Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy

This study examines the impact of concentrated founder ownership on related party transactions (RPTs) for Indian firms. We find that concentrated founder ownership is positively related to RPTs and is more likely to encourage RPTs that are beneficial for the minority shareholders. We also observe that RPTs are associated with higher firm value. This relationship is more pronounced for business group firms and firms with more highly concentrated founder ownership. We show that the reputation incentive plays a very important role in founders’ decisions, and they use RPTs as an efficient transaction mechanism.     

Does corporate governance transparency affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts?

Using country‐level proxies for corporate governance transparency, this paper investigates how differences in transparency across 21 countries affect the average forecast accuracy of analysts for the country's firms. The association between financial transparency and analyst forecast accuracy has been well documented in previous published literature; however, the association between governance transparency and analyst forecast accuracy remains unexplored. Using the two distinct country‐level factors isolated by Bushman et al. (2004 ), governance transparency and financial transparency, we investigate whether corporate governance information impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts over and above financial information. We document that governance transparency is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for financial transparency and other variables. Furthermore, our results suggest that governance‐related disclosure plays a bigger role in improving the information environment when financial disclosures are less transparent. Our empirical evidence also suggests that the significance of governance transparency on analyst forecast accuracy is higher when legal enforcement is weak.     

中小企业板上市公司股权结构、公司治理与企业绩效:基于随机前沿生产函数的分析

本文通过构建深圳中小企业板上市公司股权结构影响企业绩效的复合随机前沿生产函数,利用2006—2008年面板数据对中小企业的股权结构和企业绩效的关系进行了经验研究,结果表明中小企业的股权集中度与企业绩效之间显著正相关,这与国内文献中对大公司的经验研究结果一致,表明当前上市公司的股权集中有利于公司治理改善和企业绩效的提高。但是第一大股东持股比率却与绩效负相关,这与对大公司的研究结论相反,表明在中小企业中存在较为明显的"隧道挖掘"现象,"一股独大"在中小企业中并不利于公司治理。研究结果还表明,国家、法人、外资或个人对公司治理的绩效无显著差异;流通股比重、高管持股、研发人员投入等都与企业绩效不相关;中小企业具有较强的股权融资倾向,不符合"啄食顺序"的资本结构理论。     

Corporate governance norms and practices

We evaluate the impact of corporate governance on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we differentiate between minimally accepted governance attributes that are satisfied by all firms in a given country and governance attributes that are adopted at the firm level. This approach allows us to differentiate between firm-level and country-level corporate governance, thus contributing to an ongoing debate in the literature about whether governance attributes are largely determined by country factors or firm characteristics. Despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, we find that many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond those that are adopted by all firms in the country, and that these improvements in corporate governance are positively associated with firm valuation. Firms that choose not to adopt sound governance mechanisms tend to have concentrated ownership and sizeable free cash flow, consistent with agency theories based on self-interested managers and controlling shareholders. Our results indicate that the market rewards companies that are prepared to adopt governance attributes beyond those required by laws and common corporate practices in the home country.     

Does geographic dispersion affect firm valuation?

We find that the geographic dispersion of a corporation affects its firm valuation. Firms with subsidiaries located in different regions of the United States experience a valuation discount of 6.2% after controlling for the impact of both global and industrial diversifications. The valuation discount increases as firms expand their operations to different regions nationwide. Results show that firms with more anti-takeover provisions are more likely to be geographically diverse, and that these firms experience greater value discounts compared with their counterparts with fewer such provisions. Our overall evidence suggests that the geographic location of corporate activities is an essential component of corporate policies and has important market valuation implications.     

Corporate social performance, financial performance and institutional ownership in Canadian firms

This study examines the relationship of corporate social performance (CSP) to financial performance (FP) and institutional ownership. We perform our empirical analyses on a large-sample of publicly held Canadian firms and use a novel independent measure of CSP. Based on tests utilizing four years of panel data, we found no significant relationship between a composite measure of firms’ CSP and FP. However, we found significant relationships between individual measures of firms’ CSP regarding environmental and international activities and FP. Our findings indicate a significant relationship between firms’ composite CSP measure and the number of institutions investing in firms’ stock. In addition, we found significant relationships between firms’ CSP ratings regarding their international activities and product quality and the number of institutions investing in firms’ stock. These findings, while subject to the limitations inherent in the use of specific CSP measures, provide mixed support for the business case for CSP.     

The impact of corporate governance on Internet financial reporting

This study examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure transparency measured by the level of Internet financial reporting (IFR) behavior. We measure corporate governance by shareholder rights, ownership structure, board composition, and audit committee characteristics. We develop a disclosure index to measure the extent of each sample firm’s IFR by presentation format, information content, and corporate governance disclosures. Results indicate that firms with weak shareholder rights, a lower percentage of blockholder ownership, a higher percentage of independent directors, a more diligent audit committee, and a higher percentage of audit committee members that are considered financial experts are more likely to engage in IFR. The findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms influence a firm’s Internet disclosure behavior, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Additional exploratory analysis indicates that the association between corporate governance and IFR varies with firm size. Our results suggest that new regulatory guidance in corporate governance leads to improved disclosure transparency via IFR.     

Government ownership,corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China

This study investigates how government ownership and corporate governance influence a firm's tax aggressiveness. Using Chinese listed companies during 2003–2009, we find that compared with government‐controlled firms, non‐government‐controlled firms pursue a more aggressive tax strategy. In particular, non‐government‐controlled firms with a higher percentage of the board shareholdings and with a CEO who also serves as the board chairman are more aggressive. For government‐controlled firms, we find that board shareholding has an impact on tax aggressiveness and it does not differ between local and central government‐controlled firms. However, local government‐controlled firms in less developed regions where the implementation of corporate governance measures is generally less effective are more tax aggressive than those in other regions.     

Corporate transparency and firm value: Does market competition play an external governance role?

We investigate whether market competition affects the relationship between corporate transparency and firm value in the United States using a sample of 12,665 firm-year observations, representing 1,644 individual firms for the period 1996–2018. The results show that stronger transparency enhances firm value, and market competition has a significantly positive effect on that relationship. More importantly, we use hierarchical linear models further to explore the cross-level interaction impact of market competition, and we find evidence suggesting that the industry-level competition has a significant cross-level moderating effect. Additionally, consistent with the substitute perspective, we also find that the disciplinary power of competition on the relationship between transparency and value is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, our evidence supports the “bright side” of the competition view and highlights the active external governance role that competition plays in the value promotion effect of corporate transparency at both the individual and the industry levels.     

Discussion of ‘Government ownership,corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China’

In this article, I discuss several aspects of the paper by Chan et al. (2013). After a brief introduction, the next three sections discuss the hypothesized links between government ownership, corporate governance, institutional factors and tax avoidance in Chan et al. (2013). The fifth section investigates some possible extensions on tax research in the setting of China, while the sixth section concludes this discussion.     

Corporate governance and elites

Using a qualitative methodology (interviews), we examine the relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and elitist interventions. In doing this, we identify three elitist groups – political, cultural and religious, and investigate how they shape the legitimacy and effectiveness (or otherwise) of the institutional drivers of corporate governance in Nigeria. We caution the widely-held notion in the literature which suggests that institutions act as a check on the behaviour of elites and influence how elites compete and emerge. Alternatively, we argue that elites, in the presence of institutional voids, can invent, circumvent and corrupt institutions.     

Corporate governance and firm performance

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature:First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance.Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.     

优化股权结构:完善上市公司治理结构的突破口

从公司治理结构产生的历史和逻辑来看 ,股权结构和公司治理结构有渊源关系。股权结构是公司治理结构的基础 ,它决定了公司治理的形式和模式。本文对 94 4家上市公司的股权结构进行全面的统计分析 ,并结合各类持股主体的行为特征 ,得出我国公司内、外部治理机制都不能有效发挥作用的结论 ,作者提出了优化我国股权结构进而完善上市公司治理结构的政策建议。     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.