Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

中国环境税制现状、问题及对策研究

环境污染已经成为当今世界面临的共同问题,制约着经济的发展,威胁着人类的生存。实施环境税则是解决这一问题的有效措施之一。本文介绍了环境税的理论基础,分析了中国环境税制度现状及存在的问题,认为中国现行有关环境保护的税费政策,由于存在缺少以保护环境为目的的专门税种、现有涉及环保的税种中有关环保的规定不健全、考虑环境保护因素的税收优惠单一等问题,其力度和系统性不足以形成对环境的保护。并对中国环境税制度建设对策进行了探讨,提出了在将部分排污费改为环境污染税,征水污染税、二氧化硫税和垃圾税,使其成为中国环境税的主体税种的基础上,调整现行资源税和消费税,构建中国环境税收体系的对策。     

建立环境税收制度 走可持续发展之路

随着可持续发展理论得到国际社会日益广泛的认同,环境保护问题也备受各国政府的重视。我国长期以来的经济高速增长是通过以大量消耗资源、严重污染环境为特征的粗放型经济发展模式来实现的,由此也造成一系列严重的环境问题。我国应在进一步完善现行环境保护税收措施的基础上,尽快研究开征环境保护税,使其作为环境税收制度的主体税种,构建起一套科学、完整的环境税收制度体系,使税收在环境保护方面发挥更重要的作用。     

欧盟经验对构建中国环保税体系的借鉴意义

经济手段尤其是财税手段成为各国政府解决环境问题的重要工具,特别是在欧盟国家,环境税的应用最广,实施后的效果最好。在审视中国目前有关环境保护税费的基础上,参考借鉴欧盟的经验,构建中国的环保税体系,具有长远的意义。     

环境偏好和环境税视角下企业技术决策博弈分析

构建双寡头垄断市场下企业技术决策的博弈模型,并将消费者环境偏好和环境税引入模型。首先分析消费者的环境偏好对市场需求的影响;然后运用逆向归纳法探讨企业在环境税约束下的两阶段博弈;最后分析消费者环境偏好和环境税对企业技术决策的综合影响。研究表明:消费者的环境偏好降低了双寡头垄断企业的市场需求,激发了企业在没有环境税下采纳绿色技术的动机;当征收环境税时,企业采纳绿色技术的效益与环境税率的关系曲线呈倒U型,消费者的环境偏好与环境税引发的效益区间正比变动。     

非理性就医对医保费用管理的挑战及应对策略

目的分析参保患者非理性就医现象,积极探索应对策略,为控制不合理增长的医疗费用提供参考。方法结合我院医保工作中对医保基金正确合理使用的管理及参保患者的就医情况,分析近年来参保患者非理性就医的现象、原因及结果,探索应对策略,总结规范化管理的措施。结果小病大治、大病贵治、无病保养等是非理性就医的主要表现,严重影响医保费用的管理,助推了过度医疗和医疗费用的不合理增长。结论应落实国家医药卫生体制改革,完善配套的医疗保险政策,深化医院医保费用管理,科学控制基本医疗付费总额,控制医疗费用不合理增长,从而保障医保基金的安全使用。     

环保产业财税扶持的国际比较

通过对比分析国内外对环保产业的财税扶持政策现状,指出我国环保产业在财税扶持方面存在着财政支出不足、财政补贴手段单一、税制不健全等弊端;提出综合运用财政工具、配置税收政策等对策,为环保产业架构一个有利于发展的空间,使我国环保产业跨越式发展,以吻合国民经济发展的需求。     

策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析

文章把战略性贸易政策模型扩展到环境领域,策略性环境政策认为政府有动机通过降低环境标准补贴出口企业,以达到利润转移的目的.文章分析了策略性环境政策中比较受忽视的一部分--环境技术补贴,本国政府结合使用环境税和减排补贴,我们验证了政府使用策略性环境政策的动机,得到了最优的污染排放税率,认为虽然环境政策仍旧不能消除生产带来的环境损害,但是环境技术补贴提高了本国的环境标准,企业会更少地遇到绿色壁垒报复.     

供需视角下环境问题实质的探讨

从供需视角探讨了环境问题的实质,认为环境问题实质上是对环境产品供给日趋减少,需求日趋增加,供给急速地逼近需求、小于需求甚或供给为零的揭示。基于这一把握提出了政策建议。     

北方草地生态建设中的环境税和生态补偿

通过构建多目标权重评价体系,结合内蒙古草原生态系统定位站放牧试验样地的数据,文章研究指出锡林郭勒盟定位站附近的适宜放牧率为2.67羊/ha,低于单目标条件下的每公顷绵羊4羊/ha。同时,在经济学和生态系统系统服务理论的基础上,依据谢高地等人(2001年)的研究,提出了环境税和生态补偿的标准,分别是每公顷15元和90元。     

Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.     

增值税的国际比较与思考

本文通过我国和国外增值税征收状况的比较分析, 针对我国现行增值税存在的问题和不足, 提出在小规模纳税人、征税范围、增值税类型的选择、税款抵扣与发票管理四个方面,可以借鉴国外成功经验和先进办法, 进一步对我国现行增值税税制加以改进和完善： 我国对小规模纳税人设定的税率偏高, 税率应在３ ％ —４ ％ 为宜; 为了使我国的增值税形成完整的课征体系, 应把那些与货物交易密切相连的服务业纳入征税, 并最终将农业纳入增值税的征税范围;应尽快实行消费型增值税; 对发票的管理可采用“以票管税、帐票结合”的方法, 强化责任制,建立省级发票稽核中心, 地、市建立分中心, 实现本地区范围内的稽核工作。     

基于CGE模型的环境税优惠政策的环保效应分析

通过建立一个CGE模型,并对该模型在存在和不存在环境税优惠政策两种场景下的社会产出、产品供应和社会福利状况进行模拟分析,考察环境税优惠政策的环保效应。结果表明,环境税的税收减免在长期内对社会福利的影响不大,但是,它却会对环境税的环境保护效果产生较大的负面影响。在使用税收减免工具时,政府要从社会福利和环境保护、能源使用等方面加以考虑,避免社会总福利的净损失。     

个人所得税征管方式的有效选择——强调代扣代缴环节在个税征管中的地位

近年来,我国个人所得税的征管问题成为人们关注的焦点,加强征管能力的建议颇多,建议从代扣代缴环节入手,分析扣缴义务人在个人所得税征管中的重要地位,及扣缴义务人与纳税人的经济关系,并提出以代扣代缴环节为突破口,实行"延期纳税法"来提高个人所得税征管水平.     

我国开征环境税的可行性分析

环境税可解决政府补贴的弊端,鼓励技术创新,避免污染权交易和直接管制手段所存在的问题,具有公平、高效、简单易行、强制性和自我规范性等优点.排污费等相关税收的征收实践、有关的政策和丰富的国际经验,为我国开征环境税提供了可靠的依据和参考.我国已具备开征环境税的有利条件,应尽快建立与完善环境税法体系,用税收等强制性方法实现循环经济和可持续发展.     

Competitiveness and Exemptions From Environmental Taxes in Europe

A number of European countries have introduced a variety of environmental taxes. A common characteristic of their implementation is the inclusion of exemptions and tax relief, in particular for (some sectors of) manufacturing industry. This paper analyses the pattern and motivation of exemptions as they have developed in Western European countries, making clear the difference between the nominal and effective tax rates once the exemptions have been taken into account. The principal motivation for exemptions relates to concern about competitiveness. While particular environmentally-intensive sectors may have some grounds for concern, even these might be able to achieve cost-effective environmental improvements, such that their competitive position is not over-disadvantaged, while for an economy structured like the UK's, an environmental tax plus rebate scheme, sometimes called an ecological tax reform, would be likely to yield benefits in terms of competitiveness. The exemptions usually run counter to the environmental economic logic of using environmental taxes to internalise social costs and give economic signals that are based on the full costs of production, and they are likely to increase the costs of achieving a given level of emission reduction. With little justification for them also on the grounds of competitiveness, it would therefore be undesirable on both economic and environmental grounds for them to remain a feature of the implementation of environmental taxes in the future.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.     

生态环境、环境税与可持续经济增长

如何实现经济和生态环境的和谐发展,已经成为全球关注的焦点。文章把生态环境纳入生产函数和效用函数,构建一个考虑环境税的内生增长模型,运用最优控制方法求解模型的最优均衡解。并在此基础上,进一步探讨了生态环境与可持续经济增长的关系以及环境税对最优增长路径的影响。发现环境税的开征降低了最优增长路径上的经济增长率,却提高了人们的最优消费水平。而人们环境意识的提高可以帮助减小因环境税给经济增长率带来的冲击。     

Consequences of Environmental Tax Reform for Unemployment and Welfare

We investigate the welfare effects of environmental tax reform, i.e. raising environmental taxes and using the proceeds to reduce distortionary taxes on labour. The framework of analysis is a small open economy with involuntary unemployment due to a rigid consumer wage. Environmental tax reform boosts not only environmental quality but also employment if substitution between labour and resources is easy, the production share of the fixed factor is large, and the initial tax rates on resources and profits are small. If the initial tax system is sub-optimal with a negligible tax on resources, profits rise as well.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.