Regional versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization,Environmental Taxation,and Welfare

The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries.     

Free Trade, Growth, and Convergence

Can trade liberalization have a permanent affect on output levels, and more important, does it have an impact on steady-state growth rates? The model emphasizes the role that knowledge spillovers emanating from heightened trade can have on income convergence and growth rates during transition and over the long run. Among the results of the model, unilateral liberalization by one country reduces the income gap between the liberalizing country and other, wealthier countries. From the long-run growth perspective, unilateral (and multilateral) liberalization generates a positive impact on the steady-state growth of all the trading countries.     

Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: empirical evidence of the equal treatment rule

Abstract. A fundamental difference between multilateral trade agreements like the GATT and WTO and a preferential agreement is the multilateral agreements’ inclusion of a most‐favoured‐nation principle. Though MFN requires that members implement policies that provide equal treatment to all GATT/WTO countries, how far do members actually follow the MFN principle when so required? We empirically investigate a sample of GATT/WTO trade disputes and the effect of successful dispute settlement negotiations on the disputed product trade of third country exporters to the defendant country. We document evidence of trade liberalization consistent with defendant countries successfully applying the equal treatment rule. JEL classification F13     

Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy

In this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization, permitted by Article XXIV of the GATT, on country׳s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade. We present a model, in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups. We show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization. On one hand, the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations. On the other hand, when countries share similar political preferences, multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization.     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis

Why is a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries observed instead of progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? This paper answers this question by exploring the enforceability of different types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an infinitely repeated game framework. The authors search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under different conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, differences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which is shown to be the first‐best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare.     

Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization and the Environment

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects national and global pollution in a multi‐country model incorporating monopolistic competition and intra‐industry trade as well as inter‐industry trade. Each country produces skill‐intensive differentiated goods and labor‐intensive goods. Pollution is a by‐product of production but pollution abatement can be undertaken. Regardless of country characteristics, if the differentiated‐good sector is sufficiently cleaner (dirtier) then, without any change in environmental taxes, a multilateral reduction in import protection accorded to the differentiated good or to both goods typically leads to a decline (rise) in pollution in all countries. Pollution havens tend not to arise.     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

知识溢出下增长收敛的复杂性

在知识经济条件下,贸易自由化能否对一个国家的产出水平产生影响,能否为国际经济带来收敛,这是一个重要问题。文章通过假设国家之间构成一个知识网络,贸易中存在非线性的知识溢出,模拟了单边或多边关税下调对一个国际经济增长的收敛行为。研究结果表明,进入WTO体系后关税下调并不总意味着收敛的出现,收敛性依各经济体的初始状态和学习能力的大小而出现复杂行为,在知识网络体系单元取向上,网络的溢出参数——学习能力是决定性因素。多区域系统一旦出现收敛,则不会以牺牲富国利益为代价,即收敛是以低水平稳态向高水平稳态转移的形式出现的。     

Trade Liberalization and Heterogeneous Technology Investments

We propose a trade model where heterogeneous firms decide on a productivity‐enhancing technology investment. The model analyzes the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on firm‐ and industry‐level productivity. Freer trade increases the incentives to invest in technology by raising export profits. It also dampens these incentives, however, as profits stemming from domestic sales are reduced. Only exporters benefit from the former positive effect. The shape of the distribution of efficiency draws, the level of trade costs and the technology intensity of the industry are key elements removing the ambiguities regarding the net impact of trade liberalization.     

How deep is your love? A quantitative spatial analysis of the transatlantic trade partnership

This paper explores the quantitative effects of trade liberalization envisioned in a transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union. We use a quantitative trade model that, in contrast to other works, features consumptive and productive uses of land and we allow for labor mobility and a spatial equilibrium. Our calibration draws mainly on the world input–output database (WIOD). The eventual outcome of the negotiations is uncertain. Tariffs in E.U.–U.S. trade are already very low, however, so that an agreement will have a major impact only by eliminating nontariff barriers. These are extremely hard to quantify. We address these uncertainties by considering a corridor of trade‐liberalization paths and by providing numerous robustness checks. Even with ambitious liberalization, real income gains within a TTIP are in the range of up to 0.46 percent for most countries. The effect on outside countries is typically negative, yet even smaller. Taking land into account scales down the welfare effects strongly. Interestingly, we find that all German counties derive unambiguous welfare gains even though the model allows for negative terms‐of‐trade effects. Our analysis also implies that in order to arrive at the same welfare gains as under a TTIP, a multilateral liberalization would have to be much more ambitious for the U.S. than for the E.U.     

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION*

Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation.     

Direct Investment Liberalization,Commodity Trade and Income Distribution: What Can the WTO do?

This paper analyzes a model of two-way movement of physical capital, and examines the effects of direct investment liberalization on resource allocation, income distribution and commodity trade. If either country or both countries liberalizes investment under exogenously given commodity prices, some factor owners in a country will gain but some others will lose. If capital movement affects commodity prices, all factor owners in a country may be better off after multilateral investment liberalization. In these cases, it will be much easier for the home country to sign an agreement liberalizing investment flows.     

Multilateral trade and export-led growth in the world economy: some post-war evidence

In this paper, we address an empirical question: is there evidence to substantiate the assumption that the post-war liberalization of world trade has actually led to a significant increase in the world GDP? In our attempt to answer that question, time series data in the Penn World Table 6.1 are aggregated across countries to obtain a measure of world trade and output, and the total number of GATT/WTO member countries is employed as an explanatory variable to account for the impact of multilateral trade agreements, such as the Kennedy Round, Tokyo Round, and the Uruguay Round, on the trade-growth nexus. We then examine the relationship between world trade and the post-war GDP per worker across the world through the multivariate cointegration and error correction modeling and the Granger causality test. The results suggest that, at the global level, the post-war liberalization of multilateral trade has promoted both GDP and trade activities. There is also evidence that supports the export-led growth hypothesis in the world economy.     

The Future of East Asia’s Trade: A Call for Better Globalization

This paper is about how East Asia should respond to the challenges of the external environment. The first challenge is the current slowdown in trade, which has been due to cyclical and structural factors such as the decline in productivity and the maturation of global value chains. The rise in protectionism as measured by rising trade restrictiveness has not impacted on trade, but political and policy uncertainty regarding the direction of trade policy seems to have begun to impact on trade growth. The policy stance of increased protectionism and a retreat from the multilateral rules‐based trading system is linked to the pockets of the population who have not seen their incomes improve and who have blamed their plight and increased inequality on globalization. In fact, the issue is more about the lack of effective responses to manage the costs of trade liberalization. East Asian economies need to respond to these challenges by upholding the multilateral rules‐based trading system, continuing the various pathways to regional economic integration, and ensuring better globalization through effective capacity building and policies to address the negative effects of trade liberalization.     

Does it Matter Who You Sign With? Comparing the Impacts of North–South and South–South Trade Agreements on Bilateral Trade

Free trade agreements (FTAs) lead to a rise in bilateral trade regardless of whether the signatories are developed or developing countries. Furthermore, the percentage increase in bilateral trade is higher for South–South agreements than for North–South agreements. The results are robust across a number of gravity model specifications in which we control for the endogeneity of FTAs (with bilateral fixed effects) and also take account of multilateral resistance in both estimation (with country‐time fixed effects) and comparative statics (analytically). Our analytical model shows that multilateral resistance dampens the impact of FTAs on trade by less in South–South agreements than in North–South agreements, which accentuates the difference implied by our gravity model coefficients, and that this difference becomes larger as the number of signatories rises. For example, allowing for lags and multilateral resistance, a four‐country North–South agreement raises bilateral trade by 53% while the analogous South–South impact is 107%.     

The impact of FTAs on MENA trade in agricultural and industrial products

This article analyses the impact of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on Middle East and North African Countries (MENA) trade for the period 1994–2010. The analysis distinguishes between industrial and agricultural trade to take into account the different liberalization schedules. An augmented gravity model is estimated using up-to-date panel data techniques to control for all time-invariant bilateral factors that influence bilateral trade as well as for the so-called multilateral resistance factors. We also control for the endogeneity of the agreements and test for self-selection bias due to the presence of zero trade in our sample. The main findings indicate that North–South-FTAs and South–South-FTAs have a differential impact in terms of increasing trade in MENA countries, with the former being more beneficial in terms of exports for MENA countries, but both showing greater global market integration. We also find that FTAs that include agricultural products, in which MENA countries have a clear comparative advantage, have more favourable effects for these countries than those only including industrial products.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

An Eaton–Kortum model of trade and growth

We combine a multi‐country, continuum‐good Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with a multi‐country AK model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) to examine how trade liberalization affects countries' growth rates and extensive margins of trade over time. Focusing on the three‐country case, we obtain three main results. First, a permanent fall in any trade cost raises the balanced growth rate. Second, trade liberalization increases the liberalizing countries' long‐run fractions of exported varieties to all destinations. Third, the long‐run effects of trade liberalization are different from its short‐run effects, which can reverse the welfare implications of the static Eaton–Kortum model.     

"新区域主义"与多边贸易体制的冲突及协调

"新区域主义"蓬勃发展使WTO建立的多边贸易体制面临新的挑战.文章解析了"新区域主义"自20世纪90年代以来盛行的背景及原因,指出了其与多边贸易体制的冲突根源,厘清了多边贸易体制通过管理区域贸易协定以协调二者冲突的行事思路,并根据上述研究重新定位了"新区域主义"与多边贸易体制的相互关系.     

Distance to Frontier and New Import Growth

In a panel‐data study involving product‐level import data for 48 developing countries that underwent substantial trade liberalization between 1989 and 2001, this study finds that the growth of trade in new goods imported following major trade liberalization is related to the state of technology that existed just before liberalization. The study develops two new measures of the extensive margin. Findings indicate that greater is the distance of a country from the world technology frontier, the faster is its growth of new goods imports. This indicates a higher cost of trade protection for countries further away from the world technology frontier.