Overlapping tax revenue,soft budget,and rent seeking

This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments’ rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment.     

论公共卫生最优支出策略

公共卫生支出具有极强的正外部性.如果由地方政府或私人选择公共卫生支出的水平,那么他们的最优选择是较低的公共卫生支出和较高的个人消费(内含个人医疗支出),整个社会的福利将会处于较低的水平状态.本文在一个动态的框架下分析了发生这种现象的经济学原因,说明中央政府而非地方政府或私人应该对公共卫生的建设承担更大的责任,应由中央政府负责全国公共卫生体系的建设.     

Bailouts in a Federation

The recent move towards decentralization in countries such as Spain, Hungary, and South Africa and the difficulties that central governments have had in dealing with fiscal irresponsibility on the part of regional governments in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and India has made the study of transfer systems one of the most important areas of research in federalism today. A model of a federation is developed in which regional governments act as Nash competitors with each other but are first-movers in a Stackelberg game with the central government. The central government finds that it will maximize its expected votes by increasing transfers as regions borrow. This bail out of regional governments creates a regional soft budget constraint and results in two incentive effects, a common pool effect on tax payments and an opportunity cost effect. The soft budget constraint lowers the opportunity cost of borrowing for the region, but also increases the tax-cost since a portion of the borrowing must be paid for through increased taxes. The common property problem associated with tax payments implies that the increased tax cost must be less than the decrease in the opportunity cost (leading to excessive borrowing) unless the central government increases grants to other regions when it institutes a bailout. Somewhat surprisingly, in the latter case the additional increased taxes may increase costs enough to offset the lower opportunity cost resulting from the bailout, leading to efficient borrowing decisions as in the case of a hard budget constraint. The results are also useful for understanding the empirical estimation of soft budget constraints.     

印度的医疗卫生融资改革

印度公共医疗卫生支出水平较低,且在各邦之间分布不均。中央政府拨款对于各邦政府自身医疗卫生支出具有替代性。本文认为,要推进印度医疗卫生事业改革,必须扩大公共医疗卫生支出,提高政府支出效率,并重新设计转移支付制度。     

The stimulative effect of an unconditional block grant on the decentralized provision of care

Understanding the impact of central government grants on decentralized healthcare provision is of crucial importance for the design of grant systems, yet empirical evidence on the prevalence of flypaper effects in this domain is rare. We study the decentralization of home care in the Netherlands and exploit the gradual introduction of formula-based equalization to identify the effect of exogenous changes in an unconditional block grant on local expenditure and utilization. A one euro increase in central government grants raises local expenditure by twenty to fifty cents. Adjustments occur through the number of hours as well as through substitution between basic and more advanced types of assistance. These findings suggest that conditioning of grants is not required for the central government to retain a moderate degree of control over the decentralized provision of care.     

中国公共预算约束软化的体制成因：理论分析与实证检验

科学和民主的预算管理制度建立前,税制和分税制对政府预算约束有重要作用。中国税制和分税制缺乏内生约束机制,地方政府有空间和激励突破预算框架参与过度财政竞争,使公共预算约束软化。根据公共预算软约束的估计和面板 probit模型,1994年的税制和分税制改革整体硬化了全国预算收入约束,但导致东部的预算收入约束软化,且未改善预算支出约束。现行税制和分税制下,不规范的税收优惠政策、投资扩张冲动和专项转移支出依赖是导致公共预算约束软化的重要机制。     

中国地方政府财政支出效率及影响因素的实证研究

本文利用随机前沿分析方法对我国26个省级地方政府1978～2008年的财政支出效率进行了测算,并分析了影响地方政府财政支出效率的主要因素。研究结果表明:(1)中部地区的政府财政支出效率平均好于东部地区和西部地区;(2)1994年的分税制改革明显地提高了我国地方政府的财政支出效率,但之后地方政府的财政支出效率呈逐年下降趋势;(3)财政自主性、人均GDP、人均预算内财政收入对地方政府的财政支出效率有显著的负面影响,人口密度对地方政府的财政支出效率有显著的正面影响。     

转移支付与地方政府支出规模膨胀——基于中国预算制度的一个实证解释

自2000年以来,为了缩小地区间差距和促进基本公共服务均等化,我国的财政转移支付规模迅速扩大。本文利用1994-2015年省级年度数据发现,地方政府获得的一般性转移支付和专项转移支付每增加1元,年度一般预算财政支出将分别增加1.61元和2.12元,远远超过本地财政收入增加所产生的影响。这也意味着财政转移支付在我国产生了较大的“粘蝇纸效应”。在2010年提前下达固定数额转移支付指标改革后,一般性转移支付的“粘蝇纸效应”有所下降。使用分月数据的回归结果显示,“年底突击花钱”对专项转移支付“粘蝇纸效应”的贡献最大。本文的研究表明,转移支付引发的地方财政收入的不确定性、转移支付下拨时滞以及刚性的年度预算平衡制度是导致我国地方政府支出规模膨胀的重要原因。本文的研究结论意味着,中央应进一步规范转移支付制度、扩大提前下达转移支付指标的范围、加快转移支付的拨付进度、建立和完善跨年度预算平衡机制、积极防范转移支付的道德风险问题。地方各级政府应该加强预算执行管理,强化预算约束力。     

政府卫生支出的差异性评估:基于省际、区域和城乡的实证研究

本文聚焦政府卫生支出的差异性,运用基尼系数、泰勒指数等方法,定量研究省际、区域间和城乡间政府卫生支出的不均衡状况和程度,研究发现,经济发展水平决定了各地政府卫生支出的水平和居民医疗卫生服务的水平.医疗卫生资源的配置不当和制度缺陷是造成目前政府卫生支出不均衡的主要原因.在新医改的背景下,调整发展思路,完善相关制度有助于改善政府卫生支出不均衡的状况.但是,制度的惯性和体制的约束决定了不均衡状况的改变将是一项长期的工作.     

Public debt,bailouts, and common bonds

We look at a model where countries of different sizes provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants can give rise to optimal expenditure levels, but countries can induce bailouts. We study the characteristics of these bailouts in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and how these characteristics are affected by the introduction of common bonds. Partial substitution of common for sovereign bonds has two implications. First, it lowers the average and marginal borrowing costs of countries which may be eligible for bailouts. This effect leads to higher borrowing in these countries irrespective of their bailout expectations. Second, the lower borrowing costs mitigate the incentives of countries to induce a bailout and, therefore, constrain the parameter set for which a soft budget constraint equilibrium exists. As a result, the introduction of common bonds can also be in the interest of those countries that provide the bailouts.     

Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants Under Asymmetric Information

This paper develops a theoretical explanation why it may be optimal for higher-level governments to pay categorical block grants or closed-ended matching grants to local governments. We consider a federation with two types of local governments which differ in the cost of providing public goods. The federal government redistributes between jurisdictions, but cannot observe the type of a jurisdiction. In this asymmetric information setting, it is shown that the second-best optimum can be implemented with the help of categorical block grants and closed-ended matching grants, but not with unconditional block grants or open-ended matching grants. JEL Code: H77, D82     

跨期总额控制、预算执行规则弱化与辖区公共支出绩效

本文采用2008-2017年中国31个省级辖区的面板数据,在区分经常性与资本性地方公共支出的基础上,代表性地考察了社会治安、社会保障、环境保护、基础设施建设四类以结果导向为主的公共支出绩效指标体系,并以财政资金使用非遵从度与跨期财政支出总额控制指数两个核心指标分别描述短期预算执行规则弱化与跨期财政支出总额控制,进而运用广义矩估计(GMM)方法展开实证研究。结果显示:(1)短期预算执行规则弱化对财政经常性支出与资本性支出的绩效影响截然相反。(2)跨期财政支出总额控制的严格约束对促进经常性与资本性支出绩效的提高起到相似的推动作用。(3)跨期财政支出总额控制与短期预算执行规则弱化对财政经常性与资本性支出绩效存在不同的交互效应。     

Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants

This paper describes the tax and expenditure externalities that can occur in a federation, focusing on the (relatively neglected) vertical tax and expenditure externalities which arise when state governments' tax and expenditure decisions affect the federal government's budget constraint and vice versa. Formulas are derived for matching grants which correct the distortions in governments' decision-making caused by fiscal externalities. With vertical tax externalities, the matching revenue grant may result in transfers from the state government to the federal government. With vertical expenditure externalities, the federal government should provide a matching expenditure grant equal to the additional federal revenue that is generated from an additional dollar spent by a state on productivityenhancing activities such as education.     

地方竞争是否阻碍了地方政府债务绩效的提升？——理论框架及空间计量研究

本文从举债行为策略视角考察地方竞争对地方政府债务绩效的影响。 首先,从不同地区间举债行为策略互动的视角对地方竞争如何影响地方政府债务绩效进行理论诠释,其次,在采用Global超效率DEA方法测度地方政府债务绩效的基础上,突破空间独立性假设,运用空间杜宾模型对地方竞争影响地方政府债务绩效的效果及空间外溢性进行实证检验。研究发现,在地方效用最大化目标导向下,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都对债务增速产生了较为显著的正向影响和空间外溢效应,导致地方采取主动扩大债务规模的举债行为策略。与此同时,随着债务规模的持续增长,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都将对债务绩效产生“规模报酬递减”的负向影响和空间外溢效应,尤其是公共投资竞争的影响效果更加明显。进一步地,如果考虑到可能存在预算软约束现象,地方竞争还将与预算软约束行为相结合,对债务绩效产生了“使用效率递减”的负向影响。本文结论为通过债务合理使用来促进经济高质量发展,防范化解地方政府债务风险提供了政策启示。     

财政约束软化:表现、后果及其治理

财政约束主要表现在财政支出约束、财政收入约束和预算原则约束等几个方面.在财政约束软化的情况下,政府可能会产生这样几种倾向:公共物品的不合意供给、盈利化行为、过度负债.在处于经济转型期的中国,财政约束软化的现象大量存在,由此而引发了种种社会经济矛盾.若想解决矛盾,其根本出路就在于建立法治财政,实现财政约束的法治化.     

分税与地方财政支出结构

本文研究了税收分成对地方财政支出结构的影响。理论分析发现,在地方政府的财政支出结构竞争中,税收分成比例的提高将直接导致地方政府增加生产性公共支出,发挥生产性支出的产出外部性,提高产出水平和自身税收收入水平,实现福利最大化。一系列经验分析显著地验证了上述结论,即当地级市政府的税收分成率提高10%,该地区生产性支出占比将提高1.39%。本文的分析和结论有助于解释中国地方财政支出结构变动的原因,从而为政府间税收分配改革提供有效的政策建议。     

地区竞争、支出责任下移与地方政府债务扩张

地方政府债务过度扩张容易引发系统性经济风险。本文通过一个地方政府举债行为理论模型,分析了政府间共同事权的支出责任下移、竞争性地区的举债行为对地方政府债务规模的影响。在此基础上构建空间面板计量模型,利用279个地级市数据进行回归分析,结果表明:地方政府债务扩张是支出责任下移与标尺竞争机制共同驱动的结果;政府间支出责任下移造成的财政压力是地方政府被动负债的重要原因;地方政府间的标尺竞争使其在举债融资行为上表现为明显的策略模仿;各地区在债务扩张的主因上存在异质性,东部地区政府债务的增加主要是地区间竞争的结果。这意味着化解地方政府债务风险不仅应规范政府间财政支出责任划分,更重要的是完善地方政府的政绩考核体系和违规举债的问责机制。     

财政自主权、财政支出结构与全要素生产率--来自230个地级市的检验北大核心

本文尝试将财政自主权、财政支出结构与经济效率联系,在我国财政分权理论框架下揭示地方财政自主权与技术进步之间的关系。在理论上,提出了"地方财政自主权越高,技术进步水平也越高,但随着经济性财政支出边际效率递减以及社会性财政支出的长期不足,财政自主权对技术进步的影响正在减弱"的命题假说。在实证上,以1999-2013年230个城市数据,采用工具变量法检验了财政自主权对城市全要素生产率的影响。实证结果表明:(1)城市财政自主权对城市全要素生产率影响较弱,主要是对TFP组成中的规模效率(SE)和技术进步(TP)产生了较为明显的正影响;(2)财政自主权越高的城市,越倾向于增加经济性财政支出比重,而对于社会性支出则更有动机展开"逐底竞争";(3)财政自主权对全要素生产率构成中的规模效率(SE)和技术进步(TP)的影响呈现出减弱的趋势;(4)城市财政自主权的提高可以显著改进微观企业层面的全要素生产率水平。     

Prices and Protocols in Public Health Care

This article addresses the problem of how to determine the optimalallocation of public expenditure in the health sector. The firstpart poses the question: How should the set of services providedin the public health care system and the fees charged for thembe chosen to maximize the health status of the population witha fixed budget? First, the findings show that policy reformshould take into account the response of the private sector.Substituting for a reasonably well-functioning private sectoris not as valuable as providing services the private sectorcannot. Second, the assumptions needed to justify the cost-effectivenessof medical interventions as a criterion for setting prioritiesare so restrictive as to make this method usable in few, ifany, circumstances. Third, prices for any one service shouldbe set to balance the conflicting goals of encouraging its useand of conserving the budget for more effective services. The second part broadens the objective of policy to cover thestandard welfare economics concerns of utility and market failure,that latter being extensive in the health sector. It reexamineswelfare maximization rules to show that only the market failurecomponents of shadow prices are needed to calculate the welfaregains from public investments.     

税收优惠政策清理的价值取向、政策评估与顶层设计

地方税收优惠政策泛滥是中国财税领域长期存在且饱受争议的问题,积弊已久的税收优惠政策已经严重干扰到了市场资源配置与竞争公平性。2014年国家出台了系列政策,对地方税收优惠政策进行清理,采取“一刀切”的方式,要求坚决取缔一切不合法、不合规的地方优惠政策,忽视了地方政府利益现实诉求和区域经济发展差异,未全面调整处理好优惠政策背后的中央与地方利益关系,导致执行半年的清理行动搁置。因此,接下来的税收优惠清理行动需要兼顾地方利益诉求与央地关系调整,围绕建立税式支出预算监测报告机制,使税收优惠的作用及因此减少的税收收入显性化,并纳入预算管理程序;统筹结合税制改革,调整税收优惠清理路径;研究赋予地方一定税收优惠立法权的可行性,完善转移支付机制等顶层设计,以全面深化税收优惠体制改革。