The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy

A pressure group model where environmental and industry lobby groups offer political support in return for favorable pollution tax policies is used to explain and predict the equilibrium pollution tax in sectors protected by tariffs. The political economy effects of trade liberalization are investigated. The pollution tax is shown to decrease if the lobbying effort by the environmental lobby decreases more rapidly than by the industry lobby ceteris paribus. The level of political conflict falls with trade liberalization. Pollution may increase because of a reduction of the pollution tax, and tax revenues may fall simultaneously as pollution increases.     

Budget Structure and Pollution Control： A Cross-country Analysis and Implications for China

In the published literature, the differences in environmental performance across countries are typically explained using the Environmental Kuznets Curve. The Environmental Kuznets Curve states that pollution initially increases with economic growth. Once GDP per capita reaches a certain level, the relationship reverses. In the present paper, we provide an alternative hypothesis, where budget structure plays an important role in explaining the variations in pollution across the world.＂ the lower the business-related taxes as a share of total tax revenue, the higher the property tax in total tax revenue and the higher the ratio of public health expenditure in total expenditure, then the stronger the incentive of pollution control and the lower the pollution level. Our empirical findings reveal that the budget structure does have an important impact on pollution control. The policy implication of this research is that effective control of environmental pollution requires changes in tax structure and expenditure assignment. This research has important policy implications for China ＂s tax system reform and pollution control efforts.     

我国环保税、费制度的现状及完善对策

当前我国的税、费制度与加强生态环境保护工作的现实需求存在着较大的差距。税制上突出表现在税种的安排、税率的设计,税收优惠的实施等方面;排污收费制度表现为征收标准偏低、征收管理不到位、缺乏激励企业治污积极性的作用等方面。为此,应针对现行税、费制度中不利于生态环境保护的方面进行调整和完善。     

国外环境税法律制度的发展实践及对我国的启示

在不断加重的环境危机的挑战下，运用环境税手段来保护环境成为许多发达国家的制度选择。经过初步萌动、形成发展和成熟完善等三个阶段的发展，国外环境税法律制度形成了丰富的内容体系，包括污染税、资源税和生态税等税种以及其他有利于环保的相关税种和税收措施。国外环境税法律制度的发展实践取得了多方面的积极效果，对我国有着积极的启示     

大气污染防治增加了企业税负吗

《京津冀及周边地区2017年大气污染防治工作方案》将"2+26"城市确定为京津冀大气污染传输通道城市进行联合防治，基于此，文章以2013-2019年"2+26"城市所在省市的A股上市公司为研究对象，运用双重差分法检验"2+26"城市大气污染联合防治行动对企业税负的影响。研究结果表明，对"2+26"城市而言，大气污染联合防治行动使得企业税负显著增加。区分企业所在城市规模、是否属于污染密集型行业、企业所有制性质的异质性分析发现，大气污染联合防治行动对非污染密集型行业企业、国有企业以及位于小规模城市的企业税负影响更大。     

临港经济发展中政府管制下的环境税收制度初探

临港经济的发展在取得巨大成就的同时也带了严重的环境污染问题,而环境的恶化必然阻碍临港经济的发展。环境税收制度作为解决环境污染的重要经济手段,已经初步显示出其优越性。如何更好地利用环境税收制度解决临港经济发展中带来的环境污染问题,对许多港口城市的经济发展都具有重要意义。     

世代交叠模型中的环境政策分析

本文在OLG模型中考虑资本生产带来的环境外部性，分析了市场竞争均衡结构下的资本动态学，并且在稳态时比较静态分析经济中各因素对经济和环境的影响，认为：严厉的环境政策有利于积累更多的资本，且有利于提高环境质量等。另外，政府在征收环境税，内在化环境外部性的同时，还需要征收消费税、一次性转移等内在化代际外部性以实现社会最优配置。     

排污税与减排补贴的减排效应比较研究

研究排污税、减排补贴对减排的影响机理,并从污染排放控制效果、等量污染排放下的社会福利影响等方面对减排效应进行比较分析,得出以下结论:排污税率、减排补贴率均与污染排放负相关,与社会福利水平的关系均受税率和补贴率的影响;当税率和补贴率等量提高时,排污税效果比减排补贴的效果好;当经济由未采用政策到采用政策而导致等量减排时,就社会福利的增加量而言,减排补贴比排污税的社会福利增加量大。此研究结论从政策的减排效果和福利影响方面,给予政府制定减排政策提供了参考依据。     

Environmental taxation and employment

Summary This paper explores how environmental taxes affect employment. It argues that the case for environmental taxes should rest on environmental grounds rather than possibly favorable employment effects. Using pollution taxes to shift the tax burden away from labor is likely to be difficult for economic, social, and political reasons. Moreover, these taxes are likely to raise the overall tax burden-even if the revenues are recycled as lower distortionary taxes. To stimulate employment, governments should rely on alternative instruments targeted at the labor market.     

关于我国生态环境补偿机制的税收政策思考

我国的生态环境补偿机制开始于1980年代初,但时至今日,环境污染仍显严重,生态环境补偿机制仍存缺陷。而税收政策是有效的生态补偿手段,我国现行税制中,可纳入生态税制的主要有6个税种:资源税、消费税、城市维护建设税、车船使用税、城镇土地使用税和耕地占有税。本文在分析我国构建生态环境补偿机制现状和必要性的基础上,通过借鉴国外关于构建生态环境补偿机制税收政策的经验,来建立和完善我国的税收政策,以服务生态环境补偿机制。     

Water pollution and abstraction and economic instruments

The paper assesses the potential role for economic instrumentsin the regulation of water pollution and abstraction in thelight of the UK government's discussion documents. Economicinstruments offer the potential for greater cost efficiencyin achieving environmental targets than existing command-and-controlmethods. Applying economic instruments in the water context,however, is complex, because the location of pollution sourcesis critical and because of the interactions between pollutantsand between effluent and abstraction. Schemes for recyclingtax revenue to polluters in ways which preserve the appropriatemarginal incentives are examined, and the possibility of combiningthe existing quantitative controls with a tax scheme is explored.     

Fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution: Evidence from Chinese panel data

China's environmental pollution casts a shadow on its economic success. Concerning fiscal decentralization, China introduced the rule-based tax assignment system in 1994. To avoid the structural change in underlying fiscal regimes, we use the provincial panel data during the period 1995–2010. We find that fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on environmental pollution as it is measured per capita emission of wastewater, waste gas or solid waste in system GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimation. Our results are robust when we use different measures of fiscal decentralization. We further find that fiscal decentralization has a significant, positive effect on pollution abatement spending and pollutant discharge fees, which indicates possible mechanisms for fiscal decentralization to help protect the environment.     

Fiscal and environmental policy under monopolistic competition

Summary Keynesian demand management offsets some of the distortions caused by monopolistic competition and thus induces multiplier effects on national income and environmental damages. The cost of public funds rises with the virtual environmental tax and the degree of competition in the product market. The virtual environmental tax rises with abatement and falls with the cost of public funds. Consequently, greener preferences induce a rise in the virtual environmental tax, the cost of public funds and public abatement, and a fall in the provision of traditional public goods. A greater preference for traditional public goods harms environmental quality, since both abatement and output fall. Protecting cartels lowers the cost of public funds and may raise the provision of both traditional public goods and abatement. Environmental quality may thus rise, but other components of social welfare will fall. The paper also analyses the effects of private abatement, pollution taxes, fiscal consolidation and the progressivity of the tax system on government policy, employment, environmental quality and welfare.This paper was prepared for the OCFEB workshop Quantitative Economics for Environmental Policy held at the Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, March 22 1994. We thank Casper van Ewijk and Jenny E. Ligthart for useful comments.     

排污权交易的非现实性和征收污染环境税的必要性

从财政的角度上来说,改革排污收费制度呼声最高的方案有两个,一是开征污染环境税,二是进行排污权的交易。但是,笔者认为现在进行排污权的交易时机还不成熟,而及时开征污染环境税则是一个可行的方案。     

A many-person Corlett-Hague tax rule with externalities

This study addresses environmental tax reforms in a many-personeconomy. Starting from a situation of uniform commodity taxation,a tax reform raising the tax on a good complementary to leisureor on a good that is environmentally harmful may be seen aswelfare-improving as long as environmental externalities donot affect commodity demand. When environmental quality reducescommodity demand, a trade-off arises between the direct beneficialimpact of the higher environmental tax and its indirect, harmfulimpact caused by reduced tax revenues. A second trade-off mayalso arise from a conflict between efficiency and distributionalequity.     

Second Best Environmental Policies under Uncertainty

We construct a strategic environmental policy model of an international duopoly. Governments use environmental policies, such as an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to firms, however, governments are unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand and the cost of abatement. Our results suggest that not only the presence but also the absolute level of uncertainty matters for the optimal choice of the environmental policy instrument. Moreover, the optimality conditions under strategic behavior may lead to welfare losses relative to the cooperative outcomes because of under‐regulation and lack of policy coordination between the two countries.     

论我国环境税收体系的构建

随着我国经济的快速增长,环境问题日趋严重,已成为制约我国可持续发展的重要因素之一。经济手段在环境保护中的应用取得了空前的发展,税收是政府实施环境保护的必要经济性措施。因此,构建一套适合我国国情、科学而完整的环境税收制度,已刻不容缓。通过借鉴国外环境税制实践经验和评析我国与环境相关的税费政策,最终提出构建适应我国国情的环境税制的设想。     

对开征环境税的思考

随着我国社会主义市场经济体制的建立和税制改革的进一步深化,仅凭行政手段来解决环境问题,已不能适应市场经济发展的客观需要。通过课征环境税来保护环境,已成为大势所趋。本文首先介绍了开征环境税的必要性;然后对国外环境税税制建设情况进行了分析和总结,并介绍了我国环境相关税费制度的建设情况;最后,从我国环境污染现状出发,借鉴发达国家的成功经验,结合现有税费制度提出了我国环境税的设计思路。     

Pollution Taxes When Firms Choose Technologies

We consider the properties of a pollution tax when the regulated firm has a discrete choice of technologies with which to reduce pollution. The firm's technology choice makes possible two sequences of play: the traditional one in which the regulator moves first, committing to a tax rate before the firm adopts a technology, and an alternative one in which the firm moves first by adopting a technology. We find that a range of pollution levels, including possibly the first-best one, are unattainable when the regulator moves first. The regulator may be better able to achieve the first-best outcome when the firm moves first.     

Taxing Energy to Improve the Environment: Efficiency and Distributional Effects

We study the effects of environmental tax policy in a dynamic overlapping generations model of a small open economy with environmental quality incorporated as a durable consumption good. Raising the energy tax may yield an efficiency gain if agents care enough about the environment. The benefits are unevenly distributed across generations since capital ownership, and the capital loss induced by a tax increase, rises with age. A suitable egalitarian bond policy can be employed in order to ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With this additional instrument the optimal energy tax can be computed.