The Interplay among Financial Regulations,Resilience, and Growth

Interconnectedness has been an important source of market failures, leading to the recent financial crisis. Large financial institutions tend to have similar exposures and thus exert externalities on each other through various mechanisms. Regulators have responded by putting in place more regulations with many layers of regulatory complexity, leading to ambiguity and market manipulation. Mispricing risk in complex models and the arbitrage opportunities through the regulatory loopholes have provided incentives for certain activities to be more concentrated in the regulated entities and for other activities to leave the banking into new shadow banking areas. How can we design an effective regulatory framework that would perfectly rule out bank runs and TBTF and to do so without introducing incentives for financial firms to take excessive risk? It is important for financial regulations to be coordinated across regulatory entities and jurisdictions and for financial regulations to be forward looking, rather than aiming to address problems of the past.     

Credit risk drivers: Evaluating the contribution of firm level information and of macroeconomic dynamics

Understanding if credit risk is driven mostly by idiosyncratic firm characteristics or by systematic factors is an important issue for the assessment of financial stability. By exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments, we observe that in periods of economic growth there may be some tendency towards excessive risk-taking. Using an extensive dataset with detailed information for more than 30 000 firms, we show that default probabilities are influenced by several firm-specific characteristics. When time-effect controls or macroeconomic variables are also taken into account, the results improve substantially. Hence, though the firms’ financial situation has a central role in explaining default probabilities, macroeconomic conditions are also very important when assessing default probabilities over time.     

Credit risk transfer and financial sector stability

In this paper, we study credit risk transfer (CRT) in an economy with endogenous financing (by both banks and non-bank institutions). Our analysis suggests that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instruments is to be welcomed. Moreover, we find the transfer of credit risk from banks to non-banks to be more beneficial than CRT within the banking sector. Intuitively, this is because it allows for the shedding of aggregate risk which must otherwise remain within the relatively more fragile banking sector. Therefore, regulators should act to maximize the benefits from CRT by encouraging the development of instruments favorable to the cross-sectoral transfer of aggregate credit risk (including basket credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations). Finally, we derive the optimal regulatory stance for banks relative to non-bank financial institutions. We show that a level playing field approach is sub-optimal. Regulatory stances should be set to actively encourage cross-sector CRT, first because of the higher fragility of the banking sector and second to induce banks to incur the costs of CRT which otherwise lead them to undertake an insufficient amount of CRT.     

The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets using a sample composed of 34 banks from Central and Eastern Europe for a period spanning from 2005 through 2012. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between central bank transparency and financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. On the other side, increased central bank transparency significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of banks. The relationship is influenced by the restrictiveness of regulatory framework. We argue that a more transparent central bank is beneficial for the banking sector from a microprudential perspective. However, it may create incentives for financial institutions to engage in risky activities and through herd behavior may increase individual contribution to the risk of the banking system.     

Openness,financial structure,and bank risk: International evidence

Using panel data from a large cross-country sample covering 97 countries over the period 1996–2017, we combine 2SLS procedure with system GMM estimation to study the relationship between openness, financial structure and bank risk. The main contribution of the paper is that we identified a new channel, i.e. the financial structure channel, through which financial openness reduces bank risk. In particular, we find that as financial openness increases, a country's financial system tends to be more market-based, and a more market-based financial system is associated with higher bank market power, better information sharing and more revenue diversification, all of which contribute to the reduction in bank risk. We also find that the effect of inflow restrictions on bank risk is more pronounced than that of outflow restrictions. These results highlight the importance of an appropriate design of a country's opening-up strategy to match the evolution of its financial structure to increase bank stability.     

21st century scandals: towards a risk approach to financial reporting scandals

Financial reporting scandals in the 21^st century have been followed by many changes in the regulatory framework of financial reporting. While it is natural to ask for research evidence on the effectiveness of these changes in preventing new scandals, we discuss some of the difficulties in conducting this type of research as well as limitations of commonly used approaches. We argue as the central point of this paper that both research and regulation should be based on an explicit acceptance of a permanent risk of financial reporting failure, rather than working on the assumption that this risk can and should be ever further reduced. Acceptance of this point of view can turn what is currently a scattering of unconnected research efforts into a coherent research agenda with potentially high relevance. Facing the existence of permanent financial reporting risk leads to a series of interconnected questions including the measurement of this risk, both actual and as perceived by various stakeholder groups, communication and education concerning these risks, and mechanisms to share or transfer these risks.     

Application of the Reporting Entity Concept in Australia

For decades, the reporting entity concept has been the foundation of differential reporting in Australia. Those entities classified as ‘reporting entities’ are, prima facie, required to produce full GAAP‐based financial reports while other (non‐reporting) entities are generally able to produce less complex and shorter ‘special purpose’ financial reports. In recent years, the application of the concept, as originally set out in the Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) 1 Definition of the Reporting Entity, has been criticized on several grounds—particularly, that it does not yield the reporting outcomes originally intended by regulators. Our analysis of 1,546 companies lodging financial statements with the corporate regulator in Australia (ASIC) shows the principles‐based criteria in SAC 1, designed to indicate the existence of a reporting entity, do not systematically explain its application by entities. Our findings are relevant for policy makers, researchers, and regulators concerned with how these choices might be more effectively regulated in future and whether this is best done through principles‐based or rules‐based approaches.     

Enterprise risk management in financial groups: analysis of risk concentration and default risk

In financial groups, enterprise risk management is becoming increasingly important in controlling and managing the different independent legal entities in the group. The aim of this paper is to assess and relate risk concentration and joint default probabilities of the group’s legal entities in order to achieve a more comprehensive picture of a financial group’s risk situation. We further examine the impact of the type of dependence structure on results by comparing linear and nonlinear dependencies using different copula concepts under certain distributional assumptions. Our results show that even if financial groups with different dependence structures do have the same risk concentration factor, joint default probabilities of different sets of subsidiaries can vary tremendously.

Backtesting for risk-based regulatory capital

In this paper we present a framework for backtesting all currently popular risk measurement methods for quantifying market risk (including value-at-risk and expected shortfall) using the functional delta method. Estimation risk can be taken explicitly into account. Based on a simulation study we provide evidence that tests for expected shortfall with acceptable low levels have a better performance than tests for value-at-risk in realistic financial sample sizes. We propose a way to determine multiplication factors, and find that the resulting regulatory capital scheme using expected shortfall compares favorably to the current Basel Accord backtesting scheme.     

Operational risk quantified with spectral risk measures: a refined closed-form approximation

The quantification of operational risk has become an important issue as a result of the new capital charges required by the Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) to cover the potential losses of this type of risk. In this paper, we investigate second-order approximation of operational risk quantified with spectral risk measures (OpSRMs) within the theory of second-order regular variation (2RV) and second-order subexponentiality. The result shows that asymptotically two cases (the fast convergence case and the slow convergence) arise depending on the range of the second-order parameter. We also show that the second-order approximation under 2RV is asymptotically equivalent to the slow convergence case. A number of Monte Carlo simulations for a range of empirically relevant frequency and severity distributions are employed to illustrate the performance of our second-order results. The simulation results indicate that our second-order approximations tend to reduce the estimation errors to a great degree, especially for the fast convergence case, and are able to capture the sub-extremal behavior of OpSRMs better than the first-order approximation. Our asymptotic results have implications for the regulation of financial institutions, and may provide further insights into the measurement and management of operational risk.     

REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: TOWARD A FOCUSED APPROACH

Regulation of financial markets arose in a simpler time when transactions were carried out face to face on an exchange floor or in a banker's office—when trading was localized and the variety of financial instruments was small. Today the task of regulators is much more difficult. Markets are global, trading takes place in cyberspace, and the variety of financial instruments is limitless.
The initial focus, and still the central concern, of our regulatory system is to ensure full corporate disclosure and transparency of trading markets. But regulation today goes far beyond disclosure requirements. The existing tendency to expand regulation to match the expanding financial markets is likely to be inefficient, unwieldy, and too costly, given the increased complexity and global nature of financial markets. A new approach and a new regulatory mindset are needed—one in which regulators aim to identify and provide only necessary regulation rather than simply continuing to expand regulatory oversight. Such a focused approach to regulation would separate what is regulated from what is not. Those aspects of banking that are essential to the integrity of the payments system would be regulated while other aspects would not. Some securities and derivatives markets would be regulated, while others would not. And market participants would be able to choose which markets to participate in. Given an ever-expanding financial system, such a focused approach to regulation is not only the most cost effective one—it is also likely to prove the only workable alternative to a system that is now under great pressure.     

The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors

Using a new database covering some 91 supervisory agencies, this paper examines how important various skilled experts are in the supervisory process and the relative usage of different kinds of such experts. We seek to explore what kind of perspective supervisors in different institutional settings may adopt: a macro-oriented perspective or a more micro-approach? The answer to this question is relevant, as there is evidence that many financial crises have been macro-induced.It is found that central banks employ more economists and fewer lawyers in their supervisory/financial stability wing than non-centralbank supervisory agencies. This result would indicate that an institutional setting with direct or indirect central bank involvement is more likely to produce a macro-approach. Next, there are significant economies of scale in financial supervision, though this can be measured by several alternative variables (e.g., the relative scale of bank intermediation). Finally, there do not appear to be major economies of scope. A more complex financial system with a well-developed stock market would need both more supervisors as well as more skilled ones.     

How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem*

As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.     

The impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk

This paper examines the impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk. We use a static model on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior to quantify the systemic risk in the cross-sectional dimension in both regulated and unregulated systems. Although imposing a capital requirement can lower individual risk, it simultaneously enhances systemic linkage within the system. By using a proper systemic risk measure combining both individual risk and systemic linkage, we show that systemic risk in a regulated system can be higher than that in an unregulated system. In addition, we analyze a sufficient condition under which the systemic risk in a regulated system is always lower.     

Government interventions and default risk: Does one size fit all?

We examine the effectiveness of the financial sector rescue packages provided by the national governments during the 2008 financial crisis. This study questions the implicit assumption that government interventions have an uniform effect on the default risk of individual banks. After testing the results for sensitivity, our main findings suggest that there exists a significant negative relationship between the announcement of the financial sector rescue packages and the daily change of the credit default premium. However, quantile regressions show that the effectiveness of these packages differs across banks: most interventions do not decrease the risk of intermediate to low-risk banks, while they do reduce the risk of high-risk banks. Besides, we find that interventions aimed at specific financial institutions are more effective in restraining banking risk than broad interventions taken to stabilize the financial market as a whole.     

The U.S. small business bankruptcy amendments: A global model for reform?

On February 19, 2020, the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 went into effect in the United States. This statute was intended to make the rescue regime of Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code more effective for smaller businesses that would not otherwise have the financial wherewithal to complete a traditional Chapter 11 reorganization. This article describes the central innovations of the new statute, and considers whether they might be adaptable by other countries.     

Fund portfolio networks: A climate risk perspective

Within Europe, investment funds are more exposed to climate-sensitive economic sectors than banks, insurers, and pension funds. However, few climate-related financial risk assessments of the fund sector have been conducted. We use 8 trillion EUR of fund portfolio holdings to help fill this gap, using the network of portfolio overlaps. Funds with more polluting portfolios (brown funds) invest across more firms than funds with cleaner portfolios (green funds). This apparent diversification hides a concentration risk: brown funds are more closely connected with each other (have more similar portfolios) than green funds, which tend to herd less (have less similar portfolios with each other). This suggests that, in the event of a widespread climate-related financial shock, brown funds will face greater stress levels than green funds. A climate risk scenario exercise confirms this: among total system losses of 443 billion EUR, brown funds' losses are typically between two and three times higher than green funds' losses. Brown funds also have more systemic impact: because they play a more central role in the investment fund network, brown funds contribute twice as much towards system-wide losses as green funds. These findings suggest that, despite the growing attention paid to sustainable investing, systemic vulnerabilities remain and many funds' portfolio diversification approaches do not yet adequately incorporate climate risk.     

Research Note: Revisiting Fair Value Accounting––Measuring Commercial Banks' Liabilities

IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IASB, 2000), requires assets to be marked to fair value if held-for-trading, available-for-sale purposes, or if they are derivatives; held-to-maturity securities, originated loans and originated securities are measured at amortized cost, providing they are not held-for-trading. Financial liabilities are measured at amortized cost except those that are held-for-trading or derivatives. A proposed amendment would accommodate improved fair value measurement of financial instruments. Commercial banks are greatly affected by any accounting standard concerning the recognition and measurement of financial instruments, whether related to assets or liabilities. This article demonstrates that the existing and proposed standards perpetuate the mismeasurement of interest rate risk for commercial banks. Under IAS 39 banks that have a balanced position, that is, no interest rate risk, counterfactually could show large changes in income through interest rate changes. An alternative accounting treatment, full fair value reporting of financial assets and liabilities, including all loans and deposits, is offered. Presently fair value data are mandated as footnote disclosure.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

Bank regulation and international financial stability: A case against the 2006 Basel framework for controlling tail risk in trading books

In attempting to promote international financial stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) provided a framework that sought to control the amount of tail risk that large banks around the world would take in their trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements. However, many of these banks suffered significant trading losses during the recent financial crisis. Our paper examines whether the Basel framework allowed banks to take substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty. We find that it allowed banks to do so and that its minimum capital requirements can be notably procyclical. Hence, focusing on the way the Basel framework sought to control the amount of tail risk in trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements, our paper supports the view that it was not properly designed to promote financial stability. We also discuss alternative regulatory frameworks that would potentially be more effective than the Basel framework in preventing banks from taking substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty.