Real indeterminacy of equilibria and manipulability

In this paper, we analyze the indeterminacy of equilibria in financial markets and propose a selection mechanism. We suggest that there is one equilibrium that prevails over the others, as a result of the market power of the agents that some states of nature become monopolists of certain commodities. Given a financial assets model, we define a price game and show the existence of mixed strategies equilibria. Then we purify these equilibria by considering a price game with incomplete information.     

我国资产证券化风险研究

资产证券化是资本市场上广泛应用的一种融资方式,自2004年我国设立首批资产证券化试点以来,这种模式引起了金融机构极大的兴趣,随着资产证券化进程的加快,其中各种问题也初现端倪,证券化风险控制问题也逐渐提上日程。     

金汉拉扎开关站筏板基础的优化设计

文章对回填区肋梁向上凸出的筏板基础纵、横向梁及板的断面尺寸的优化设计进行分析,得出结论：当柱下纵向梁的刚度大于横向梁的刚度并旦板的厚度相对于纵向梁的高度较薄时,横向梁与板相对于纵向梁是柔性的,上层结构传下来的荷裁大多被纵向梁承担,此时基础梁、基础板的混凝土和钢筋用量最少,结构设计最优。     

基于跳扩散模型的知识产权证券化定价

知识产权正不断成为资本市场上一项重要的资源。知识产权证券化作为一种新型的金融创新工具,对优化资源配置、提高金融市场效率、解决创新型中小企业融资难问题以及拓展投资渠道都起到重要的作用。为了对知识产权证券化进行合理定价,本文力求从新的视角引入跳扩散模型,将鞅论、随机微分方程理论应用到知识产权证券化的定价问题中,综合考虑违约风险与市场风险对知识产权证券化价格的影响,建立知识产权证券化定价模型,并用Monte Carlo方法对模型进行数值模拟。     

Reinsurance or securitization: The case of natural catastrophe risk

We investigate the suitability of securitization as an alternative to reinsurance for the purpose of transferring natural catastrophe risk. We characterize the conditions under which one or the other form of risk transfer dominates using a setting in which reinsurers and traders in financial markets produce costly information about catastrophes. Such information is useful to insurers: along with the information produced by insurers themselves, it reduces insurers’ costly capital requirements. However, traders who seek to benefit from trading in financial markets may produce ‘too much’ information, thereby making risk transfer through securitization prohibitively costly.     

Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities

We study contests in which there are multiple alternative public-good/bad prizes, and the players compete, by expending irreversible effort, over which prize to have awarded to them. Each prize may be a public good for some players and a public bad for the others, and the players expend their effort simultaneously and independently. We first prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game, then establish when the total effort level expended for each prize is unique across the Nash equilibria, and then summarize and highlight other interesting and important properties of the equilibria. Finally, we discuss the effects of heterogeneity of valuations on the players’ equilibrium effort levels and a possible extension of the model.     

Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions

This paper endogenizes in a standard hidden action model the point in time when a risk neutral and wealth constrained agent and the principal observe the realization of an additional signal: before the agent’s effort choice (ex ante information) or after (ex post information). In a decision problem, ex ante information does (weakly) better than ex post information because the decision maker can tailor efforts to the information. We show that this is not the case for incentive problems: a negative incentive effect arises under ex ante information that prevails even though the principal tailors the agent’s effort to the information.     

银行开展中小企业信贷资产证券化模式探讨

对银行中小企业信贷资产证券化可行性及开展该项业务的意义进行了阐述,深入探讨中小企业贷款证券化模式,建议银行在有效的风险控制下平稳健康开展中小企业信贷资产证券化业务。     

Securitization and optimal retention under moral hazard

Securitization improves liquidity in capital markets by allowing originators to remove issued loans from its balance sheet and use the proceeds for other purposes. Securitization is often suspected of being one of the main reasons for the recent financial crisis. One concern is that securitization leads to moral hazard in lender screening and monitoring. By selling loans to investors and removing them from their books, banks have a lesser incentive to carefully evaluate and monitor borrowers’ credit quality to ensure that they can repay their loans. One problem in the literature is that the analysis of securitization is very general and suffers from a lack of specific security design analysis under asymmetric information. We address the moral hazard problem using a principal–agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. We show that the optimal contract must contain a retention clause in the presence of moral hazard. The optimal retention is affected by tranching and credit enhancement.     

商业信息在传统与电子两种销售模式下的收益分析

本文从传统销售模式和电子销售模式中信息发布和搜索成本的角度出发,用信号博弈的思想分析了有退款保证的商品交易模型,得出如下结论:在成本回收年限内,如果电子销售模式下买卖双方的信息搜索和发布成本小于其在传统销售模式下的成本时,可选择电子销售模式;否则,应选择传统销售模式。     

Are shirking and leisure substitutable? An empirical test of efficiency wages based on urban economic theory

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.     

Credit risk securitization and bank soundness in Europe

Using a unique sample of 749 cash and synthetic securitization transactions issued by 60 stock-listed bank holdings in the EU-13 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2007 this paper provides empirical evidence that credit risk securitization has a negative impact on the issuing banks’ financial soundness. Baseline findings hold even when controlling for likely reverse causality by employing instrumental variable techniques and substituting the accounting-based z-score ratio by market-based indicators of bank risk. Moreover, investigating the relationship between credit risk securitization and single z-score components in order to evaluate significant transmission channels proposed by relevant theoretical literature, we find a negative impact of securitization on bank profitability and capital environment as well as a positive relationship between securitization and the issuing bank's return volatility. Against the background of our empirical results we underline that the decision by the Basel Committee to enhance the new Basel III framework in the field of securitization is a step in the right direction.     

Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure

In the context of team production, this paper studies the optimal (deterministic and stochastic) information allocation that implements desired effort levels as the unique Bayesian equilibrium. We show that under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform agents even though they may be ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is that informing the agents asymmetrically can be effective in avoiding “bad” equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure.     

资产定价模型(CAPM)在住房抵押贷款证券化(MBS)定价中的应用

20世纪80年代以来,住房抵押贷款证券化(MBS)在我国有了长足的发展,为了对住房抵押贷款证券化产品进行合理定价,本文引入CAPM模型来确定正确反应证券风险的贴现率,并且分析了CAPM模型的产生以及发展过程,最后对其进行动态的修正.     

合成型资产证券化:创新视角的一个经济分析

合成型资产证券化作为传统资产证券化与信用衍生品特性相结合的金融创新,现已成为发达国家商业银行转移信贷风险的一种常见结构金融技术。与传统型资产证券化相比,合成型资产证券化在融资结构设计、发起人职责、对支撑资产依赖度、现金转移结构条款以及交易后续处理安排等方面存在较大差异。合成型资产证券化的出现及发展既与国际银行监管制度及其变迁密切相关,同时也是金融市场深化以及银行内部风险管理技术成熟到一定阶段的必然产物。从趋势看,尽管资产证券化的监管套利动机渐趋弱化,但合成型资产证券化特有的结构设计以及广泛的适用范围使其在提升银行运行效率上有着非常独特的优势,因此其必将成为未来银行业业务创新的重要工具。     

Production theory,uncertain prices and investment portfolios

This paper examines the allocative decisions of a competitive firm where input and output prices are uncertain and where the capital asset pricing model prevails. The firm behaves much as a profit maximizer under certainty, except that certainty equivalent prices formally replace the known prices. These certainty equivalent prices are composed of the expected price, the covariance of the price with the market (a measure of systematic risk) and a measure of risk aversion in the economy. Both static and comparative static propositions emerge in a natural way as extensions of standard, competitive and profit maximizing behavior. In addition, the model contains both the certainty case and the risk-neutral case as limiting examples.     

Integration, agglomeration and welfare

This paper studies the social desirability of agglomeration, and the efficiency arguments for policy intervention in a simple, analytically tractable new economic geography model. The location pattern emerging as market equilibrium is ‘bubble-shaped’, i.e. it features dispersion both at high and low trade costs and stable equilibria with partial and full agglomeration for intermediate levels of trade costs. We show that the market equilibrium is characterized by over-agglomeration for high trade costs and under-agglomeration for low trade costs, and we work out analytically that a net pecuniary externality is the underlying cause of this market failure. One particularly noteworthy result is that the net pecuniary externality is positive at high levels of trade freeness. However, there is no market under-agglomeration unless this positive net pecuniary externality interacts with an additional congestion force originating in the (per se efficient) competitive housing market.     

Sales contests,promotion decisions and heterogeneous risk

This paper examines a general model of sales contests in which agents have heterogeneous attitudes toward risk. It shows that agents that are less risk averse have a higher probability of success. A corollary to this result shows that when absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, wealthier agents have a higher probability of promotion. The same wealth effect makes it possible for more risk averse agents to take greater risks in a multi‐round promotion tournament. Next, a stability analysis shows that these equilibria are attractors under a best response dynamic. While it is well‐known that sales contests can be an effective incentive device for eliciting effort from employees, this research suggests the added benefit that when used as a basis for promotion decisions, sales contests act to filter the hardest working agents to the top of the corporate hierarchy. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

应收账款证券化-企业融资方式新选择

应收账款的回收和变现,对企业保持充足的现金流、维持正常生产经营活动,将起到至关重要的作用。利用资产证券化这种先进的融资模式和技术,对应收账款实行表外融资,无疑可以成为化解企业巨额应收账款风险的一个新的重要途径。本文从应收账款证券化的一般原理和运作机制出发,分析应收账款证券化思想在我国运用的现实意义,探索我国应收账款证券化道路上存在的问题和障碍,并提出对策和建议。     

Horizontal vs. Vertical Interdependence in Multinational Activity*

This paper sheds light on interdependencies in multinational activity that are brought about by (horizontal) trade in final goods and (vertical) trade in intermediate goods (within and between host countries). We use a panel data set of US foreign affiliate sales to 16 developed countries in seven industries over the period 1983–2000, distinguish between horizontal and vertical interdependence in multinational enterprise activity and allow for both market size (demand)‐related as well as remainder linkage effects. Evidence suggests that vertical interdependence is somewhat more important than horizontal interdependence and, hence, vertical motives of multinational activity tend to dominate horizontal ones.

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