Price Momentum and Idiosyncratic Volatility

We find that returns to momentum investing are higher among high idiosyncratic volatility ( IVol) stocks, especially high IVol losers. Higher IVol stocks also experience quicker and larger reversals. The findings are consistent with momentum profits being attributable to underreaction to firm‐specific information and with IVol limiting arbitrage of the momentum effect. We also find a positive time‐series relation between momentum returns and aggregate IVol. Given the long‐term rise in IVol, this result helps explain the persistence of momentum profits since Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) study.     

The role of shorting,firm size,and time on market anomalies

We examine the role of shorting, firm size, and time on the profitability of size, value, and momentum strategies. We find that long positions make up almost all of size, 60% of value, and half of momentum profits. Shorting becomes less important for momentum and more important for value as firm size decreases. The value premium decreases with firm size and is weak among the largest stocks. Momentum profits, however, exhibit no reliable relation with size. These effects are robust over 86 years of US equity data and almost 40 years of data across four international equity markets and five asset classes. Variation over time and across markets of these effects is consistent with random chance. We find little evidence that size, value, and momentum returns are significantly affected by changes in trading costs or institutional and hedge fund ownership over time.     

Market states,expectations, sentiment and momentum: How naive are investors?

Following Cooper et al. (CGH) 2004 we test whether market states are relevant for predicting UK momentum profits. However, rather than simply categorising up/down markets based on actual prices as CGH, we suggest that investors may view expectations and/or sentiment as important. Contrary to the findings for the US, we find that momentum returns are not related to CGH-defined market states. Similar findings hold for an expectations-based split. In contrast, for the whole sample period, construction and retail sentiment indicators explain differences in momentum profits. However, robustness tests suggest that their explanatory power is driven by the post-subprime crisis period.     

Bank loans during the 2008 quantitative easing

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.     

Has momentum lost its momentum?

We evaluate the robustness of momentum returns in the US stock market over the period 1965–2012. We find that momentum profits have become insignificant since the late 1990s. Investigations of momentum profits in high and low volatility months address the concerns about unprecedented levels of market volatility in this period rendering momentum strategy unprofitable. Momentum profits remain insignificant in tests designed to control for seasonality, up or down market conditions, firm size and liquidity. Past returns, can no longer explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns, even following up markets. Investigation of post holding period returns of momentum portfolios and risk adjusted buy and hold returns of stocks in momentum suggests that investors possibly recognize that momentum strategy is profitable and trade in ways that arbitrage away such profits. These findings are partially consistent with Schwert (Handbook of the economics of finance. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2003) that documents two primary reasons for the disappearance of an anomaly in the behavior of asset prices, first, sample selection bias, and second, uncovering of anomaly by investors who trade in the assets to arbitrage it away. In further analyses we find evidence that suggest two other possible explanations for the declining momentum profits, besides uncovering of the anomaly by investors, that involve decline in the risk premium on a macroeconomic factor, growth rate in industrial production in particular and relative improvement in market efficiency.     

Information Uncertainty and Momentum Phenomenon Amidst Market Swings: Evidence From the Chinese Class A Share Market

This paper empirically investigates how firm-level information uncertainty impacts momentum profits in the Chinese Class A share market. We employ seven different factors to gauge the degree of firm-level information uncertainty—firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, trading volume, and the quality/strength of corporate governance (free float ratio). We find evidence showing that information uncertainty has an amplifying effect over the momentum profits, and the amplifying effect is more pronounced over the time periods following DOWN market state over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2013. The robustness of the empirical evidence is warranted by a risk-adjustment test based on the FF3F model and Wang and Xu’s (Financ Anal J 60(6):65–77, 2004) FF3F model, a sub-period analysis, and a different definition of market states. The empirical findings can provide an important reference point for international and domestic investors when adjusting investment strategies and portfolio positions in relatively volatile financial markets such as the Chinese stock market.     

On the suboptimality of single-factor exercise strategies for Bermudan swaptions

This paper examines the interaction between momentum in the returns of equities and corporate bonds. We find that investment grade corporate bonds do not exhibit momentum at the three- to 12-month horizons. Instead, the evidence suggests that they exhibit reversals. However, significant evidence exists of a momentum spillover from equities to investment grade corporate bonds of the same firm. Firms earning high (low) equity returns over the previous year earn high (low) bond returns the following year. The spillover results are stronger among firms with lower-grade debt and higher equity trading volume, seem robust to various risk and liquidity controls, and hold even after controlling for past earnings surprises. In examining the source of the spillover, we find that the bond ratings of firms with positive (negative) equity momentum continue to improve (deteriorate) in the future, suggesting underreaction to the information in past equity prices about changing default risk is a likely source of the spillover effect. Overall, our results suggest that both equity and debt underreact to firm fundamentals, but past equity returns is a better proxy of firm fundamentals than past bond returns.     

Surprises,sentiments, and the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates

Between 2005 and 2009, we document evident time-varying credit risk price discovery between the equity and credit default swap (CDS) markets for 174 US non-financial investment-grade firms. We test the economic significance of a simple portfolio strategy that utilizes fluctuation in CDS spreads as a trading signal to set stock positions, conditional on the CDS price discovery status of the reference entities. We show that a conditional portfolio strategy which updates the list of CDS-influenced firms over time, yields a substantively larger realized return net of transaction cost over the unconditional strategy. Furthermore, the conditional strategy’s Sharpe ratio outperforms a series of benchmark portfolios over the same trading period, including buy-and-hold, momentum and dividend yield strategies.     

Does revenue momentum drive or ride earnings or price momentum?

This paper examines the profits of revenue, earnings, and price momentum strategies in an attempt to understand investor reactions when facing multiple information of firm performance in various scenarios. We first offer evidence that there is no dominating momentum strategy among the revenue, earnings, and price momentums, suggesting that revenue surprises, earnings surprises, and prior returns each carry some exclusive unpriced information content. We next show that the profits of momentum driven by firm fundamental performance information (revenue or earnings) depend upon the accompanying firm market performance information (price), and vice versa. The robust monotonicity in multivariate momentum returns is consistent with the argument that the market does not only underestimate the individual information but also the joint implications of multiple information on firm performance, particularly when they point in the same direction. A three-way combined momentum strategy may offer monthly return as high as 1.44%. The information conveyed by revenue surprises and earnings surprises combined account for about 19% of price momentum effects, which finding adds to the large literature on tracing the sources of price momentum.     

Unsolicited Versus Solicited: Credit Ratings and Bond Yields

This paper is the first attempt to analyze Standard & Poor’s unsolicited and solicited ratings by using bond-yield data in Japan. Our findings show that there are differences in firm characteristics between firms seeking solicited ratings and those that receive unsolicited ratings. Firms with solicited ratings have less information asymmetry and are more likely to be owned by foreign investors, generate more revenue from exports, be cross-listed in the US, and have higher firm quality. But, firms with unsolicited ratings pay higher costs for debt, and their bond prices react more strongly to credit-rating changes. Yield spreads for new bonds with unsolicited ratings are higher than those with solicited ratings, because unsolicited ratings have higher information asymmetry, and investors therefore demand higher yields. We find that bond-price reactions to the announcements of unsolicited rating downgrades (upgrades) are negative (positive) and significant, while bond prices do not react significantly to solicited rating downgrades or upgrades.     

Reexamining momentum profits: Underreaction or overreaction to firm-specific information?

We design a new measure and find that the predictability of past returns on future returns increases as stocks respond with delay to firm-specific information. Our results suggest that momentum is caused by both investors’ underreaction and overreaction to information. However, underreaction to information seems to be the primary cause, particularly during the more recent period. Our findings are robust for recent explanations of momentum profits and alternative methods for computing our measure. We also find that stocks respond with delay to firm-specific information, partly due to certain firm characteristics, and partly because they escape investor attention due to their low visibility. Our paper extends and refines Jegadeesh and Titman’s (J Financ 56(2):699–720, 2001) finding that momentum profits are consistent with behavioral models’ predictions regarding investors’ overreaction.     

Momentum,Reversals, and Fund Manager Overconfidence

This paper examines the role of investor overconfidence and self‐attribution bias in explaining the momentum effect. We develop a novel measure of overconfidence based on characteristics and trading patterns of US equity mutual fund managers. Stocks held by more overconfident managers experience greater momentum profits and stronger return reversals than stocks held by less overconfident managers. The difference in momentum profits is not compensation for risk nor is it attributable to stock characteristics that influence momentum. Our results are consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) who argue that momentum results from delayed overreaction caused by overconfidence and biased self‐attribution.     

Momentum and industry growth

In this paper, we find that individual stock momentum varies almost monotonically with industry growth. Firms in the highest industry growth quintile have significantly higher momentum compared to those in the lowest growth quintile. We find that the above-average growth group within each quintile has significantly higher momentum profits than the below-average group. Further, momentum profits of the highest industry growth quintile are always higher than those for the universe of firms, suggesting an economic benefit to stratifying firms based on industry growth and relative company growth intra-industry, while following a momentum investment strategy.     

Individualism and Momentum around the World

This paper examines how cultural differences influence the returns of momentum strategies. Cross-country cultural differences are measured with an individualism index developed by Hofstede (2001) , which is related to overconfidence and self-attribution bias. We find that individualism is positively associated with trading volume and volatility, as well as to the magnitude of momentum profits. Momentum profits are also positively related to analyst forecast dispersion, transaction costs, and the familiarity of the market to foreigners, and negatively related to firm size and volatility. However, the addition of these and other variables does not dampen the relation between individualism and momentum profits.     

SPLIT RATINGS,BOND YIELDS,AND UNDERWRITER SPREADS

A split bond rating occurs when Moody's and Standard & Poor give different ratings to the same issue. We examine 1,277 public industrial bond issues, where 221 have split ratings, issued from 1980 through mid-1993. For split-rated industrial bonds, neither rating agency consistently gives higher ratings. Earlier studies find yields for split-rated bonds to be priced as either the higher or the lower of the ratings. We find the yields on split-rated bonds to be an average of the yields on the two ratings. Split ratings for industrial bonds appear to reflect random differences on the part of rating agencies. Our results differ from previous studies because we use a substantially larger sample and include high-yield bonds. As long as a bond has an investment-grade rating, the underwriter fees are found to be essentially the same for all rating categories. Below investment grade, the rating substantially affects the underwriter fee. Thus, split ratings for high-yield bonds have an important effect on the underwriter spread.     

Market States and Momentum

We test overreaction theories of short-run momentum and long-run reversal in the cross section of stock returns. Momentum profits depend on the state of the market, as predicted. From 1929 to 1995, the mean monthly momentum profit following positive market returns is 0.93%, whereas the mean profit following negative market returns is −0.37%. The up-market momentum reverses in the long-run. Our results are robust to the conditioning information in macroeconomic factors. Moreover, we find that macroeconomic factors are unable to explain momentum profits after simple methodological adjustments to take account of microstructure concerns.     

Director Networks and Credit Ratings

We explore the effect of director social capital, directors with large and influential networks, on credit ratings. Using a sample of 11,172 firm‐year observations from 1999 to 2011, we find that larger board networks are associated with higher credit ratings than both firm financial data and probabilities of default predict. Near‐investment grade firms improve their forward‐looking ratings when their board is more connected. Last, we find that larger director networks are more beneficial during recessions, and times of increased financial uncertainty. Our results are robust to controls for endogeneity. Tests confirm that causality runs from connected boards to credit ratings.     

Are red or blue companies more likely to go green? Politics and corporate social responsibility

Using the firm-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, we find that firms score higher on CSR when they have Democratic rather than Republican founders, CEOs, and directors, and when they are headquartered in Democratic rather than Republican-leaning states. Democratic-leaning firms spend $20 million more on CSR than Republican-leaning firms ($80 million more within the sample of S&P 500 firms), or roughly 10% of net income. We find no evidence that firms recover these expenditures through increased sales. Indeed, increases in firm CSR ratings are associated with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA, suggesting that any benefits to stakeholders from social responsibility come at the direct expense of firm value.     

Contrarian Profits and the Overreaction Hypothesis: the Case of the Athens Stock Exchange

This paper investigates the existence of contrarian profits and their sources for the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). The empirical analysis decomposes contrarian profits to sources due to common factor reactions, overreaction to firm‐specific information, and profits not related to the previous two terms, as suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (1995). Furthermore, in view of recent evidence that common stock returns are related to firm characteristics such as size and book‐to‐market equity, the paper decomposes contrarian profits to sources due to factors derived from the Fama and French (1993, 1996) three‐factor model. For the empirical testing, size‐sorted sub‐samples that are rebalanced annually are employed, and in addition, adjustments for thin and infrequent trading are made to the data. The results indicate that serial correlation is present in equity returns and that it leads to significant short‐run contrarian profits that persist even after we adjust for market frictions. Consistent with findings for the US market, contrarian profits decline as one moves from small stocks to large stocks, but only when market frictions are considered. Furthermore, the contribution to contrarian profits due to the overreaction to the firm‐specific component appears larger than the underreaction to the common factors.     

The 52-week high,momentum, and investor sentiment

This paper examines the link between the profitability of the 52-week high momentum strategy and investor sentiment. We hypothesize that investors' investment decisions are subject to behavioral biases when the level of investor sentiment is high, resulting in higher profits for the 52-week high momentum following high-sentiment periods. Our empirical results confirm this prediction. In addition, we find that the significant profit of the 52-week high momentum following high-sentiment periods persists up to five years. Further investigations show that the strong persistence of the 52-week high winners (losers) is concentrated in stocks with higher (lower) earnings surprises, especially during periods following high sentiment. Overall, our results provide supportive evidence for the anchoring biases in explaining the 52-week high momentum, especially when the role of investor sentiment is taken into account.