Hayek’s 1945 Finlay Memorial Lecture: Tracing the origins and evolution of his ‘true’ individualism

Hayek’s original 1945 University College Dublin lecture outlined the origins and evolution of two different interpretations of ‘individualism’, comparing and contrasting what Hayek terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism notwithstanding the misleading contemporary interpretations and distorted perceptions of the assumptions underlining ‘true’ individualism. Hayek developed and extended the Scottish Enlightenment theory of spontaneous order originally formulated by Adam Ferguson’s maxim that social order was the result of unintended human action rather than the result of deliberate human design in order to explain the origin of complex social structures, which originated in a Cromwellian maxim. The origination and inspiration for the title of Hayek’s lecture is also considered, as is the influence of other thinkers; Mandeville, Tocqueville, Mill, Acton and Schatz that Hayek cites in his Dublin lecture.     

Praxeology,Experimental Economics and the Process of Choice: F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith on the Misesian Action Axiom

Mises’s action axiom postulates that human action is purposeful behavior. While this axiom is the building block for a powerful methodology, it is also incomplete, because it sets aside the underlying processes of decision-making. And while Mises does not dismiss the gap between intention and action, he is silent on it, relegating such a study to psychology. We contend that a study of underlying thought patterns and the process of choice – rather than contradicting praxeology and the action axiom – in fact complements the writings of Mises. To demonstrate this, we look at two authors: F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith. Hayek’s theory of the sensory order sheds light on the process of choice, and explains how decision-making is contextually embedded. Smith’s concepts of ecological rationality and neurological “hard-wiring” help us understand decision-making. We argue that cognitive foundations enrich our understanding of the process of choice, and thus of the Misesian action axiom.     

Hayek on corporate social responsibility

Hayek published a piece in 1960 that criticized corporate social responsibility as a norm for economic organizations, although he regarded corporate actions to be subject to essentially the same moral rules as individual action. This article identifies and reorganizes Hayek’s criticisms of social justice, the rule of law and morality, his comparison of the open society and the closed society, and his treatment of charity and altruism. The aim is to clarify the Hayekian perspective on CSR. These considerations explain why the ‘social’ perspective on responsibility is considered dangerous in a free society, how to separate legal compliance and morality from concerns about social justice.     

Intertemporal Choice,Saving and Investment,and Interest Rate: Contributions from a Neglected Hayekian Model

Hayek’s ‘Utility analysis and interest’ expounds a graphical model of intertemporal choice that has not received the attention it deserves. This model is important in that it can be used as a basic macroeconomic model and can therefore perform for the Austrian School the role that the Solow model plays for the standard neo-classical paradigm. This article provides an in-depth presentation of the Hayekian model, and then applies the model to key theoretical issues in macroeconomics; namely, the effects upon intertemporal equilibrium and upon the interest rate of a change in time preference, of the implementation of a technical development and of an increase in the supply of labor.     

Keynesian Dominance in Crisis Therapy

The 1930s’ debate about the short-run Keynesian response to crisis and Hayek's critique of its long-run consequences has significant contemporary parallels. This article examines, from a historical perspective, the Keynes–Hayek debate by considering the development of Keynesian economic theory, its ascension and application during financially sound times, the Hayekian critique, the monetary counter-revolution, and the Keynesian renaissance in the wake of the global financial crisis. It is shown that Keynesian fiscal measures prevail over the Hayekian approach in the midst of a crisis leading to rising inflation and public debt, depressed long-run growth and a new crisis.     

Hayekian evolution reconsidered: a reply to Hodgson

This is a reply to Geoffrey Hodgson's Comment on an earlierpaper by Caldwell (Hodgson on Hayek: a critique). Though certainareas of agreement are noted, differences in interpretationconcerning Hayek's views on the Malthus–Darwin relationship,on cultural evolution, on the extent to which Hayek may be characterisedas an ontogenist, and on methodological individualism remain.     

Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did he really change his mind?

The aim of this research is to establish whether, and if so in what way, Hayek changed his mind about the Great Depression of 1929.The work is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the ‘early’ Hayek of the 1930s. Hayek was the great rival of Keynes. Both explained the Great Depression, applying opposing business cycle theories. For Keynes, the crisis was caused by an excess of saving over investment; for Hayek, on the contrary, by an excess of investment over saving. In the early 1930s, Röpke attempted a synthesis, positing that a recession due to overinvestment can degenerate, as in 1929, into a depression caused by oversaving. Hayek examined and rejected Röpke's theory. In the second part, I present the ‘later’ Hayek of the 1970s. After years of silence and solitude, Hayek was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, precisely for the contribution he made in the 1930s to the theory of the business cycle. Hayek returned to his pursuit of the ghost of Keynes, debated with his friend and rival Friedman, re-examined Röpke's special case and, according to Haberler, changed his mind. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve the dilemma.     

Chocolate-box soldiers: A critique of ‘an economic theory of military tactics’

The purpose of this article is to challenge Geoffrey Brennan and Gordon Tullock's application of methodological individualism to battle in ‘An Economic Theory of Military Tactics’, this journal, 3 (1982, pp. 225–242). My thesis is that methodological individualism distorts the social nature of combat. To defend this thesis, first, I argue that the analysis of Brennan and Tullock assumes the very thing that is most in doubt in a battle, namely, that anyone is motivated to be killed or to kill. These motivations rest on the social ties of combatants to their comrades. Finally, a proper understanding of heroism illustrates the responsibility and sacrifice of battle neglected by Brennan and Tullock's analysis.     

The Freiburg school and the Hayekian challenge

At first sight and in terms of explicit references, the relationship between Hayek and the early Freiburg School seems to have been one of mutually benign neglect. It took several decades before the “Hayekian challenge” was fully understood in Freiburg; in a way one could even argue that the challenge arrived in Freiburg only with Hayek himself in 1962. This delay can mostly be explained by different foci of attention. Hayek’s evolutionary economics and his classical-liberal social philosophy centers around the problem of private, dispersed knowledge. The (early) Freiburg School’s economics and its ordo-liberal social philosophy centers around the problem of private, concentrated power. This difference of perspective has consequences and can partly be explained by the different intellectual sources the proponents were drawing upon, and the different political struggles they were engaged in.     

Monetary Calculation and the Unintended Extended Order: The Misesian Microfoundations of the Hayekian Great Society

In the last decade, a small group of Austrians has attempted to argue that there are crucial distinctions between the Misesian and Hayekian lines of influence, and that the former is the superior. This paper argues that the group has both misread Hayek and underplayed the similarities of Mises and Hayek. More specifically, it sees Mises's emphasis on monetary calculation and goal-driven human action as providing the microfoundations for Hayek's emphasis on spontaneous order and the epistemic properties of the price system. The paper also disputes the claim that Hayek held a “fully-informative,” neoclassical view of prices and explores the disequilibrium foundation for Hayek's understanding of the role of prices as knowledge surrogates. The relationship between monetary calculation and cooperation in anonymity is discussed in the final section.     

A brief note concerning Hayek’s non-standard conception of knowledge

Whatever F.A. Hayek meant by “knowledge” could not have been the justified true belief conception common in the Western intellectual tradition from at least the time of Plato onward. In this brief note, I aim to uncover and succinctly state Hayek’s unique definition of knowledge.     

Can a Dictator Turn a Constitution into a Can-opener? F.A. Hayek and the Alchemy of Transitional Dictatorship in Chile

Commenting on the Pinochet regime, Friedrich Hayek famously claimed in 1981 that he would prefer a ‘liberal’ dictator to ‘democratic government lacking liberalism.’ Hayek's defense of a transitional dictatorship in Chile was not an impromptu response. In late 1960, in a little known BBC radio broadcast, Hayek suggested that a dictatorial regime may be able to facilitate a transition to stable limited democracy. While Hayek's comments about Pinochet have generated much controversy, this paper neither provides a blanket condemnation of his views (he did not advocate dictatorship as a first-best ‘state of the world’) nor tries to excuse his failure to condemn the Pinochet junta's human rights abuses, but instead provides a critical assessment of Hayek's implicit model of transitional dictatorship.     

Methodological interactionism: Theory and application to the firm and to the building of trust

Recent insights from the “embodied cognition” perspective in cognitive science, supported by neural research, provide a basis for a “methodological interactionism” that transcends both the methodological individualism of economics and the methodological collectivism of (some) sociology and is consistent with insights from social psychology. It connects with a Mengerian exchange perspective and Hayekian view of dispersed knowledge from Austrian economics. It provides a basis for a new, unified social science that integrates elements from economics, sociology, social psychology, and cognitive science. This paper discusses the roots of this perspective, in theory of cognition and meaning, and illustrates its application in a summary of a social–cognitive theory of the firm and an analysis of processes by which trust is built up and broken down.     

A Critique of ‘Neoliberal Autonomy’: The Rhetoric of Ownership Society

The rhetoric of the Ownership Society defined by the Cato Institute has been integral to framing the motivation behind the Social Security reform introduced by George W. Bush. This motivational frame involves a fierce advocacy of what we will call ‘neoliberal autonomy’ in a Hayekian and Friedmanite sense. For Hayek and Friedman, the social adequacy component of Social Security is problematized in the name of self-reliance and individual choice, which rejects any authoritative standards as morally indefensible. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of the Ownership Society, though it glorifies the neoliberal notion of autonomy, does not explicitly question the moral basis of Social Security. Rather, by defining the terms of debate, it frames the meaning of Social Security along neoliberal lines in an attempt to make a supposedly detached economic case for private retirement accounts. In this ‘pro-privatization’ framework, the social adequacy component of the Social Security system fades away as individual equity, or actuarial fairness, comes to the fore as the chief theme. We suggest a ‘pro-social’ rhetoric that recognizes the pursuit of social standards as providing the element of autonomy.     

Ludwig von Mises on the epistemological foundation for social sciences reconstructed

This paper focuses on Ludwig von Mises’s attempt to establish an epistemological/methodological foundation for the social sciences (praxeology). I reconstruct Mises’s writings by disentangling the distinct realms of ontology and epistemology in his arguments. Although Mises’s line of reasoning is squarely based on the distinction between ontology and epistemology, he nonetheless tends to mix ontological and epistemological viewpoints in his argumentation, thereby clouding the issue involved. I believe this is one reason why the writings of Mises appear to be so difficult and engendered different as well as competing readings amongst Austrian economists. Furthermore, this analysis also allows us to assess whether or not Mises offers a sound theory of knowledge. I conclude that praxeology displays internal tensions and explain the reasons for these tensions.

The Unconscious Countermovement and the Conscious Polanyian Movement: A New Vocabulary for Contemporary Polanyian Scholarship

ABSTRACT

This article aims to overcome an impasse in current Polanyian scholarship by suggesting a new vocabulary to explain Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ and ‘countermovement’ concepts – the unconscious countermovement and the conscious Polanyian movement. It argues current literature often misinterprets these core concepts, which can lead to a misunderstanding of Polanyi’s general thesis. This paper uses the Carton (2018. On the Nature of the Countermovement: A Response to Stuart et al.’s ‘Climate Change and the Polanyian Countermovement: Carbon Markets or Degrowth?’. New Political Economy)-Stuart et al. (2019. Climate Change and the Polanyian Counter-movement: Carbon Markets or Degrowth? New Political Economy, 24 (1), 89–102) debate on the countermovement to exemplify some of the current misapplications of the countermovement as explicitly ‘anti-capitalist’ (Stuart et al. 2019. Climate Change and the Polanyian Counter-movement: Carbon Markets or Degrowth? New Political Economy, 24 (1), 89–102) movements. This paper argues that in fact all countermovements, as described in The Great Transformation, are necessarily non-ideological. I argue that dialectics and consciousness are fundamental to understanding the double movement and countermovement concepts and that highlighting the conscious/unconscious dynamic within Polanyi’s work helps avoid misreadings of key concepts and provides a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of Polanyi’s general theory.     

Sickonomics: Diagnoses and Remedies

In their recent analysis of the alleged decay in modern economics, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis claim to find its source and origin in the “marginal revolution” of the 1870s. They argue that this development led to “methodological individualism” and the detachment of economics from society and history. I contest their account of the marginal revolution and of the role of Alfred Marshall among others. They also fail to provide an adequate definition of methodological individualism. I suggest that neoclassical economics adopted a denuded concept of the social rather than removing these factors entirely. No such removal is possible in principle. It is also mistaken to depict neoclassical economics as the science of prices and the market. In truth, neoclassical economics fails to capture the true nature of markets. I consider some sketch an alternative explanation of the sickness of modern economics, which focuses on institutional developments since World War II.     

Steuart's position on economic progress

This paper attempts to understan James Steuart's position on economic progress in terms of the Hayekian version of the natural law tradition and the civic–humanist approach. It is argued that the latter paradigm offers a more relevant framework. Particular attention is to Steuar's preoccupation with ‘frugality’ in connection with his treatment of the stages of trade and his position is contrasted with that of Hume. Without denying Steuart's link with the Scottish Historical School, the mercantilist aspect of his outlook is emphasized.     

Lifestyle changes and the lifestyle selection process

This paper presents an analysis of barriers to the uptake of eco-friendly ways of life that is based upon an evolutionary complex systems approach to the workings of the mind and the choices that people make. It questions the effectiveness of price-based policies for promoting change and emphasizes the role of non-price factors and complementarities in choice. Inducing behaviour change may therefore require ensuring consumers’ lifestyle prerequisites are met. In the light of Hayek’s (1952) book The sensory order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), the paper examines the systematic processes by which cognitions are formed and minds evolve, and potential for inducing changes via policy measures that aim to derail stereotypical lines of thinking. Though the paper’s theoretical perspective differs from the behavioural economics that underpins the ‘Nudge’ approach to policy, the paper’s analysis is intended to be complementary with the ‘Nudge’ approach.     

Schumpeter’s Split Between “Pure” Economics and Institutional Economics: Why Methodological Individualism Was Not Fully Considered

While Joseph A. Schumpeter is classified as a pioneer of evolutionary economics in a wide sense and of entrepreneurship and innovation management in a narrower sense, Schumpeter is less known for his contributions in the area of scientific methodology and history of science. The paper deals with methodological premises in Schumpeter’s scientific positioning. In 1908, in his Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Schumpeter developed and pioneered his methodological individualism which is very much acknowledged. However, comparing these early positions with methodological writings in his History of Economic Analysis (1954) shows that he has not really shifted from methodological individualism to an institutional perspective that addresses the academic interplay and sees economic action rooted in historical predispositions, paths and social constraints.