BRAND AGRICULTURE AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: WHEN ARE HIGHLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS SUSTAINABLE IN THE REMOTE PERIPHERY?

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of new economic geography, incorporating brand agriculture that produces differentiated agricultural products. Focusing on the core‐periphery space, we show that highly differentiated brand agriculture can be sustained in the periphery even when access to the core market is not particularly good. This result supports the promotion of innovative products in rural areas in order to avoid direct price competition in generic commodities markets under unfavorable conditions.     

Financial factors and company investment decisions in transitional China

We investigate the propensity of Chinese publicly listed firms to invest in response to financial factors, according to the a priori degree of a firm's information problems: industry sector, ownership structure and firm size. The firms in primary and tertiary industries are found to be liquidity‐constrained in their investment decisions. The investment‐cash flow sensitivity of the firms in secondary industry indicates that they lost privileged access to credit in the course of China's market transition. However, we find no evidence that financial liberalization resulted in an easing of financing constraints for small‐ and medium‐sized firms. Our result indicates that agency problems, stemming from a state‐controlling pyramidal ownership structure, are responsible for the misallocation of internal funds. The importance of bankruptcy and agency costs in relation to debt finance for certain types of borrowers reflects the transitional nature of the financial environment facing Chinese firms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions

This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.     

Rivalry Restraint as Equilibrium Behavior

Rivalry restraint has received a lot of attention as a theory of profits in recent research on business strategy. Its economic rationale is explained as the consequences of either exogenous or endogenous anticompetitive forces present in different industries. In this paper, we use a dynamic oligopolistic industry model and show that rivalry restraint emerges as equilibrium behavior among firm owners who delegate decisions to managers. In the corresponding two‐stage game, managers choose optimal production rates in a dynamic Cournot market and owners set incentives for managers, acting sequentially rational. Equilibrium incentives correspond to rivalry restraint, that is, managers are less aggressive in the product market with lower outputs and increasing profits for all firms in the industry.     

Firm Productivity and the Foreign‐Market Entry Decision

We use Japanese firm‐level data to examine how a firm’s productivity affects its foreign‐market entry strategy. The firm faces a choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the case of FDI, the firm has two options: greenfield investment or acquisition of an existing plant (M&A). If it selects greenfield investment, it has two ownership choices: whole ownership or a joint venture with a local company. Controlling for industry‐ and country‐specific characteristics, we find that the more productive a firm is, the more likely it is to choose FDI rather than exporting and greenfield investment rather than M&A.     

The dynamic investment and exit decisions of venture capitals

This study develops a continuous time model to examine a complete two-stage decision process for venture capitals (VCs), including investment in the private market at Stage 1 and exit through IPO in the public market at Stage 2. Optimal timings, investment terms, and exit decisions are investigated using the real options game theory under two cases: the same required returns in the public and private markets and a higher required return in the private market than in the public market. Our results indicate that the same required returns in the public and private markets generate an optimal investment decision at Stage 1 without relation to the exit decision in Stage 2. However, when the required return in the private market is higher than that in the public market, the exit decision will influence the investment decision. The size of the initial capital, ownership structure, growth rate and risk of industry, required returns in public and private capital markets, extent of lock-up period price pressure, and transaction costs of financing are important factors influencing the equilibrium results.     

Firm Experience and Market Entry by Venture Capital Firms (1962–2004)

In this paper, we examine a firm's decision to enter new markets as related to the depth and breadth of its experience and the relative distance of those markets. We situate our discussion and analysis in the context of the venture capital (VC) industry, and examine whether and when US VC firms enter five high‐technology investment markets through first‐ or later‐round investments. This setting allows us to observe both the firms that chose to enter a new market and those that did not, and analyse the antecedents of these decisions. We find that VC firms overall are less likely to enter distant markets; those with broader experience are more likely to make first‐round entries. In addition, VC firms with deeper investment experience are more likely to make first‐round entries in proximate markets and less likely to enter distant markets and make later‐round entries. These results offer interesting implications for the literature on organizational learning and entrepreneurship.     

Public education under capital mobility

The paper considers a two-country model of overlapping generations economies with intergenerational transfers motivated by altruism and investment in human capital. We examine in a non-stationary competitive equilibrium the optimal provision of education with and without capital market integration. First, we explore how regimes of education provision—public, private or mixed—arise and how they affect the dynamics of autarkic economies. Second, we study the effects of capital market integration, in equilibrium, on the optimal provision of education. Third, we show that capital market integration enhances government intervention in the provision of public education (to improve the welfare of its constituents) and consider various solutions to such a competition.     

Capital Market Imperfections, Uncertainty and Corporate Investment in the Czech Republic

In this study we examine private investment behavior of firms in the Czech Republic. A special feature of the study is that the investment equations include variables which may give some more insights into the role of capital market imperfections as well as the effect of uncertainty. Our results find support for the accelerator model. We find evidence for cash-flow effects on Czech corporate investment. It is striking that indeed smaller longer privatized firms face relatively less cash flow restrictions. Financial structure doesn't matter as much as we expected. We find that smaller firms react positively to more uncertainty.     

Wage bargaining,productivity growth and long-run industry structure

This paper studies the innovation dynamics of an oligopolistic industry. The firms compete not only in the output market but also by engaging in productivity enhancing innovations to reduce labor costs. Rent sharing may generate productivity dependent wage differentials. Productivity growth creates intertemporal spillover effects, which affect the incentives for innovation at subsequent dates. Over time the industry equilibrium approaches a steady state. The paper characterizes the evolution of the industry's innovation behavior and its market structure on the adjustment path.     

Mode choice,transport structure and urban land use

A theoretical model of the urban land market is solved to examine the impact of bimodal passenger transportation on equilibrium residential land use. In this model travel to the central business district occurs on a dense system of radial roads or bus routes and a competing system or radial expressways or mass transit lines fed by a subsidiary system of densely spread access streets. Under rational behavior assumptions for households, it is shown that various basic urban forms can result depending on the relative generalized cost characteristics of the competing dense and sparse radial networks. The basic urban forms yield fundamental shapes, differing as to the relative geometry and position of the market areas for the two modes. The standard Alonso-Muth model of unimodal travel and circular urban form is found to result as a special case in several of these cases. American urbanized areas of various sizes and modal mix provide plausible examples for each of the basic forms. The paper concludes with a discussion of the model's implications as a framework for examining optimum urban transport structure and the proliferation of transport routes as a function of urban size.     

The R&D Investment–Uncertainty Relationship: Do Strategic Rivalry and Firm Size Matter?

This paper uses a real options perspective to augment a standard research and development (R&D) investment model and implement a firm‐level empirical analysis to assess the practical significance of market uncertainty and its interactions with strategic rivalry and firm size. We use a measure of firm‐relevant market uncertainty along with panel data and find that firms invest less in current R&D as uncertainty about market returns increases. The effect of firm‐specific uncertainty on R&D investment is smaller in markets where strategic rivalry is likely to be more intense. Furthermore, holding access to financing constant, the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment is attenuated for large firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial overconfidence,overinvestment, and R&D spillover

This paper examines whether a firm will select an overoptimistic manager when a cost‐reduction investment has a spillover effect. We consider a Cournot competition model where R&D investment ex ante occurs before the process of product market competition. Our analysis reveals that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium for firms to delegate overoptimistic managers. We show that only when the spillover effect is sufficiently high do firms benefit from delegation. Furthermore, the equilibrium confidence level and investment decision first decrease and then increase as the spillover parameter changes. As the initial production cost increases, the equilibrium performance becomes worse.     

Firm interdependence in oligopolistic markets

This paper develops an econometric model capable of identifying the pattern of interdependent behavior among firms in an oligopolistic industry. The model is based on the necessary conditions for producer equilibrium which, for a firm in an oligopolistic market, include the firm's conjectural variations. The conjectural variations are unknown parameters. The production model is based on the translog production function. The domestic coffee roasting industry is analyzed. Industry and size class specific Cournot and equality hypotheses are tested. Interdependent behavior cannot be rejected.     

Entry,capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing: A model of the U.S. fiberglass insulation industry

In this paper, a model is developed that suggests that entry into an industry selling a relatively homogeneous product can be deterred by investment decisions. The model characteristics are related to the institutional structure of the fiberglass insulation industry in the United States with the conclusion that the behavior of the industry closely emulates that behavior predicted by the analysis.     

Competition Among Health Plans: A Two‐Sided Market Approach

We set up a two‐sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholders on one side and providers on the other. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two‐sided framework allows us to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers' side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of the competition depends mainly on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on the providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO receives a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that by highlighting the two‐sided market structure of the health plans' competition, our model provides a new insight to understand the increase in the PPOs' market share as observed in the USA during the last decade.     

CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment Under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U‐shaped relationship. As the product market tends toward perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Integration, Complementary Products, and Variety

This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.     

Business Angel Syndication and the Evolution of Risk Capital in a Small Market Economy: Evidence from Scotland

In this paper, we examine the evolution of risk capital markets in a small market economy, with particular reference to business angel syndication. Scotland provides a valuable case, where the number of business angel syndicates (BAS) has grown from 3 to 18 between 2001 and 2010, the most radical shift in market organisation of any region in Europe. Findings suggest that a narrow range of focused but integrated public policies can be very effective in risk capital ‘capacity building’. Results suggest that syndication generates larger investment deals and more follow‐on investment but results in less new investments, fewer exits and an ‘equity gap’ in the lower end of the market, suggesting the need for ongoing formation of new BAS and greater emphasis on investment exits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.