 1980s. We show that this apparent contradiction is the result of flawed measurement. Conventional indicators such as the Lerner index and Panzar–Rosse H-statistic fail to measure competition in Chinese loan markets properly due to the system of interest rate regulation. By contrast, the profit elasticity (PE) approach does not suffer from these shortcomings. Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in China during 1996–2008, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when the PE indicator is used.     

Import competition,employment and wage in US manufacturing: new evidence from multivariate panel cointegration analysis

This paper examines whether employment and wages in the US manufacturing sector exhibit any long-run relationship with import competition. The results based on a multivariate panel cointegration analysis of observations on 12 two-digit SIC manufacturing industries over the period from the third quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1992 indicate that US manufacturing employment does not bear a long-run relationship with import competition but manufacturing wage does. While the long-run correlation between import price and manufacturing wage is found to be sector sensitive panel estimation reveals a highly significant negative correlation between import price and manufacturing wage.     

Capital regulation, bank competition, and financial stability

We analyze capital requirements if banks compete for loans and deposits. Banks and firms are subject to a risk-shifting problem. The ambiguous effect of competition on banks’ risk-taking translates into an ambiguous effect of capital requirements on financial stability.     

The recession's effect on hospital registered nurse employment growth

Recessions are not uncommon in the United States, but the most recent recession is arguably the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although recessions result in increases in national unemployment in most sectors of the economy, they have resulted in increases in registered nurse (RN) employment as many non-working married RNs re-enter the workforce when their spouses lose their jobs. Over the past decade, hospital RN employment increased by more than 400,000 with virtually all of this growth associated with the two recessions that occurred during this period. The most recent recession led to an increase in hospital RN employment that was not only unprecedented in size, estimated at nearly 250,000, but was marked by the employment of large numbers of RNs over 50 years of age. While national unemployment rates remain high, hospitals should prepare for an eventual jobs recovery when many RNs are likely to leave the workforce.