Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Risk-Sensitive Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games

We present partial results showing that risk-sensitive oligopolists would spend less on advertising than would their risk-neutral counterparts. The model is an infinite-horizon stochastic game in which each firm's “goodwill” is a random function of both its own and its competitors' current and past advertising expenditures. Single-period firm profits have a market share attraction form. Each firm seeks to maximize its expected exponential utility of the sum of discounted profits. We analyze the impact that risk sensitivity and other parameters have on equilibrium advertising strategies by exploiting the special structure of the stochastic game model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C73.     

Measuring the systemic risk transfer from the United States to the South African financial sector

The sub-prime crisis in 2008 illustrated how systemic risk in the financial sector of one country could spread to the financial sectors in other countries, and subsequently result in a global financial crisis. This direct transfer of systemic risk was made possible by phenomena such as contagion and common shocks. The way in which these elements of interconnectedness can magnify seemingly small levels of systemic risk, and subsequently transfer between financial sectors illustrate the necessity for a more in-depth analysis. This measurement is done using three approaches. A dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model is used to investigate contagion. To analyse the volatility spillover effect from the US to SA, an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model is employed. Finally, a new contribution is made where a marginal expected shortfall (MES) model is used to set the FTSE/JSE All-Share Index (ALSI) as a hypothetical bank in the financial sector of the S&P 500. All approaches show weak evidence for a direct systemic risk transfer and therefore indicate that any systemic risk transfer is more likely to take an indirect form through changes in capital flows or interest rates.     

A DSGE model of banks and financial intermediation with default risk

This paper takes the view that a major contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008 was a failure to correctly assess and price the risk of default. In order to analyse default risk in the macroeconomy, a simple general equilibrium model with banks and financial intermediation is constructed in which default-risk can be priced. It is shown how the credit spread can be attributed largely to the risk of default and how excess loan creation may emerge due to different attitudes to risk by borrowers and lenders. The model can also be used to analyse systemic risk due to macroeconomic shocks which may be reduced by holding collateral.     

Fire sales by euro area banks and funds: What is their asset price impact?

The assets under management of investment funds have soared in recent years, triggering a debate on their possible implications for financial stability. We contribute to this debate assessing the asset price impact of fire sales in a novel partial equilibrium model of euro area funds and banks calibrated over the period between 2008 and 2017. An initial shock to yields causes funds to sell assets to address investor redemptions, while both banks and funds sell assets to keep their leverage constant. These fire sales generate second-round price effects. We find that the potential losses due to the price impact of fire sales have decreased over time for the system. The contribution of funds to this impact is lower than that of banks. However, funds’ relative contribution has risen due to their increased assets under management and banks’ lower leverage and rebalancing towards loans. Should this trend continue, funds will become an increasingly important source of systemic risk.     

The equity price channel in a New-Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions and banking

This paper studies the role of the equity price channel in business cycle fluctuations, and highlights the equity price channel as a different aspect to general equilibrium models with financial frictions and, as a result, emphasizes the systemic influence of financial markets on the real economy. We develop a canonical dynamic general equilibrium model with a tractable role for the equity market in banking, entrepreneur and household economic activities. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data over the sample period 1982Q01–2015Q01. We show that a dynamic general equilibrium model with an equity price channel well mimics the U.S. business cycle. The model reproduces the strong procyclicality of the equity price. The equity price channel significantly exacerbates business cycle fluctuations through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels. Our results support the increasing emphasis on common equity capital in Basel III regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial stability, but amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.     

Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.     

Measuring systemic risk using vine-copula

We present an intuitive model of systemic risk to analyse the complex interdependencies between different borrowers. We characterise systemic risk by the way that financial institutions are interconnected. Using their probability of default, we classify different international financial institutions into five rating groups. Then we use the state-of-the-art canonical (C-) and D-vine copulae to investigate the partial correlation structure between the rating groups. Amongst many interesting findings, we discover that the second tier financial institutions pay a larger contribution to the systemic risk than the top tier borrowers. Further, we discuss an application of our methodology for pricing credit derivative swaps.     

What can Islamic financing tell us about macro-prudential policies?

Macro-prudential policies are theoretically effective at mitigating a debt deflation crisis by forcing individuals to internalize their impact on aggregate prices reducing systemic risk caused by pecuniary externalities. To better understand the potential effectiveness of a macro-prudential time varying tax/subsidy on debt/dividends, we empirically estimate the impact of an Islamic financing presence on financial crises. Adherence to Islamic financing principles for a nontrivial portion of a country’s population has similar impacts to a macro-prudential policy in that these limited asset holders are likely to hold less debt or use debt-like instruments rather than conventional debt, driving down their marginal rate of substitution and the price of equity in equilibrium. To empirically estimate the effects of this policy, we interact an Islamic financing variable with debt in an otherwise standard model of financial crises. The results show that this macro-prudential-like policy decreases the likelihood of a banking crisis by 50%. The contribution of the article is twofold. First, we show that an Islamic finance presence encourages precautionary savings like a macro-prudential policy. Second, using an Islamic finance presence to capture macro-prudential potential effects, we find empirically that the likelihood of banking crises are cut roughly by half when such policies are in effect.     

Feedback effects between credit ratings and financial markets

Credit rating agencies often make sharp adjustments in their pronouncements during times of stress in financial markets. These adjustments typically happen with a delay relative to shocks in market prices. Since prices convey information about what market participants are doing and thinking, it is likely that rating agencies take into account market prices when issuing their pronouncements.In order to understand the relationship between credit ratings and financial prices, we develop a model of debt roll-over in which rating agencies incorporate information publicly available in financial markets. We find that (1) rating agencies respond to market prices, i.e. nonfundamental price volatility can shift financing conditions from a low risk spread and high credit rating equilibrium to an equilibrium with high spread and low rating, and (2) rating agencies can anchor expectations about the equilibrium in financial markets, thus serving as an antidote to nonfundamental price volatility.     

Social Welfare Analysis in a Financial Economy with Risk Regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of many countries in the world have adopted VaR‐based risk regulation to control market risk of financial institutions. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financial institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financial institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and that some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financial fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated economy than in an unregulated one.     

The Home Bias in Equities and Distribution Costs

We show that incorporating distribution costs into a general equilibrium model of international portfolio choice helps to explain the home bias in international equity investment. Our model is able to replicate observed investment positions for a wide range of parameter values, even if agents have an incentive to hedge labor income risk by purchasing foreign equity. This is because the existence of a retail sector affects both the correlation of domestic returns with the domestic price level and the correlation between financial and non‐financial income.     

Catastrophe theory and the financial crisis

This paper develops and estimates catastrophe‐augmented models of the financial crisis. We employ catastrophe theory to explain discontinuous jumps in state variables of dynamic systems. We estimate an augmented bank failure model showing that the buildup of risk and an increase in the Federal Funds rate combined with low reserves (negative insurance effect) have been the main drivers of the financial crisis. Therefore, macroprudential policy and rating agencies play a key role in preventing the buildup of (systemic) risk and preventing the economy from entering a bifurcation area.     

Equilibrium risk shifting and interest rate in an opaque financial system

We analyse the risk-taking behaviour of heterogenous intermediaries that are protected by limited liability and choose both their amount of leverage and the risk exposure of their portfolio. Due to the opacity of the financial sector, outside providers of funds cannot distinguish “prudent” intermediaries from those “imprudent” ones that voluntarily hold high-risk portfolios and expose themselves to the risk of bankrupcy. We show how the number of imprudent intermediaries is determined in equilibrium jointly with the interest rate, and how both ultimately depend on the cross-sectional distribution of intermediaries' capital. One implication of our analysis is that an exogenous increase in the supply of funds to the intermediary sector lowers interest rates and raises the number of imprudent intermediaries. Another one is that easy financing may lead an increasing number of intermediaries to gamble for resurection following a bad shock to the sector's capital, again raising economywide systemic risk.     

Estimating the Marginal Contribution to Systemic Risk by A CoVaR‐model Based on Copula Functions and Extreme Value Theory

In this paper, we quantify the contribution to systemic risk of a single financial institution by utilizing a analytical framework based on the principles of Extreme Value Theory (EVT) for modelling the marginal distributions and on the properties of copula functions for describing the dependence structure between the financial system and the single financial institution. Among the several systemic risk measures proposed nowadays by academics and estimated by public data, we choose to adopt as systemic risk metric the Conditional Value‐at‐Risk (CoVaR). We select a co‐risk measure like the CoVaR because of its macro‐dimension that allows us to integrate the dependence structure of the single financial institution and of the whole financial system in the systemic risk measurement. While the copula functions have been utilized in some pioneer studies on this area, the EVT principles have not yet been implemented in such a context of systemic risk contribution measurement.     

International trade,foreign direct investments,and firms’ systemic risk : Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper measures the contribution of firms in the financial and non-financial sectors to systemic risk. We quantify systemic risk as possible risk spillovers from individual firms to the economy by taking into account time-varying linkages between the firm and the economy. Based on a novel dataset that combines data on international trade and foreign direct investments with daily stock data for 67 Dutch listed companies from 2006–2015, our results indicate that high systemic risk contributions are not only present in the financial sector, but also occur in other sectors of the economy. We find that firms within the financial sector are more capable than non-financial firms of reverting to their pre-financial crisis level of systemic risk contribution. Having examined the potential role globalization fulfills in determining systemic risk, we find two main opposing effects. First, firms in internationally trade-intensive sectors contribute less to systemic risk than firms in sectors with low trade intensity. Second, systemic risk rises when firms are engaged in foreign direct investment activity, suggesting that international networks and global supply chains contribute to systemic risk propagation. Our empirical results imply that macro-prudential policy aimed at monitoring systemic risk should be extended to non-financial sectors and should take into consideration globalization measures, such as foreign direct investments and global supply chains.     

Equilibrium real interest rates and the financial cycle: Empirical evidence for Euro area member countries

We estimate the equilibrium real interest rate for nine Euro area member countries and the Euro area as a whole using quarterly data from 1995 to 2015. We expand the standard model of estimating real equilibrium interest rates to incorporate the financial cycle for the private sector. We show that adding the financial cycle indeed alters the equilibrium real interest rate estimates and, in line with previous studies, that there is a fall in the equilibrium real interest rate over time. Our results indicate that in most member countries the real rate is lower than its equilibrium level. Hence, they should not worry about secular stagnation now. This is because secular stagnation is likely to occur when real interest rates are higher than their equilibrium levels. This result can serve as a starting point for further research in this field, e.g. by adding public sector financial cycles or disentangling the roles of households, corporations and the government.     

Dynamic sentiment asset pricing model

Conventional wisdom suggests that the equilibrium stock price is not affected by investor sentiment, and the equilibrium price at an early time is higher than the one at a later time. In contrast to this wisdom, we present a dynamic asset pricing model with investor sentiment and we find that investor sentiment has a significant impact on the equilibrium stock price. The equilibrium stock price, which is affected by pessimistic sentiment at time 0, may be lower than the one at time 1. Moreover, consistent with the reality stock market, our model shows that time varying sentiments can lead to various price changes. Finally, the model could offer a partial explanation for the financial anomaly of high volatility.     

Monetary policy and systemic risk-taking in the euro area banking sector

Available empirical evidence on the significance of the (micro) risk-taking channel of monetary policy is not enough to indicate a threat to financial stability. Evidence of risk-taking with systemic risk implications is necessary. Statistical measures that capture systemic risk in all its forms within a structural factor-augmented vector autoregressive model suggest that conventional and unconventional monetary policies have resulted in systemic risk-taking in the euro area banking sector. Systemic risk has taken the form of an increase in the banking sector’s vulnerability via contagion and interconnectedness. Banks’ balance sheets, however, do not account for the full transmission from (micro) risk taking to systemic risk-taking. The main policy implication is that a persistently accommodative monetary policy may drive a monetary authority with a price stability mandate to consider a possible trade-off with financial stability. At a minimum, coordination between monetary and macro-prudential policies requires serious consideration.     

Assessing downside and upside risk spillovers across conventional and socially responsible stock markets

Since the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, socially responsible (SR) investments have become an alternative form of conventional finance, giving rise to further systemic risk between conventional and SR stock markets. In this paper, we assess this risk transmission using Value at Risk (VaR) modeling for the US, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, over the period covering January 2004–December 2016. We find that socially responsible stock markets exhibit less risk than do conventional markets in terms of the risk hedging properties induced by the SR screening. Second, contributions to systemic risk vary across market phases and return distribution levels, with a larger contribution and spillover effect during the recent global financial crisis. For example, at the downside of the distribution (CoVaR at 5%), the conventional European index shows the highest contribution to the world market’s systemic risk, while the US stock market shows the highest contribution at the upside of the distribution (CoVaR at 95%). This finding is justified by the difference in the risk aversion of investors that varies with the market state as well as the disparities in the development of SR markets.