Predictions of growth in U.S. corporate profits: Asymmetric vs. symmetric loss

This study evaluates the Federal Reserve and private forecasts of growth in corporate profits for 1984-2004. These forecasts are both rational and directionally accurate but suggest different loss structures. The Federal Reserve forecasts tend to significantly under-predict and imply asymmetric loss. The private forecasts, however, are free of such bias, suggesting symmetric loss. Given that the Federal Reserve forecasts are made to help with policymaking, our findings point to the Fed's cautiousness not to incorrectly predict the downward moves in growth in corporate profits. The private forecasts are made by experts who (with a strong profit-motivated interest) attempt to generate financial gain and thus predict the upward moves as accurately as the downward moves.     

Has the Fed improved U.S. economic performance?

This paper finds that U.S. economic performance has not generally improved under the Federal Reserve, with the possible exception of the Great Moderation. We analyze the Fed and pre-Fed periods in terms of the rates and volatilities of inflation and real GDP growth. Comparing the pre-Fed periods to the post-World War II period and the Great Moderation, we find that real GDP growth has been lower under the Fed, while inflation has been higher. The volatilities of inflation and GDP growth have both declined under the Fed, but the reductions occurred mostly during the Great Moderation.     

Taylor rules and the Great Inflation

Can US monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule when policy is evaluated with real-time inflation and output gap data? Using economic research on the full employment level of unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment published between 1970 and 1977 to construct real-time output gap measures for periods of peak unemployment, we find that the Federal Reserve did not follow a Taylor rule if appropriate measures are used. We estimate Taylor rules and find no evidence that monetary policy stabilized inflation, even allowing for changes in the inflation target. While monetary policy was stabilizing with respect to inflation forecasts, the forecasts systematically under-predicted inflation following the 1970s recessions and this does not constitute evidence of stabilizing policy. We also find that the Federal Reserve responded too strongly to negative output gaps.     

Asymmetric Loss and the Rationality of Inflation Forecasts: Evidence from South Korea

We examine asymmetry in the loss functions of South Korean consumers' and the Bank of Korea's (BOK) inflation forecasts, and test the rationality of these forecasts under the assumption of a possible asymmetric loss function. Under an asymmetric loss function, we find evidence of asymmetry and support for rationality. We also examine whether the BOK's forecasts incorporate respective forecasts and consensus forecasts efficiently. They broadly use available information efficiently, and their results are robust to inflation‐targeting measures and the recent global financial crisis. However, our results suggest that the information efficiency of the BOK's forecasts for consumers was affected during the period 2007–2008.     

Rationality of inflation–output forecasts of MMS survey: international evidence

We analyse the individual rationality of inflation and output forecasts from Money Market Survey (MMS) for a group of G7 countries and EU under asymmetric univariate Linlin and Linex loss functions. We also test for joint rationality of inflation–output forecasts using the forecast rationality test under multivariate asymmetric loss functions proposed by Ulu (2013). Our results indicate that rationality is often rejected under symmetric loss, and results improve towards rationality when asymmetric loss functions are assumed. The assumption of multivariate asymmetric loss compared to univariate asymmetric loss provides further evidence towards rationality. We also analyse directional forecast accuracy of the inflation and output forecasts and find that the inflation–output forecasts of MMS are valuable when considered both jointly and separately.     

Independent but Not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in Monetary Policy at the Fed

Independent central banks are thought to be effective inflation hawks because they are run by technocrats with conservative monetary policy preferences. However, central bankers can only protect their independence by compromising with the elected officials who grant them their independence. Policy, therefore, is likely to be a weighted average of the preferences of the central bank and the government. Consequently, central bankers may be eager to help right‐wing governments stay in power and oppose the election of left‐wing governments. We show evidence from the United States that interest rates (a) decline as elections approach when Republicans control the White House, but rise when Democrats do; and (b) are sensitive to the inflation rate (output gap) when Democrats (Republicans) are in the White House. Thus, the Federal Reserve is a conditional inflation hawk. Since the Fed became operationally independent in 1951, the Republicans have exhibited a decided electoral advantage in presidential politics.     

Do FOMC forecasts add value to staff forecasts?

This paper compares the economic forecasts of members of the Board of Governors and presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks, and then investigates the value of each group's forecasts in supplementing the forecasts of the Board of Governors' staff. We find that the presidents tend to forecast higher inflation and real GDP growth, and lower unemployment than the members of the Board of Governors. We also find that the presidents' real GDP and unemployment rate forecasts add value to the real economy forecasts of the staff, while the governors' inflation forecasts add value to the staff's inflation forecasts.     

German business cycle forecasts, asymmetric loss and financial variables

We examine the efficiency of German forecasts for output growth and inflation allowing for an asymmetric loss function of the forecasters. We find the loss of output growth forecasts to be approximately symmetric while there is an asymmetry in the loss of the inflation forecasts. The information of financial variables seems to be adequately incorporated into the output forecasts but to a lesser extent into the inflation forecasts.     

Federal reserve monetary policy and the non-linearity of the Taylor rule

We propose and estimate a generalized Taylor rule for the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) to find out how the Fed funds rate is sensitive to changes in inflation and output gap variables in the post war period. We find that Fed's monetary policy has only reacted significantly to changes in inflation when they were between approximately 6.5–8.5%. However, the policy stance change on these changes was relatively small. The findings suggest that the US Fed has been too averse to change from its current monetary policy stance, and that it has not reacted noticeably to changes in the US economic activity, as measured by the output gap. The generalized functional form for the monetary policy rule suggests that similar non-linearity exists in the directional change of the Fed rate.     

A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC*

We defend the forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) against the criticism of Christina and David Romer (2008, American Economic Review 98, 230–235) by assuming that the FOMC’s forecasts depict a worst‐case scenario that it uses to design decisions that are robust to misspecification of the staff’s model. We use a simple macro model and a plausible loss function to illustrate how such an interpretation of the FOMC’s forecasts can explain the findings of Romer and Romer, including the pattern of differences between FOMC forecasts and forecasts published by the staff of the Federal Reserve System in the Greenbook.     

Is the Fed’s news perception different from the private sector’s?

The recent literature on monetary policy has dedicated considerable attention to modelling agents’ processing of information about the future in real time. This paper contributes to this growing strand by investigating the implied differences in the so-called news shocks estimated from the standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model using the real-time data sets from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook (GB) forecasts. Alternative specifications with either the SPF or GB forecasts aim to delineate the differences in the private sector’s and the Fed’s expectations of future macroeconomic outcomes and identify the differences in their perception of news shocks. Our results indicate that while the demand news shocks have very similar distributions in the two datasets, the monetary and cost-push news shocks from the models estimated on the GB data tend to be larger than those from the SPF. These findings suggest that the Federal Reserve’s forecasting methods allow for more variation in future outcomes than the SPF’s. These findings mesh well with the extant literature on the superiority of the Fed’s forecasts relative to the private sector’s and provide a structural explanation for the source of this superiority.     

DID TIME INCONSISTENCY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREAT INFLATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE FOMC TRANSCRIPTS

We use evidence from detailed records of FOMC deliberations to argue that time inconsistency theory can help explain the excessive monetary expansion that characterized Arthur Burns's tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman (1970–1978). The records suggest that the Fed perceived a Phillips curve tradeoff and political pressures that made it difficult to adopt disinflationary policies; the tendency toward excessively expansionary policy was exacerbated by the short-run planning horizon the Committee faced in each of its meetings. We argue that comparative static predictions of the time inconsistency model are consistent with the rise of inflation during the Burns years and its subsequent fall.     

What can we learn from revisions to the Greenbook forecasts?

Although there have been many evaluations of the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook forecasts, we analyze them in a different dimension. We examine the revisions of these forecasts in the context of fixed event predictions to determine how new information is incorporated in the forecasting process. This analysis permits us to determine if there was an inefficient use of information in the sense that the forecast revision has predictive power for the forecast error. Research on forecast smoothing suggests that we might find a positive relationship between the forecast error and the forecast revision. Although we do find for some variables and horizons the Fed’s forecast errors are predictable from its forecast revisions, there is no evidence of forecast smoothing. Instead the revisions sometimes have a negative relationship with the forecast error, suggesting in these cases that the Fed may be over-responsive to new information.     

Evaluating FOMC forecast ranges: an interval data approach

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve publishes the range of members’ forecasts for key macroeconomic variables, but not the distribution of forecasts within this range. To evaluate these projections, previous papers compare the midpoint of the range with the realized outcome. This paper proposes an alternative approach to forecast evaluation that takes account of the interval nature of projections. It is shown that using the conventional Mincer–Zarnowitz approach to evaluate FOMC forecasts misses important information contained in the width of the forecast interval. This additional information plays a minor role at short forecast horizons but turns out to be of sometimes crucial importance for longer-horizon forecasts. For 18-month-ahead forecasts, the variation of members’ projections contains information that is more relevant for explaining future inflation than information embodied in the midpoint. Likewise, when longer-range forecasts for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are considered, the width of the forecast interval comprises information over and above the one given by the midpoint alone.     

The information content of the Reserve Bank of Australia's inflation forecasts

In this article, the inflation forecasts produced by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and that generated by private forecasters, are used to assess whether the Reserve Bank possesses information about inflation that the private sector does not have. The results show that the Reserve Bank inflation forecasts embody useful predictive information about inflation, beyond that contained in private forecasts, over the recent inflation targeting period.     

DO POLITICS CAUSE REGIME SHIFTS IN MONETARY POLICY?

Whether or not politics cause changes in monetary policy is controversial in the literature. This article re‐examines the link between politics and regime shifts in monetary policy using two alternative approaches. First, empirical results show that both the presidential and Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) chairmanship regimes do not influence monetary policy under the assumption that the Fed closely follows an interest rate rule. On the other hand, evidence also suggests that changes in political regimes are able to account for the deviations from the optimal Taylor rule. (JEL E52, E58, D78)     

An overhaul of Federal Reserve doctrine: Nominal income and the Great Moderation

The Great Moderation is often characterized by the decline in the variability of output and inflation from earlier periods. While a multitude of explanations for the Great Moderation exist, notable research has focused on the role of monetary policy. Specifically, early evidence suggested that this increased stability is the result of monetary policy that responded much more strongly to realized inflation. Recent evidence casts doubt on this change in monetary policy. An alternative hypothesis is that the change in monetary policy was the result of a change in doctrine; specifically the rejection of the view that inflation was largely a cost-push phenomenon. As a result, this alternative hypothesis suggests that the change in monetary policy beginning in 1979 is reflected in the Federal Reserve’s response to expectations of nominal income growth rather than realized inflation as previously argued. I provide evidence for this hypothesis by estimating the parameters of a monetary policy rule in which policy adjusts to forecasts of nominal GDP for the pre- and post-Volcker eras. Finally, I embed the rule in two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with gradual price adjustment to determine whether the overhaul of doctrine can explain the reduction in the volatility of inflation and the output gap.     

Assessing the (de-)anchoring of households’ long-term inflation expectations in the US

Well-anchored inflation expectations play an important role in the achievement of price stability. The (de-)anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in the US has been under debate since the sub-prime crisis. This paper assesses and explains the evolution of the degree of (de-)anchorage of households’ long-term inflation expectations in the US during the period of 1990 to 2019, in a time-varying framework. We find the long-term inflation expectations to be de-anchored during the entire study period. The de-anchorage was greater in the first half of the 1990s. Subsequently, it has declined but has not yet anchored. An increase in inflation perception reduces the degree of de-anchorage in a (persistently) low-inflation perception period, whereas it causes a rise in the degree of de-anchorage when inflation perception is around its long-term average or is persistently high. Further, a rise in economic policy uncertainty also increases the de-anchorage of households’ long-term inflation expectations. This suggests that the Federal Reserve System (Fed) may find it beneficial to pay more attention to households’ inflation perception.     

Asymmetric behavior of inflation differentials in the euro area: Evidence from a threshold unit root test

This paper tests the existence of persistent inflation rate differentials in the euro area by employing linear as well nonlinear unit root tests. Besides linear unit root tests, a two-regime threshold unit root test examines the conjecture that inflation rate differentials follow a nonlinear two-regime process towards a threshold, switching from the persistent regime to the transitory one and vice versa. The results imply that threshold nonlinearity is confirmed in 10 out of the 16 cases. However, we have found unit root regime-switching behavior only in six out of the 16 cases under investigation. This finding implies that these inflation rate differentials were persistent when they were low (regime 1), but transitory when they were high (regime 2). This asymmetric behavior can possibly be explained by the different degree of pressure exercised on governments, which is accompanied with different inflation rate differentials. On the contrary, despite the evidence of nonlinearity, the majority of the inflation rate differentials are found to be monotonically persistent. Our results have strong implications for policy makers. In particular, the documented persistency in the inflation rate differentials might have long-run costs in terms of price and macroeconomic stability.