Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.     

Unobservable transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the manager is evaluated using a balanced scorecard

This study investigates the optimal level of transfer prices chosen by managers in a divisionalized firm when they are evaluated based on a balanced scorecard. A unique assumption of our model is that transfer prices are unobservable to a competing firm's managers. In contrast to the findings in several studies that examine strategic transfer pricing, this research shows that a manager who is evaluated using a balanced scorecard chooses a transfer price that exceeds marginal cost given a market competitor in a specific economic environment. This result is caused mainly by our model's assumption that a manager considers the competitor's profit in his/her in decision-making when the objective is to maximize long-term profit. This study makes a significant contribution to the strategic transfer pricing literature by showing that even if the transfer price is unobservable to rivals, the optimal transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the final product market is characterized by price competition, something not shown in previous analytical accounting research.     

External and Internal Pricing in Multidivisional Firms

Multidivisional firms frequently rely on external market prices in order to value internal transactions across profit centers. This paper examines market‐based transfer pricing when an upstream division has monopoly power in selling a proprietary component both to a downstream division within the same firm and to external customers. When internal transfers are valued at the prevailing market price, the resulting transactions are distorted by double marginalization. The imposition of intracompany discounts will always improve overall firm profits provided the supplying division is capacity constrained. Under certain conditions it is then possible to design discount rules so that the resulting prices and sales quantities are efficient from the corporate perspective. In contrast, the impact of intracompany discounts remains ambiguous when the capacity of the selling division is essentially unlimited. It is then generally impossible to achieve fully efficient outcomes by means of market‐based transfer pricing unless the external market for the component is sufficiently large relative to the internal market.     

我国债券市场价格波动的均衡与因果分析

债券价格的决定理论主要有古典利率理论、流动偏好理论、可贷资金理论和理性预期理论。本文采用协整和因果检验方法，研究宏观经济变量、货币金融变量与我国债券市场价格波动的联动和因果关系。我国债券市场价格与固定资产投资、净出口，物价指数、货币供应量、金融机构存贷款和外汇储备存在长期均衡关系。居民储蓄和净出口对我国债券市场价格走势具有单向引导关系，我国债券市场价格对固定资产投资和金融机构存款具有显著影响。     

Do prices reflect market fundamentals in real estate markets?

The purpose of this article is to examine prices on land and REIT shares for possible evidence of deviations from market fundamentals, the underlying economic forces. Models of market fundamentals are developed from the intertemporal capital asset pricing model so that risk aversion and a stochastic investment opportunity set can be incorporated in the analysis. The approach in this article is to compare ex post values of actual discounted cash flows with prices and to test whether the price series are unbiased predictors of the future discounted cash flows. Several tests of the relationship are presented, and the results suggest that prices of real estate investment trusts and prices of farm land do not always reflect fundamental value.     

Auditing internal transfer prices in multinationals under monopolistic competition

This paper derives an appropriate standard price that can be used by the tax authorities of a country for auditing transfer prices in multinational firms (MNFs) for the purpose of social welfare maximization of the country. We assume that the corporate tax rate in the host country, where MNFs undertake foreign direct investment to locate their manufacturing divisions, is lower than that in the home country. Our conclusion is that the tax authorities of the home country should not always force MNFs to hold down the transfer price through a too strict audit standard if it aims to maximize social welfare of the country in the long-run equilibrium. This result implies that tax authorities face a trade-off between consumer welfare and tax revenue when determining the standard price used for auditing. One notable implication is that the tax authorities should raise the upper-limit price allowed for internal transfers as the elasticity of substitution between brands for consumers decreases.     

投资项目风险、外部性与投资资本内部定价

从业绩评价角度,以委托代理理论作为分析工具,研究投资项目风险、外部性对投资资本内部定价的影响。研究结论表明:投资资本的最优内部"价格"与用于决策的企业资本成本一般不同,投资项目风险、外部性对其有重要影响;当平均投资收益率等于边际投资收益率时,只有投资项目风险对投资资本内部定价有影响;投资失败的赔偿制相比有限责任制,会减弱投资项目风险和外部性对投资资本"定价"的影响。这一研究为正确地制定投资资本的内部价格和合理地评价投资业绩提供了理论基础。     

Information technology,organizational design,and transfer pricing

We show how information technology affects transfer pricing. With coarse information technology, negotiated transfer pricing has an informational advantage: managers agree to prices that approximate the firm's cost of internal trade more precisely than cost-based transfer prices. With sufficiently rapid offers, this advantage outweighs opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining time, and negotiated transfer pricing generates higher profits than the cost-based method. However, as information technology improves, the informational advantage diminishes; the opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining eventually dominate, and cost-based methods generate higher profits. Our results explain why firms generally prefer cost-based methods, and when negotiated methods are preferable.     

Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals

A multinational firm sets the price that applies tointra-firm trade between the firm's affiliates at a central level,but delegates decisions about national prices (or quantities)to national affiliates. When these affiliates encounter competitionit is shown that delegation of authority and the nature of competitionchanges the role of the transfer price; it now becomes both atax saving and a strategic device. Comparative static resultsdevelop transfer pricing policies for affiliates encounteringCournot as well as Bertrand competition.     

On the implied market price of risk under the stochastic numéraire

This papers addresses the stock option pricing problem in a continuous time market model where there are two stochastic tradable assets, and one of them is selected as a numéraire. An equivalent martingale measure is not unique for this market, and there are non-replicable claims. Some rational choices of the equivalent martingale measures are suggested and discussed, including implied measures calculated from bond prices constructed as a risk-free investment with deterministic payoff at the terminal time. This leads to possibility to infer a implied market price of risk process from observed historical bond prices.     

Are liquidity and corporate control priced by shareholders? Empirical evidence from Swiss dual class shares

Stadard asset pricing models generally exclude corporate control and liquidity considerations as joint explanatory factors of the stock price formation process. This empirical study investigates their influence on Swiss Bearer and Registered share prices issued by the same firm. It is shown that the statistical properties of both shares' returns differ without implying profitable arbitrage opportunities. A multifactor model of the ‘premium’ between Bearer and Registered stock prices is then proposed and tested. The results show that the freely negotiable equity book value, the existence of dominant shareholder positions and ownership transfer regime changes are significant variables in explaining the dual class share price differential.     

A Comparison of Option Prices Under Different Pricing Measures in a Stochastic Volatility Model with Correlation

This paper investigates option prices in an incomplete stochastic volatility model with correlation. In a general setting, we prove an ordering result which says that prices for European options with convex payoffs are decreasing in the market price of volatility risk.As an example, and as our main motivation, we investigate option pricing under the class of q-optimal pricing measures. The q-optimal pricing measure is related to the marginal utility indifference price of an agent with constant relative risk aversion. Using the ordering result, we prove comparison theorems between option prices under the minimal martingale, minimal entropy and variance-optimal pricing measures. If the Sharpe ratio is deterministic, the comparison collapses to the well known result that option prices computed under these three pricing measures are the same.As a concrete example, we specialize to a variant of the Hull-White or Heston model for which the Sharpe ratio is increasing in volatility. For this example we are able to deduce option prices are decreasing in the parameter q. Numerical solution of the pricing pde corroborates the theory and shows the magnitude of the differences in option price due to varying q.JEL Classification: D52, G13     

Management control in the transfer pricing tax compliant multinational enterprise

This paper studies the impact of transfer pricing tax compliance on management control system (MCS) design and use within one multinational enterprise (MNE) which employed the same transfer prices for tax compliance and internal management purposes. Our analysis shows immediate effects of tax compliance on the design of organising controls with subsequent effects on planning, evaluating and rewarding controls which reveal a more coercive use of the MCS overall. We argue that modifications to the MCS cannot be understood without an appreciation of the MNEs’ fiscal transfer pricing compliance process.     

Discussion of “decentralized capacity management and internal pricing”

Dutta and Reichelstein (2010) study the role of transfer pricing and organizational choice in providing incentives for efficient decisions on the acquisition and subsequent reallocation of capacity within decentralized firms. Their analysis suggests that transfer prices based on the historical cost of capacity facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. They also find that symmetric responsibility center structures are generally better suited for providing efficient investment incentives than hybrid organizations. An important condition for the derivation of the two results is the linearity of the shadow prices of capacity. If shadow prices are nonlinear, transfer prices should be below (above) the historical cost of capacity in order to counteract the managers’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest). Because profit center organizations can use transfer prices for mitigating the inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices, they offer a natural advantage over pure investment center organizations in implementing efficient capacity decisions. Overall, these observations suggest that the curvature of profit functions is an important factor in determining the suitable instruments for decentralized capacity management.     

Towards an organizational theory of the transfer pricing process

Understanding the transfer pricing issue as it arises in large decentralized firms is important, because it represents a pervasive problem in the design of managerial accounting and control systems in complex organizations. This paper draws on the growing literature on the economics of internal organization to develop an understanding of the strategic, organizational and transactional conditions under which transfer pricing (and related control) issues arise, and the organizational processes used to implement intra-firm transfers of products and to determine transfer prices. The objective of the paper is to develop a theory of the transfer pricing process and to reduce hypotheses from the theory.     

Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery

This paper examines the implications of market microstructure for asset pricing. I argue that asset pricing ignores the central fact that asset prices evolve in markets. Markets provide liquidity and price discovery, and I argue that asset pricing models need to be recast in broader terms to incorporate the transactions costs of liquidity and the risks of price discovery. I argue that symmetric information‐based asset pricing models do not work because they assume that the underlying problems of liquidity and price discovery have been solved. I develop an asymmetric information asset pricing model that incorporates these effects.     

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination†

We study access pricing rules that determine the access prices between two networks as a linear function of marginal costs and (average) retail prices set by both networks. When firms compete in linear prices, there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of underlying demand conditions. When firms compete in two‐part tariffs, there exists a class of rules under which firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, the regulator can choose among these rules to pursue additional objectives such as increasing consumer surplus or promoting socially optimal investment.     

THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION IN STOCK MARKET LIBERALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM KOREA

Stock market liberalization is a decision by a country’s government to allow foreigners to buy securities in that country’s capital market. This study examines how the liberalization of the Korean stock market affected stock price behavior and changed the role of accounting information for investment decisions. The Korean stock market opened its door to foreign investment in 1991. Prior to this, market inefficiencies, such as the superfluous co-movement of stock prices with industry or market indices or investment based on rumor and speculation, were widespread. Since the opening of the stock market to foreigners, a more rational pricing behavior has emerged. This setting provides a unique opportunity to investigate how stock price behavior has changed with market liberalization and what was the role of accounting information in this process. Our results indicate that the co-movement behavior of stock prices by industry decreased and stock price differentiation based on individual firm characteristics increased after market liberalization. The results also show that the explanatory power of accounting numbers increased after market liberalization. Overall, the results imply that foreign investors contributed to the improvement of market efficiency with the opening up of capital markets in Korea. We believe that our results provide useful evidence to other capital markets that are in a similar situation.