Disclosure regulation and information risk

The present paper examines the impact of the Corporations Law Reform Act 1994 on information-based trading in Australian Stock Exchange-listed stocks. Results show that information-based trading is higher in the post-reform period, particularly for lower capitalization stocks. Further analysis shows that this is caused by a fall in turnover and rise in the number of slow trading days. After controlling for these factors, the reform is found to have no impact on information-based trading. Interestingly, the volume of price-sensitive disclosures is found to have no impact on either the level of information-based trading or market spreads.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk taking

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.     

数字普惠金融:风险与监管

三方面因素促进中国互联网金融发展 通过研究中国互联网金融发展指数得出三个重要发现,一是从2014年1月至2016年末的增长速度翻了一番;二是从地级市来看,中国沿海地区的发展水平远远超过内陆的发展水平,一个地级市互联金融的发展水平大致和它跟杭州城市之间的物理距离呈反比,也就是说离杭州越远发展水平越低;三是互联网金融在过去几年间基本上是80后和90后的年轻人在推动的一个活动.     

Will Any q Do?

We find that the relative levels of computationally costly q estimators and simple q estimators, when used as continuous variables, are affected by variations in many firm financial characteristics. In contrast, when the estimators are used as dichotomous variables, they classify the vast majority of firms identically with respect to the unit q breakpoint. Finally, we find that the computationally costly approach may induce sample‐selection bias as a result of data unavailability. Our results suggest that the simple approach is preferable except when extreme precision of the q estimate is of paramount importance and sample‐selection bias is not likely to be an issue.     

The effect of regulation on optimal corporate pension risk

We study firms' pension prefunding and portfolio allocation choices in a model in which firms trade off the need to compensate workers for the financial risk in their pension benefit against the cost advantage that may be gained by exploiting underpriced pension insurance. In the absence of pension insurance, the firm minimizes costs by rendering promised benefits free of risk to workers, who are assumed to be unable to hedge firm-specific risk. Various forms of government intervention, such as benefit guarantees, can alter this outcome dramatically by providing the firm with an incentive to shift risk to other parties. In this case, we find that the firm's decisions depend on, among other influences, the degree of insurance mispricing, the amount of guaranteed benefits, the stringency of minimum funding requirements, and the costs of financial distress.     

论内部评级法与商业银行风险监管

文章探讨通过内部评级法强化商业银行的风险监管问题。     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

Bank regulation and systemic risk: cross country evidence

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using data for banks from 65 countries for the period 2001–2013, we investigate the impact of bank regulation and supervision on individual...     

A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.     

Bank pay caps,bank risk,and macroprudential regulation

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.     

2015:融资不再纠结

尊敬的CFO们:大家好!2014年,融资成本问题始终是各方热议的焦点。围绕这个话题,我观察到几个非常有趣的现象:第一,热点转换快,从货币市场利率到无风险利率,从债券市场到影子银行,从地下钱庄再到银行贷款;第二,每次转换完成后,之前的进展很快就被忘记,或视而不见;而且人们谈融资,很少有人谈及股票市场,似乎融资及融资成本与股市无关;第三,在讨论同一个话题时,经常出现的情况是,大家说的都是"融资成本",     

A Rose.com by Any Other Name

We document a striking positive stock price reaction to the announcement of corporate name changes to Internet-related dotcom names. This "dotcom" effect produces cumulative abnormal returns on the order of 74 percent for the 10 days surrounding the announcement day. The effect does not appear to be transitory; there is no evidence of a postannouncement negative drift. The announcement day effect is also similar across all firms, regardless of the firm's level of involvement with the Internet. A mere association with the Internet seems enough to provide a firm with a large and permanent value increase.     

Country risk,portfolio decisions and regulation in international bank lending

This paper examines the concept of ‘country risk’ and relates it to the construction of efficient loan portfolios in international banking. Applicability of conventional portfolio-theoretic concepts to the management of country lending exposure is examined, as are the requisites of country review systems for national exposure management. The issue of international banking regulation is assessed in this context, focusing on the dangers inherent in national and international regulatory initiatives for optimum global capital allocation.     

银行业：并购之外可有蹊径？

20世纪90年代并购浪潮的势头已经削弱,美国银行业要寻找兼并以外的其他途径增加盈利:只有通过更好的价值定位和提高生产率来实现。银行要实现这些目标,必须在业务模式、客户目标、贷款和资产管理方法、运营和电子支付等方面进行革新。首席执行官在制定相关举措时会更多地顾及公司各项业务。     

Reserve regulation and recourse as a source of risk premia in the federal funds market

In this paper we demonstrate that there is a pronounced and persistent daily pattern of returns in the federal funds market, centered on Wednesday. We present evidence that explains this phenomenon as a reflection of the optimal behavior of banks operating in an environment in which there are effective reserve requirements and a penalty cost for recourse to discount borrowing. In particular, we report empirical evidence that shows there was a significant upward shift in the amplitude of this pattern of daily returns that resulted from (1) the increase in uncertainty associated with the change in Federal Reserve operating procedures during the 1979–1982 period, and (2) the imposition of a surcharge on discount borrowing instituted by the Federal Reserve. Our results demonstrate that what otherwise might be regarded as anomalous interest-rate behavior is consistent with the optimal response of banks to the regulatory environment within which they operate.     

Avoiding Taxes at Any Cost: The Economics of Tax-Deferred Real Estate Exchanges

This study examines the role tax-deferred exchanges play in the determination of reservation and transaction prices in U.S. commercial real estate markets. Taxpayers face significant time constraints when seeking to complete a delayed tax-deferred exchange. In a perfectly competitive market, a weakened bargaining position would not affect the transaction price. However, in illiquid, highly segmented commercial real estate markets, the exchanger may be required to pay a premium for the acquired property relative to its fair market value. Using a unique and rich dataset of commercial property transactions, we find that tax-motivated exchange buyers pay significantly more, on average, than non-exchange investors for their apartment and office properties, all else equal. Moreover, these average price premiums generally exceed the tax deferral benefits investors obtain by the use of a tax-deferred exchange. This result is robust to a number of alternative specifications. Thus, for many investors the pursuit of tax avoidance comes at a steep price.     

The effect of internal control and risk management regulation on earnings quality: Evidence from Germany

We investigate the impact of mandatory internal control and risk management (ICRM) reform on earnings-based attributes of accounting quality in Germany. Although prior studies examine changes in accounting quality under SOX Sections 302 and 404, there is scant evidence of the accounting quality effects of ICRM reform in foreign jurisdictions. Such evidence is warranted given the ongoing global policy debate of ICRM reform in the post-SOX era. We extend existing research by examining changes in earnings quality following the 1998 German legislation on control and transparency (KTG). The KTG regime provides a unique setting in which the regulatory scope extends beyond internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) to include broad business and enterprise risk control. Using both a differences and difference-in-differences research design, we find that German firms experience an increase in timely loss recognition and a decrease in earnings smoothing after KTG. We also find some evidence of a decrease in loss avoidance behavior. Additional analyses show that the sensitivity of capital investment efficiency to earnings quality increases in the German market after KTG, suggesting that earnings quality effects of mandatory ICRM reform has positive consequences for capital resource allocation. Together, our results are consistent with the achievement of one of the intended outcomes of ICRM regulation—increased accounting quality through effective ICRM systems.     

中国银行业监督管理委员会：加强监管信息化建设 促进银行业提高信息科技风险管理水平

中国银行业监督管理委员会（以下简称“银监会”）信息中心承担着银监会系统信息化建设和银行业信息科技风险监管的职责。在银监会党委的正确领导下,信息中心完成了大量的系统建设,建立了覆盖银监会系统的网络基础设施,建立了以非现场监管系统、现场检查系统为核心的监管信息系统,为银行监管提供了现代化支撑手段。     

自我管制、政府管制与独立管制——注册会计师行业管理模式比较研究

编者按:中国注册会计师协会近年来每年都组织专家学者进行课题研究,为行业管理决策提供参考,为行业理论研究添砖加瓦,为行业扩大宣传提供资料.为扩大中注协课题研究的影响,促进行业理论与政策研究的深入开展,本刊特辟"课题研究"栏目,专门刊载这些课题研究报告.