Antitrust Enforcement and Nonenforcement as a Barrier to Imports – with Illustrations from the Japanese Film Dispute

The role of antitrust in opening foreign markets to imports is a strong yet often unpredictable undercurrent in international trade disputes. The U.S. government may seek to protect its exporters who are denied access to a foreign market either by enforcing U.S. antitrust laws or by using trade law remedies against the importing country for not enforcing its antitrust laws. Both actions raise issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction and comity.The primary goals of antitrust law and trade law are sometimes complementary but often diverge. Antitrust is primarily intended to benefit consumer welfare, while the purpose of trade law is to gain access to foreign markets for the benefit of domestic enterprises and their workforces. Consequently foreign market access pursued under antitrust law can raise novel issues when there is no apparent injury to domestic consumer welfare suffers from too little competition, whereas trade law pursue market access strictly as principles of fairness that have no necessary relationship with consumer welfare anywhere.This paper examines two aspects of antitrust law – (1) non-enforcement by the importing country, and (2) enforcement of U.S. law to compel access to the foreign market – and discusses the current dispute between Eastman Kodak Co. and Fujji Photo Film Co. as an illustration of the issues introduced above.     

基于零售商垄断势力的纵向约束--一个经济分析框架

基于零售商垄断势力的纵向约束成为近年来西方国家反垄断司法实践所关注的焦点之一,然而现有的文献对于零售商拥有更大垄断势力的情形较少涉及.本文通过构建基于零售商垄断势力的纵向约束的经济分析框架,试图对传统产业组织理论主要针对生产商垄断势力的研究框架进行一定的补充,并对我国反垄断法的制定提出一些建议.     

算法合谋的反垄断规制及工具创新研究

在数字经济领域,数字商务企业采用算法定价会明显提高合谋的可能性和可实施性,具有较大的价格合谋风险,因而成为反垄断法关注的重点。学理上,尚待明确的问题有:算法定价促进合谋的内在机理和类型化机制;如何创新反垄断执法体制以有效规制自主学习算法;在反垄断事后执法无效情况下,是否需要以及如何实行事前规制等。研究表明:算法合谋的反垄断规制宜坚持分类治理原则,采取事后反垄断禁止为主并辅之以事前规制的政策组合,反垄断政策工具创新应主要针对自主学习算法合谋。算法合谋反垄断规制政策需重新界定构成非法合谋的"协议"要件,明确当事企业的主体责任,重在采取以"软执法"为主的反垄断执法体制。事前规制政策应坚持"基于设计来遵守法律"的原则,强化算法审查机制和审查能力建设,并将提升算法透明度和可问责性作为重点。     

WHAT PRICE THEORY CAN—AND CANNOT—DO FOR ANTITRUST

This paper examines the methodology and policy recommendations of Judge Robert Bork's writing on antitrust. It accepts as valid his premise that conventional price theory is the only appropriate organon for evaluating the welfare impact of an antitrust rule. However, it holds that in the analysis of cartels and mergers, Bork does not realize the full implications of his approach.
Of the many prohibitions which antitrust law now contains, Bork wants to retain only two-the prohibition of cartels and of large horizontal mergers. Even these two, however, cannot be maintained on pure price theory grounds. According to price theory, if price or merger agreements are inefficient, and i f entry and exit are free, then these agreements-like other inefficient practices-will be eroded by entry. Consistently applied, then, price the0 y provides no support for antitrust laws.
A lack of support on price theory grounds does not imply that antitrust laws are unjustified. Most practices prohibited by anti-trust law have closesubstitutes. Consequently, the law probably inflicts no great harm on economic efjiciency. Moreover, repeal of these laws could result in state-owned monopolies or economic planning, both of which would be far worse for economic efficiency.     

THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST GUIDELINES ON BUSINESS

The dual antitrust goals of predictable law enforcement and accurate decisions in individual cases have been in conflict for decades. There are three dimensions to this conflict. First, there may be insufficient information on how the courts and enforcement agencies interpret the antitrust statutes. Second, the enforcement agencies may not use consistent standards to evaluate actual and potential antitrust cases. Third, antitrust guidelines may differ significantly from case law.
Unfortunately, attempts to improve one dimension of antitrust policy generally create conflicts elsewhere. Thus, the search for better antitrust decision making in individual cases has made antitrust counseling more complex and expensive. Over time, standards have evolved at different rates at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the courts, and inconsistencies among these three decision-making bodies have further complicated the task of antitrust counseling. In this environment, improved and updated information on antitrust standards can potentially be very valuable to the business community.     

反垄断机构自利与反垄断过度——基于预算最大化模型分析

与一般文献不同,本文聚焦反垄断的负面影响.受自利动机的驱使,反垄断机构存在预算最大化的倾向,这会造成反垄断过度乃至掠夺企业的后果.因此,我国应该通过各种措施控制反垄断,如明确反垄断利益、明确反垄断权限、公开反垄断信息、加强反垄断监管等,以使反垄断机构尽责地为公共服务.     

反垄断法总则与双边市场理论的铆合适用--以互联网医药行业为例

互联网医药行业中,私人经济与公共利益交叉程度高,同时涉及经济垄断和行政垄断领域,部分适用通过市场机制配置资源的原则。其涉及市场机制的部分,可能会触动反垄断调查。医药实体行为或业务的性质,是界定该行为或业务是否适用市场机制的标准,同时也是判断《反垄断法》适用性的标准。互联网平台经济具有双边市场的特性,会在相关市场的界定和竞争分析的路径方面与传统医药行业案件不同。另一方面,并非所有医药行业与互联网平台的结合都适用双边市场理论,决定双边市场理论适用性的标准是医药实体与互联网平台之间的相互关系。在处理互联网医药行业垄断案件时,需正确区分两个关系:市场机制与非市场机制的关系、医药实体与互联网平台的关系。     

反垄断调查的一个鉴别：一致性定价行为背后的差异与合谋

如何区分成本上涨时企业同时涨价的行为究竟是价格合谋还是寡头竞争的企业正常的价格调整行为？这是反垄断执法机构面临的一个难题。本文通过数理模型证明了无论企业进行伯川德竞争还是古诺竞争，寡头竞争的企业的定价随着成本的变化存在一个连续调整路径，而组成卡特尔的企业的定价则会随着成本的变化出现一个不连续的跳跃。因此反垄断执法机构在观察到企业的一致性定价行为之后，如果能从以往的价格监测纪录中发现这些企业在成本下跌时，价格存在着更大幅度的下调，则可以据此怀疑这些企业存在着价格合谋，应开展更深入的调查来搜集这些企业违反《反垄断法》的全面证据。     

Legal tradition and antitrust effectiveness

This article uses cross-country data to empirically investigate through which channel legal origin can influence antitrust effectiveness. The evidence shows that the adaptability channel (legal flexibility) is more important for explaining antitrust effectiveness than the political channel (authority independence). The evidence also suggests that countries in which a judicial decision is a source of law will provide more legal flexibility and will adapt more easily to changing economic circumstances. They will therefore also have better enforcement of antitrust rules. On the other hand, a legal tradition that takes no formal notice of legal precedent will make the competition environment much less predictable. To the extent that these findings are true, one would expect competition agencies in Common law countries to perform better than those in Civil law countries.     

法律规则的经济学建构——法律经济学的研究成果综述

法律经济学是将经济学的理论和方法应用于法律制度分析的学科。经过近40年的发展,通过对财产法、合同法、侵权法、刑法、反垄断法和诉讼法的经济分析,法律经济学研究取得了丰硕成果,初步形成了财产法、合同法、侵权法、犯罪和惩罚、反垄断法和司法程序的经济理论。     

JAPANESE ANTITRUST: RECONCILING THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Japanese antitrust law exempts a variety of vertical and horizontal restraints that remain closely regulated in the United States. Despite these dissimilar antitrust environments, however, market concentration, firms' exercise of market power, and deadweight loss from monopoly are highly similar in the two countries. The hypothesis that antitrust alters the relative mix of price to non-price competition rather than the absolute level that competition assumes might explain this empirical puzzle. Thus, this paper studies Japanese antitrust exemptions for resale price maintenance and export cartel associations to illustrate how adopting vertical and horizontal restraints has allowed Japanese firms to substitute towards forms of non-price competition better tailored to industry characteristics.     

劳动法的执法困境与反思—以煤矿安全基准法为视角

我国劳动法的主要功能在于通过保障弱者的基本生存利益以维护社会公正，通过国家强制性立法保障劳工的人身健康与安全。尽管在立法层面我国劳动安全基准法已经比较完善，然而执法却面临巨大的困境。以煤矿安全基准法的立法体系与执法为视角，我们可以发现政府、资方与劳动者各自的法律处境与行为动因复杂，政府职能的改进是提高劳动法执法效力的重要前提。短期来看，可以通过加强劳动监察的独立性、平衡用人单位与劳动者的力量等途径改善劳动法的执法状况。     

关于徐州市信访管理与化解机制创新的调研报告

信访工作一边关系着党和政府的形象,一边关系着群众的切身利益,徐州市的信访管理和化解机制创新,体现了信访工作内在的科学性,把握了信访工作的规律性,托起了徐州信访工作的坚实基础,我们必须不断探索信访管理和化解的新机制,坚持不懈地抓好各项信访工作的落实,采取更加扎实的措施,为推进法治徐州建设、促进全市社会和谐稳定作出新的贡献。     

我国个人住房按揭贷款制度存在的问题及对策

个人住房按揭贷款业务的开展,在改善我国居民居住条件的同时,也存在一些问题,对此学术界有不少文章进行了分析,但这些文章几乎都是从保护银行的角度出发,对侵犯银行利益的诸如骗贷等行为进行研究,而从保护借款人利益的角度,无论学术界还是实务界都鲜有人进行分析,通过实地调查研究,发现银行在与借款人签订《抵押借款合同》前后,利用垄断地位与格式条款等侵害借款人正当权益。本文从法律与金融两个角度,对我国个人住房按揭贷款制度存在的问题,主要有对按揭贷款的捆绑销售问题,格式合同中剥夺借款人对抵押物的合理使用权、加重借款人的责任与义务、剥夺借款人对争议解决方式的选择权、银行单方面解除合同的随意性过大、以及在贷款类别上设置的缺陷,还款方式上的缺陷,提前还贷上存在法律缺陷等,进行较为深入地剖析,最后得出结论与对策建议：一方面需要修订现行相关法规,加强法律监管;另一方面借款人也需要提高自身的知识水平。     

反垄断法私人实施的法经济学分析

反垄断法的实施分为公权实施和私人实施两种,美国反垄断法私人实施的情况比较普遍,我国传统上看重的是公权力的实施作用,而忽略私人力量对反垄断法的实施.反垄断法私人实施在经济学上要满足几个条件,如信息不对称、激励机制、成本/效益最大化.通过对美国反垄断法私人实施条件的分析,指出了我国目前反垄断法私人实施的不足和有待改进的地方,如起诉主体、激励机制的设计以及私权与公权力之间的协助关系.     

Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies*

Bertrand supergames with non‐binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero‐cost, low‐cost and high‐cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.     

中国环境立法的困境与出路

在环境法律实践的过程中,通过与污染受害者沟通和交流,发现许多问题都是根源于环境立法存在的问题。也就是,环境立法中的单向的立法理念,只注重至上而下的国家力量,这会导致法律与最初目的的偏离,从保护环境利益走向保护部门利益。因此,要寻求新的出路——发展双向融合的立法理念,即注重至上而下的政府主导与至下而上的公众参与有机结合,通过公众有效参与环境立法,发现环境法律实践中的问题,及时反馈到立法领域。从而在有效的互动中完善环境法治。     

Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect

We analyze the impact of leniency programs on the behavior of firms participating in illegal cartel agreements in a two-stage repeated game model. Our approach takes into account asymmetric punishment effect and allows to discuss the design of leniency programs in the setting with asymmetries. The main contribution of the paper is that we consider heterogeneous firms. This heterogeneity results in additional costs in case of disclosure of the cartel, which are caused by asymmetric punishments. Next, following current antitrust rules, we analyze effects of the strictness of leniency programs, which reflects the likelihood of getting a complete exemption from fine even in case many firms self-report simultaneously. Our main conclusion is that leniency programs work better for small companies, since a lower rate of law enforcement is needed in order to induce self-reporting by smaller firms, while big firms are less likely to start a cartel in the first place given the possibility of self-reporting in future. Finally, we analyze optimal enforcement strategies of the antitrust authority and conclude that the authority with limited resources should implement more generous leniency rules the more cartelized the economy is.     

上市公司治理与中小投资者利益保护

保护中小投资者利益是当前证券市场中亟待解决的关键问题之一。本文从理论和现状两个方面分析了上市公司治理与中小投资者利益保护的关系,并在此基础上,从股权结构、董事会治理、信息披露和法制建设四个方面提出了完善公司治理结构和保护中小投资者利益的若干对策。     

COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION*

This paper investigates the impact of antitrust policy on the strategic choice of product specification when firms can collude with respect to prices, cannot collude with respect to location and may have their collusion ended if it is detected by the antitrust authority. Depending on the aggressiveness of the antitrust authority, different location configurations may emerge in equilibrium. Extremely aggressive and extremely lax policies lead to the least efficient outcomes while the configuration maximizing social welfare is obtained by an intermediate policy.